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Abstract 
How and why do legislative proposals fail in the EU policy-making process? Previous literature on EU decision-
making and policy-making processes strongly focuses on the phenomenon of consensus and consensus-building 
and the EU advertises that 85% of all legislative proposals end in first-reading agreements and only 15% fail. The 
EU seems to succeed more often than it fails. To understand, however, what motivates actors to approve a 
legislative proposal, it is important to understand what incites them to let others fail. The present study 
investigates failed cases where the Commission presented a proposal to the Council and the Parliament that, 
then, became deadlocked in the process. An interesting puzzle presents itself, which suggests that there is more 
to policy-making failure than the previous literature can account for: proposals that failed in the first round are 
withdrawn by the Commission, adapted and recast and lead to agreement in the second round. Which incentives 
do the Commission, the Council and the Parliament have to partake in a game with such failure? After conducting 
four comparative, in-depth case studies in two policy areas the answer is as follows: failure enables all actors to 
not only achieve gains through bargaining, but also frame losses in a way that brings reputational gains. Failure of 
policy-making becomes a strategic, mutually beneficial game, where everybody ultimately is a winner - if not in 
substance or procedure, then in reputation. The Commission plays an important role as the initiator of legislation 
as it controls its shape and framing and can set up the game in a way that enables success after failure. The 
Commission can also decide to pursue its own goals within the policy process instead of playing a strategic game 
with the co-legislators. It can also practice symbolic blame politics with failure instead of initiating a second round 
and pursuing agreement. In any case, the empirical analysis shows that the role of the Commission in the process 
of policy-making, and its impact on the dynamics of success and failure, are greater than anticipated by previous 
scholarship. The present study can be the basis for further in-depth process research on the role and behavior of 
the Commission in EU policy-making as it provides an innovative approach to understanding the dynamics 
between the three institutions and opens the black box of intra-institutional and inter-institutional decision-making. 
Actors, conditions and mechanisms are investigated in detail by triangulating documents, media reports and 
expert interviews, and carefully evaluating their explanatory power with regard to the strategic failure.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
7 
 
Kurzbeschreibung  
Wie und warum scheitern Gesetzesvorschläge in EU-Gesetzgebungsprozessen? Die bisherige Literatur zu 
Verhandlungs- und Gesetzgebungsprozessen in der Europäischen Union konzentriert sich stark auf das 
Phänomen der Konsensbildung, denn die EU wirbt damit, dass nur 15% ihrer Vorschläge scheitern und 85% im 
Schnellverfahren bereits in der ersten Lesung erfolgreich beschlossen werden. Die EU scheint also mehr Erfolge 
als Misserfolge zu verzeichnen. Um jedoch zu verstehen, was Akteure motiviert, einem Gesetz zuzustimmen, 
muss man auch verstehen, was sie dazu bewegt, einen Vorschlag scheitern zu lassen. Die vorliegende Arbeit 
betrachtet gescheiterte Fälle, bei denen die Kommission einen Vorschlag vor Rat und Parlament brachte, dieser 
jedoch im Prozess blockiert wird. Ein interessantes Puzzle präsentiert sich, das nahelegt, dass mehr hinter dem 
Scheitern von Gesetzesvorschlägen steckt, als die bisherige Literatur aufgezeigt hat: in der ersten Runde 
gescheiterte Vorschläge werden von der Kommission in erneuter Form wieder vorgelegt und führen dann in der 
folgenden Runde zum Erfolg. Welchen Anreiz gibt es für die Kommission, den Rat und das Parlament, ein 
solches Spiel mit Scheitern zu spielen? Die folgende Antwort ergibt sich aus vier vergleichenden Fallstudien aus 
zwei Politikbereichen: Scheitern ermöglicht es allen Akteuren, nicht nur Gewinne zu erhandeln, sondern auch 
Verluste so darzustellen, dass sie daraus einen Reputationsgewinn ziehen können. Somit wird Scheitern von 
Gesetzen in der EU ein strategisches, gegenseitig nutzbringendes Spiel, bei dem letztlich alle gewinnen - wenn 
nicht in Substanz und Prozedere, dann an Reputation. Die Kommission spielt dabei eine herausragende Rolle, 
denn als Initiatorin hat sie die Kontrolle darüber, wie das zu verhandelnde Gesetz aufgebaut und dargestellt wird 
und es liegt an ihr, das Spiel so zu initiieren, dass eine Einigung in mehreren Runden letztlich möglich ist. Die 
Kommission kann jedoch, an Rat und Parlament vorbei, ihre eigenen Ziele verfolgen und statt eines strategischen 
Spiels mit dem Ziel einer erfolgreichen Politikgestaltung symbolische Politik betreiben, indem sie keine zweite 
Verhandlungsrunde einleitet und das Scheitern Rat und Parlament anlastet. In jedem Fall zeigen die empirischen 
Befunde, dass die Kommission mehr Einfluss auf den Gesetzgebungsprozess hat, als bisher angenommen, 
sowohl auf Scheitern als auch auf Erfolg. Die vorliegende Arbeit kann somit Grundlage für mehr und 
tiefergehende Prozessforschung zur Rolle der Kommission im Politikprozess der EU werden, denn sie liefert 
innovative Ansätze zum besseren Verständnis der Dynamik zwischen den drei Institutionen und öffnet die 
Blackbox der informellen Verhandlungsprozesse in und zwischen den Institutionen. Akteure, 
Rahmenbedingungen und Mechanismen werden mit Hilfe von Dokumenten, Mediendaten und Experteninterviews 
genau analysiert und geben Aufschluss darüber, welche Faktoren und Verhaltensweisen im Prozess den 
Ausschlag für Scheitern oder Gelingen geben.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
8 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
9 
 
Table Of Contents 
 
I. Introduction: the EU’s policy failure puzzle ........................................................................... 15 
1.1 Research question ........................................................................................................ 17 
1.2 Defining and conceptualizing failure: what do we understand by failure in the EU 
policy-making process? ............................................................................................................ 18 
1.3 The contribution ............................................................................................................. 22 
1.4 Summary, research mandate and proceedings.................................................................. 25 
II. Theorizing failure in the policy-making process: the importance of structure ....................... 27 
2.1 The decision-making framework: the legislative procedure .......................................... 27 
2.1.1 Co-decision in the post-Lisbon era: the ordinary legislative procedure ..................... 27 
2.1.2 The structural origins of failure: the formal practice of first reading agreements 
and the ambiguity of informal trilogies ................................................................................... 33 
2.2 Two level setting: conflict interactions between the European and national level ......... 35 
2.2.1 Bottom-up: how national controversies shape European policy-making ...................... 36 
2.2.2 Top down and bottom up again: the effect of crises in a two-level setting ................... 38 
2.2.3 Patronage by the European Council: no priority, no success ...................................... 41 
2.2.4 Summary ...................................................................................................................... 41 
2.3 Party and coalition politics: ideology structures conflict and controversy ........................... 42 
2.3.1 National and European party politics: contradictory or complementary? ..................... 42 
2.3.2 How do party politics matter for policy failure? ............................................................. 44 
2.4 Structural determinants of failure: reviewing key conditions............................................... 44 
III. Theorizing policy failure: the importance of agency, negotiation processes and the 
process of failure ......................................................................................................................... 45 
3.1 The key actors: institutions and individuals as agents of failure ......................................... 45 
3.1.1 The Council and state representatives: the intergovernmental stronghold .................. 49 
3.1.2 Spotlight on relais actors: the Council Presidency and the Council SG ....................... 52 
3.1.3 The Parliament and MEPs: between rights protection and power play ........................ 53 
3.1.4 Spotlight on relais actors: the rapporteur and the shadow rapporteurs ....................... 58 
3.2 Co-legislator dynamics of failure ........................................................................................ 59 
3.3 The closeted strategist at the center: Commission-centric models of failure ..................... 61 
3.3.1 The causal mechanism model 1: the Commission as a perfect agenda-setter ............ 66 
3.3.2 The causal mechanism model 2: the Commission as an imperfect technocrat ........... 70 
3.3.3 The causal mechanism model 3: the Commission as a supranational activist ............ 76 
3.3.4 Summary of previous models: conditions and mechanisms ........................................ 80 
3.3.5 The causal mechanism model 4: Commission as a strategic actor in incremental, 
multi-stage policy and blame game ....................................................................................... 83 
3.5 Summary of all models and research mandate .................................................................. 90 
IV. Research design: setting the baseline for process analysis ............................................. 93 
4.1 Case selection strategy: qualitative comparative case studies to uncover processes 
of failure .................................................................................................................................... 93 
4.1.1 Choice of policy and issue areas: looking for controversy to find failure ...................... 95 
  
10 
 
4.1.2 Choice of failure cases: explaining outcome selection ................................................. 98 
4.2 Data selection and collection ............................................................................................ 100 
4.2.1 Strategies of data collection: purposive selection ...................................................... 100 
4.2.2 Official documents: the baseline to reconstruct the process ...................................... 103 
4.2.3 Media reports: complementary source for triangulation ............................................. 104 
4.2.4 Expert interviews ........................................................................................................ 105 
4.3 Data analysis .................................................................................................................... 112 
4.3.1 Process research and structured focused comparison: qualitative content analysis 
with MaxQDA ...................................................................................................................... 112 
4.3.2 Inferring strategic mechanisms and blame exchanges through frames ..................... 114 
4.4 Discussion of the methodological approach ..................................................................... 119 
4.5 Summary and research mandate ..................................................................................... 120 
V. Justice and Home Affairs: dynamics of policy failure in the area of border policy .......... 121 
5.1 Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 121 
5.2 The Schengen Governance Package: strategic failure in several rounds ........................ 125 
5.2.1 The previous rounds of failure .................................................................................... 126 
5.2.2 The proposal .............................................................................................................. 129 
5.2.3 The policy formulation, conditions and conflict constellations .................................... 131 
5.2.4 The negotiation process: mechanisms of deadlock ................................................... 134 
5.2.5 The mechanisms of consensus-building: from deadlock to agreement ..................... 140 
5.2.6 The agreement ........................................................................................................... 142 
5.2.7 The blame framing game ........................................................................................... 145 
5.2.8 Model fit and evaluation of the evidence .................................................................... 148 
5.3 The Smart Borders Package: strategic failure in two rounds ........................................... 151 
5.3.1 The proposal .............................................................................................................. 152 
5.3.2 Policy formulation, conditions and conflict constellations ........................................... 154 
5.3.3 The negotiation process: mechanisms of deadlock ................................................... 161 
5.3.4 The withdrawal and blame framing game .................................................................. 170 
5.3.5 The recast: conditions and mechanisms of consensus-building ................................ 174 
5.3.6 Model fit and evaluation of the evidence .................................................................... 184 
5.4 Border policy: comparative findings and conclusions ....................................................... 190 
VI. Social and Employment Policy: dynamics of policy failure in the area of gender 
equality policy ............................................................................................................................ 197 
6.1 Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 197 
6.2 The Maternity Leave Directive: (ongoing) strategic failure? ............................................. 201 
6.2.1 The proposal .............................................................................................................. 202 
6.2.2 Policy formulation, conditions and  conflict constellations .......................................... 203 
6.2.3 The negotiation process: mechanisms of deadlock ................................................... 208 
6.2.4 The withdrawal and blame framing game .................................................................. 218 
6.2.5 The recast: mechanisms of consensus-building ........................................................ 223 
6.2.6 Model fit and evaluation of the evidence .................................................................... 226 
  
11 
 
6.3 The Gender Quota Directive: persistent deadlock or a different kind of strategic failure? 230 
6.3.1 The proposal .............................................................................................................. 231 
6.3.2 Policy formulation, conditions and conflict constellations ........................................... 231 
6.3.3 The process: mechanisms of deadlock ...................................................................... 235 
6.3.4 The blame framing game ........................................................................................... 242 
6.3.5 Model fit and evaluation of the evidence .................................................................... 245 
6.4 Gender equality policy: comparative findings and conclusions ........................................ 249 
VII. Comparing findings across policy areas: highlighting similarities and idiosyncrasies in 
processes of policy-making failure ............................................................................................. 254 
7.1 Causes of failure .............................................................................................................. 257 
7.2 Stages and institutional dynamics of failure ..................................................................... 261 
7.3  Actor influence and relais actors ..................................................................................... 262 
7.4 Conditions and mechanisms of failure: key findings ......................................................... 266 
7.5 Framing failure: reputational gains and losses compared ................................................ 272 
VIII. Lessons learned: discussion of findings and implications for policy research .................... 278 
8.1 Internal validity: how much failure can the approach explain? ......................................... 278 
8.2 External validity: a generalizable approach to explaining policy failure? .......................... 284 
8.3 Implications for policy research: theoretical limitations and prospects ............................. 287 
8.4 Implications for process research: empirical limitations and prospects ............................ 289 
8.5 Failing forward: does the EU really deliver through strategic policy-making failure? ....... 292 
IX. Bibliography .......................................................................................................................... 296 
9.1 Literature .......................................................................................................................... 296 
9.2 Documents and media reports ......................................................................................... 322 
9.2.1 Official documents ......................................................................................................... 322 
9.2.2 Media reports ................................................................................................................ 349 
X. Annexes ................................................................................................................................ 360 
10.1 Expert Interview guide examples ................................................................................... 360 
10.2 List of interviews ............................................................................................................. 365 
10.3 Data analysis: framing and data analysis catalogues for MaxQDA ................................ 367 
10.4 Treaty of Lisbon: article 70 TFEU and article 77 TFEU .................................................. 370 
10.5 Salience tables, graphs and documents ........................................................................ 371 
10.6 Council document access request: response letter ........................................................ 378 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
12 
 
List of figures and tables  
 
Figure 1: stages of failure, chapter 1, heading 1.2  
Figure 2: the ordinary legislative procedure, chapter 2, heading 2.1.1 
Figure 3: bargaining model of legislative success, chapter 2, heading 2.1.2 
Figure 4: honest broker, chapter 3, heading 3.4.1  
Figure 5: causal mechanism of co-legislator deadlock, chapter 3, heading 3.4.1 
Figure 6: imperfect technocrat, chapter 3, heading 3.4.2  
Figure 7: causal mechanism of technocratic failure, chapter 3, heading 3.4.2 
Figure 8: activist failure, chapter 3, heading 3.4.3 
Figure 9: causal mechanism of activist failure, chapter 3, heading 3.4.3  
Figure 10: strategic failure, chapter 3, heading 3.4.5  
Figure 11: causal mechanism of strategic failure, chapter 3, heading 3.4.5 
Figure 12: paths to success and failure, chapter 8, heading 8.1 
 
Table 1: conditions model 1-3, chapter 3, heading 3.4.4 
Table 2: mechanisms model 1-3, chapter 3, heading 3.4.4 
Table 3: summary models and conditions, chapter 3, heading 3.5 
Table 4: summary models and mechanisms, chapter 3, heading 3.5 
Table 5: Schengen timeline, chapter 5, heading 5.2  
Table 6: evaluation conditions Schengen, chapter 5, heading 5.2.8 
Table 7:  evaluation mechanisms Schengen, chapter 5, heading 5.2.8 
Table 8: Smart Borders timeline, chapter 5, heading 5.2 
Table 9: evaluation conditions Smart Borders, chapter 5, heading 5.3.6 
Table 10: evaluation mechanisms Smart Borders, chapter 5, heading 5.3.6 
Table 11: evaluation conditions Maternity Leave, chapter 6, heading 6.2.6 
Table 12: evaluation mechanisms Maternity Leave, chapter 6, heading 6.2.6 
Table 13: evaluation conditions Gender Quota, chapter 6, heading 6.3.5 
Table 14: evaluation mechanisms Gender Quota, chapter 6, heading 6.3.5 
  
13 
 
Table 15: overall model evaluation, chapter 7 
Table 16: model evaluation and refinement, chapter 7, chapter 7 
Table 17: general evaluation of conditions, chapter 7, heading 7.4 
Table 18: general evaluation of mechanisms, chapter 7, heading 7.4 
Table 19: external validity, chapter 8, heading 8.2 
 
List of abbreviations  
 
ALDE - Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (Parliament) 
 
COM - European Commission  
 
COREPER (I and II) - Committee of Permanent Representatives (Council)  
 
Council - Council of the European Union/Council of Ministers  
 
DG - Directorate General (Commission)  
 
DG EMPL - Directorate General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion (Commission) 
 
DG Home - Directorate General for Migration and Home Affairs (Commission) 
 
DG JUST - Directorate General for Justice and Consumers (Commission) 
 
EC - European Council  
 
ECJ - European Court of Justice  
 
ECR - European Conservatives and Reformists (Parliament) 
 
EES - Entry-Exit System 
 
EMPL - Committee on Employment and Social Affairs (Parliament) 
 
EP - European Parliament  
 
EPP -  European People’s Party (Parliament) 
 
EPSCO - Employment, Social Policy, Health and Consumer Affairs Council   
 
EU - European Union  
 
eu-LISA - European Agency for the operational management of large-scale IT systems in the 
area of freedom, security and justice  
 
  
14 
 
FEMM - Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality (Parliament) 
 
Greens/EFA - Greens European Free Alliance (Parliament)  
 
JHA - Justice and Home Affairs  
 
JURI - Committee on Legal Affairs (Parliament) 
 
LIBE - Committee for Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (Parliament) 
 
MEP - Member of the European Parliament  
 
RTP - Registered Traveller Program  
 
SCIFA - Strategic Committee on Immigration, Frontiers and Asylum (Council)  
 
S&D - Socialists & Democrats (Parliament) 
 
(Council) SG - General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union  
 
SIS - Schengen Information System 
 
TCN - third country nationals  
 
UK - United Kingdom  
 
VIS - Visa Information System  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
15 
 
I. Introduction: the EU’s policy failure puzzle   
 
European policy integration has always been marked by a contrast between rapid 
policy and institutional change on the one hand and controversial, obstacle-ridden 
policy-making processes on the other (Héritier, 1999). The EU advertises that 85% of 
all legislative acts are first-reading agreements1, which suggests that either the 
process goes very smoothly, because everyone agrees with the Commission 
proposal and the co-legislators agree with their respective positions, or there is a lot 
of backdoor work. From previous research, we know that the latter is the case (Reh 
et al., 2013; Kleine, 2013; Smeets, 2013). Still, despite transparency initiatives and 
reforms introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon about accountability, the negotiation 
processes in and between the legislative institutions remain relatively secretive 
(Smeets, 2013; Smeets 2015). At best, the public can reconstruct which institution 
held meetings at which point in time and get a succinct summary of the outcomes, 
but how they get stuck with policy they very often do not like remains largely 
unknown to them. The strategic elements of the process such as how actors 
bargained, exchanged views or struck deals remain largely a mystery (Naurin, 2015). 
There is still comparatively little work on the inter-institutional dynamics of informal 
negotiations, specifically the informal interplay between institutions before and during 
trilogues (Rasmussen and Reh, 2013; Kardasheva, 2013; Héritier and Reh, 2012). 
Failure, as in rejection of legislative files, has been a rare occurrence since the birth 
of the European Union with the Treaty of Lisbon (Ripoll Servent, 2017: 73). Formal 
rejection, at least, has not been an instrument the co-legislators have used 
frequently. However, failure does not necessarily equal formal rejection, even though 
it has been treated as such even by the most recent scholarship (Ripoll Servent, 
2017: 74f.). Failure encompasses controversial cases where formal rejection did not 
take place, but where there was inter-institutional deadlock and/or withdrawal of the 
proposal after pressure from the co-legislators. In the post-Lisbon era alone, there 
are an elevated number of such cases2. Withdrawn and blocked files are even more 
interesting than the formally rejected ones, because there seems to be something 
hindering the institutions to take the final step to formal rejection.  
 
                                                          
1 Interview 4; Interview 5 
2 The Commission registers all withdrawals in the annex of its annual work programs. A complete list of those 
working programs including the withdrawal notices can be found here (2007-2018): 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/publications/european-commission-work-programme_en  
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“Wir haben das neulich mal scherzhaft so formuliert: wenn die Kommission etwas vorlegt, 
muss man verhandeln. Es ist nicht so, dass man sagt, selbst wenn sich alle 28 einig sind, 
dass das absoluter Mist ist, was da vorgelegt wurde, wird das nicht zurückgezogen. Ist der 
Vorschlag auf dem Tisch, wird er verhandelt. Und wir haben dann im Scherz gesagt, der Rat, 
versucht dann, etwas daraus zu machen und das EP macht alles schlimmer. Letztendlich hat 
man dann etwas, das keiner wollte, aber man hat etwas. Ist vielleicht sehr pauschal gesagt, 
aber oft hat man dann in dem europäischen Prozess am Ende etwas, mit dem keiner 
glücklich ist, weder die Kommission, die den Vorschlag gemacht hat, noch das EP, das den 
Rat beschuldigt, etwas daraus gemacht zu haben, was keiner will, so dass letztlich der 
Kompromiss ungewollt ist. Ein Kompromiss ist also dann perfekt, wenn alle unzufrieden sind. 
In die Richtung geht es oft. Normalerweise würde man ja auch erwarten, wenn sich im Rat 
alle einig sind, dass man der Kommission sagt, sie soll ihre Hausaufgaben machen und 
einen neuen Vorschlag vorlegen, aber das passiert nicht. Wenn man das Thema hat, muss 
man sich damit auseinandersetzen.”3 
 
What happens to those 15% of legislative proposals that the institutions do not agree 
upon at first reading? What happens to those proposals that are stuck in or 
withdrawn during first reading? Current models of policy-making focus on the 
resolution of controversy and mechanisms of consensus-building between the 
institutions without providing clear models, conditions and mechanisms for explaining 
deadlock and failure.  
 
Consequently, there is a gap in the literature as to the behavioral incentives to initiate 
in the policy process: Why propose legislation that fails? Why take the trouble of 
drafting a proposal and start negotiations only to let the proposal fail in the process?  
 
The Commission holds extensive consultation procedures with stakeholders and has 
built networks of communication with member state governments and 
parliamentarians to know about preference constellations around a policy issue. 
Member state governments and parliamentarians lobby the Commission and try to 
put forward their interests and push for those issues that they consider most salient 
to be put on the agenda and those issues they wish to avoid to be kept off the 
agenda. There are numerous informal channels before and during a negotiation 
process through which all actors in the legislative institutions can acquire information 
across institutional borders. Why do legislative proposals fail despite extensive 
informal preparatory exchanges?  
 
                                                          
3 Interview 23  
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These questions concern all the actors involved at all stages of the policy process: If 
the Commission can collect information about preferences and the agenda, why does 
legislation still fail in the negotiation process? If the co-legislators can lobby the 
Commission during the agenda-setting and policy formulation process, why let the 
Commission come forward with a proposal only to let it fail in legislative negotiations?  
 
Empirically, there is a puzzling variation in types of failure: some cases where failure 
occurred and a proposal was withdrawn, like the Schengen Governance reform, the 
Smart Borders Package or the Maternity Leave policy reform, reappear in a different 
form, while in other cases, like the Gender Quota case, the proposal stays 
deadlocked without withdrawal or recast.  
 
Very recently, there have been a number of controversial files, which failed in the 
negotiation process due to disagreements between the institutions. The Commission 
proposed a reform of the Schengen Governance in 2009 that failed twice at the early 
stages of informal trilogues. This means that it was informally rejected by the Council 
or the Parliament, which signaled to the Commission that the file was not negotiable, 
only to be approved in the third round after the proposal had been recast with 
significant modifications in substance and procedure. A similar procedure can be 
observed for the Smart Borders Package, which failed in the first round and is now on 
the road to approval after substantial amendments to the original proposal. The 
phenomenon seems to even extend to more than one policy area as apart from 
Justice and Home Affairs, similar processes can also be observed in areas where the 
interests and stakes are somewhat different, such as Social and Employment Policy. 
The Maternity Leave Directive, failed in the first round. The policy idea was then 
reframed and presented in a reconfigured package in the second round, which is on 
the road to agreement now. 
1.1 Research question 
 
To understand policy failure in the context of European Union policy-making, we 
need to look both at causes and conditions and mechanisms of failure. Therefore, 
this thesis investigates the question of policy failure from a process perspective 
(“how”) and a causal perspective (“why”), combined in an approach that accounts for 
structural factors as well as actor behavior.  
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The overall research question this thesis attempts to answer is the following:  
 
How and why do proposals fail in the European policy-making process? 
 
The first step in answering the question is providing a definition and 
conceptualization of policy failure as the outcome to be explained.  
 
1.2 Defining and conceptualizing failure: what do we understand by failure 
in the EU policy-making process? 
 
Most of the research on deadlock and policy failure is based on the assumption of 
unanimity, the common decision-making procedure in the Maastricht and Amsterdam 
era of the European Union (Héritier, 1999; Bovens and t’Hart, 1998) where the veto 
of one state representative in the Council could block a negotiation process 
(Moravcsik, 1998) and the European Parliament arguably limited influence 
(Moravcsik, 1993). However, there were indications of increasing involvement of the 
European Parliament in policy areas where qualified majority voting was applicable 
(Raunio and Hix, 2000; Hix, Raunio and Scully, 2003). In this thesis, the few 
systematic approaches to explaining policy failure (Bovens and t'Hart, 1998; 
Moravcsik, 1998; Héritier, 1999), all quite dated, will be combined with more recent 
insights into the politics of  controversy and consensus in the European Union 
(Thomson, 2011; Smeets, 2016) in order to present a new approach in 
understanding how and why policy-making processes fail in the European Union. 
More specifically how actors strategically exploit deadlock and failure for a mutually 
beneficial game of blame attribution and blame avoidance.  
The types of failure that are relevant here are those negotiation processes, which are 
controversial and end in deadlock over a policy proposal (Héritier, 1999). Failure as 
the outcome of a policy-making process is understood as “deadlock followed by 
withdrawal”, as it concerns the informal stage of the policy-making process. This is 
the stage before the formal first reading, when the co-legislators negotiate their 
positions on the Commission proposal and coordinate in trilogues. The outcome 
occurs when negotiations are deadlocked in the legislative process and the 
Commission withdraws the proposal. Deadlock can occur at different stages (see 
figure 1). The proposal can fail directly after transmission by the Commission to the 
  
19 
 
co-legislators (failure at the policy formulation stage), the proposal can end in 
deadlock at the stage where Council and Parliament negotiate internally to develop a 
position (failure at the position-taking stage) and it can fail in trilogues between 
Council and Parliament (failure at the inter-institutional negotiation stage). 
 
(Figure 1, stages of failure, source: own illustration) 
Failure due to deadlock can either lead to a recast by the Commission, which 
launches a new round of negotiations that once again opens the possibility for 
deadlock or success or to the Commission shelving the policy idea, which would 
result in complete failure of the proposal.  
To be precise, there are three possible final outcomes of the policy-process after 
withdrawal and recast: the first one is success following failure (1), wherein failure of 
one or more rounds of negotiations should eventually be followed by success and 
agreement on a modified version of the policy idea, usually starting with an extensive 
proposal and extreme positions, leading to a lowest common denominator outcome. 
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The second possible outcome would be continued deadlock or final rejection even 
after recasting to attempt more negotiation rounds, which could be classified as 
complete failure (2). In this case, the Commission should be expected to shelve the 
entire policy idea. But with the long shadow of the future of the EU where proposals 
can remain deadlocked for more than 5 years without any reaction from the 
Commission. There is also a third outcome, it is a form of uncertainty, which is hard 
to fit into an outcome-focused model, but can be captured to some extent by a 
process model, at least to some extent. This outcome is persistent deadlock (3), 
without rejection or withdrawal being formalized. In this case negotiations are 
deadlocked in trilogues, but the Commission does not withdraw the proposal and co-
legislators do not formally reject it. This can result in some form of “legislative limbo” 
where the proposal simmers somewhere between the legislators without any 
negotiations or progress on the file. It can be a strategic move initiated by either of 
the co-legislators or the Commission, if persistent deadlock is preferable to actual 
failure or investing in consensus-building. The Commission might eventually withdraw 
the deadlocked proposal, the new Juncker REFIT/better regulation program actually 
makes withdrawal more likely4 than under previous Commissions. In this case, two 
follow-up outcomes are possible: the policy project would either end up being part of 
a strategic second round of negotiations or completely fail.  
The final outcome this thesis tries to explain is the first one: success following failure. 
Problems are identified and the Commission has taken on the task of developing a 
legislative proposal, but the negotiations end in deadlock and it fails at one of the 
stages of the negotiation process, either agenda-setting, (intra-institutional) position-
taking or (inter-institutional) negotiation.  
Deadlock means that the co-legislators were not able to agree on the proposal and 
directly, by outward rejection, or indirectly, by stalling the negotiations, failed the 
proposal. Deadlock encompasses procedural and substantive dimensions, legislators 
can produce deadlock over the decision-making procedure as well as the substance 
                                                          
4 The REFIT (Regulatory Fitness) program is part of the European Commission’s better regulation agenda, under 
the lead of President Juncker, which aims at evaluating the necessity of each policy instrument, simplifying the 
process and verifying that law is current, relevant and simple. It also includes a clause that foresees the 
withdrawal of initiatives still under negotiation, if they are no longer up-to-date with the requirements, no longer 
correspond to the policy objectives or have been blocked in co-decision without indication of agreement for a 
sufficiently long time.  
Source: https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/law-making-process/evaluating-and-improving-existing-laws/refit-making-eu-
law-simpler-and-less-costly_en 
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of the proposal. Procedural dimensions include decision-making rules and their 
implications for actor involvement, actor behavior, and hierarchy within institutions. 
Substantive dimensions encompass quantitative and qualitative targets of the policy 
proposal such as quotas, deadlines, financial targets and so forth, but also the scope 
of the proposal.  
Failure in that regard is process-specific and means a negotiation round ended 
without an agreement between the co-legislators on the given proposal. Hence, the 
concept does not refer to the failure of policy implementation or enforcement or the 
non-proposal of policy, but to the failure of a round of negotiation. 
As mentioned in the previous section, deadlock can lead to two final outcomes: firstly, 
deadlock can lead to success after several negotiation rounds, which would be the 
“sequenced game” model of policy-making. Actors agree on the value of having the 
policy change, but do not agree on the proposal presented as it is, which results in a 
series of negotiations interrupted by deadlock periods, withdrawals and re-
submissions or significant amendments of the proposal. Secondly, deadlock can lead 
to actual failure, also described by the literature as a zero-sum bargaining game, 
where one or more actors do not agree on the value of having policy change and 
prefer definite failure by forging and sustaining deadlock over investing in consensus-
building. Either actors are committed to finding a way to agree and accept to engage 
in several rounds of negotiations to sort out the modalities of agreement, if the 
benefits and gains of material or reputational nature outweigh the costs of repetitive 
negotiations, or they are willing to risk negotiation failure, if the costs of pursuing 
negotiations are higher than the gains from having the policy proposal adopted 
(Héritier, 1999; Tsebelis, 1990).  
From the perspective of each of the three legislative institutions, there are three 
possible outcomes for the legislative game: win (1) where an actor achieves an 
outcome that is favorable to one’s interests; lose (2) when the achieved outcome is 
not favorable to one’s interests and draw (3) if an outcome is acceptable, because it 
is balanced and takes into account all relevant preferences.  
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1.3 The contribution 
 
The central argument for why policy proposals fail in one negotiation round and then 
reappear and lead to agreement in following rounds is that the process of failure is a 
strategic bargaining game orchestrated by the Commission. Actors play a game with 
bargaining over small gains in substance and procedure and place blame on the 
others (Bovens and t'Hart, 1998; Héritier, 1999; Novak, 2013). Formal rejection 
seldom occurs, because the three institutions are playing a strategic informal game 
with deadlock and withdrawal, that always fall short of rejection (Ripoll Servent, 
2017). In fact, actors play an informal game with deadlock where rather than 
investing in avoiding it (Héritier, 1999; Örnberg, 2009; Kardasheva, 2013), they 
exploit it strategically.  
 
Proposals fail as part of a staged process of several negotiation rounds through 
which actors in the different institutions try to exploit policy change in their favor and 
achieve procedural, substantive and reputational gains in several rounds of 
negotiations. This reflects the conception of the European Union as a “diverse polity 
in flux” (Héritier, 1999: 9) where actors try to accommodate diverse interests, and try 
to avoid policy failure by offering material compensations in the form of issue-
linkages, side payments or package deals (Bauer and Trondal, 2015; McKibben, 
2013; McKibben, 2014; Kardasheva, 2013) or procedural balancing through granting 
decisional rights or access (Benz, 1992; Smeets, 2015; Smeets, 2016). However, in 
this thesis, we go a step further in illuminating controversy by shifting the focus from 
explaining avoidance of deadlock and consensus-building to understanding failure, 
which is still largely missing in EU scholarship on policy-making (Wallace, Pollack 
and Young, 2015; Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace, 2006).   
 
Each institution tries to be a winner in the bargaining game while propagating the 
credo that consensus is the alleged goal, yet empirical studies have shown that not 
everybody can win in each negotiation (Veen, 2011). Framing becomes primordial, 
especially for the losers, to compensate their losses to their audiences and 
constituencies. Whenever actors speak about negotiations, they advertise early 
agreements and strive for consensus, or rather the need to avoid producing losers. 
Nevertheless, underneath the public framing and carefully crafted rhetoric, they hide 
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the bargaining battle to enable the actors involved a face-saving way to handle 
losses they have had to accept (Bovens and t'Hart, 1998; Daviter, 2011).  
 
The blaming game is beneficial to all actors involved in a setting where consensus is 
not mandatory, which is the case for post-Lisbon co-decision with QMV, because it 
offers a face-saving way of dealing with losses in policy by compensating them with 
reputational gains (Boin, t’ Hart and Connell, 2009). Within the institutions, actors 
focus on blame avoidance when moving across hierarchical levels during the 
decision-making process (Häge, 2011; Häge, 2013). The benefits the legislative 
institutions can draw from engaging in a blame game are worth the effort of dealing 
with policy failure: if they cannot achieve the necessary gains with the proposal, it is 
worth letting it fail to exploit failure for reputational purposes, which are sometimes 
more valuable than the substantive or procedural gains that could be achieved 
through the policy change.  
 
This thesis will contribute to the understanding of when failure is preferable to 
success for legislative actors and how they deal with deadlock in the process to 
achieve and appraise their gains while attributing and avoiding blame for losses. To 
do this, the scholarship on EU policy-making, decision-making and informal 
governance will be combined with comparative politics insights into bicameral 
dynamics to develop an approach to failure, which takes into account the institutional 
environment and the structural determinants and the process, namely the actors and 
the mechanisms leading to deadlock. In the theoretical framework, bargaining models 
of failure will be complemented by explications of the causal mechanisms leading to 
failure: for example structural elements such as the use of formal and informal rules. 
Three models will recapitulate and further substantiate previous findings about 
Commission behavior and link it to the process of failure to produce four different 
ways of explaining legislative failure: failure due to co-legislator position-taking after 
submission of a proposal (1), technocratic failure of the Commission due to high 
uncertainty and information asymmetry at the agenda-setting and policy formulation 
stage (2), failure due to Commission supranational activism at the agenda-setting 
and policy formulation stage (3) and lastly, a process model, which can not only 
account for failure, but also for those puzzling cases where a proposal comes back 
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after failure and is agreed upon: strategic failure, where failure is one step in a 
multistage policy and blame game (4).   
 
The models will account for all stages of the process and feature the behavior of all 
three institutions, the Commission, Council and Parliament to bring together the often 
fragmented policy-making research, which tends to only look at one institution, or, the 
bicameral dynamics between Council and Parliament. A set of comparative case 
studies show whether any findings can be extrapolated to other policy and issue 
areas, thereby extending the existing qualitative scholarship that tends to only stay 
within one policy, or issue area. 
 
The methodological contribution is threefold: looking at the informal process before 
the formal first reading procedure helps uncover the strategic game the legislative 
institutions play with each other (Brandsma, 2015; Ripoll Servent, 2011). It is 
important to include alternative explanations and allow for the possibility that there 
might be other ways to explain an outcome (Beach and Pedersen, 2013; Beach and 
Pedersen, 2011). This is why the theoretical framework will include all the thinkable 
ways of explaining failure and the empirical analysis will determine the one that is 
most likely to explain failure by carefully examining and evaluating the evidence 
(Beach and Pedersen, 2013). Considering different policy making stages enables us 
to understand which role particular actors and their strategies play and where exactly 
a process fails. Policy-making involves various stages, from agenda-setting to 
adoption and ratification, all of which bear the possibility for failure. The analysis of 
frames actors use to justify choices and attribute and avoid blame enables is to 
understand how (Bovens and t'Hart, 1998; Daviter, 2011). 
 
Empirically, it will be shown that the failure models (1)-(3) and the strategic failure 
model are not necessarily mutually exclusive, but their complementarity strongly 
depends on how the Commission reacts to failure and whether it adapts its behavior. 
Through the study of four failure cases, it will become clear that the Commission not 
only has a key role in setting the legislative agenda and providing proposals, but also 
in steering the process and dealing with negative outcomes.  
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Furthermore, through the comparison of former key policy areas of state sovereignty, 
where the potential for controversy in and between the institutions is high, it is clear 
that turning failure into success works better in areas where the EU has more 
competence and the record of co-decision negotiated proposals is longer. Where the 
EU has more formal competences after the implementation of the Treaty of Lisbon 
and longer records of co-decision, like Justice and Home Affairs (Laursen, 2012; 
Wallace, Pollack and Young, 2015), the strategic failure game is easier to play for all 
actors involved, because there is a better foundation for conflict management 
strategies and the blame game. It is clear in the case of Justice and Home Affairs 
that negotiations take place in a forum where all actors involved have long-standing 
experience in competence and policy substance battles (Brandsma, 2015). It is much 
easier to orchestrate policy failure in an environment with strong interaction networks 
and trust and a long shadow of the future due to a long-standing tradition of policy 
integration (Versluis, van Keulen and Stephenson, 2011). In less established policy 
areas where the EU possesses less formal competence and member states to a 
large extent retain legislative power like Social and Employment Policy (Hantrais and 
Campling, 1995; Duncan, 1996; Tomlinson, 2011) where policy integration is less 
dense and actors have less experience in negotiating with each other, the game is 
more difficult to play, because the stakes are different (Geyer, 2013). The area is 
much less integrated and actors have much to lose in negotiations in terms of 
competence and can rely on much less experience in negotiating agreements (Forest 
and Lombardo, 2012). This makes it more difficult to enact a strategic game, because 
the roles are less clear to everyone and there is not as dense a network and as much 
trust as in other policy areas (Lombardo and Meier, 2008; Jenson, 2008).    
1.4 Summary, research mandate and proceedings  
 
This thesis makes three important contributions to the study of legislative failure in 
the European Union. The theoretical argument provides a possible explanation for 
policy failure, which goes beyond the existing literature by modeling the process 
between all three institutions, including elements of the intra-institutional processes 
and providing a detailed typology of conditions and mechanisms of different variants 
of failure. The key insight gained through this study is how actors can exploit failure 
strategically in the process and through an accompanying framing game to turn 
failure into a reputational benefit and compensate for procedural and substantive 
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losses. Methodologically, the thesis contributes to a better understanding of the 
process dynamics through a detailed account of actors, strategic mechanisms, 
stages of possible breakdown and also key conditions, which enable or disable 
actors from pursuing strategic behavior. Empirically speaking, this thesis expands on 
existing research of policy-dynamics, especially qualitative research, by attempting a 
comparison not only of cases within one policy area, but a set of four cases across 
two policy areas. This enables us to draw conclusions about whether mechanisms 
and conditions found in one area might extend to other areas and whether it has 
potential for generalization, if tested further.  
 
The second chapter represents the first part of the theoretical framework of this 
thesis, as it gives a review of the existing literature on the policy making process by 
looking at how different studies have tried to explain the story of success and failure 
with a particular focus on the role of different types of actors, institutions as collective 
actors and individual actors, especially relais actors and their ability to steer the 
process. By looking at different stages of the policy process it will become clear that 
breakdowns of the negotiation process can occur at different stages depending on 
the type of controversy, the preference constellations and the actors involved. This 
chapter will be the first step in theorizing the policy-making process from a process 
perspective with the aim of explaining failure by looking at the dynamics within and 
between institutions.    
 
In the third chapter, the theoretical framework will be substantiated by a number of 
models to explain failure. The three Commission-centered models draw on existing 
literature, but complement and extend it by paying more attention to the process, the 
conditions and mechanisms of success and failure and the role of different actors. 
The fourth chapter provides a detailed explanation and discussion of the research 
design, including arguments for conducting process analysis and comparative case 
studies to test the model of strategic failure and a presentation and discussion of the 
document and interview data base. The expectations formulated in the theoretical 
chapter will be tested on four cases in a detailed comparative process analysis in 
chapters five and six before presenting and discussing comparative findings in 
chapter seven. The eighth and final chapter will be devoted to a broader discussion 
  
27 
 
of the benefits and limitations of the theoretical assumptions and empirical findings, 
as well as the overall framework of the present study.  
II. Theorizing failure in the policy-making process: the importance of 
structure 
 
This chapter constitutes the first part of the theoretical framework. It combines the 
review of existing literature on the role of institutional factors and agency in the 
legislative process with a discussion of the role and behavior of different types of 
actors in the process of failure. The institutional framework, the co-decision 
framework or ordinary legislative procedure (OLP), will be presented alongside 
important structural factors as legislative negotiations under the OLP are tightly 
embedded in a two-level setting that structures policy controversy and the party 
politics dynamics. General expectations about how they can affect the process and 
lead to failure will be derived for each sub-section and modeled into the causal 
mechanisms of the different process models in the following chapter. The same will 
be done for the key actors in the process, whose role and influence will be discussed 
to determine who is most likely to shape the outcome of the policy process. The 
expectations, based on previous findings, are that failure occurs if the agenda at the 
national and European levels does not coincide leading actors to not value and not 
invest in policy change. If they can achieve electoral, partisan, reputational or 
influential gains, actors will invest in achieving an agreement if that is not possible 
through the proposed policy, failure and deadlock are likely outcomes.  
2.1 The decision-making framework: the legislative procedure 
 
This section, as well as the following two, will introduce structural factors, which 
encompass the process of legislative negotiations, in particular the formal and 
informal rules of procedure, which enable or limit actor behavior. Apart from 
institutional rules, context also matters for success or failure, and the current crisis 
context is likely to affect the interests and incentives of all actors involved.  
2.1.1 Co-decision in the post-Lisbon era: the ordinary legislative procedure 
 
Secondary law-making presents a different type of collective action problem than 
intergovernmental bargaining over the creation of an institution. Quarreling over 
policy is different from quarreling over integration and competence distribution (Bauer 
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and Trondal, 2015). The stakes are not the same for policy change as they are for 
competence transfers in treaty negotiations. The post-Lisbon era has brought new 
types of battles in a more integrated policy environment: strategic and orchestrated 
battles over competence, procedure and nitty gritty details of policy proposals 
(Smeets, 2013; Bauer and Trondal, 2015).  Defending your interests in a setting 
without unilateral alternatives (Héritier, 1999; Falcó-Gimeno, 2012) means that 
negotiations of individual proposals take place in a context of overall path 
dependence in terms of the general direction in the policy fields where integration 
has been proceeding for a while. Therefore, it is difficult to reverse. While this is true 
for EU policy-making, it is not true in the same way for Treaty negotiations where 
member states negotiate relinquishing sovereignty, which is a core constitutional 
matter. Actors calculate strategies differently if they know it is a context of repeated 
interaction and they will have to face the same partners again in the future; there 
compromise becomes more likely (Falcó-Gimeno, 2012), and they make concessions 
that might not be necessary in order to reach an agreement (Tsebelis and Ha, 2014).  
 
The Treaty of Lisbon has rendered collective decision-making more complex: inter-
institutional dynamics have been complicated by the extension of co-decision due to 
the increased involvement of the Parliament, the generalized application of qualified 
majority voting in the Council, as well as the new political agenda of the Juncker 
Commission. It has been argued that competition and controversy between 
institutions has increased. Competition due to national sensitivities in the Council has 
been amplified by the economic and migration crises, conflict in between states is 
more pronounced and representatives are more likely to enforce national positions 
and red lines (Wallace, Pollack and Young, 2015). In parallel, competition due to an 
activist Parliament has become more prominent. The Council and Parliament 
increasingly engage in fights for influence and rights over policy proposals (Naurin, 
2015). Lastly, competition is reinforced by a more political Commission whose role 
behavior is somewhat ambiguous as it oscillates between mediating and strategic 
interference (Bauer and Trondal, 2015). 
 
Lisbon has also changed intra-institutional dynamics as the new voting rules and the 
extension of QMV relieve the consensus-necessity to a certain extent. It is no longer 
necessary to please everyone and actors pick whoever is worth their attention. In the 
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Council, QMV slightly shifts the balance of power towards the bigger states, meaning 
the ones with more votes, especially Germany, France and the UK, and forces 
smaller states to look for coalition partners early on and/or look towards the big states 
to know what their position will be and where a possible majority or blocking minority 
coalition might be found (Thomson, 2011). This does not mean that big states always 
win and are never isolated, but it lowers the odds. Germany in particular is seldom if 
not never disregarded, as it is the biggest state with the most votes and most often 
needed to form either a majority or a blocking minority (Veen, 2011). As a result, the 
post-Lisbon setting with new voting rules reshapes the strategic possibilities of 
different actors and forces them to consider the bigger states with the most votes 
before anyone else. This makes it necessary for state representatives to seek 
informal connections early on in the process to try to form alliances. 
 
The co-decision procedure as applied today is the result of numerous formal treaty 
changes and informal rule interpretations over time. Codified in the Treaty of 
Amsterdam (1997) and renamed the ordinary legislative procedure (Art.294 TFEU) 
with the Treaty of Lisbon (2009), it is postulated as the default legislative procedure 
(Ripoll Servent, 2017). Over time, the application of the legislative procedure has 
resulted in more or less equal rights for the Council and the Parliament (Hix, 2002; 
Rittberger, 2005; Rittberger, 2012). Formally, the Parliament is on equal standing 
with the Council, informally, there are still significant differences in terms of power 
and influence over the legislative process (Wallace, Pollack and Young, 2015). The 
genesis of the current co-decision procedure was a rather rocky process for the 
Parliament. In the first version of co-decision - negotiated in the intergovernmental 
conference that led to the Treaty of Maastricht - the Parliament’s role was much less 
extensive than expected (Hix, 2002; Ripoll Servent, 2017). In the early period of co-
decision, the Council and Parliament were still exploring their options; the Parliament 
had received a number of formal powers, especially a proper veto power to reject any 
Commission proposal even if the Council had reached unanimity and a third reading 
position where the Council is forced to negotiate a joint text to which both co-
legislators have to agree to be able to pass the legislation (Crombez, 1996; Ringe, 
2010; Ripoll Servent, 2017). The time limits, the weight of the Parliament’s first 
reading opinion and the use of the extra readings were subject to controversies, 
leading Council and Parliament to develop more informal channels of negotiation and 
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exchange over time. The most important and durable of these being trilogues, the 
informal bargaining before the formal legislative agreement is struck, which was 
widely used by both Council and Parliament to try to widen their influence (Hix, 
2002). Co-decision has only recently become the most important procedure for 
legislative decision-making. Before the Treaty of Lisbon (2009), the consultation 
procedure was the most commonly used for legislative negotiations (Varela, 2009:10; 
Ripoll Servent, 2017:58-72). The Council preferred consultation as it enabled 
government representatives to concentrate on the Commission without having to give 
much consideration to the Parliament’s opinion (Costello, 2011). However, the 
Parliament used all its formal rights, including bringing the Council before the 
European Court of Justice and threatening with rejection of the Commission 
proposal, which would postpone the decision, forcing the Council to reconsider its 
amendments (Kardasheva, 2009).  
 
The ordinary legislative procedure as codified by the Treaty of Lisbon foresees the 
following formal process: the Commission submits a legislative proposal to the 
Parliament and the Council, apart from a few exceptions (Ripoll Servent, 2017), the 
right of initiative is the Commission’s privilege, even though the Council and 
Parliament can ask for a proposal. Once the proposal is transmitted to Council and 
Parliament, both institutions start intra-institutional negotiations to determine their 
position.  
 
The Parliament will appoint the committee responsible, which in turn will appoint a 
rapporteur and shadow rapporteurs to give an opinion on the file. The opinion will be 
delivered to the plenary and the Parliament can vote by simple majority on whether to 
approve the proposal without changes, with amendments or reject it. While formal 
rejection is not possible, the Parliament can informally ask the Commission to 
withdraw or send the file back to the committee for further deliberation, if the plenary 
does not approve. The Council sends the file to the working party responsible where 
delegations from all member states discuss the technical details of the proposal. In 
parallel, the file is given to COREPER, the committee of permanent representatives, 
where diplomats of all member states discuss the political elements of the proposal. 
The last step is transmission to the Ministers and formal acknowledgement of the 
proposed common Council position by the responsible Ministers of all member states 
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(Naurin and Wallace, 2008; Naurin, 2010). If the proposal is approved, either by 
consensus and without vote or by qualified majority, the Council has achieved a 
formal position for negotiations with the Parliament (voting dynamics in the Council 
see: Hagemann, 2015; Hagemann and Høyland, 2008). If the Parliament has no 
amendments to the Commission proposal, the Council can also adopt it without 
changes, in which case the legislation is adopted. If the Parliament has amendments 
and the Council decides to accept them, the proposal is also agreed upon.  
 
The Council can agree upon a first-reading position if it decides to amend the 
Commission proposal, by qualified majority if the Commission is willing to incorporate 
the amendments, or by unanimity if that is not the case, or the legislation concerns 
specific special areas (taxation social security, foreign policy, defense and police 
cooperation) (Ripoll Servent, 2017: 69ff). Until the point where the Council has 
officially taken a first reading position, the Commission can still amend or withdraw 
the proposal. The Council can reject the Commission proposal as a whole at first 
reading. While this is a rare occasion both the Commission and the Council can use 
the threat of withdrawal or formal rejection to their advantage, if need be. Also, first 
reading does not have any formal time limits that co-legislators must respect. The 
informal coordination and position-taking negotiations can continue without pressure, 
leaving all three institutions strategic opportunities to exploit the lack of time pressure 
for both consensus-building and controversy-seeking.  
 
Both the Council and the Parliament can prolong internal negotiations, thereby de 
facto blocking the process by stalling the negotiations (Ripoll Servent, 2017:70f.). The 
second reading is essentially similar to the first, except that there are strict time limits 
within which positions must be taken, communicated and agreements must be struck 
in order to adopt the legislation. Also, second readings require an absolute instead of 
a simple majority in the Parliament, which makes it strategically preferable for the 
Parliament to avoid second reading. The conciliation committee is an absolute rarity 
in the legislative process, empirically spoken. For example, in the period from 2009-
2014, only 9 files reached the conciliation stage (Ripoll Servent, 2017: 71) with most 
having been settled before. Conciliation is highly formalized and requires both co-
legislators to follow a set of clearly defined steps to produce a joint text (see Ripoll 
Servent, 2017: 71ff.)    
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(Figure 2, the ordinary legislative procedure, source: own illustration, after Ripoll 
Servent, 2017) 
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It has been argued that the Commission’s formal standing has been weakened in the 
co-decision setting, as it was not clear whether the Commission could still withdraw a 
proposal once the Council had reached a common position. This has been clarified 
by the Treaty of Lisbon. The Commission provides its opinion on the Parliament 
amendments and Council position in first reading, and on the Parliament’s 
amendments in second reading (Tsebelis and Garrett, 2000). The Treaty of 
Amsterdam also clarified that the Council could not fall back on its position if 
conciliation was unsuccessful, but that the proposal would be considered not adopted 
(Hix, 2002). The Treaty of Lisbon also established a fast track for legislation and 
enabled first reading agreements (Art.294 TFEU, Art. 295 TFEU), foregoing the other 
formal stages of the decision-making. Since then, the EU has established a record for 
fast-tracking agreements. Rather than resolving controversy, it has been shifted to a 
new and informal stage of decision-making, the trilogues, which take place before 
any formal position-taking and official first reading negotiations. This has shifted most 
of the negotiation process to an informal phase before the formal first reading, where 
Commission, Council and Parliament informally negotiate to exchange views and 
positions on the files to sort out controversies before any formal decision is made.  
2.1.2 The structural origins of failure: the formal practice of first reading 
agreements and the ambiguity of informal trilogies 
 
All the institutions assume specific roles in the process. The ideal legislative scenario 
pictures the Commission as a formal agenda-setter, an honest broker and 
gatekeeper with little strategic influence on the ensuing process (Rasmussen, 2007; 
Crombez et al., 2003). It proposes a policy that lies between the expected positions 
of Council and Parliament after the consultation of both. The co-legislators adopt 
compromise-seeking positions within the possible zone of agreement (figure 2) 
(Wallace, Pollack and Young, 2015). In this case, agreement will be found 
somewhere within the bounds of the zone of agreement, it can slightly favor the 
Parliament or the Council, depending on who was more influential in the bargaining 
process (Tsebelis, 1990; Wallace, Pollack and Young, 2015). In a perfect scenario, 
where all institutions performed according to their role, failure would not occur, 
because the placement of the proposal by the Commission enables a deal that 
satisfies both co-legislators in one round of negotiations (Wallace, Pollack and 
Young, 2015).   
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(Figure 3, bargaining model of legislative success, source: own illustration) 
The process of legislative bargaining would then consist of concessions being made 
by the co-legislators, the Council and Parliament, in order to find a compromise that 
lies towards the middle of each institution’s preference. It is possible that due to the 
shadow of the future or cross-issue linkages during the process, either one of the co-
legislators makes unnecessary concessions to the other, leading to an outcome that 
is closer to the interests of one co-legislator rather than the other (figure 3) (Thomson 
et al., 2006; Wallace, Pollack and Young, 2015). 
The increasing importance of informality and the normalization of consensus have 
been widely addressed and discussed by rationalists (Thomson, 2011, Reh et al., 
2013) and constructivists (Kauppi, 2010; Kauppi and Madsen, 2008; Saurugger, 
2014) alike. It has been argued that the expansion of informal trilogues and the 
tendency towards early agreements shifts decision-making power to key actors, such 
as rapporteurs, shadow rapporteurs or the Council Presidency (Judge and Earnshaw, 
2011; Farrell and Héritier, 2004; Ripoll Servent and Trauner, 2015). Trilogues were 
the result of an exercise of balancing out the expected negative consequences of the 
generalization of the co-decision procedure (De Ruiter and Neuhold, 2012) and both 
co-legislators tend to exploit the lack of formal time limits to take their time to settle 
conflicts during controversial negotiations (Shackleton, 2000).    
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Failure is also much more an informal than a formal question. More often than not, 
the Council does not formally reject the Parliament amendments and the Commission 
proposal, but rather stalls negotiations by discontinuing its intra-institutional work on 
the file or forming an informal blocking minority thereby presenting the other two 
institutions with the looming threat of rejection without actually carrying it out (Ripoll 
Servent, 2017).  
 
Formally, Council and Parliament are on equal footing in the legislative procedure 
and formal rejection of a proposal is a rarity in European policy-making. Important 
negotiations take place in a highly informal setting and controversies are settled in 
informal exchanges between institutions. This is important to keep in mind when 
trying to investigate instances of legislative failure and understand the dynamics of 
success and failure in policy-making from the perspective of the actors involved. 
Informality provides actors with behavioral incentives and the choice to either rely on 
informal mechanisms or make formal or public statements. This is important as it can 
have a decisive influence on the process and outcome of the negotiations 
(Heisenberg, 2005; Schneider, 2008).    
 
The EU is a special institutional setting with two distinct, but closely interlinked levels: 
the national and the European level. Changes at the national level, like elections or 
crisis-induced changes, affect the dynamics at the European level and vice versa as 
all three institutions are connected to the national level: the Parliament is elected by 
national electorates, the Council is almost entirely composed of state representatives 
and the Commissioners are appointed national officials and the European Council, 
the patron of the legislative agenda, is composed of the heads of state. A decisive 
connecting element, which has a crucial influence on the policy-making process is 
party politics. Party agendas at the national level can be uploaded to the European 
level and coalition dynamics at the national and European level are strongly 
codependent (Mühlböck, 2013).  
2.2 Two level setting: conflict interactions between the European and 
national level  
 
In this section, we will look more closely at the peculiar institutional structure of the 
European Union and the closely intertwined national and European institutional 
structure, which is reflected by the central role of the Council of Ministers and the 
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European Council, two solely intergovernmental institutions with dominant positions 
in the legislative process. It will be argued that national actors use the European level 
to further their interests and exploit the institutional venues to outsource or settle 
national controversies.  
Political agents maneuvering in multilevel settings always face tension between 
autonomy and control. Therefore, the situation is complex as many different actors 
are responsible for finding compromise. Everyone has to make concessions, but 
each individual representative also has to justify the decision and get it approved 
“back home” (McCubbins and Schwartz, 1984; Trondal, 2004; Trondal and 
Veggeland, 2003).  
2.2.1 Bottom-up: how national controversies shape European policy-making 
 
Changes in the two-level setting and national political dynamics affect European 
political processes; actors anticipate and incorporate European policy developments 
when seeking to influence national political processes and vice versa  (Héritier, 1999; 
Ruggie, 1993; Aspinwall, 2002; Aspinwall, 2007).  
 
The two-level setting is conditioning the process in a straightforward manner, as all of 
the key actors involved in legislative decision-making have double allegiances to the 
national and the European level. Supranational policy change is evaluated by the 
extent to which it results in losses of competence, distributive losses and how high 
the costs of instrument adjustment will be. The higher the losses and costs, the more 
likely it is that actors will oppose policy change (Héritier, 1997; Ripoll Servent, 2017). 
Depending on the political system and the internal organisation of the state, 
coordination between levels can be difficult, the involvement of national parliaments 
through ratification and consent might be necessary, which adds another veto player. 
Minister portfolios and the support of other subnational actors must also be secured 
(Benz, 1992). Throughout the process of coordination of levels, actors in the national 
polity who fear a loss of decisional power or losses on substantive grounds are likely 
to lobby governments to oppose the policy change, which results in a reduction of the 
zone of possible agreement and an increased risk of deadlock (Sebenius, 1992).  
 
The uploading phase, where issues are brought to the European agenda, is 
strategically crucial, as actors have to produce timely, coherent and sensible national 
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positions and build support for them at the European level. Before policy negotiations 
start, actors have to maneuver on both the national and European level to coordinate 
between and within policy departments (Geuijen et al., 2008). The two-level platform 
can be exploited for controversies, famously called “venue shopping” (Guiraudon, 
2000) translating public opinion sentiments and trends or particular government 
agendas from the national to the European level, which can result in the contestation 
of integration and policy change or support thereof (Guiraudon, 2000; Ripoll Servent, 
2017). If an issue is salient to a constituency and there is a demand for a policy 
solution to be found at the European level, actors are more invested in bringing about 
policy change and will fight harder to secure gains for their constituents. On the other 
hand, if an issue is considered to be of little importance or better solved at the 
national than the European level, actors will not invest in finding agreement and 
prefer failure over policy change.  
 
Actors in European institutions, especially in the Council, are dependent upon 
national political agendas; hence, changes in government due to national elections 
are likely to affect both actor constellations and dynamics in the Council. 
Reconfigurations of governments, such as dismissals and replacement of Ministers 
(Sundström, 2016; Sabatier and Weible, 2014), or ideological shifts due to a new 
party or coalition taking office, can affect the positions and behavior of state 
representatives (Niemann and Mak, 2010). These changes affect the time horizon of 
Council actors who are much more focused on the short-term than the Commission 
and can pursue a more long-term policy strategy (Hartlapp, Metz and Rauh, 2016).  
 
European Parliament elections alter the power balance between groups within it and 
are therefore likely to affect the balance between the Council and the Parliament 
(Ripoll Servent and Trauner, 2015; Hagemann and Høyland, 2010; Costello, 2011). 
Similarly replacements or changes in the actors participating in the Council can affect 
the negotiation process (Sundström, 2016), either by removing brakemen and 
enabling drivers to build supporting coalitions or by adding breakmen and increasing 
the number of actors opposing the policy change (Smeets, 2015). National elections 
can bring different parties with different policy preferences and priorities into power, 
which results in a replacement of Ministers in the Council and a reconfiguration of 
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national positions, sometimes in the middle of a negotiation process on a legislative 
proposal (Niemann and Mak, 2010).  
 
Apart from the links between the national level and the Council and the Parliament, 
there are also a number of important cross-level links with the Commission, which 
can influence the policy process. Commissioner appointments and seconded national 
experts to the Commission are mechanisms of influence across the two levels. 
Member states strategically place national experts in the Commission to lobby their 
interests in the Commission’s internal policy formulation process (Wonka, 2008; 
Trondal, 2007; Sundström, 2016). The Commission exploits this opportunity 
strategically to gain as much information about member state preferences as 
possible to see which proposal might get the most support in the Council (Geuijen et 
al., 2008; Gornitzka and Sverdrup, 2011). Commissioners are also an important tool 
of influence for member states, as they have the authority to steer the policy 
trajectory in their Directorate-General (DG) and give the member state sending the 
Commissioner the ability to control the agenda to a certain extent (Liefferink and 
Andersen, 1998).  
2.2.2 Top down and bottom up again: the effect of crises in a two-level setting 
 
Apart from changes in the national system due to elections and the dynamics of party 
politics, exogenous shocks, such as crisis events, sudden migration influx, economic 
collapse and terror attacks, also affect the policy agenda of governments. In turn, 
governments might value differently a policy proposal coming from the European 
level, it might be perceived as a solution to a problem, or, on the contrary, become an 
undesirable policy change Princen, 2007; Zahariadis, 2013). Hence, crises can be a 
catalyst for the success or failure of particular political projects by either opening or 
closing windows of opportunity (Princen, 2007; Brändström and Kuipers, 2003). 
Crises raise the stakes and affect the agenda, as they shift attention to particular 
issues and away from others. Crises issues make controversy more likely, which in 
turn increases the odds of failure (Princen, 2007; Princen and Rhinard, 2006).  
 
How do crises concretely affect the legislative process in the EU? Crises change the 
political and economic context, within which negotiations take place. Crisis in 
combination with the reformed institutional setting increases complexity (Zahariadis, 
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2013; Bauer and Trondal, 2015). Vertical and horizontal interactions between actors 
in a multi-level setting multiply and more actors enter the scene. This creates more 
institutional complexity due to the multitude of rules governing interactions between 
actors within the legislative institutions. The crisis also increases issue complexity as 
well as the amount and nature of informational linkages. The more actors, the more 
information overload, the more complex the collective decision-making process 
becomes. The institutional setting in which negotiations take place, the stages of the 
process, and the issue characteristics greatly impacts the strategies actors can use 
(Lewis, 2010; Elgström and Jönsson, 2000; McKibben, 2010; Oppermann and 
Viehrig, 2011). 
 
The crises have increased urgency and uncertainty due to disruptions in the political 
and economic context and actors use crises to engage in framing contests and blame 
avoidance (Boin, ‘tHart  and  McConnell, 2009). It has been shown for EU decision-
making that crises increase urgency, in turn, urgency increases both pressure to act 
and conflict, alter preferences and affect positions actors take during negotiations 
and the strategies they use (Princen, 2011). Effects of issue salience differ between 
high politics and low politics areas (McKibben, 2010). Justice and home affairs issues 
have a similar importance level as social and employment issues overall, compared 
to a number of other issue areas, because politicians attach sovereignty concerns to 
these areas as they are connected to the most important policy concerns of citizens, 
namely security and welfare. High politics areas are those areas where states are 
most concerned with relative losses and will be less inclined to compromise, whereas 
in low politics areas, absolute losses matter and more compromising behaviour can 
be expected (Dür and Mateo, 2010; Wallace, Pollack and Young, 2015; Forest and 
Lombardo, 2012; Graziano and Hartlapp, 2015). 
 
But do crises lead to more failed proposals? That is an empirical rather than a 
theoretical question, since crises affect the preference constellations and salience of 
the actors involved, but do not alter the process itself. Different issues might arise 
and negotiations might become more controversial, but crises can function as 
catalysts for policy change (Hartlapp, 2016; Scherpeel and Perez, 2015). Issues can 
fail, because the stakes are too high, or because actors do not consider them worth 
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their while or they can succeed, because a crisis opened a window of opportunity 
(Kingdon, 1984; Héritier, 1999; Wallace, Pollack and Young, 2015).  
 
Within the area of Justice and Home Affairs, not all issue areas have the same 
salience level. For examples, issues concerning immigration and security matters 
and data protection rank higher than questions of police cooperation and civil justice. 
Obviously salience is also coupled with the current agenda and can be affected by 
sudden shifts: the more salient, the higher the pressure on governmental actors to 
find solutions and depending on the level of political conflict in the domestic arena, 
the lower the chance of resolving it on the domestic level (Laursen, 2012; Roos, 
2013). Looking at issues in the border policy area with migration relevance would 
therefore provide for critical cases as the migration and security crisis is of crucial 
importance to states (high politics, high salience). Within the area of justice and home 
affairs, security measures are more salient than migration management measures: 
the more salient the issue, the more likely states are to contest extant policy or 
propose policy reversal (Roos, 2013). Since the outbreak of the migration crisis and 
the following security crisis, pressure has been highest on national governments and 
the EU to act in this area. Public opinion has also devoted more attention to Justice 
and Home Affairs issues (Monar, 2014; Haverland, De Ruiter and Van de Walle, 
2015).  
 
This trend has shifted attention away from other policy areas, which are generally 
important to actors, because they link to core state topics like sovereignty or budgets, 
but are not in the immediate focus due to more pressing need for action in other 
areas. Social and Employment Policy is one policy area where public opinion and 
policy-makers have devoted less attention to in the crisis context, even though it is 
generally considered to be a core sovereignty issue.  In addition, the economic and 
financial crisis has only confirmed the fact that the cooperation and integration in 
social and employment matters remains very contested (Pollack, Wallace and Young, 
2015). The financial crisis in particular has shifted resources from some areas to 
others and the combination of financial and economic crises has shifted the attention 
away from areas that do not need immediate policy responses to problems (Wallace, 
Pollack and Young, 2015). In the area of Social and Employment Policy, questions 
with labour market and welfare provisions relevance are considered very important, 
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because they touch upon one of the core parts of member states and have 
redistributive consequences. Within the area of Social and Employment Policy, 
measures combating unemployment and aiding businesses are more salient than 
measures geared towards combating social inequalities. In the crisis context, all 
measures touching upon the labor market are of high importance in the aftermath of 
the economic and financial crisis, which left European welfare states weakened and 
under pressure from the public. Gender equality issues are relatively less important in 
this area in the crisis context, unless they are linked to labor-market related 
measures with distributive consequences (Pollack, Wallace and Young, 2015). 
2.2.3 Patronage by the European Council: no priority, no success  
 
Recently, scholars have also investigated the role and impact of the European 
Council on the policy process, especially, but not limited to the agenda-setting 
process. It has been argued that the European Council and the Commission are joint 
agenda-setters, which depend on each other, but also engage in power play 
(Bocquillon and Dobbels, 2014). While not technically a legislative institution, the 
European Council is very much part of the overall process and strongly influences the 
dynamics of success and failure by its strategic agenda-setting and interventions, as 
it is often the source of policy initiatives and makes specific demands to the 
Commission (Tallberg, 2008; Puetter, 2012; Wallace, Pollack and Young, 2015).  
 
Salience is affected by the European Council as it determines which areas and 
issues have priority for the member states and outside events, especially the 
occurrence of crises, show that heads of state exert decisive influence on the agenda 
and the process of policy-making (Tallberg, 2008). If an issue is not considered a 
priority for the heads of state, it is likely that the European Council does not invest 
much in pushing for an agreement. If on the other hand the heads of state value and 
encourage policy change we can expect to see an agreement (Smeets, 2016). If this 
applies to intergovernmental Treaty negotiations (Beach, 2004), why would it be 
different in policy-making processes (Naurin and Wallace, 2008)?  
2.2.4 Summary  
 
The involvement of the European Council determines the fate of a Commission 
proposal insofar as its support of a proposal determines how important the issue will 
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be to state representatives in the Council. If it is not a priority, it is likely to be 
neglected on the agenda. If the Commission proposal goes against the interests of 
the heads of state, Council opposition is likely to be the consequence. If actors 
exploit the European level to settle national conflicts, it can lead to failure of the 
initiative, if they cannot rally sufficient support among the other actors. If on the other 
hand, actors can build supporting coalitions and convince their partners of the value 
of uploading an issue and handling it on the European level, conflict can be 
outsourced and possibly solved with a European policy decision.  
2.3 Party and coalition politics: ideology structures conflict and controversy 
  
In this section, party politics and coalition dynamics will be discussed as a special 
kind of linkage between the national and European level, which influences the 
negotiation dynamics and has an impact on the success or failure of a negotiation in 
so far as it enables or disables certain strategic mechanisms. This is particularly 
important, as the co-decision procedure, as explicated above, requires actors to build 
majority coalitions to approve a proposal and minority coalitions to block it.  
2.3.1 National and European party politics: contradictory or complementary? 
 
Party politics in the EU are only partly similar to national politics. They aggregate 
citizen interests and provide ideological platforms for political debate and policy-
making, yet European elections are second order compared to national elections. 
There are no clear majorities or stable coalitions and no institutionalized 
government/opposition dynamics (Hix, Noury and Roland, 2007; Mühlböck and 
Yordanova, 2017, Rasmussen, 2008; Rasmussen MK, 2008).  
 
Co-decision and bicameralism create a smaller set of winning coalitions between the 
institutions and determine clearer winners and losers in negotiations (Costello, 2011), 
which makes it even more important to all actors involved to bargain for gains and 
find a face-saving way of dealing with losses. This is especially true for smaller 
parties and smaller member states (De Ruiter and Neuhold, 2012; Farrell and 
Héritier, 2003)  
 
In the Parliament, studies have shown that MEPs tend to vote according to national 
party lines rather than European ones if an issue is very salient domestically, despite 
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high levels of cohesion across European ideological groups (Hix et al., 2007; 
Frantescu, 2015; Mühlböck and Yordanova, 2015). The higher the incentives to 
follow national party lines, the more likely it is that they will defect in European policy 
negotiations (Meserve et al., 2009; Meserve et al., 2017). Nonetheless, there are 
variations according to role conceptions and aspirations of MEPs, depending on 
whether they focus on the national or the European career path or if they are oriented 
towards the party or towards a career within the European institution and so forth 
(Lindstädt et al., 2012).  
 
There is a constant interplay of levels to find agreement in the Council (Häge and 
Naurin, 2013; Smeets, 2015; Grøn and Salomonsen, 2015). Brakemen want to 
increase the level of contestation by moving the issue up to the political levels and 
drivers want to keep the issue from the ministerial level. Ministers tend to pursue a 
different agenda and are more concerned with communicating at the national level 
(Smeets, 2015). States build coalitions to find majorities to support or oppose a 
proposal. Coalition dynamics are dynamic and complex, as actors balance various 
allegiances (Bailer, 2011; Bailer, 2010; Bailer, 2004; Finke 2016). There are 
numerous factors which can influence coalition-building such as power-based 
dynamics (Lindberg, Rasmussen and Warntjen, 2008) , issue-based considerations 
(Odell, 2000; Veen, 2011), ideology (Hagemann and Høyland, 2008), culture, 
geography and attitude towards European integration (Kaeding and Selck, 2005, 
Aspinwall, 2007). While findings on the impact of ideological, territorial and other 
coalitions have been inconclusive (Kaeding and Selck, 2005; Veen, 2011), it has 
been shown that power asymmetry in the Council largely influences coalition 
dynamics (Thomson, 2011; Naurin and Lindahl, 2008) as powerful states are better 
able to steer a process towards success or failure, because they are better able to 
build blocking minority or majority coalitions due to their advantage in formal 
bargaining power (Bailer, 2011; Naurin and Lindahl, 2008; Veen, 2011; Thomson, 
2011). Larger states are less willing to make concessions, since they have better 
outside options and are less sensitive to reputational costs (Dür and Mateo, 2010; 
Kleine, 2013; Naurin, 2015). 
 
 
  
44 
 
2.3.2 How do party politics matter for policy failure? 
 
In a multilevel-setting like the EU, actors face competing demands due to their 
multiple allegiances. National and European party politics can have a significant 
impact on the policy process, depending on how actors interpret their roles and 
functions (McKibben, 2015; McKibben, 2007). The less national and European party 
politics agendas coincide, the higher the likelihood that a proposal fails: 
contradictions or tensions between the European and national agenda affect coalition 
dynamics in the Council and the Parliament and increase the likelihood of opposition 
and formation of blocking minorities. Disruptions due to changes in the national arena 
can shift the majorities in the Council and affect coalition dynamics in a way that can 
both make or break deadlock depending on whether actors make use of the strategic 
opportunities.  
 
For legislative negotiations, party politics are very important as all three institutions, 
especially the co-legislators have to ensure during trilogues that they can secure both 
a stable majority coalition within Council and Parliament and an inter-institutional 
overlap that is large enough to enable a first-reading agreement (Costello, 2011; 
Hagemann and Høyland, 2010; Finke 2016). Hence, actors have an incentive to 
exploit the national party politics agenda and the coalition possibilities in the 
European institutions to their advantage (Schneider, Finke and Bailer, 2010). Actors 
who are set on failure of the negotiation have an incentive to increase controversy, 
build blocking minorities, signal opposition through isolation (Smeets, 2015; Smeets, 
2016) or stall the negotiations by keeping the issue from moving through the 
institutional channels necessary for achieving an agreement. This is most often done 
through silent opposition, where actors do not voice an opinion on an issue and 
thereby hindering the consensus-building process (Smeets, 2016; Novak, 2013).  
2.4 Structural determinants of failure: reviewing key conditions 
  
The generalization of the ordinary legislative procedure and the qualified majority 
voting rule have changed the setting for policy-making and thereby altered the stakes 
and strategic opportunities for the actors involved. The Council has to deal with a 
Parliament on equal standing and consider compensation mechanisms to make up 
for procedural and substantive losses the Parliament has to accept in the process. 
Internally, the member states encounter different incentives for coalition-building. As 
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it is no longer necessary to achieve unanimity, state representatives now focus on 
either building supporting majority coalitions or blocking minority coalitions. The 
Parliament has more formal influence, which it can use to extract substantive, 
procedural or reputational gains from the Council. The Commission can no longer 
mainly focus on accommodating the Council, but also has to consider the Parliament.  
 
The process is further complicated by the interdependence of dynamics between the 
European and the national level. Any significant changes on the national level can 
compromise the success of a policy proposal, because a crisis disrupts the process 
and actors reevaluate their positions or divert their attention. Crises can open or 
close windows of opportunity for a particular policy change. If the crisis shifts 
attention away from the issue or increases the costs compared to the benefits, failure 
becomes more likely. A replacement of actors on the national level can lead to the 
breaking or building of coalitions in European institutions. A blocking minority can 
become possible due to more actors opposing the proposal or new actors lead to a 
break-up of a blocking minority and there is an opportunity to negotiate compromises.  
III. Theorizing policy failure: the importance of agency, negotiation processes 
and the process of failure 
 
The goal of the second part of the theoretical framework (chapter 3) is to bring in 
agency and model and operationalize different approaches to explaining failure, 
thereby bringing structure and agency together (Ripoll Servent and Busby, 2013; 
Saurugger, 2014) in distinct models, which can be tested on actual legislative 
negotiations by performing a process analysis. The models will complement existing 
scholarship with a novel focus on inter-institutional dynamics and the role of key 
actors creating and strategically exploiting deadlock and failure. In a second step, 
after presenting and conceptualizing the different models, we will provide a detailed 
operationalization of the different models of failure to make them empirically testable 
and distinguishable.  
3.1 The key actors: institutions and individuals as agents of failure   
 
Who are the actors and what is their function in the process? What are preferences 
and which role do they play? Which strategies do they use and how do they use 
them in the process?  
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In this section, the concept of agency will be more closely examined and a typology 
of actors will be presented, which play important roles in the process and can direct it 
towards either success or failure depending on their behavior. The importance of 
actor characteristics and strategic incentives for the success or failure of a policy 
proposal of will be discussed in the subsequent chapter after having distinguished 
and examined the various collective and individual actors involved in the legislative 
process. After looking at each institution as a collective actor, it is worth opening the 
black-box of each one of the three legislative institutions to see which actors are in 
charge of navigating the process and where incentives for strategic or inadvertent 
failure might be found.  
It is necessary to define what an actor is and which types of actors should be 
distinguished and taken into consideration for negotiation analysis. This includes 
actors on a macro-level (collective/institutional actors) and actors on a micro-level 
(individual actors) (Saurugger, 2014). Agency at the institutional level is understood 
as interactions between the institutions, the inter-institutional dynamics and 
interactions of different types of sub-institutional actors within each of the institutions. 
Interaction dynamics between individual actors concerns the micro-dynamics within 
each legislative institution, as well as between the institutions (Saurugger, 2014; 
Trauner and Ripoll Servent, 2015).  
 
Collective or institutional actors represent aggregated interests. The Council, 
Commission and Parliament and states as institutions are usually referred to as 
actors when trying to refer to bigger conflict lines and negotiation dynamics where 
there is no immediate need to differentiate between sub-dimensions. This shortcut 
will also be used in this thesis, without however presuming that this type of collective 
agency assumes that these institutions are unitary actors since it is important to 
consider the competing interests within the institutions, which are often dissimulated 
in models that rely on common institutional positions, without looking at intra-
institutional dynamics of position-taking (McElroy, 2007; Ringe, 2010). Individual 
actors, on the other hand, can be captured by the following behavioral typology: (1) 
relais actors pursue a general strategy of exerting influence among peers, (2) 
economic actors partake in utility-maximizing and focus on the economic dimension, 
whereas political domestic (3) actors can be linked back to party politics dynamics at 
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the national and European level (Odell, 2000; Favell and Héritier, 2004). Whether 
actors display one or the other type of behavior depends on preferences (Moravcsik, 
1998) and strategic goals (Héritier, 2010) in combination with the influence of norms 
and socialization at the European level (Farrell and Guiraudon, 2011; Saurugger, 
2013).  
 
Relais actors, drivers and brakemen, etc., are those actors that have important 
strategic advantages in steering negotiations in their favor, brokering deals and 
mediating conflicts (Héritier, 1999; Farrell and Héritier, 2003; Ringe, 2010; Smeets, 
2013; Smeets, 2015). In relation to explaining failure of negotiation processes, actors 
matter in so far as they have different sensitivities to failure based on the different 
levels of importance they attach to issues. The more they are affected by a potential 
outcome, the less credible their threats (Farrell and Héritier, 2003). 
 
An EU institution can also serve as an actor, as it aggregates the preferences of the 
individual actors, which it encompasses. EU institutions are of increasing importance 
in the intergovernmental setting of the Union (Beach, 2005). An institution, as a 
concept, stands for a set of rules and practices that guide the interactions of actors in 
the given structural context (March and Olsen, 1998).   
 
With regard to the role of actors in the process we observe, from the previous review 
of the two-level setting and the many structural factors that condition actor behavior, 
that the complexity of representation and actor behavior in EU institutions is still 
unresolved. There are no straightforward interpretations or prevailing logics. Patterns 
of behavior are complex, dynamic and contingent. The behavior of actors within the 
institutions remains not only largely ambivalent, but also highly context-dependent 
(Beyers, 2010; Trondal, 2008; Kassim, 1994), which makes it difficult for research to 
predict how issues and interests will play out at the supranational level (Daviter, 
2011; Cross, 2013).  
 
Role conceptions matter, as agency in the EU is linked to questions of 
representation, similar to those in national political systems. The representative role 
of actors comprises four possible types, which are complementary, rather than being 
mutually exclusive: a (1) formalistic type, which captures the level of discretion or the 
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formal authorization to act by a mandate, a symbolic (2) type, which is embodied in 
behavioral norms and habits that are considered appropriate, and an imperative (3) 
type where actors behave under clear guidance of instructions defined by political 
superiors, in the EU. This means that domestic officials act on the basis of national 
instructions, individual autonomy and discretion are restricted. Civil servants possess 
lesser, developed bureaucratic networks and have no involvement in political 
conflicts.  Politicians are the main actors, other societal actors are not involved. The 
last type is a liberal (4) type with almost infinite autonomy, where representatives are 
independent experts, unbiased by domestic interests, and have the possibility to 
include non-national interests in their strategies. Bureaucrats act independently from 
politics, while politicians have less concrete preferences for policy outcomes and high 
trust in bureaucrats and networks with other societal actors are strong (Beyers and 
Trondal, 2004; Saalfeld and Müller, 1997). 
As role conceptions differ, the incentives for behavior also differ. Actors who are set 
on extending the decisional influence of an institution are likely to perform differently 
from those actors who are focusing on policy integration or contestation thereof, 
which is particularly valid for actors in the European Parliament (Ripoll Servent, 2017; 
Bale and Taggart, 2006; Scully and Farrell, 2003). But questions of socialization 
effects and role conceptions extend to the Council (Bauer and Trondal, 2015; Beyers 
and Trondal, 2004; Lewis, 2010) and the Commission as well (Geuijen et al., 2008). 
With the two-level setting and the shift from the national to the European setting, 
actors face tensions between different roles and functions. They have more or less 
autonomy to make choices in the process (McCubbins and Schwartz, 1984), 
depending on how tightly they are bound to national prerogatives and mandates 
(Odell, 2000).  
Socialization, in combination with the dependence on reciprocity in light of the EU’s 
long shadow of the future, makes certain actor characteristics indispensable for 
avoiding or resolving deadlock. Interpersonal relations, familiarity and trust are 
understood through judging a negotiation partner to be dependable, true to their word 
and deliver on their promises. Reciprocity is the reward given in response to 
trustworthiness, which can be a concession in some form, a deal or even an 
abandoning of a position or a reservation (Liefferink and Andersen, 1998; Bovens 
and t’Hart, 2016). Familiarity enables close interpersonal relations, which in turn 
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make successful conflict management more likely, because actors possess the 
necessary entry points to address problematic positions (Falcó-Gimeno, 2014) and 
try to avoid deadlock and failure (Schimmelfennig, 2003; Schimmelfennig, 2005; 
Niemann, 2006) or reinforce controversy and create blockages (McKibben, 2013). 
  
Decision-making processes are made of different stages, not only comprising an 
intra- and inter-institutional dimension, but also agenda-setting, position-taking and 
ultimately trilogue sequences. Negotiations resemble less a clear-cut staged 
bargaining, but rather a nested, interconnected and often circular process. The 
complexity of the process leaves considerable leverage to all institutions and actors 
within them to exploit strategic options and manipulate the process (Brandsma, 2015; 
Bauer  and  Trondal, 2015). Complexity is further increased by the fact that most of 
the negotiations take place in highly informal settings (Kleine, 2014), which is a key 
condition for achieving policy change in the European setting, as it enables actors to 
negotiate without facing public scrutiny (Smeets, 2015).  
 
To better understand these complex dynamics of the co-decision process, it is 
important to clarify the roles and functions of the different institutions involved and 
shed light on their internal dynamics (Costello and Thomson, 2013, Hagemann, 
2015; Warntjen, 2012). 
3.1.1 The Council and state representatives: the intergovernmental stronghold 
  
Arguably, the most important institution in the legislative system is the Council of the 
European Union, as it is the representative of member states’ interests. Unlike the 
Parliament, the Council has extensive decision-making powers that extend beyond 
co-decision, including the possibility to unanimously change the legal basis of a 
proposal to avoid the co-decision procedure altogether (Naurin and Wallace, 2008; 
Wallace, 2006; Warntjen, 2007). Also, recent research about the effects of the crisis 
on institutional dynamics in the EU has demonstrated that the crisis benefits the 
intergovernmental bodies, the Council and the European Council increasingly call the 
shots, not only deciding on the agenda, but also intervening in the policy process. 
Additionally, the Council becomes the main focus of the legislative process as the 
executive organ of national governments (Puetter, 2012; Puetter, 2015).  
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Member state representatives demonstrably defend very different interests and are 
by no means always easily persuaded to give them up or accept compromises 
(Wallace  and  Naurin, 2008; Smeets, 2016, 2013). Most of the Council research has 
focused on initial preference divergence and the different types of division and 
cleavages, finding empirical evidence for ideological, territorial and issue-based 
cleavages (Dür  and  Mateo, 2010; Bailer, 2011, 2010, 2004). Recent research has 
acknowledged that the extension of co-decision introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon 
changes the dynamics, making them more complex, less sequential and more 
informal (Häge  and  Naurin, 2013). Despite the growing influence of the Parliament, 
the primordial role of a few member states remains unchanged, especially those with 
the best network and the strategic advantage of being the biggest players in terms of 
voting power and path-dependent influence, such as Germany, France and the pre-
Brexit UK (Arregui  and  Thomson, 2009; Häge, 2011; Johansson, 2013; Naurin, 
2015).  
 
The importance of cleavages also remains unchanged as member state 
representatives still diverge in their interests across party and ideological lines 
(Lindberg, Rasmussen  and  Warntjen, 2008; Hagemann  and  Høyland, 2008) and 
sometimes also across territorial lines (Kaeding  and  Selck, 2005; Schimmelfennig, 
2003, Schimmelfennig, 2005). However, quantitative research has acknowledged 
that findings about the Council regarding the causes and determinants of negotiation 
outcomes are still inconclusive, especially with regard to failure. This leads us to 
conclude that success or failure are neither solely based on initial positions and 
conflict settings, but a complex number of aspects in the actual negotiation, evolving 
over the course of the decision-making process, which are likely to be different for 
each policy area and even vary across issues. 
  
With the increase in intergovernmentalism in the post-Lisbon setting, the dynamics in 
the Council and between the Council and European Council have shifted towards 
more intergovernmentalism. As the European Council gets more and involved the 
importance of the Minister level increases and the role of COREPER decreases in 
terms of decision-making power. Political decisions are increasingly made at 
ministerial level or by de facto intervention of the European Council through 
statements made by the heads of state while negotiations are still ongoing (Bailer, 
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2011; Bauer and Trondal, 2015). There is a constant interplay of levels to find 
agreement in the Council (Häge and Naurin, 2013; Smeets, 2015; Grøn and 
Salomonsen, 2015). Brakemen want to increase the level of contestation by moving 
the issue up to the political levels and drivers want to keep the issue from the 
ministerial level as the involvement of Ministers tends to increase controversy making 
it harder to resolve deadlock (Häge, 2011). Ministers play an unpredictable role, as 
they tend to pursue a different agenda and are more concerned with communicating 
towards the national level and can upload unintended issues to the policy process 
(Smeets, 2015). However, involvement of Ministers cannot alway be forgone 
conclusion, as at COREPER level, we observe variance in autonomy and constraints 
for actors. State representatives possess varying levels of discretion for delegates 
(Häge, 2008) based on how much the state is interested in finding agreement 
(McKibben, 2007). Actors tend to operate between the technical and political level to 
try to solve issues left over by working parties and avoid conflict at the ministerial 
level (Smeets, 2015). The working party level (Häge, 2008) anticipates what 
COREPER and the ministerial level would do and tries to solve as many technical 
issues as possible to avoid political conflict (Smeets, 2015) . 
  
As for intra-institutional decision-making, research has convincingly demonstrated the 
existence of a consensus-seeking nature (Lewis, 2000, Lewis, 2003; Lewis, 2010) in 
the Council. It contains a special club-like culture with somewhat flexible discretion 
levels where actors discuss their national positions in a setting of high levels of trust, 
mutual responsiveness, shared responsibility and repeated interaction (Bauer and 
Trondal, 2015; Smeets, 2015). The consensus norm in the Council is also biased in 
favor of the big three (Germany, France and the United Kingdom) who are less willing 
to make concessions, since they have better outside options and are less sensitive to 
reputational costs (Dür and Mateo, 2010; Kleine, 2013; Naurin, 2015). Isolation in the 
consensus culture is the decision to voice opposition or signal commitment to a 
position for brakemen to hinder the blame avoidance strategy and drivers to use the 
different levels to avoid isolation and negotiation failure (Smeets, 2015, 2016). Similar 
strategic options involve threatening to take issues up to ministerial level to ensure 
that there is sufficient contestation to get other actors to move the issue up to that 
level for brakemen to stop it. Supporters try to avoid excessive exposure at 
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ministerial level by appealing to solidarity and limiting the amount of Minister 
interventions (Smeets, 2013). 
 
Blame attribution and blame avoidance are a means for the Council to exploit policy 
failure rather than voting explicitly against an issue (Hayes-Renshaw, Aken and 
Wallace, 2006) or practicing an absence of explicit opposition so not to compromise 
their credibility Informal rather than formal blockage is a way to circumvent formal 
breaking of consensus politics, while still interrupting the negotiations. Most often, 
actors use informal blocking voting minorities and backdoor lobbying to enquire after 
other actors with blocking positions (Häge, 2011).  
  
Avoidance of vetoes and deadlock in the Council (Hayes-Renshaw, Aken and 
Wallace, 2006; König and Junge, 2009) and why the Council does not use its 
possibilities for blockage (Sullivan and Selck, 2007; Smeets 2016) have been either 
explained by normative pressure (Heisenberg, 2005) and a shared responsibility to 
keep the process going (Lewis, 2005) that make obstructive behaviour inappropriate 
and expose those obstructing actors to stigmatization (Adler-Nissen, 2014; 
Schimmelfennig, 2003) or as the winning majority handing out unnecessary 
concessions to a non-blocking minority (Häge, 2013; Tsebelis, 2013).  
  
There is a transparency-efficiency trade-off (Hillebrandt et al., 2014; Hagemann and 
Franchino, 2016), which the literature has conceptualized as information exchange 
through voting and public statements. Lower transparency means negotiators have 
little information about the strength of policy positions of co-negotiators, which can 
lead to negotiation failure. High transparency means negotiators can proceed more 
efficiently, but it raises reputational costs due to public commitment to a position 
(Stasavage, 2004; Hagemann and Franchino, 2016). This is relevant when it comes 
to the choice of how to frame decisions, especially in cases of failure. 
3.1.2 Spotlight on relais actors: the Council Presidency and the Council SG 
 
All levels are involved in the decision-making process in the Council (working groups, 
COREPER I or II, Ministers), but some actors play a particular role and have special 
strategic opportunities that deserve to be examined more closely (Schalk et al., 2007, 
Häge and Naurin, 2013). Member state representatives at all levels fulfill a role that is 
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characterized by their duty to best represent the will of the national government to 
which they are accountable. The main relais actor in the Council undoubtedly is the 
Council Presidency (Kleine, 2013; Veen, 2011, Häge and Naurin, 2013), as it is a 
broker within the Council and is supposed to act as a mediator (Niemann and Mak, 
2010). Every state will assume this role at some point, regulated by a fixed schedule 
with a rotation period of six months for each Presidency. Its role is supposed to be 
one of a neutral mediator, but every state assuming that role obviously also has a 
preference over the issue, which can lead to problems if the interest supersedes the 
mediation role (Niemann and Mak, 2010). 
  
Within the Council, the Presidency assumes an important role as the agenda-setter, it 
decides what to put on the Council agenda and what to keep off the agenda; it can 
decide to keep conflictual issues off the agenda or push them, shorten or lengthen 
the negotiation process by setting up more or less meetings (Tallberg, 2004; 
Tallberg, 2008). It thereby not only controls the speed of negotiations on an issue, 
but can also strategically create or prolong blockages (Thomson, 2011). In reverse, 
the Presidency also assumes an important role in consensus-building by deciding 
upon compromise proposals and on the use of levels. The Presidency decides which 
issues are taken on board and when a proposal is moved to a different level (Novak, 
2013; Smeets, 2016). It is assumed that QMV increases the importance and strategic 
influence of the Presidency since it can pursue its agenda without having to fear 
opposition by other member states through vetoes (Roos, 2013; Kleine, 2014). 
  
The Presidency is assisted by the Council Secretariat General, which is formally an 
administrative aid to the Presidency. As an apolitical actor it can play an important 
role in mediating conflicts and offering unbiased solutions. It often provides for 
creative textual and political solutions together with the Presidency (Beach, 2004; 
Christiansen, 2002). The Council legal service is the fourth actor in the triangle of 
important Council actors, as it offers legal support and is a valuable source of 
creative legal and textual solutions (Tallberg, 2008).  
3.1.3 The Parliament and MEPs: between rights protection and power play 
  
The co-decision setting would not be complete without accounting for the ever-
increasing role of the European Parliament. It has become a considerable actor in 
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many policy areas and continues to be a strong advocate of integration, even though 
it is increasingly concerned with uncertainty and internal preference divergences 
(Ringe, 2010). 
 
The Parliament’s role and influence in the EU’s institutional setting has gradually 
been strengthened, mainly regarding its legislative functions through the extension of 
co-decision, its budgetary control and the role of representation of citizens through 
the creation and extension of accountability channels (Ripoll Servent, 2017). The 
Parliament’s powers stem largely from its repeated efforts to push the formal 
boundaries of the institutional framework and challenge the decision-making rules. 
Often the Parliament has been successful in achieving and formalizing changes that 
strengthened its position, but sometimes these attempts backfired (Ripoll Servent, 
2017).  
 
The Parliament as a co-decider has taken on the practice of “anticipatory 
compliance”, as it uses the informal stage of decision-making, in particular trilogues, 
to test which amendments are more acceptable to the Council and the Commission 
and leave those out of the draft report that might be considered too radical (Burns 
and Carter, 2010). In comparison, before the generalization of co-decision the 
Parliament had adopted more controversy-seeking maximalist positions (Huber and 
Shackleton, 2013), leading to more moderate position outputs and a dominance of 
grand coalition politics instead of ideological cleavages (Hix and Høyland, 2013).  
 
Comparable to the Council, the EP also faces a double struggle: defending its 
position vis-à-vis the Council, whilst dealing with increased internal contestation 
(Ringe, 2010; Ripoll Servent, 2014). Party allegiances and ideological alliances play 
an important role in the Parliament. Research has extensively investigated party 
group cohesion and competition between groups (Hix, 2002; Hix, Noury  and  
Roland, 2005, 2007; Lindberg, Rasmussen  and  Warntjen, 2008), so much so that 
Parliament actors cooperate with actors from other institutions if they have similar 
ideological allegiances (Bauer  and  Trondal, 2015).  
 
The hierarchically structured internal decision-making procedure makes permanent 
committees and rapporteurs important brokers of interest in the position-taking 
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process and relais actors for the ensuing negotiations between Council and 
Parliament (extensive explanation: Burns, 2013; Ringe, 2010). As Commission 
proposals are first discussed in the relevant committees in the Parliament where 
MEPs can table amendments before the proposals is passed on to the plenary for 
discussion and formal validation, this particular institutional level and its actors have a 
significant strategic influence. Rapporteurs possess the most expertise on the issue 
and are in charge of drafting the reports on the proposals under discussion, which 
permits them to direct the debates and lay the groundwork for the Parliament’s official 
position for co-decision (Ringe, 2010). We argue, in line with previous quantitative 
and qualitative research on salient policy areas that though formally the Parliament’s 
power increased, the Council still calls the shots in policy-making, especially in crisis 
settings, thus giving indications of a reversion to intergovernmentalism (Costello and 
Thomson, 2013). 
  
The Parliament’s internal logic is inherently ambiguous: different settings for 
negotiations (policy area committees with sub-committees for specific policy 
portfolios, party groups, plenary) make it unclear which allegiance dominates for 
MEPs (national/territorial, portfolio, ideological). Due to the multiplication of settings 
and overlaps in competence, conflicts between committees over policy issues have 
become more common (Mather, 2001; Neuhold, 2001; Burns, 2006). MEPs are 
committed to both supranational committees and ideological party groups as well as 
national party assemblies (Raunio, 2000) and the operational logic of the Parliament 
permits them to interpret their roles as they see fit (Whitaker, 2005; Scully, 2003). 
Intra-institutional processes are similar to those of national parliaments: political 
conflict takes place along traditional left-right lines, MEPs vote in accordance with 
their party affiliations rather than national affiliations, the party system becomes more 
consolidated and competitive as the powers of the EP increase and party group 
cohesion is generally higher than in other parliaments (Hix, Noury and Roland, 2007; 
Lindberg, Rasmussen and Warntjen, 2008; Ringe, 2010). 
  
Quantitative and in-depth qualitative analyses of position-taking and negotiation 
processes in various policy areas (Ringe, 2010; Ripoll Servent, 2011, Ripoll Servent,  
2012; Ripoll Servent and Trauner, 2015) have shown that the Parliament’s 
negotiation process in the committees is similar to the Council in the sense that it is 
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subject to a consensus-building process, where MEPs search for other actors and 
groups closest to their interests. However, the actual role of the central actors, 
rapporteurs and committees is still largely understudied. The role of rapporteurs has 
been strengthened through the extension of co-decision and the allocation process of 
dossiers among party groups has become more important and more competitive 
(Yordanova, 2013), but it remains to be thoroughly investigated empirically how their 
influence plays out and what impact they have on the decision outcome. 
 
To a certain extent, the Parliament’s intra-institutional processes are similar to the 
Council: there are cleavages along sectoral and ideological lines in the internal 
position-taking process as well as similar patterns of conflict, which can then cut 
across institutional lines in the negotiation process if there is an ideological overlap 
(Costello, 2011; Bauer and Trondal, 2015). The tendency for early first-reading 
agreements affects the negotiation dynamics in the EP since it needs a simple 
majority for a first-reading agreement, but an absolute majority for a second-reading 
agreement. Increased co-decision competition with the Council has incited the right-
wing to seek coalitions aside from the left-wing where it’s possible (Yordanova, 
2011). It has also increased the importance of pivotal groups, ALDE, since the 
coalition options are limited (Costello, 2011).  
 
The first thing to observe about the Parliament’s internal process of position-taking is 
the strong committee system (McElroy, 2007), similar to the US congress, which is in 
charge of structuring the Parliament’s input into the legislative process and enables 
parliamentarians to express their opinions on policy outputs without any interference 
by an executive. Committees are structured by distributive and partisan cleavages 
and perform informational functions as parliamentarians exchange expertise on 
policy issues and bargain over gains for constituencies (Yordanova, 2011).  
 
Committees are the main origin of amendments on a proposal as discussions on the 
Commission proposal take place in the assigned committees before the plenary 
formalizes and an opinion (Finke, 2017; Ripoll Servent, 2017). Committees have their 
own internal dynamics and different policy fields function differently. Some 
committees are more controversy-oriented, while others behave more consensually: 
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the Civil Liberties Committee (LIBE), for example, has shifted from confrontational to 
consensual after the shift to co-decision (Ripoll Servent, 2015).  
 
The more influential the Parliament becomes in the legislative process, the more 
complex the task of MEPs has become as they have to manage a growing amount of 
political and technical information to perform successfully and influence the EU’s 
policy output. To manage both preparatory work and performances in the plenary, 
alongside their representative functions in their constituencies, MEPs have strong 
administrative support, upon which much of the legislative preparative work depends 
(Busby and Belkacem, 2013; Winzen, 2011).  
 
Similar to high-profile actors in the Council and the Commission, MEPs also have a 
wide and varied administrative support structure of parliamentary assistants, political 
advisors and secretariat officials who assist them in acquiring and processing 
information about legislative files and processes and filters the various demands the 
MEPs are confronted with (Roger and Winzen, 2015). The more salient an issue, the 
less discretion for administrative and support officials have in steering the process 
politically. The administrative actors become production support and provide 
guidance with regard to the role of the institution in the policy process, not the 
specific policy file (Neuhold and Dobbels, 2015; Dobbels and Neuhold, 2015).  
 
How MEPs behave, how much they invest in policy negotiations and which goals 
they pursue depends on a number of factors: the salience of the issue to national 
constituencies and the position of national and European parties and groups, but also 
the process of acquiring and filtering information and the role conception of each 
actor. There is not one single role or type of behavior. Altogether, the context, 
incentives and individual preferences altogether shape individual behavior (Ripoll 
Servent, 2017). When trying to explain failure, it might therefore be worth looking at 
how MEPs perform in the policy negotiations, for example, which factors are more 
influential in explaining their behavior and where incentives for dissent might lie.   
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3.1.4 Spotlight on relais actors: the rapporteur and the shadow rapporteurs   
 
Similarly to the Council, the Parliament’s sublevels contain several types of actors 
with potentially decisive influence on the negotiation process and the outcome.   
 
The institutional sub-bodies usually involved in legislative negotiations are the 
respective committees according to policy and issue area, but some actors play a 
particular role and have special strategic opportunities, which deserve to be 
examined more closely. They may play a key role in developing and proposing a 
compromise to the plenary, which will not only ensure the support of a majority of 
MEPs, but also the support of the co-legislator (Favell and Héritier, 2004; Brandsma, 
2015). Committees formally have a strong role, which they exploit differently in 
different policy areas (Roederer-Rynning and Greenwood, 2017). Where in some 
areas, committees are very active and seek to be strongly involved in the trilogues 
(Roederer-Rynning and Greenwood, 2017), in other areas most of the work is done 
informally by the rapporteur and the shadow rapporteurs (Bressanelli, Koop and Reh, 
2016).  
 
In co-decision, rapporteurs are the main actors, as they have better access to 
information, can set the agenda and shape policy outcomes and can block or slow 
down negotiations (Costello and Thomson, 2010). Together with the shadow 
rapporteurs, the rapporteur holds a series of informal meetings inside the Parliament 
and with the other legislative institutions to determine the main cleavages and points 
of discussion (Ripoll Servent, 2017). Rapporteurs tend to be most trusted and valued 
in the Parliament, if they are considered to be loyal to the Parliament’s general 
interests and work towards internal and inter-institutional compromise (Costello and 
Thomson, 2011; Yordanova, 2011). This means that they have to balance personal, 
partisan and institutional interests (Finke, 2012).  
 
They have an ambiguous role, as they are not only relais actors and thereby 
represent the interest of the Parliament as an institution vis-à-vis the Council, but also 
political actors of a party group, which can create some tension. Research has shown 
that the more contested the rapporteur’s position within the EP and the Council, the 
less likely agreement becomes (Naurin and Rasmussen, 2013; Naurin and 
Rasmussen, 2011). Rapporteurs are in charge of committee work on a Commission 
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proposal, by drafting amendments and a report to be presented to the plenary for a 
vote. 
 
While committee chairs can have an important influence of the committee agenda 
(Reh and Héritier, 2012), trilogues tend to make rapporteurs the primary agenda-
setters in the Parliament due to their strategic informational advantage (Favell and 
Héritier, 2004). They can largely shape the content of the proposal and the choice of 
rapporteur can affect the level of expertise embodied in the legislation, the strength 
and breadth of party group and plenary support (Yordanova, 2013). Similarly to the 
Council, alongside the rapporteur, there are a number of other actors, which perform 
important functions in how the Parliament forms positions and negotiates 
compromises with the Council. Shadow rapporteurs are procedurally not as important 
as the rapporteurs, but have more influence on the development of the Parliament 
position than other committee members or the plenary. They usually come from 
different political groups to provide balance and represent the polarization of 
Parliament. The Parliament’s legal service, as an administrative actor, offers legal 
support and is a valuable source of creative legal and textual solutions.  
 
As the role of relais actors is to provide information and find opportunities for linkages 
to achieve compromise, within and across institutional borders, they play an 
important role in turning conflict and controversy into agreement (Brandsma, 2015).  
3.2 Co-legislator dynamics of failure 
 
When it comes to the inter-institutional dynamics of the process, the literature has 
gone in different directions for explaining why bargaining processes end in deadlock: 
many have considered failure to be the result of co-legislator dynamics, namely 
extreme positions of Council and Parliament (Thomson, 2011; Veen, 2011). It can be 
both or either of the two co-legislators taking a position that deliberately departs from 
the possible zone of agreement as a strategic departure or through lack of 
knowledge about the other institution’s positioning, due to information asymmetry, in 
which case even a Commission proposal that is geared towards the middle ground 
between the two and is compromise-oriented, would not lead to a successful 
outcome, because there would not be room to negotiate for the co-legislators 
(Thomson, 2011; Wallace, Pollack and Young, 2015).  
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The increased use of the OLP has made the Council and the Parliament negotiate 
more directly with each other (Mühlböck, 2013), and has encouraged the Parliament 
to look more closely to the Commission to ensure that its preferences are included in 
the proposal (Egeberg et al., 2014). In the process, the Parliament still takes a more 
pro-integration stance, making the Commission the pivotal actor between the co-
legislators (Nugent and Rhinard, 2015).  
There are different views on the role and influence of the Parliament in the legislative 
process. In the area of Justice and Home Affairs, for example, the Parliament has 
been seen as a veto-player to the Council, playing the Council’s opponent, by 
providing an integrationist and liberal counterbalance to the Council. In Justice and 
Home Affairs, the Parliament is focused on sovereignty and security. The Parliament 
tries to get support from the Commission in its quest for power (Ripoll Servent and 
Trauner, 2015; Liefferink and Andersen, 1998). Though formally, the Parliament’s 
power increased, the Council still calls the shots in policy-making, especially in crisis 
settings, thus giving indications of a reversion to intergovernmentalism (Costello and 
Thomson, 2013). In response, to avoid failure, the Parliament has to adopt a more 
feasibility-oriented position in Home Affairs matters and specifically accept a more 
securitized agenda for border policy to be able to secure its procedural influence and 
avoid being sidelined by the Council. It will do so if it can avoid compromising its own 
procedural influence and does not put into question competence distribution in border 
policy matters. The Council will pursue a security-agenda, insist on national 
competences and try to keep control over policy matters so that they remain as close 
as possible to the state competences (Ripoll Servent, 2015; Huber, 2015). In social 
affairs, as the role of the EU as such is still rather limited and policy is often non-
binding, to avoid resistance by member states (Anderson, 2015), the Parliament’s 
influence remains limited, it relies mainly on the Commission pushing for integration 
(Kantola, 2010; Guerrina, 2005). However, the Parliament has strongly and publicly 
pushed for more integration leading the Commission to propose more legislation 
(Van der Vleuten, 2007).  
In terms of actor behavior, it would be expected that the Council pushes for state 
control and limited involvement of supranational institutions, which is countered by 
the Parliament’s demands for a liberal approach and extended influence of 
supranational institutions. Conflict and failure are very likely if the co-legislators 
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manifest this behaviour throughout negotiations and do not adjust their positions to 
engage in consensus-seeking behaviour. 
However, increasingly, the Parliament is perceived to have evolved in its role to focus 
on a more pragmatic approach oriented towards convincing the Council that it is a 
legitimate and trustworthy partner in co-decision matters and does not compromise 
policy efficiency. This strand therefore views the Parliament as a realistic co-
legislator. According to their findings, the Parliament has demonstrated a willingness 
to concede to the Council on its security demands in different areas of Justice and 
Home Affairs, it has been argued that the Parliament behaves more pragmatically 
abandoning its more integrationist or liberal demands (Ripoll Servent and Trauner, 
2015; Huber, 2015). According to this conception of bicameral dynamics we would 
expect Parliament to favour a pragmatic and feasibility-oriented approach and be 
more willing to side with the Council on security-related matters and refrain from 
making too integrationist or liberal demands, which would result in a lower likelihood 
of conflict and deadlock between Council and Parliament. 
3.3 The closeted strategist at the center: Commission-centric models of failure 
 
To this day, the literature disagrees as to whether the Commission has any strategic 
role beyond the one of an honest broker who considers the preferences of the co-
legislators, knowing that the Council can unanimously amend the proposal and that 
the Parliament can reject it by a simple majority (Wallace, Pollack and Young, 2015). 
It has been argued that the Commission has lost power and influence due to the 
Parliament’s empowerment under co-decision (Thomson and Hosli, 2006).  
 
We argue that the role of the Commission as the official policy agenda-setter and 
initiator of EU legislation makes it the first important strategic actor to consider. The 
Commission as a policy entrepreneur has to identify the problems and policies that 
would be most likely to forge consensus among member states. Its success as an 
agenda-setter depends on how well it can anticipate and exploit preference ambiguity 
(Geuijen et al., 2008; Ackrill, Kay and Zahariadis, 2013; Pollack, 1997; Nugent and 
Saurugger, 2002; Zahariadis, 2008). The Commission is not an indifferent and 
impartial broker of interest, but a strategic actor itself, deciding on whether or not to 
consider the preferences of member states and the Parliament when drafting a 
proposal (Princen, 2011; Bauer and Trondal, 2015). The overall ambiguity and 
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heterogeneity of preferences in the co-decision procedure grants the Commission’s 
drafting strategy considerable influence on how easy or difficult the negotiation 
process will be (Princen and Rhinard, 2006; Bauer and Trondal, 2015). In agenda-
setting, its role is particularly important, as the proposal and the way it is framed set 
the tone for the ensuing negotiations between Council and Parliament. Which of the 
roles it assumes depends on the issue at hand, as well as the resources both actors 
and expertise and the context surrounding the negotiations (Princen, 2011; Princen, 
2007; Princen and Rhinard, 2006; Boin, Hart  and  McConnell, 2009). 
  
Nonetheless, the role of the Commission has been controversially discussed in the 
literature allowing for the conclusion that the Commission’s role is multifaceted 
comprising at times a number of contradictory organisational logics, which reflect the 
tensions between its bureaucratic and political functions (Christiansen, 1997; Nugent, 
1997; Cini, 2008; Bauer and Trondal, 2015).  
 
The Commission’s right to initiate legislation enables it to dictate the legislative 
agenda and force the Council to deal with issues (Roos, 2013; Thomson et al., 
2006). With the increased use of the ordinary legislative procedure, the Commission 
influence has also expanded (Egeberg, 2014), especially with regard to its role in the 
agenda-setting process, where it possesses a strategic first-mover advantage. This is 
because it is the only one capable of proposing legislation and controlling the experts 
involved in the drafting process (Geuijen et al., 2008). The Commission can 
strategically take into account policy preferences of member states or EP actors, but 
rather than simply being a broker of interests and a pool of policy ideas, it is a self-
interested seeker of capacity and power (Bauer and Trondal, 2015). By the way it 
acts at the agenda-setting stage, it can significantly shorten or lengthen the decision-
making process. It most often opts for an incremental approach to policy formulation, 
as it anticipates the heterogeneity of positions, especially Council and Parliament 
(Bauer and Trondal, 2015). The Commission waits until a window of opportunity 
opens to push its desired policy, such as a crisis or changing interest constellations 
(Scherpereel and Perez, 2014) and distributes costs and benefits over time over time 
to move forward controversial policies (Müller and Slominiski, 2013).  
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At the agenda-setting stage, the Commission has a strategic first-mover advantage, 
as it is the only one to propose legislation and controls the national experts who will 
try to get their positions taken into account, knowing that the process will be in their 
favor if they can get their concerns taken seriously by the Commission at the drafting 
stage. However, the Commission controls this process and can interrupt the attempts 
at influencing at any time, if necessary (Geuijen et al., 2008). As an agenda-setter 
and policy formulator, the Commission is in charge of shaping the framing of the 
policy issue for the legislative negotiations. This drafting process contains framing 
competition inside the Commission (Baumgartner and Mahoney, 2008), which leads 
to diverse and sometimes conflicting interests into the policy-making process, as the 
Commission is selective in the way it incorporates interests and to what extent it 
takes into account different perspectives when drafting a proposal (Daviter, 2011).   
 
Inside the Commission, lead DG and lead Commissioner control who has access to a 
file, and broker in case of conflict between DG’s, the Presidency can also intervene to 
veto or steer the process, which resembles a mixture of issue framing and internal 
decision-making decide which issue makes it to the agenda and these processes 
entail a discrepancy between what would have been the solution to a problem and 
the actual result of the policy formulation process, which is a mix of coalitions, 
competition, compromise and confusion among officials, and have very different 
ways of framing issues (Hartlapp, Metz and Rauh, 2013). Commissioners are 
politicians that have national experience (Wonka, 2007) and can take on a number of 
different roles in the policy process (Egeberg, 2006), including national, partisan or 
sectoral roles (Thomson, 2011).  
 
Based on the above, I will present and operationalize a set of concise and succinct 
variants to explain how failure occurs in legislative negotiations, with particular 
emphasis on the outlined strategic role of the Commission and its behavior at 
different stages of the process. A first variant will function as a null hypothesis to the 
assumption of Commission influence on the process of failure. The following three 
variants will specify a particular type of Commission behavior and how it leads to 
deadlock and failure of the policy-making process. Drawing on the institutional setting 
and structure presented in chapter two, each variant will provide two sets of models: 
a bargaining model to capture the inter-institutional dynamics of the process and a 
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causal mechanism model to provide an explication of the conditions under which the 
model is likely to occur alongside a specification of the strategic mechanisms that are 
expected to be present. Each variant will therefore contain a causal mechanism 
model, in graphic form accompanied by an explanation of the conditions and 
mechanisms, which draws on the previous chapter and the conditions and actors that 
have been presented in the previous chapter by specifying how and in which context 
their behavior is likely to lead to failure. 
The inter-institutional dimension of EU policy-making is essentially a complex nested 
game (Tsebelis, 1990; Veen, 2011) consisting of a mix of bargaining and arguing, 
conflict and cooperation, party dynamics and coalition-building and multi-level 
considerations of negotiators, which provides the framework for a number of strategic 
moves of institutions and actors within institutions. The literature has come up with a 
set of bargaining models to explain legislative decision-making, specifically the path 
to agreement, I intend to provide a set of possible explanations for how and why 
proposals fail in the process. All behavioral incentives, channels of influence and 
important structural factors will be modelled into each variant as conditions and 
mechanisms in the process of policy failure.  
 
The following general preference and conflict lines can be derived from previous 
literature: The Commission’s main goal is to achieve an update of the status quo that 
increases supranational integration and involvement of institutions. Its main concerns 
and red lines in matters of substance and procedure are unilateralism by the Council 
and governments retaining too much power or attempting renationalization of 
competences and the downgrading of policy standards (Young, 2015). The Council 
wants to preserve the status quo and national rules to the greatest extent possible 
and concede as little sovereignty as possible to the other institutions, if more 
competence transfer or policy change is necessary to solve the given problem. 
National governments’ main procedural red lines are the Commission and the 
Parliament gaining more control and influence over policy than the Council and its 
substantial concerns are avoiding binding legislation that overly restricts government 
discretion (Moravcsik, 1993; Moravcsik, 1998; Héritier, 1999; Elgström and Jönsson, 
2000; Roos, 2013). The Parliament wants to achieve a transfer of competences from 
the national to the European level, secure and extend its own involvement and 
achieve an increase in policy standards. Its red lines are being excluded from the 
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process and the Council attempting re-nationalization or a lowering of policy 
standards (Ripoll Servent, 2012; Ripoll Servent, 2015).  
 
Based on findings discussed previously, we can assume the following about an 
institution’s sensitivity to failure: if the negotiation process does not provide incentives 
to the institution to realize its goals and most importantly, if the red lines have been 
crossed and there is no indication that it can be reversed, the actor will prefer 
negotiation failure (Scharpf, 2006; Héritier, 1999). The Commission prefers failure to 
an continuation of the negotiations on the proposal, if the continuation would result in 
an agreement that takes competences away from the EU level to repatriate them 
and/or lower policy standards (Princen, 2011; Wallace, Pollack and Young, 2015). 
The Council prefers failure to an agreement if it would result in transferring more 
sovereignty to the EU than is strictly necessary to solve the policy problem and/or 
upgrade policy standards below the lowest common denominator in a way that 
requires significant changes in domestic constituencies and that does not directly 
benefit governments (Costello and Thomson, 2013). The Parliament prefers failure to 
an agreement, if it would result in competences being taken from the EU and/or in the 
Parliament’s influence being curtailed and/or policy standards being lowered to 
benefit governments (Tsebelis and Garrett, 2000; Hix et al., 2006).  
 
Failure can occur, because the Commission, as a policy initiator, was either unable to 
collect any or sufficient information about co-legislator positions (information 
asymmetry) or unwilling to do so, because it pursued its own agenda (activism), 
resulting in a policy proposal that strongly departs from the position of either of the 
two co-legislators and makes it impossible to settle for a compromise (Toulmin, 2003; 
Smeets, 2015). The proposal can be either too favorable to either the Council or the 
Parliament (Nugent and Rhinard, 2015). Positions between co-legislators would in 
this case be distant enough so that deadlock due to a proposal that departs too far 
from the middle ground becomes likely. Otherwise the co-legislators would have 
incentive enough to overcome differences and find an agreement, as it would be less 
costly (Nugent and Rhinard, 2015). 
Drawing from and extending upon existing literature, four models of failure will be 
presented subsequently, which explain and account for how different types of 
Commission behavior are conducive to negotiation failure. These models will be 
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operationalized in the following sections to be tested on four empirical cases of policy 
failure.   
3.3.1 The causal mechanism model 1: the Commission as a perfect agenda-
setter  
 
To begin, we will present the null hypothesis of sorts, a model of failure, which 
presumes that the Commission is doing its job as a policy formulator and honest 
broker and that failure is induced by the co-legislators in subsequent negotiations 
(figure 4). This is followed by three Commission-centric approaches to explaining 
failure, which will also account for the many aforementioned imperfections of and 
outside influences on the policy process: the informal and unregulated negotiations 
between Council and Parliament to resolve conflicts where much depends on the 
actors involved and their (limited) ability to exert influence including the informal 
influence of the Commission and the impact of contextual factors and external events 
(Wallace, Pollack and Young, 2015), as well as all the stages of the process (Bauer 
and Trondal, 2015).   
 
 
 
(figure 4, honest broker, source: own illustration) 
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The Commission has been portrayed as a formal initiator of legislation (Tsebelis, 
2002), a depoliticized technocrat (Haverland, De Ruiter and Van de Walle, 2016; 
Princen and Rhinard, 2006), or an honest broker due to its role as the guardian of the 
Treaties and the initiator of legislation (Nugent and Rhinard, 2015). The Commission 
is supposed to provide for proposals which respond to the problems at hand while 
brokering between the interests of the Council and the Parliament. Spatial models 
have placed the Commission on a position between the Council and Parliament, 
which are supposed to occupy the extremes of the scale. By occupying the middle 
ground, the Commission ensures that both co-legislators find the proposal 
acceptable, if they are willing to make some concessions to find agreement. The final 
agreement is likely to be quite close to the Commission’s original proposal, if it has 
done its brokering job correctly (Ripoll Servent and Trauner, 2015; Cini and Suplata, 
2017). 
  
The first failure model, rather than being Commission-centric, postulates that the 
Commission is not in control of the process, but rather the co-legislators, as the 
Commission’s initiatives are merely policy inheritance (Nugent and Rhinard, 2015). 
Most of the initiatives are a continuation of EU action, where the Council and the 
Parliament have already discussed the general lines and the Commission is clear 
about co-legislator preferences (Nugent and Rhinard, 2015). The Commission 
performs its duty as a formal initiator of legislation based on instructions by the 
European Council, but does not have any particular influence on policy formulation or 
the course of the legislative negotiations (Young, 2015). The main reason for 
deadlock are extreme positions by the co-legislators, with a greater likelihood of 
deadlock being the result of the Parliament expressing its preference too early and 
the Council stalling the negotiations, as the Council is much more willing and able to 
be obstructive than the Parliament (Nugent and Rhinard, 2015). 
This shifts the emphasis from the Commission to the co-legislators. The Commission 
behaves like an honest broker during policy formulation with the goal of passing 
legislation. Failure would therefore be rooted not at the agenda-setting stage, but the 
negotiation stage and would be the consequence of persistent extreme positions of 
the co-legislators. It can be the Council taking and keeping an extreme position 
despite compromise offers from the Parliament, in which case Parliament is likely to 
call Council out for failure. If on the other hand, the Parliament takes an extreme 
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position and rejects compromise offers from the Council, the Council is likely to block 
and blame Parliament for failure. Hence, the Commission proposal as submitted after 
the agenda-setting and policy formulation stage is not the origin of failure. The 
Commission performed its duty as an agenda-setter, but the co-legislators did not 
adopt consensus-oriented behavior, either Council or Parliament or both, resulting in 
deadlock. The most common type of deadlock is the Council refusing to express its 
preference on the proposal when the Parliament has already done so, resulting in 
negotiation deadlock (Nugent and Rhinard, 2015).    
 
Factors, which would explain failure after the agenda-setting stage that is not induced 
by the Commission would be the following: the situation in the domestic 
constituencies changes throughout the negotiation process, affecting co-legislator 
positions. Informal channels of negotiation are established and available to the actors 
and actor use them to exchange information about preferences and positions and 
strike compromise deals. In the case of failure, the co-legislators do not use these 
channels to search for compromise. Party politics and coalition constellations in 
national constituencies, and party politics in European institutions are initially 
favorable to the policy change and the proposal, during the agenda-setting and policy 
formulation process, as the Commission draws up a consensus-oriented proposal. 
Nontheless, change canoccur during the process when the proposal has already 
been submitted, for example due to national or European elections, leading to one or 
both of the co-legislators taking an opposing position (figure 5, orange marking).   
 
(figure 5, causal mechanism of co-legislator deadlock, source: own illustration) 
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It has been argued that preferences are endogenous and therefore not stable, they 
are not fixed a priori, but develop during the process, making them subject to the 
exchanges between actors and other influences, which induce them to recalculate 
their priorities (Odell, 2000; Béland and Cox, 2011; Saurugger, 2013). Complex and 
changing positions result in complex strategies, actors can and do rely on different 
strategies at different stages of the decision-making process, even to the point of 
contradicting previous preferences and strategies by subsequent ones (Saurugger, 
2013).  
As discussed in chapter 2, state-level factors and EU-level factors can incite actors to 
adapt positions and strategies to become more demanding or accommodating or 
remain consistent (Odell, 2000; Gehring and Kerler, 2008; Gehring, 1998). There is, 
of course, remaining uncertainty (Héritier, 1999) and it is likely that not all positions 
are predetermined, before actors enter into negotiations (Smeets, 2015). Actors can 
be forced to make choices during the process, due to time constraints, which are not 
congruent with their initial preferences (Héritier, 1999).  
However, this conception of failure only makes sense if we assume that co-legislator 
preferences change from the time the Commission collects information and drafts the 
proposal and when the proposal is actually submitted (figure 5, purple marking). It is 
rather unlikely that preferences, especially taken on an aggregate level, change to 
the extent that a co-legislator who has been supportive of policy change at the time 
of agenda-setting will have moved to opposition by the time the proposal has been 
submitted for negotiation (Bailer, 2011; Thomson, 2011; Garrett and Tsebelis, 2000; 
Moravcsik, 1998). Actors tend to invest in developing a clear position on an issue, if 
they attach importance to it (Falcó-Gimeno, 2014; Selck, 2006), which does not mean 
that all issues are equally important to all actors or all positions are equally developed 
(Falcó-Gimeno, 2014; Warntjen, 2012). There is remaining uncertainty and room left 
for negotiation. Nonetheless, despite some uncertainty and fluctuation, we can 
assume that preferences and conflict constellations are rather stable: economic 
preferences center around costs and redistribution, decisional preferences concern 
the prospect of winning or losing influence through a decision and instrumental 
preferences determine the need for creation or adjustment of policy instruments 
(Héritier, 1999; Gehring and Kerler, 2008; Bailer, 2011).  
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This dynamic applies to the Council and Parliament alike (Bailer, 2011; Hagemann 
and Høyland, 2010). Positions might be unclear to some extent at the policy 
formulation stage (Ackrill, Kay and Zahariadis, 2013), but the Commission tends to 
anticipate uncertainty and ambiguity and uses framing of the proposal (Daviter, 2011; 
Saurugger, 2014) and access points through seconded national experts and contacts 
to the Parliament (Sundström, 2016) to counterbalance the uncertainty and 
ambiguity. Negotiation strategies and mechanisms are also dependent on actors 
knowing each other’s preferences. Consensus-building and controversy-seeking 
strategies such as coalition-building, issue-linkage, package deals and other types of 
deals are struck based on preference similarities (McKibben, 2013; McKibben, 2014).  
Why would either of the co-legislators let the Commission draft and submit a proposal 
and engage in intra- and inter-institutional negotiations first, only to let it fail due to 
extreme positions?  
Assuming the Commission is an honest agenda-setter and wants to place the 
proposal in the possible zone of agreement, based on its knowledge about the 
preferences of the Council and the Parliament, which have been demonstrably 
argued to be quite stable (Freund and Rittberger, 2001; Thomson, 2011; Héritier, 
1999; Bailer, 2013): And why then would the Commission be oblivious to changing 
dynamics in co-legislator preferences when considering policy change?  
It is much more plausible to presume that the roots of failure lie with the performance 
and behavior of the Commission. This can be because the Commission was unable 
to perform correctly as an agenda-setter and policy formulator, because it was 
unwilling to and deliberately set the proposal up for failure, or because failure is an 
important and deliberate step in the policy-making process.  
3.3.2 The causal mechanism model 2: the Commission as an imperfect 
technocrat  
 
If the Commission cannot correctly perform its task as the agenda-setter, deadlock is 
the result of high uncertainty about co-legislator preferences and a wrongful 
estimation of those preferences by the Commission and/or a wrongful translation into 
a policy proposal (figure 6). To put it simply: the co-legislators have a more or less 
clear idea of what they expect from policy change, but the Commission does not 
correctly assess the situation.   
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To those who view the EU policy-making process as an exercise in bureaucratic and 
administrative governance, the Commission is an imperfect technocratic bureaucracy 
(Nugent and Rhinard, 2015): The Commission is conceived of as the technocrat of 
the European institutions. It executes the task of drafting complex technical proposals 
and is in charge of mediating the technical aspects of negotiations between the co-
legislators, which requires a great deal of investment in expertise and an equivalent 
infrastructure (Zahariadis, 2008). However, the Commission’s resources and 
expertise are also limited: its bureaucracy is developed, but it is as susceptible to 
failure as any national bureaucracy, especially in cases or areas, where substantial 
technical expertise is required and its experience in dealing with the policy matters 
are not as developed (Nugent and Rhinard, 2015). This is the case for less integrated 
policy areas, or areas where sovereignty has long been guarded by member states 
(Boranbay-Akan, König and Osnabrügge, 2016; Lelieveldt and Princen, 2015; 
Sabatier and Weible, 2014; Ackrill, Kay and Zahariadis, 2013). 
 
(figure 6, imperfect technocrat, source: own illustration) 
 
If we transform this into a process model, this would mean that the Commission, due 
to high uncertainty, proposes legislation which deviates from the possible zone of 
agreement between Council and Parliament. The proposal is either too close to what 
the Parliament would prefer, or to the Council’s preferences, and by consequence too 
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far away from the respective other co-legislator. For this to result in success, the 
Commission will have to adapt the proposal as it learns about the Council’s and the 
Parliament’s positions to move within the zone of agreement and the co-legislators 
likewise will have to adopt positions within the possible zone of agreement to enable 
a bargaining process. This scenario of course assumes that the Commission is 
willing to adapt the proposal and the co-legislators are willing to adapt their positions. 
Without learning and updating, the proposal will fail. The learning and updating 
exercise requires capability on behalf of the Commission, but does not presume any 
strategic behavior, as the Commission is a technocratic agent.  
 
(Figure 7, causal mechanism of technocratic failure, source: own illustration)  
 
If the Commission’s inability to perform its duty as a policy formulator correctly is at 
the root of failure, we would expect the following conditions to hold.  
 
The overall policy agenda of the co-legislators is not opposed to policy change, both 
national governments and parliamentarians are aware of the problem and in favor of 
a European solution. National government officials and/or heads of state have 
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mentioned or raised the issue in meetings expressing themselves in favor of a 
European policy proposal. This is visible through mentions in European Council 
Conclusions or statements by national government representatives in favor of a 
European approach to a given problem. Party politics and coalition constellations in 
national constituencies and European institutions are favorable to the policy change 
at the time of agenda-setting, there is no signal of general opposition to policy 
change through public statements of national parties, heads of state and government 
officials and members of the European Parliament. Hence preference constellations 
regarding the policy change overlap sufficiently to enable a compromise. Failure 
would therefore be the result of a Commission presenting a proposal that does not fit 
the problem, or presenting a proposal too early, without the necessary opportunity in 
the agenda.  
 
The Commission can be unable to correctly assess whether there is a window of 
opportunity for a policy change and whether the agenda of key actors coincides with 
the intended policy proposal and develops policies, before a problem has been 
identified (Zahariadis, 2013), which is further aggravated by the increasing complexity 
of EU policy integration, as multiple policies and policy objectives impede each other 
(Streeck and Thelen, 2005) and coordination has to occur across sectors and 
multiples levels (Zahariadis, 2008), turning the policy process into a “garbage can” 
(Cohen et al., 1972; Richardson, 2006). Despite the best intentions, the Commission 
can be a flawed, boundedly rational5 policy initiator, which falls short of its task due to 
intervening factors such as time pressure, reduced capacities or normative 
pressures, which hinder the rational processing of information (Héritier, 2010; 
Zahariadis, 2008). 
 
One typical Commission fallacy during policy formulation is the failure to correctly 
estimate the zone of agreement. Informal channels exist, but are not always 
sufficiently or correctly used by the Commission to communicate with the Council 
Presidency, the permanent representations or the parliamentary committees and 
MEPs. We would then observe in the data that the Commission did not formally 
and/or informally collect sufficient information about co-legislator preferences and 
                                                          
5 “Bounded rationality asserts that decision-makers are intentionally rational; that is, they are goal-oriented and 
adaptive, but because of human cognitive and emotional architecture, they sometimes fail, occasionally in 
important decisions” (Jones, 1999: 297) 
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therefore falsely estimated the preference constellations in either or both of the co-
legislators or falsely translated the preferences into the policy proposal. There would 
be no sufficient information flows between the three legislative institutions during the 
consultation and the policy formulation phase and/or wrongful translation of the 
information would be received into the policy proposal. This should be visible through 
an absence of official documents attesting to information collection or exchange 
and/or the affirmation in interviews that the Commission did not perform according to 
the expectations in matters of policy design. The Commission would be pointed to as 
the source of (procedural, substantial) flaws in the policy proposal by the co-
legislators with emphasis on its technocratic inability to draw up an appropriate 
solution (Hartlapp et al., 2016; Howlett, 2012).  
 
The lack of information collection can be due to the following factors. One factor is 
mishaps in information transmission due to faulty transmission channels between co-
legislators and Commission (consultation phase). Consultation phase malfunction 
would imply no formal or informal contacts between the Commission and Council 
(Presidency, Secretariat or permanent representations) and Parliament (committees, 
MEPs, administration). If the malfunction occurs during the drafting phase, we would 
observe mishaps in internal coordination between directorates-general or policy units 
or hierarchical levels (desk officer, head of unit, director general, Commissioner, 
College of Commissioners) (Bovens and t'Hart, 1998). This would be visible in the 
data through contradictory information about preferences and positions provided by 
Commission and co-legislators respectively. Another factor is faulty transposition of 
information into the proposal (drafting phase). There are two types of mechanisms 
connected to the policy formulation phase that can lead to failure, due to erroneous 
Commission behavior. Firstly a lack of a window of opportunity: the Commission 
wrongly estimates the timing for the policy proposal and chooses a time where the 
focus of the co-legislators lies on other issues making them less inclined to invest in 
negotiations,  as policy needs a window of opportunity and creative agenda-setting 
(Wallace, 1996). Secondly, the Commission can wrongly estimate co-legislator 
preferences, resulting in flaws in the design of the proposed policy change that leads 
to co-legislators opposing the proposal, but not the policy change. This can be 
framing conflicts, if the issue as presented and framed is not coinciding with the 
expressed preferences and salient issues of the co-legislators leading to frame 
  
75 
 
contestation regarding the design of the proposal (substance, procedure, scope) 
(Daviter, 2011).  
 
Failure is expected to occur shortly after the agenda-setting stage, when the 
proposals are transmitted to the co-legislators for position-taking and the discrepancy 
is made between the proposal and the actual preference (figure 7, green marking). 
Either one or both of the co-legislators will reject the proposal or recommend revision 
of the policy proposal due to flaws in its design or the framing under which it is 
presented (figure 7, orange marking). Success is still possible, if the Commission 
engages in a learning and updating exercise (figure 7, red marking).  
 
The premise of this model is that the miscalculation is unintentional; a malfunction 
that leads to failure does not include a strategic intention on the side of the 
Commission or the co-legislators. The Commission’s performance as a policy initiator 
is called into question with regard to its ability to provide (legal, technical or political) 
expertise, which makes failure the result of a misfit between the policy solution and 
the perception of the problem (Scharpf, 1986; Zahariadis, 2008). Hence, we observe 
that the Commission is willing to withdraw and perform learning exercises in terms of 
acquiring more technical, legal or other information necessary to improve the 
proposal and make it acceptable to the co-legislators (Turnpenny et al., 2009; 
Howlett, 2012). This should be visible through the fact that the Commission seeks 
contact with the co-legislators, formally and informally, and engages in the acquisition 
of technical and legal expertise.  
 
Blame attribution and blame avoidance rhetoric (figure 7, blue marking) would be 
technical and legal, rather than political, as there are no concerns for the co-
legislators about the Commission pushing a particular agenda. There would be no 
particular mobilization by brakemen to oppose the policy change as such, but rather 
a questioning of factual accuracy or the framing of the presented proposal (Smeets, 
2015; Smeets, 2016). The blame attribution in this scenario is rather straightforward 
for the two co-legislators. As the Commission’s inability is the main reason for failure, 
the Commission will receive blame for not being able to draw up an acceptable 
proposal. Blame rhetoric by Council and Parliament centers around bureaucratic 
performance and the technocratic aspects of the policy formulation process such as 
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flaws in the procedure or the substance of the proposal with regard to technicality, 
feasibility, legal basis, financial costs, quantitative targets, or regulations.   
 
It is expected that the Commission will justify failure in reference to the complexity of 
the task, bureaucratic malfunctioning or information transmission problems. 
Commission rhetoric is justificatory and geared towards accounting for any potential 
mishaps by referring to the complexity of the issue, to time pressure, and/or technical 
and legal feasibility.  
 
3.3.3 The causal mechanism model 3: the Commission as a supranational 
activist  
 
Rather than being a perfect honest broker or an imperfect technocrat, the 
Commission can also be an activist, who tries to expand its powers (Hartlapp et al., 
2016) and pursue its own preferences (Franchino, 2009). The Commission can 
behave as a legislative activist, pushing for its own agenda when proposing 
legislation and thereby disregarding the interests and preferences of the co-
legislators (Bauer and Trondal, 2015). The reasons for such a behavior could be 
found in the Commission’s supranational identity as an institution and its naturally 
integrationist tendencies as an agenda-setter (Héritier, 1999). The disregard for the 
co-legislators preferences in policy formulation combined with the unwillingness to 
adapt the proposal during the negotiation process to move within the possible zone 
of agreement with the co-legislators explain failure in this case.  
 
The Commission is a “purposeful opportunist” (Cram, 1997) or a “skillful 
entrepreneur” (Haverland, De Ruiter and Van de Walle, 2016) whenever it pursues a 
strategy of power expansion (Bailer, 2013) by selecting input and expertise, as well 
as elements in the political agenda, which fit its own preferences (Franchino, 2009). 
The Commission tries  to exploit the other political actors dependence on immediate 
payoffs and its own longer time horizon  to frame policy in a way that increases its 
symbolic and reputational gains (Hartlapp, 2016), for example by referring to values 
and strategically connecting normative elements to the desired policy change 
(Verloo, 2005; Klein, 2013). 
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(figure 8, activist failure, source: own illustration)  
 
While, in bargaining theory, it is possible that either of the co-legislators block an 
activist proposal, in the institutional constellation of the EU, it is much more likely that 
member states in the Council would reject overly ambitious supranationalist 
proposals. This is a key difference to technocratic failure, where the co-legislators 
both signal that the proposal is not acceptable, in the case of activism, given the 
overall preference constellations of the institutions, it is more likely that the Council 
will block, because the Commission is considered to be overly supranationalist and 
would therefore be further away from the Council than from the Parliament (Nugent 
and Rhinard, 2015). Evidence from several studies in different policy areas, for 
example Justice and Home Affairs (Roos, 2013; Bürgin, 2017) and Social Affairs 
(Van der Vleuten, 2007),  suggest that the Commission as a policy entrepreneur and 
supranational activist is disregarding member states to the advantage of European 
institutions (Bauer and Trondal, 2015). The Parliament can therefore be expected to 
welcome and support the Commission initiative and side with the Commission, 
leading the Council to consider the Commission too responsive to EU institutions 
(Nugent and Rhinard, 2015).    
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Failure in this case is due to unilateral Commission action, a deliberate departure 
from the zone of possible agreement during the policy formulation process, which 
results in a proposal that does not correspond to the co-legislators’ agenda. It has 
been shown for several policy and issue areas, that the Commission displays activist 
behavior by pushing for a strongly integrationist agenda against the opposition of the 
Council in particular (Cini, 1996; Woll, 2006; Radaelli, 2000; Hooghe, 2001). The 
Commission brings forward a proposal that pushes its own agenda without 
responding to the Council’s preferences, but with an advertisement of its own agenda 
during the agenda-setting stage.  
 
(Figure 9, causal mechanism of activist failure, source: own illustration)  
The key condition for failure due to activist behavior by the Commission is the non-
coincidence of the overall agenda of the co-legislators with the proposed policy 
change. In particular, there is no demand for policy change at the European level by 
national governments and no indication that a European policy would be well-
received by domestic constituencies. Hence, national and European agendas of 
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national governments do not coincide, which makes the Council likely to oppose the 
policy change. There is no signal of support from national governments or explicit 
mention of a desire to have policy change on the issue. The European Council also 
does not signal support for the issue.   
 
Despite the availability of informal channels between all institutions, but the 
Commission disregards information transmitted. The Commission has had access to 
information about co-legislator preferences during policy formulation, formally or 
informally, through public statements or informal connections to member state and 
Parliament representatives. The Commission does not advertise the proposal as 
something demanded by member states or the Parliament, but refers to a pro-
European integration agenda and the benefits of the Commission being in charge of 
the policy issue.   
 
We can expect strong public rhetoric by Commission actors in favor of a legislative 
proposal by the Commission and no signal of support by co-legislators during 
agenda-setting: Council and Parliament do not pronounce themselves in favor of the 
initiative beforehand during agenda-setting and policy formulation. We expect no 
Parliament committee reports or statements by MEPs and no statements by Ministers 
or national leaders calling for a Commission-led legislative initiative.  
 
If the co-legislators are not in favor of the policy initiative, we should observe 
blockage by both co-legislators at an early stage of the negotiation process, as actors 
in both institutions will question the Commission claims and use of red lines, threats 
and blocking minority building to prevent progress on the proposal (Smeets, 2015; 
Smeets, 2016) (figure 9, orange marking).  
 
Failure will occur shortly after the agenda-setting stage, when the proposals are 
transmitted to the co-legislators for position-taking and the discrepancy between the 
proposal and the actual preferences becomes evident (figure 9, green marking). The 
Commission does not withdraw the proposal to recast a modified version that would 
be more acceptable to the co-legislators. If the co-legislators are not in favor of the 
policy initiative and do not desire a policy proposal on the issue, we should not see a 
follow-up revised proposal, but rather a definite rejection or withdrawal of the 
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proposal without follow-up. Brakemen will strongly mobilize against the policy change 
and form durable blocking minorities against the proposal (Smeets, 2015), while not 
encouraging a revision and recast of the proposal.  
 
Blame attribution rhetoric will focus on pinpointing Commission activism. The 
Commission will receive most of the blame for failure from both co-legislators (figure 
9, blue marking). The Council will blame supranationalist Commission activism and 
the fact that the Commission is willing to forsake practicality and feasibility to propose 
legislation, which is not beneficial to member states. The Parliament will blame the 
Commission for not sufficiently pushing the Council. The Commission will attribute 
blame mainly to the Council for being unwilling to accept more ambitious policy 
change and refer to obligations they should to deliver to citizens. The co-legislators 
will also attribute blame to each other, as it increases their respective reputational 
gains: The Council will blame the Parliament for siding with the Commission or being 
too lenient with the Commission and its activism. The Parliament will blame the 
Council for being intergovernmentalist and restrictionist and unwilling to consider a 
more ambitious policy change.  
3.3.4 Summary of previous models: conditions and mechanisms 
  
The following table provides a summary of the conditions (table 1) that are expected 
to be present, if any of the respective models applies to a given case of legislative 
failure. If a condition is present, it will be denoted with a positive sign (+), if it is 
absent, a negative sign (-) will be used.  
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(Table 1, conditions model 1-3, source: own illustration) 
 
The process of legislative failure is likely to contain the following mechanisms (table 
2)  that are to expected for each of the models, if they hold true. If a condition is 
present, it will be denoted with a positive sign (+), if it is absent,  a negative sign (-) 
will be used.  
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(Table 2, mechanisms model 1-3, source: own illustration) 
 
The previous models encompass the main findings of previous literature on 
Commission behavior and its role in the legislative process. The following model, I 
argue, provides a better understanding of the dynamics of failure in the EU policy 
process.   
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3.3.5 The causal mechanism model 4: Commission as a strategic actor in 
incremental, multi-stage policy and blame game 
 
Why, however, would the Commission go through the effort of drawing up a proposal 
only to risk failure? Because a proposal that does not build on the co-legislator 
preferences and is not geared towards a middle ground makes it likely that the co-
legislators let the proposal fail and the Commission does not get the policy change.  
The remaining puzzle, outlined in the introduction, for which none of the models 
presented so far can account is the fact that failed proposals often reappear in a 
changed form and are afterwards approved by the co-legislators.  
The argument made about failure being strategic is building on the observation that 
failure of a negotiation process, either deadlock, rejection or withdrawal of a proposal, 
does not lead to the definite disappearance of a policy project, but rather results in 
the Commission, revising or redrafting the proposal and adapting its strategy. Rather 
than being mutually exclusive, the aforementioned three models of failure can be 
combined with a strategic approach, if we follow the argumentation in the literature 
that the Commission can pursue more long-term goals and approach policy change 
in an incremental manner, due to its linear time horizon as a policy-maker (Hartlapp, 
2016). Where the Council and the Commission have a cyclic horizon, due to their 
dependence on elections, and need for more immediate payoffs, the Commission 
can delay success (Hartlapp, 2016; Nugent and Rhinard, 2015).   
There is something to gain for all legislative institutions in not letting a proposal pass 
in the first round. This includes procedural, substantive and  reputational gains. The 
legislative process becomes a multi-sequence game, where deadlock and failure are 
just the first stage, followed by one or more stages of negotiation that ultimately lead 
to success. The Commission behaves incrementally. It initially deliberately proposes 
legislation that is ambitious to enable a bargaining process in several rounds, 
interposed by a series of blame attribution and blame avoidance exercises by the 
Commission, Council and Parliament. The Council and the Parliament get immediate 
payoffs through the blame game and the Commission gets the desired policy change 
in the long run.  
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In the process, the Commission exploits the possibilities given by the formal and 
informal setting of the policy-making process to employ a combination of deliberate 
strategies, windows of opportunity and a policy of integration by stealth (Wallace, 
1996), partitioning, coupling, salami tactics or packaging policy to achieve small 
improvements while accommodating diverging interests (Roos, 2013; Sabatier and 
Weible, 2014; Ackrill, Kay and Zahariadis, 2013; Smeets, 2015) and engaging in 
framing and priming (Zahariadis, 2008). The result is a complex inter-institutional 
process with a mixture of orchestrated moves and procedural battles (Smeets, 2013; 
Smeets, 2015), blame, entrapment and exposure (Schimmelfennig, 2001; 
Schimmelfennig, 2003).  
The Commission as a policy inheritor is the pivotal actor (Nugent and Rhinard, 2015; 
Viteritti, 2010). Its policy initiatives are a continuation of previous EU action and the 
general lines have already been discussed by the Council and Parliament, so the 
Commission is clear on what the co-legislator prefer and can maneuver the policy 
process since it is present at all stages. However, it is not possible to clearly 
determine how responsive the Commission is to either of the two institutions, since 
exchanges are informal and not systematically recorded. Although crude figures 
indicate that the Commission is more responsive to the Parliament than the Council 
(Egeberg, 2014), the Commission’s power has shifted from the agenda-setting stage, 
which is increasingly bureaucratic, to the negotiation stage where the Commission 
becomes an informal mediator (Nugent and Rhinard, 2015).  
  
If the Commission is a strategic agenda-setter and political leader (Bauer and 
Trondal, 2015), it does not only provide for a compromise proposal, but actually sets 
the agenda strategically. It diverges from its role as a technocratic expert and a 
facilitator of EU policy-making. This means that the Commission intentionally drafts 
and frames proposals in a way that can diverge from both Council and Parliament 
preferences and continues to push for its agenda in the negotiation process, thus 
compromising the possibility for consensus (Ripoll Servent and Trauner, 2015; 
Boswell and Geddes, 2010; Kassim et al., 2013; Princen, 2007). If the Commission is 
a strategic agenda-setter, we can expect to see ambitious and integrationist 
proposals, or a framing, which true to the purpose of a supranational actor 
emphasizes the involvement of EU institutions and the transfer of competences from 
states to the EU level. Conflict and failure are likely in a setting where either 
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Commission or Parliament, or both, push for an agenda, which conflicts with the 
Council (Ripoll Servent and Trauner, 2015).  
 
(figure 10, strategic failure, source: own illustration) 
 
The rationale behind a multi-stage process is to enable all actors involved to not only 
bargain over gains and losses, but also frame others for those losses to escape 
blame vis-à-vis the respective constituencies, to which the institutions are 
accountable.  
The Council, and the actors who form the institution, are accountable to national 
governments and have to fulfill governmental and coalition promises (Wallace, 
Pollack and Young, 2015). The Parliament is accountable to citizens and bound by 
its role as the defender of fundamental rights and citizen interests (Ripoll Servent, 
2013). The Commission has to conform to both the role of mediator and promoter of 
European integration (Nugent and Rhinard, 2015). In the negotiation process, each 
institution tries to advance their interests to the greatest extent possible, but the 
understanding of consensus in the ordinary legislative procedure is one of balancing 
losses in substance and procedure with reputational gains. Similarly, Smeets (2013; 
2016) argued for the unanimity setting that the long shadow of the future and the 
mutual dependency on the goodwill of the others in future negotiations induce actors 
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to make sure that everyone can deal with failure in a face-saving way (Bovens and 
t'Hart, 1998).  
This is the model (figure 10) presumed to be most likely to explain policy failure in the 
legislative decision-making process. It presumes that the legislative institutions are 
strategic actors, who exploit the legislative game to maximize their gains through 
policy change, which includes procedural, substantive and reputational gains. Failure 
is therefore only a sequence in the set of negotiations that is necessary to achieve 
those gains.  
 
(Figure 11, causal mechanism of strategic failure, source: own illustration)  
The Commission performs a strategic role in policy formulation by setting the agenda 
of the proposal, it decides which elements to take up in the proposal and how much 
controversy to include. It tends to frame the initial proposal quite ambitiously instead 
of orienting it towards the lowest common denominator to increase the probability of 
a more ambitious policy output (Thomson et al., 2006; Daviter, 2011). The 
Commission collects information from all stakeholders, including the co-legislators 
and drafts an ambitious legislative proposal (Tsebelis, 1990; Roos, 2013) and 
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exploits the access to information about state preferences via seconded national 
experts to acquire information about which proposal would be most acceptable to the 
Council (Schmidt, 2000). The co-legislators respectively play a blame and threat 
avoidance (Naurin, 2010) and blame attribution game. They levels and institutional 
channels of access and exchange to each other and rely on relais actors, their 
experience, the trust in their ability and their personal contacts to counteract 
information asymmetry (Häge, 2011; Daviter 2011).  
At the agenda-setting stage, there are already possibilities for informal strategic 
influence of both co-legislators on the Commission. Both Council and Parliament 
keep strong informal ties with the Commission and the Commission usually enquires 
after the preferences of both institutions. The Commission, Council and Parliament 
do not always have the same agenda and it depends on how the issue is framed as 
to whether or not they can agree on the policy formulation (Princen, 2007; Princen, 
2011). There are several possibilities to frame a proposal and exert influence: The 
Council can uses seconded national experts or appeal to civil servants in the 
Commission based on nationality links, whereas the Parliament can form intergroups 
to have informal talks and try to put something on the EU agenda through statements 
and reports (Hartlapp, 2016; Bauer and Trondal, 2015; Sundström, 2016; Häge, 
2011).  
The main element of this variant of explaining failure is the possibility for all 
institutions involved to exploit failure to achieve reputational gains to compensate 
losses: those actors with the most losses in substance and procedure will be able to 
exploit failure to place blame on the others (Bovens and ‘t Hart, 1995; Brändström 
and Kuipers, 2003; Hood, 2002; Hood, 2007). Therefore, blame avoidance and 
blame attribution can be even more important than taking credit for successes 
(Weaver, 1986).  
In the first round of negotiations, the three institutions can make maximalist demands 
to be able to downscale in the following rounds without too many losses. Depending 
on the issue and the preference constellations, maximalist demands can come from 
the Parliament, the Council or both. In either case, the process between the co-
legislators will lead to deadlock.  
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The Parliament’s position will be more extensive and expansive than the 
Commission’s and much more than the Council’s, who will agree to negotiate if states 
have an interest in shifting issues to the EU level to forego accountability or deal with 
domestic pressure and will weigh the sovereignty losses issue per issue (Tsebelis 
and Garrett, 2000; Roos, 2013). Either Council or Parliament initiate first round 
deadlock (figure 11, orange marking).  
During the policy formulation stage, the Commission collects information from the co-
legislators during the agenda-setting process. All institutions are aware of each 
other’s preferences, but the Commission still submits an ambitious proposal, as part 
of the incremental approach, to ensure that after bargaining between the Council and 
the Parliament that the result is favorable to its preferences (Bauer and Trondal, 
2015).  
There have been sufficient contacts between the Commission and Council and 
Parliament during policy formulation and the Commission has received information 
from national governments and members of the Parliament through public statements 
and informal channels (Sundström, 2016).  
After submission of the proposal, we should see the start of the intra-institutional 
position-taking discussions in the Council and the Parliament to form their respective 
positions and start informal trilogues. While, actors signal general approval of the 
intended policy change and signal their support for investing in negotiating, they also 
voice opposition to the proposal as presented. Despite opposition, the co-legislators 
make it clear that a revised proposal would be welcome. Challenges to the proposal 
can include procedural and substantive dimensions. Actors can contest the frame, 
the factual accuracy or the scope of the proposal, as well as the substantive 
provisions, such as quotas or other targets (Smeets, 2015) (figure 11, green 
marking).    
In response to deadlock, the Commission will eventually withdraw the proposal and 
resubmit an amended version that is within the zone of agreement set by the co-
legislators. As a result, the institutions can frame failure to their advantage. The 
expected final outcome would be agreement after at least two rounds of negotiation. 
The negotiation rounds following failure will be used for bargaining over the details of 
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the proposal, with each institution trying to gain ground and amend the proposal in 
their favor.  
Everyone benefits from first round failure, because they get the opportunity to frame 
the gains and losses to their advantage: The Commission gets to first put out an 
ambitious proposal and advocate that it fights for a stronger Europe, for more 
integration and better policy solutions for the public, which is either too close to the 
Council or the Parliament in substance and/or procedure or promoting too much of a 
Commission-centric agenda. The Council gets to criticize the first proposal as far too 
ambitious and defend national sovereignty and frame the second, more moderate 
proposal as a success in defending national interests to the domestic public. The 
Parliament can take a strong position in the first round, defend rights and 
supranational integration thereby fulfilling its role as the defender of the European 
public and can blame any watering down on the Council.  
In the negotiation rounds following failure, we should then observe consensus-
building behavior and attempts at resolving remaining conflicts by all actors involved. 
The Commission will invest in exploiting windows of opportunity and frame the 
proposal in a way that enables compromise. And the Council and Parliament will 
employ strategic mechanisms to bring about majority coalitions and strike first 
reading agreements (figure 11, red marking).     
For this game to work, the overall policy agenda of the co-legislators has to be 
favorable to policy change. There is a window of opportunity to put forward the 
proposal and actors attach particular salience to the proposal. Both national 
governments and parliamentarians are aware of the problem and are in favor of a 
European solution: In other words, national government officials and/or heads of 
state have mentioned or raised the issue in meetings expressing themselves in favor 
of a European policy proposal.  
 
Preference constellations regarding the revised proposal have to overlap sufficiently 
to enable a compromise; as in, none of the actors oppose the policy change. Party 
politics and coalition constellations in national constituencies and European 
institutions are favorable to the policy change. Hence, there is no signal of general 
opposition to policy change through the public statements of national parties, heads 
of state and government officials and members of the European Parliament. 
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In terms of blame avoidance, we should see statements by actors from all institutions 
exploiting failure of the proposal to promote their respective agendas (Bovens and 
t'Hart, 1998; Héritier, 1999) (figure 11, blue marking):  
The Commission will endorse a liberal pro-integration agenda, promoting the need for 
European policy solutions to improve citizen’s rights, considering it is the best 
institution to represent those interests. The Council will defend a restrictive 
sovereignist agenda, promoting intergovernmentalism and the need to respect 
national policy traditions. Parliament will advocate itself as the advocate of a 
supranationalist agenda, promoting the need for European policy to counteract 
intergovernmentalist governments and advocating a citizen and rights-oriented 
perspective, considering it is the best institution to represent those interests.  
The Commission will blame any watering down of the proposal, losses in terms of 
supranationalization both in terms of substance and procedure, on the other two 
institutions. The Council will blame the Commission and the Parliament for being too 
ambitious and defend national sovereignty. The Parliament will blame the Council for 
being too intergovernmentalist and the Commission for being too lenient with the 
Council if it concedes to any demands.         
The changes made to the proposal in the second round give all institutions the 
opportunity to frame gains and losses to their advantage and benefit from an 
agreement that does not correspond to their ideal. The Commission frames any 
policy losses as a result of having to deal with an intergovernmentalist Council and 
an overzealous Parliament and frames any gains as a contribution to furthering 
integration. The Council frames the change from ambitious to more moderate as a 
gain in sovereignty and a success in defending national prerogatives and any losses 
as necessary concessions to a demanding Parliament or Commission. The 
Parliament will frame any losses as a result of Council dominance and the disregard 
of governments for citizen interests.  
3.5 Summary of all models and research mandate 
 
The following tables not only summarize the main conditions and mechanisms, but 
also indicate in a comparative perspective, whether they are supposed to be present 
(+) or absent (-)  in the case, if the respective model applies. This does not say 
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anything about the effect, which has been explained in the previous causal 
mechanism section.   
 
(Table 3, summary models and conditions, source: own illustration) 
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(Table 4, summary models and mechanisms, source: own illustration) 
 
The theoretical framework presented (chapter 2) and the proposed operationalization 
of the different models (chapter 3) will be tested on four cases of legislative deadlock 
and failure in two different policy areas, Justice and Home Affairs (chapters 5) and 
Social and Employment Policy (chapter 6), after a presentation and discussion of the 
chosen research design in the following chapter (chapter 4). The goal of the empirical 
analysis of the four cases of failure is to test the explanatory value of the proposed 
models and see to what extent actual inter-institutional dynamics correspond to the 
behavior we would expect. Furthermore, it will be investigated whether the expected 
conditions and mechanisms are present and conducive to failure or if there are other 
factors, we might be missing. Finally, the comparative approach will show if similar 
dynamics are at work in different policy areas. 
 
  
93 
 
IV. Research design: setting the baseline for process analysis   
 
The present chapter explains the research design, specifically the motivation to 
conduct process research doing comparative case studies, the choice of cases, data 
collection and data analysis methods. All methodological choices, especially the 
choice to combine qualitative content analysis of documents and expert interviews 
and triangulate them with media reports will be critically evaluated.   
4.1 Case selection strategy: qualitative comparative case studies to uncover 
processes of failure 
 
Whenever possible, we should use qualitative data to interpret quantitative findings in 
order to “get inside the processes underlying decision outcomes, and to investigate 
the reasons for the tipping points in historical time-series.” (Brady and Collier, 
2000:109) 
  
The goal of this study is to uncover mechanisms and causes of failure in contentious 
negotiation processes. There is a strong argument for an iterative design that 
combines deductive and inductive elements by using deduction to reconstruct 
potential explanations, specify the sequences and determine what should hold true 
for the explanation to be valid while also being open to adapting assumptions when 
discovering new evidence and gaining more insight into the cases (Bennett and 
Checkel, 2014). 
  
The most straightforward approach to process research is to conduct case studies, 
as they help reveal conditions and mechanisms and account for causal complexity, 
involving the overall agenda and context surrounding negotiation, the institutional 
dynamics, the personnel involved, and the influence of outside factors, for example 
the situation in member states (Smeets, 2015; Bennett and Checkel, 2014). Strategic 
action can be traced like moves in a chess game by tracing causal mechanisms 
within cases comparing these mechanisms across cases can permit to unveil causal 
heterogeneity (Naurin and Rasmussen, 2013). 
  
Comparing causal dynamics across similar or dissimilar cases can reveal if there 
might be a generalizable pattern and test whether there is a potential to generalize 
findings about mechanisms of failure. If related cases show similar dynamics, there 
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might be similar conditions and mechanisms at work (Bennett and Checkel, 2014). 
Choosing cases from similar policy areas is useful to see if the dynamics of failure 
tend to resemble each other in comparable cases with regard to the dynamics of 
failure. If just one case within one policy areas is analyzed, it is not possible to rule 
out that it might be a singular occurrence without any explanatory value or predictive 
capacity for other cases (Bennett and Elman, 2006; Bennett and Checkel, 2014). 
  
However, often, process research focuses on just one policy or issue area and 
misses out on the opportunity to test, if the same mechanisms and conditions are at 
play in other policy areas (Bennett and Elman, 2007). Comparison across policy 
areas would permit a tackling of the question of whether failure is inherently issue-
specific or policy-area-specific. Comparing issues within policy areas and across 
policy areas can help identify key factors/variables that enable success or condition 
failure (Bennett and Checkel, 2014) 
  
Ultimately, the goals of case study-based process research in this study are first and 
foremost to detect mechanisms and conditions of failure and to shed light on the 
causal heterogeneity and attempt a first step at explaining why findings of 
quantitative studies regarding certain structural and process factors are often 
inconclusive (Beach and Pedersen, 2013; Bennett and Checkel, 2014). It will allow 
giving detailed accounts of why and how certain factors cause outcomes and verify 
claims over key factors made by quantitative studies about policy failure and fill the 
gap of comparative causal mechanism research left by qualitative studies (Smeets, 
2015). 
  
Case study based research of negotiation processes in just a few selected cases 
faces a number of limitations. A certain level of uncertainty will remain, due to 
missing evidence, biased case selection or insufficient corroboration of expectations 
by the evidence given. Also, the researcher will be unable to credibly generalize 
beyond the cases researched (Beach and Pedersen, 2013; Beach and Pedersen, 
2011). It is possible to try looking at the bigger picture of all possible cases that are 
similar, but the mechanisms and conditions detected for the cases in question could 
turn out to be outliers in a larger set of cases. Apart from those cross-sectional 
limitations, the lack of longitudinal data does not provide the ability to convincingly 
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show whether the mechanisms are consistent over time or are just very specific to 
the context of the particular cases. Conclusions drawn about dynamics of failure will 
therefore be specific to a post-Lisbon and crisis setting context, the framework of co-
decision and qualified majority voting and the policy areas of Justice and Home 
Affairs, as well as Social and Employment policy. One could even present arguments 
in the issue areas of border policy and gender equality policy, since the broader 
policy areas both contain a number of other issue areas, which are likely to follow 
different dynamics.  
4.1.1 Choice of policy and issue areas: looking for controversy to find failure 
  
Why choose cases from the area of Justice and Home Affairs and Social and 
Employment policy and why compare them? 
  
In the context of the post-Lisbon era, it is interesting to look at cases in high politics 
policy areas, which are naturally prone to contentiousness, where Lisbon has 
affected the institutional framework, resulting in a deepening of integration and an 
increase in the competences of supranational actors, such as Justice and Home 
Affairs, and compare it to an area, which has been comparatively less affected by the 
Treaty changes, like Social and Employment policy. The degree of competence the 
EU possesses in policy areas and the experience with policy-making in the 
respective issue-areas is likely to affect negotiation dynamics and provide for more or 
fewer opportunities for strategic action. 
  
The Lisbon Treaty also changed the applicable decision-making and voting rules in 
many policy areas. Not only did member states transfer further competences, they 
also integrated more policy areas into the co-decision framework while also 
expanding qualified majority voting. Co-decision puts Council and Parliament on 
equal footing, giving the Parliament more influence and also more opportunities to 
pressure and even threaten the Council, because of a longer shadow of the future 
that incites the Council to take its positions seriously, if it wants to avoid retaliation in 
future negotiations. Qualified majority voting influences the strategic choices actors 
can make: while in unanimity, every single position, reservation and opposition has to 
be taken very seriously, because it could lead to negotiation failure. This is entirely 
different in qualified majority voting where an outlier position can be outvoted if 
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necessary and where actors are forced to build majority coalitions to support their 
positions, making it more likely to be selective in the type of coalition partner one 
would look for, which mostly applies to the big member states due to voting weight. 
  
We might expect that areas, which are less integrated provide for fewer opportunities 
for supranational actors, Commission as well as Parliament, to exert pressure, 
because they have fewer occasions and member states still retain the majority of 
competences. It is also conceivable that the Commission and the Parliament would 
be particularly keen on expanding their influence in these areas, by deliberately trying 
to push expansive proposals and be tough in the negotiations. The opportunities for 
strategic action are also likely to differ for actors depending on which policy area they 
negotiate in: issue linkages, package deals, coalitions and other strategies are more 
readily available in areas with high levels of integration, where repeated interaction 
and thick networks are a given, than in areas with relatively limited policy-making 
experience. 
  
Justice and Home Affairs is significantly more integrated than Social and 
Employment Policy. There is greater policy interdependence due to a greater 
accumulation of policies over time. The EU possesses more competences in Justice 
and Home Affairs to legislate and the policy area is almost entirely under co-decision 
and QMV now (Laursen, 2012; Wallace, Pollack and Young, 2015). 
  
The crisis context makes critical cases. It increases contentiousness and changes 
salience levels for high and low politics issues. It can be expected that cases with 
direct relation to the crises are of increased importance to policy-makers. Selecting 
current cases, in the post-Lisbon crisis setting, which are linked to the two major 
crises, the economic and financial as well as the migration and security crisis, 
therefore seems to be an appropriate choice. 
  
What started as a primarily financial crisis in 2008, has now developed into a full-
blown economic crisis with significant implications for the welfare state. The crisis 
affected many policy areas, amongst them social and employment policy, especially 
issue-areas related to national labor markets. It can be expected that member state 
governments show less willingness to agree to policy that has financial implications 
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or affects business in a way that is likely to interfere in the labor market and 
potentially cause adversity between governments and businesses. 
  
The immigration crisis started in 2011 with the increased migrant influx due to the 
Arab spring and developed into a full-blown security crisis caused by external border 
problems and the multiple terror attacks starting in 2015. Justice and home affairs, is 
undoubtedly the area that has been most affected by the crisis, especially the area of 
border policy regarding Schengen’s internal and external borders. It can be expected 
that due to increased urgency, member states would raise the issue of control and 
securitization in the Council more frequently, whereas the Parliament would be more 
concerned with civil liberties and rights protection (Ripoll Servent and Trauner, 2015). 
Member states are likely to show less willingness to accept Commission involvement, 
but a desire for quick and problem-focused solutions (Roos, 2013; Ette and Faist, 
2007). 
  
Research has not given a definite answer on how to conceptualize and how to 
measure salience levels of policy areas and issues (Beyers, Dür and Wonka, 2017; 
Leuffen, Marlang and Wörle, 2014), but the common ground is that an issue is salient 
if it is considered to be of great importance in comparison to other issue areas and 
actors dedicate a disproportionate amount of attention to it (Oppermann and Viehrig, 
2011; Warntjen, 2012; Roos, 2013).  
  
Controversy, deadlock and failure are more likely to happen in cases where conflict 
and preference divergence are present, which supposedly happens in areas of high 
importance to policy-makers (high salience policy areas). This also happens with 
issues that are high on the agenda for politicians and the public in their 
constituencies (high salience issue areas) (Thomson, 2011). Considering the above 
mentioned setting, it is not difficult to assume that in the crisis context, security and 
economy-related policies would be of particular importance to policy makers, but the 
crisis also creates a more complicated setting of interests and preference 
constellations and a higher potential for conflict, thus making these policy areas 
interesting choices for crucial conflict cases (Bauer and Becker, 2016). Within the 
area of Justice and Home Affairs and Social and Employment Policy, there are areas 
of particular importance and urgency for member state governments in the crisis 
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context, namely border policy and labour-market policy. At the same time pressure is 
high on the EU to find solutions and avoid failure in view of a skeptical public opinion 
whose opinions increasingly mirror populist forces. 
 
Justice and Home Affairs has become the most salient area in EU policy-making and 
attracts the most attention from policy-makers as well as public opinion, gradually 
increasing since the outbreak of the migration and security crisis from 2011 onwards. 
Schengen, matters related to internal and external borders, are of particular 
importance to the public (De Capitani, 2014; Hilpert, 2015; Novotná, 2014).  
 
Compared to Justice and Home Affairs matters, Social and Employment Policy is 
less salient, but remained very important to member states with regard to budgetary 
implications of labor-market related policy initiatives. Gender equality matters seem 
to be of particular importance in that regard, and public opinion seems to favor legal 
measures (Graziano and Hartlapp, 2015).  
4.1.2 Choice of failure cases: explaining outcome selection   
 
If failure is understood as proposals that have been withdrawn or rejected, deadlock 
should be understood as halt of negotiations due to lack of grounds to find 
agreement, as defined and conceptualized in the introductory chapter of this thesis., 
Therefore, we can set the following criteria for case selection: (1) failure followed by 
success (several rounds of negotiation), (2) failure without follow-up (absolute failure) 
and ultimately (3) deadlock without failure (halt of negotiations without withdrawal or 
rejection). Ideally, these cases would be clearly distinguishable in order to be able to 
clearly pinpoint types of failure and make a neat comparison of processes and causal 
mechanisms. However, due to the long time horizon of EU negotiations, not all cases 
are completed within 3 years. Consequently, there are cases, which are hard to 
classify, because negotiations have not formally ended in adoption of legislation or in 
rejection/withdrawal with an announcement of non-follow-up. For these cases, it is 
not possible to draw definite conclusions yet. It is only possible to evaluate the state 
of negotiations to see whether the negotiations point towards success or failure. 
Therefore, the typology more closely resembles (1) failure followed by success (2) 
failure followed by ongoing negotiations, with possible outcomes being either a 
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success or failure and (3) persistent deadlock, with possible outcomes being failure 
or success. 
  
It is difficult to anticipate success or failure in ongoing negotiations. Some of the 
deadlocked cases can still result in success if one of the selected cases is 
deadlocked, but has not failed. Therefore, depending on changes in circumstances or 
positions of key actors, success is still possible. Comparing failure cases to at least 
one success case seems logical, since we want to distinguish between successful 
consensus-building and persistent deadlock that leads to negotiation failure. The 
cases, which have ended in deadlock will be considered positive cases, whereas 
cases where deadlock was successfully resolved and the negotiation ended in 
agreement will be counted as negative cases. Within the set of positive cases, there 
is a variation between them. 
  
The following cases presented themselves for this analysis in the post-Lisbon co-
decision framework were selected based on the conceptualization of failure provided 
in the introductory chapter: 
 
1. Proposals where failure occurred in the first round and deadlock in the second 
round, but was turned into agreement: Schengen, Smart Borders 
 
These two cases correspond to type (1) failure followed by success. Both policy-
making processes contained instances of deadlock and failure in the first round, 
followed by agreement as the final outcome.   
 
2. Proposals where failure occurred and the second round is still ongoing, 
without deadlock: Maternity Leave 
 
The unclear state of the second round of negotiations in the third case (2), the 
Maternity Leave Directive, can most likely be attributed to the long time horizon of 
policy-making, and the the lack of time limits on informal negotiations prior to the 
formal launch of the first reading procedure. The recast package seems to be on the 
track to agreement in the Council, as there is no signal of blockage inside the Council 
and the Parliament is negotiating the file inside the relevant committees.      
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3. Proposals where deadlock occurred and the outcome is still uncertain: Gender 
Quota   
  
The persistent deadlock (3) in the case of Gender Quota does not currently fall in the 
category of failure cases that qualify for the multi-sequence model, which makes it a 
negative case at this state. However, again, due to the long and rather uncertain 
horizon of EU policy-making, it cannot be entirely excluded that even after six years 
of deadlock, there will be a second round. Still, for the framework of this thesis, and 
according to the current state of the file, we can treat it as a negative case at this 
point.   
 
There are other rejected or deadlocked proposals in the Commission’s policy record, 
but they fall outside the scope conditions of this framework: this includes procedures 
other than the co-decision framework and proposals negotiated under unanimity. It 
also encompasses proposals negotiated before Lisbon, as well as non-legislative or 
other soft law measures, where the stakes for the actors involved are different than 
they are for binding legislation. Withdrawal and failure of proposals due to external 
factors that are not linked to the legislative process such as legal incompatibility with 
the Treaty are also not included. A proposal can also become obsolote, because the 
problem has been solved through other forms of measures or other legislation at the 
European, international or national level. But this does not fall into the scope of 
contentious cases either. While these cases also constitute instances of failure, it 
cannot be convincingly argued that there is a multi-sequence failure game 
orchestrated by the legislative institutions.  
4.2 Data selection and collection  
4.2.1 Strategies of data collection: purposive selection  
 
Actual policy choices must be traced back to focal points that establish which specific 
aspects of a legislative proposal dominate the perceptions of political actors and 
motivate their actions (Hörl et al., 2005; Ringe, 2005; Rittberger, 2000). These focal 
points can, on the one hand, be important landmarks within the decision-making 
process, such as meetings and formal declarations dedcuted from official documents, 
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and on the other hand portrayals of actor perceptions, visible in the media and public 
statements, as well as ex-post interviews. 
  
This approach faces the challenge of determining at where the start and end points 
of data collection should be set (Bennett and Checkel, 2014). When tracing 
legislative processes with the aim of understanding the dynamics of success and 
failure as presented in the theoretical framework presented above, there is no clear 
answer as to where data collection should start and where it should end. This is 
especially true for strategic processes with more than one round of negotiations. The 
cases chosen for the analysis all overlap, but each case has its own time horizon, 
some cases have a much longer genesis than others, dating back to European 
Council conclusions and Commission communications from times prior to the Treaty 
of Lisbon. This can make it necessary to go further back in time for data collection, 
while others have a much shorter life span. 
  
If agenda-setting is considered, data collection cannot start with the formal 
submission of the proposal, since much of the strategic planning by the Commission 
and informal exchanges with the co-legislators will already have taken place before 
that (Geuijen et al., 2008). A starting point can be the explicit mention of the issue by 
heads of state in European Council conclusions, potentially accompanied by a call on 
the Commission to present a proposal since the European Council is the formal 
agenda-setter for European policy and the one giving incentives to the Commission 
on what to propose in terms of legislation (Bocquillon and Dobbels, 2014), or the 
absence thereof. As for the end date, for success cases, the end date of document 
collection occurs with adoption. However for failure and deadlock cases, there is no 
clear end point. Therefore, we chose a pragmatic approach and stopped data 
collection at the after the Maltese and the Estonian Council Presidency in 
November/December 2017 to include progress on second rounds in failure cases, 
while allowing for sufficient time to perform data analysis.  
 
The data collection process for documents started in April 2015 and ended in 
December 2017 in order to be able to devote enough time to interview transcription, 
data preparation and data analysis. Additional documents were collected again in 
January 2018 to verify the progress of the three files, which were still under 
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negotiation by the end of 2017. It could be confirmed through this second round of 
document collection that the Smart Borders case had been concluded and an 
agreement had been reached by November and December 2017. For the analysis of 
the consensus-building process in the second round of the Smart Borders case, 
documents will be the main source of information due to time constraints, which 
render conducting more interviews impossible on such short notice.  
  
There is a confidentiality issue regarding official documents in the Council and to 
some extent the Parliament: the relevant process documents about the trilogue 
negotiations are often not accessible to the public, even after request to the relevant 
bodies. This applies mainly the Council Secretariat General despite its transparency 
commitment. The justification provided by the Secretariat General in an official letter 
focused on the protection of sensitive information that could potentially compromise 
EU negotiations and action, and even affect public interest and security. 
  
Here are selected quotes from the letter sent in June 20176 by the department of the 
Secretariat General of the Council dealing with transparency and requests for access 
to documents. This letter was the reply to several requests sent about the different 
cases: 
  
“Full release of the information contained in this document would reveal to third parties 
sensitive details of concrete cases. This would affect the efficiency of the European Union's 
action to combat illegal immigration, terrorism and serious crime in Member States.” (Smart 
Borders) 
  
“Disclosure of the document would therefore undermine the protection of the public interest 
as regards public security. As a consequence, the General secretariat has to refuse full 
access to this document.” (Smart Borders) 
  
“Release to the public of the information contained in these notes would affect the negotiating 
process and diminish the chances of the Council reaching an agreement.” (Gender quota) 
  
“Disclosure of the documents at this stage would therefore seriously undermine the decision 
making-process of the Council. As a consequence, the General secretariat has to refuse 
access to these documents at this stage.” (Gender Quota) 
  
“The decision-making process in question in currently ongoing. Moreover the discussions are 
sensitive and complex. The issue analysed in the opinion forms an important part of the basis 
                                                          
6 The response letter from the Council Secretariat General can be found in the annex.  
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for the discussions. Disclosure of the legal advice would adversely affect the negotiations by 
impeding internal discussions of the Council on the proposal and would hence the risk 
compromising the capacity of the Council to reach an agreement on the dossier and thus 
undermine the decision-making process (...) Moreover, the legal advice covered by this 
opinion deals with issues which are contentious and where the legal position remains to be 
clarified. The legal advice is therefore particularly sensitive.” (Gender Quota) 
 
4.2.2 Official documents: the baseline to reconstruct the process 
 
A little over 400 official case-related documents, of variable size and in multiple 
languages, German, English and French, were collected manually and through a 
programmed web-scraping search with R in the official EU databases, Consilium, 
EURLEX and the Legislative Observatory of the European Parliament. This was done 
to ensure that all relevant material connected to each of the four cases has been 
taken into account7. Only documents with immediate relevance to the cases and 
containing valuable information were selected for analyis. A great number of 
administrative documents were excluded from the analysis, because the content was 
not valid for the intended analysis and did not help answer the research question. 
The documents will be used as evidence in the in-depth process analysis of the four 
empirical cases in a two-tiered approach. Firstly, outstanding text passages will be 
used in the narrative of the process analysis to support arguments about frames, 
actions, conditions and mechanisms. Secondly, all document excerpts speaking for 
or against an explanatory model of failure will be collected and evaluated. This allows 
for the drawing of better conclusions about how much evidence there is in favor of 
the preferred explanation.    
 
For the present analysis, all official documents, released by all three legislative 
institutions, with reference to the proposals under study have been collected and 
analyzed for all cases. Using the documents, a timeline for each negotiation process 
will be reconstructed to determine the landmarks in every process and reconstruct 
the formal process, which surrounds and frames the informal actor dynamics we are 
interested in. The documents were also used to trace the progress of negotiations in 
each institution and between the institutions, including both the temporal progress 
and the substantive negotiation process. Qualitative analysis and comparison of all 
                                                          
7 A list of all the documents and links to the EURLEX process files can be found in the annex, sorted 
chronologically by case.  
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available documents on one legislative file allow for the reconstruction of the formal 
part of the negotiations. This includes both the procedural progress, such as the 
amount of exchanges and the substantial progress, as the documents reflect the 
textual amendments and changes actors negotiated in the meetings in the Council, 
the Parliament and the trilogue negotiations.  
4.2.3 Media reports: complementary source for triangulation 
 
A little over 150 media documents, of variable size and in multiple languages, 
English, German and French, were collected manually at first and through a 
LexisNexis search afterwards to complement the manual search and ensure that no 
important documents were missing8. It has to be said, however, that the search for 
non-English reports using software or LexisNexis, proved to be quite fruitless, as the 
results were often articles that were not at all related to the case. This might be due 
to translation problems in the search machines. Verifications at random by doing 
manual searches on Google for specific newspapers in other languages, however, 
indicated that there might not be more reporting on the issue, thereby supporting the 
scarce output of the automated search.Those media documents without valuable 
information for the study subject were excluded from the analysis, they either just 
mentioned the case, but did not contain any valuable information about the above-
mentioned elements that would provide insight into the process of failure. 
 
To understand why actors adopt certain positions and develop and publicly 
communicate certain perceptions, it is important to look at how they portray an issue 
to the public, mostly through media channels, and which elements they emphasize in 
particular. Communicating to the public is an important part of policy-making, as 
politicians will be evaluated at election times by how responsive they have been to 
the voter, hence their interest in constantly relating to public opinion (Kohler-Koch, 
2000; Daviter, 2011). Actors engage in priming to set the agenda, by emphasizing 
particular elements of the issue when speaking of it and cause individuals to focus on 
these considerations when forming their opinion (Druckman, 2001; Druckman, 2004; 
De Vreese, 2012). 
 
                                                          
8 Links to all online media reports can be found in the annex to this thesis, sorted by case. A PDF version of the 
document, media report and interview analysis is provided in a separate database CD annex, as it amounts to 
265 pages for all three cases.   
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The media reports will mainly be used for triangulation purposes (Davies, 2001) to 
verify whether information provided in documents and interviews corresponds to the 
information given to the public via media channels as triangulation of data is an 
important part of verifying the reliability of the evidence collected to support claims. 
Triangulation in the case of inferring actor strategies from negotiation processes, 
using public statements and media reporting can be a means of cross-checking 
information gained from interviews in order to see whether there are any 
contradictions between public framing by an actor and what they reveal about the 
process in the interview setting (Druckman, 2004; Kangas et al., 2014). Relying on 
media reports alongside official documents and interviews is therefore part of the 
triangulation process to compare how issues and strategic choices are framed in the 
public media compared to how actors frame them in the confidential setting of 
interviews and detect potential contradictions9 (Lecheler, De Vreese and Slothuus, 
2009; Matthes, 2011). Eurobarometer and national opinion polls and media reports 
about public opinion trends at the European and national level provide a snapshot of 
trends in public opinion at specific times, and allow for the determination of how 
salient an issue has been at the starting point of a negotiation10 (Oppermann and 
Viehrig, 2011). But to observe which elements are picked up by actors and put on the 
agenda, how the tone of the debate develops and to what extent contentiousness 
increases or decreases, it is necessary to monitor actor behaviour and their 
statements closely through all possible channels (Slothuus and De Vreese, 2010; 
Semetko and Valkenburg, 2000; Atikcan, 2015).  
4.2.4 Expert interviews  
 
From June 2015 to June 2017, a total of 145 interview requests were sent out to 
relevant experts in the institutions, including member state representatives in national 
capitals, which are connected to the cases11. The interviews will be used as evidence 
in the in-depth process analysis of the four empirical cases in a two-tiered approach. 
Firstly, outstanding statements will be used in the narrative of the process analysis to 
support arguments about frames, actions, conditions and mechanisms. Secondly, all 
                                                          
9 Tables reflecting the collection and analysis of media reports for each case will be provided in the annex.     
10 See annex for salience reports for Justice and Home Affairs, speficially border policy and gender equality policy  
11 The transcripts of all interviews will be provided as PDF on a separate database annex, alongside the media 
reports. For practical reasons mainly, as the PDF counts 265 pages. Also, the content of the interviews is 
politically sensitive in some of the cases, there was no authorization by most of the interviewees to provide full 
transcripts along with the analysis, hence, only anonymized quotes will be used as evidence in the analysis of the 
cases.  
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interviews excerpts speaking for or against an explanatory model of failure will be 
collected and evaluated using the tailormade model of categories to look for position 
and conflict frames, as well as justifications of choices. This allows better conclusions 
to be drawn about how much evidence there is in favor of the preferred explanation.    
 
The interview questionnaires were individually developed for each interview and 
tailored to the specific information the expert could provide for the case analysis12. 
This individual tailoring instead of standardization enables the researcher to 
specifically search for and not miss out on key information and reduces the amount of 
unnecessary noise to a minimum (Tansey, 2007; Gläser and Laudel, 2010). An 
example for such a tailored approach would be the following: for an interview with a 
Parliament rapporteur on a specific case, it makes sense to tailor the questions to the 
specific case and ask for as much insider information about the committee process 
and the trilogues as possible. For an interview with a Commission official in a DG that 
was in charge of the drafting of a particular policy proposal, it is advisable to ask 
about internal dynamics, priorities, consultation strategies and so forth. Depending on 
the case, questionnaires might need to be readjusted even for the same type of 
actor, because each process and each proposal is different. Therefore, each 
questionnaire is somewhat different from the other, as knowledge about the case and 
expertise in conducting interviews increased, the questionnaires became more and 
more elaborate and refined (Dilley, 2000; Goldstein, 2002). This can hinder 
comparability, but for the sake of uncovering as many details as possible about 
causal mechanisms of failure, it was commendable to focus on the acquisition of 
information, rather than on the standardization of questions and answers (Harvey, 
2011).  
 
A total of 61 semi-structured interviews were conducted in multiple languages, 
German, English and French and could be used for the empirical analysis, because 
they were of a sufficiently high value in terms of content and quality of the recording 
or notes, a couple of interviews from the early stages of the data collection process 
had to be discarded, because they did not contain information, which was helpful to 
the understanding of the cases or did not respond to the overall research 
question.  Among those 61 interviews, there are actors in the Commission, Council 
                                                          
12 Examples for interview questionnaires will be provided in the annex. They are representative of the type of 
questions asked.  
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and Parliament, at different levels of the institutional hierarchy, most of them directly 
connected to the cases. A few are not direct informants on cases, but rather general 
informants on the legislative process and the dynamics of controversy, success and 
failure. Even within those 61 interviews, the quality and amount of information 
provided vary greatly.   
 
Not all could be recorded, because interviewees voiced confidentiality concerns. For 
those without recording, extensive notes were taken during and after the interview 
and transcribed alongside the recordings to be used for data analysis. There is no 
major difference in quality or evidence provided between recorded and non-recorded 
interviews. The willingness to divulge information did not depend on whether 
recordings were done, but rather on the personal preference of the actor and the 
level of discretion they had vis-à-vis their superior (Hermanowicz, 2002). All 
interviews have been fully transcribed, either by transcribing the recording or the 
notes taken during the interview. For the sake of comprehensiveness, language 
mistakes, stutters or digressions have been edited out of the transcripts, unless they 
were relevant for the message conveyed by the expert.  
 
Interviews as a source for political analysis have been controversially discussed. The 
researcher has to face the difficulty of balancing the quest for access to the process 
and the risk of poor data quality, bias and trustworthiness issues. Such drawbacks of 
working with political elites have been extensively discussed in political science and 
qualitative methods research (Kvale, 1994; Kezar, 2003; Tansey, 2007; Glaser and 
Laudel, 2010). 
  
However, interviews often serve as a means of inferring action post-hoc (Gläser and 
Laudel, 2010; Lodge, 2013). In this study, experts are viewed as sources of 
information, which provide access to the object of study: in this case negotiation 
processes, and enable the researcher to reconstruct the process (Gläser and Laudel, 
2010: 13). The only alternative to gain access to highly informal and secluded 
negotiations would be participatory observation, the ideal source of information about 
negotiation processes (Smeets, 2015; Smeets, 2016). However, directly participating 
in the negotiations in order to be able to observe both the formal and the informal 
parts of the process is often impossible for the researcher. 
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Another common shortcoming of interviews is the problem of ex-post rationalization. 
By the time actors are interviewed, the process is often completed and even if it is 
not, the information is not directly taken from the process, but inferred from how 
actors recall the process. This poses a number of problems related to how humans 
process information, which encompasses a number of cognitive selection and 
processing elements, that can distort data quality and those can be intentional or 
unintentional processes. Actors can simply wrongly recall a process or deliberately 
try to misrepresent the process to propagate a certain point of view, neither of which 
can be assessed through the methods available in this type of research design. 
  
This is linked to the problem of incorrect recollection or memory lacunae. Even if 
actors were accessible, data quality could still be impaired by memory lacunae. 
Some actors had difficulties recalling negotiations that were no longer ongoing, or 
that had been stalled for a while. There was also variation in terms of how much 
attention actors paid to the individual issues, which was linked to how important the 
issue was to their respective states, political groups or administrative units 
(Gigerenzer and Selten, 2002; Gigerenzer and Goldstein, 1996; Searing, 1991). 
  
There is also a danger of potential selectivity and biases in evidentiary sources 
(Bennett and Checkel, 2014). Experts potentially have instrumental motives for the 
actors involved in conveying a particular message. Since it is difficult to assess the 
intensity and impact of instrumental motives in interview situations, the most 
convenient way of dealing with the credibility and dependability issue in this case is 
triangulation, as it allows for the detection of contradictions and verify the accuracy of 
statements, especially if expert interviews are triangulated with public sources. 
  
Elite interviews are a special form of interviewing, in addition to difficulties mentioned 
above, the researcher also has to deal with reconciling scientific standards with 
requirements of confidentiality and political sensitivities (Davies, 2001; Dilley, 2000; 
Dexter 2006). Access to political experts is limited: the response rate is comparatively 
low, given the large time frame that was set for the data collection and the amount of 
requests sent out in terms of overall people and in terms of repeated demands to the 
individuals actors. Also, there are considerable concerns about confidentiality, 
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especially regarding controversial cases this is a common phenomenon. A small 
number of actors agreed to being quoted by name and affiliation, most preferred to 
remain anonymous, but still expressed concerns over how the data would be used, 
especially sensitive elements such as names of states and important actors, 
strategies and conflict dynamics, which could not be derived from public documents, 
a large majority of interviewees did not consent to be recorded and some information 
was only given off the record (Gläser and Laudel, 2010). 
  
Apart from problems of access and confidentiality, expert interviews also produce 
problems of heterogeneity in terms of data quality and completeness (Tansey, 2007). 
The credo with regards to access to sensitive informal processes is often that ‘little 
access is better than no access and some data is better than none’, because even a 
small glimpse inside the process is already better than no insight at all (Beach and 
Pedersen, 2011) but the refusal of recording or taking refuge in off-record statements 
further increase problems with incompleteness and potentially decrease the quality. 
  
Some of these problems could be resolved by promising to keep the information 
anonymous eliminating all elements that might give away the identity of the 
interviewee, such as names, affiliations with a country or institution. Often they 
agreed to be quoted in reference to their general affiliation, state representative, 
Commission expert or member of the European Parliament, but most preferred to 
keep it as general as possible. Some of the accessibility and quality problems could 
be resolved by selecting cases that were rather recent, thus increasing the chances 
of actors still being available. But none of the problems can be fully avoided, because 
people cannot be forced to respond, therefore the database will most likely contain 
some form of bias corresponding to the patterns discussed above. 
  
Regarding the sampling strategy of expert interviews, a combination of random and 
purposive sampling appears appropriate. Actors which were actually involved in the 
negotiations will be contacted to get the information required to infer the course of the 
negotiation process, but the selection of actors within the sample of those involved 
will be randomized, to avoid creating a bias based on nationality (Bleich and 
Pekkanen, 2013; Hermanowicz, 2002). 
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Regarding the success rate, less than half of the people contacted agreed to be 
interviewed, the others did not respond or declined with the number of non-
responses being generally higher than the number of refusals. The combination of 
purposive and random sampling only worked out in part, as there are some patterns 
with regard to which people were more likely to respond positively. In general, 
member state representations were more willing to talk than MEPs in absolute 
numbers, Commission officials were less reluctant to talk, but rather reclusive once 
interviewed. Between Council and Parliament members, there were no significant 
differences inter-institutionally as to how much information people revealed. Rather it 
seemed to be a question of national practices and personal preferences. Some 
examples for country-specific patterns, which emerged: Germans are generally hard 
to get and very non-responsive both when planning the interview and conducting it. 
  
Regarding data saturation, there is also variation across institutions, both in terms of 
descriptive responsiveness (favorable responses to interview request) and 
substantive responsiveness (openness to reveal information) (Bleich and Pekkanen, 
2013): As regards descriptive responsiveness of state representatives, there is a 
pattern of non-response: the southern European states can either not be reached, 
either because their email addresses did not work or because they never responded. 
Even personal connections did not help: the Greek delegation never responded, 
despite recommendations from a Greek connection. The only exception was one 
positive response from the Portuguese and one from the Spanish permanent 
representation after several tries. The Scandinavian states and the UK were 
extremely responsive. Tthe UK, Sweden, Denmark and Finland all agreed to be 
interviewed and even suggested further contacts that might be helpful. The same 
goes for the BENELUX countries. There is no clear pattern as to the CEE states, 
Poland was responsive after several attempts and agreed to interviews, Slovakia, 
Romania and Slovenia agreed in some areas, but not others, nothing came from the 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Bulgaria. There were similar patterns for France, Austria 
and Germany, interestingly, they were willing to talk about Justice and Home Affairs 
and not about Social and Employment Policy. The Baltic states display differences as 
well, the Lithuanian and Estonian representatives were quite responsive, while the 
Latvians were not. 
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Regarding substantive responsiveness, again, there are differences across state 
representations in terms of how much information and which type of information they 
were willing to divulge: BENELUX and Scandinavian representatives were the most 
talkative and the most willing to reveal sensitive information, German representatives 
were the least informative of those who agreed to be interviewed, keeping 
information rather general or refusing to respond on sensitive issues, Austria, the UK 
and France were informative, but cautious with very sensitive information. The CEE 
states strongly varied in terms of the amount and type of information they revealed. 
The Polish were more cautious than the others, the Baltic states, except for Latvia, 
were very willing to talk, but kept sensitive information to themselves. The Southern 
European representatives varied within the group, while the Portuguese kept 
sensitive information to themselves, the Spanish revealed it more eagerly. 
 
Possible explanations for these differences could lie in variances in bureaucratic 
efficiency and political culture among other factors, as actors are socialized 
differently. They not only behave differently in EU institutions (Hooghe, 2005; 
Trondal, 2004), but they are also likely to display different types of behavior when 
responding to sollicitations by researchers. There is strong variation between 
member state representations with regard to the size of administrations, efficiency 
and resources. Unsurprisingly, size and resourcefulness of countries correlates with 
the size of their administrations and the resources at their disposal to deal with 
European affairs. Larger countries, like Germany, France and the UK, have bigger 
administrations, not only nationally, but also on the European level, thus they can 
handle inquiries faster and more efficiently. Older, but smaller member states, as well 
as newer member states with efficient and prosperous national systems, like the 
BENELUX countries, Austria, Poland and the Scandinavian states show similar 
behavior. They also allocate a considerable amount of resources to their European 
administrations. On the other hand, older or newer states, big or small, with less 
efficient national administrations can allocate fewer resources to their European 
representations, which sets different conditions for how they can respond to 
demands. 
  
Literature about expert interviews and negotiation behavior has identified differences 
between actors in terms of how willing they are to open up and be transparent, which 
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can be linked to socialization effects and political culture (North/South and 
East/West) that can also be found in national administrations (Trondal and 
Veggeland, 2003; Trondal, 2004).   
  
For the other institutions, Commission and Parliament, the number of responses, 
positive or at all, was comparatively lower, but there does not seem to be a pattern 
with regard to nationality. However in the Parliament, more MEPs and affiliates from 
bigger groups responded positively to the request. All MEPs from smaller groups, 
irrespective of whether or not they belonged to the left or right spectrum, either did 
not respond at all or declined. This can be a question of resources as well. Bigger 
political groups have much more resources at their disposal than smaller groups, and 
are more often in key influential positions with access to processes and information. 
Larger groups have a higher likelihood of being able to appoint rapporteurs for 
legislative files, thus a higher likelihood of becoming relevant experts to researchers.  
4.3 Data analysis  
4.3.1 Process research and structured focused comparison: qualitative content 
analysis with MaxQDA 
 
Tracing processes is a crucial and non-negligible complementary step to 
understanding outcomes, as only it is only possible to pinpoint tipping points and 
uncover mechanisms through the deep understanding of the process (Brady and 
Collier, 2000). Process tracing can be ideally combined with expert interviews, as the 
purposive selection of key actors will provide valuable information about actors’ 
patterns and strategies in the way they frame their choices (Tansey, 2007).  
 
“Process tracing involves the examination of ‘diagnostic’ pieces of evidence within a 
case that contribute to supporting or overturning alternative explanatory hypotheses. 
A central concern is with sequences and mechanisms in the unfolding of 
hypothesized causal processes. The researcher looks for the observable implications 
of hypothesized explanations, often examining evidence at a finer level of detail or a 
lower level of analysis than that initially posited in the relevant theory. The goal is to 
establish whether the events or processes within the case fit those predicted by 
alternative explanations.” (Bennett, 2000: 208) 
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To reconstruct informal negotiation processes in EU decision-making, where the goal 
is to understand how actors make and justify strategic choices, expert interviews can 
be analyzed through various methods. Qualitative content analysis appears to be the 
most appropriate in this case, because it provides an orientation for the researcher 
when entering the analytical process by developing categories for guidance, but also 
provides interpretative freedom (Mayring, 2007; Mayring, 2010). 
Therefore, an iterative research design, combining elements of explaining-outcome 
and theory-testing process tracing (Beach and Pedersen, 2013), with systematic 
structured  comparison of cases (George and Bennett, 2000), therefore appears to 
best fit the goal of understanding processes of negotiation failure and developing 
categories and typologies of strategic mechanisms. The analysis conducted 
sometimes comes close to theory-testing process tracing (Beach and Pedersen, 
2013), as the different steps of the hypothesized causal mechanisms will be traced 
and accounted for in as much detail as possible. However, at times, due to the 
absence of data or the blackboxing of steps in the causal process, the analysis will 
more closely resemble congruence analysis and not satisfy the demands of rigorous 
process tracing (Beach and Pedersen, 2013).  
 
In the theoretical parts of this study, a typology of actors, strategies and conditions 
has been presented, which provides guidance for the empirical analysis. However, 
there should be openness towards inductive proceeding, correcting and updating of 
theoretical frameworks and assumptions in the empirical analysis. Therefore, the 
hypothesized models of failure and accompanying causal mechanisms will be 
evaluated and updated based on the findings to mark the lessons learned about the 
theory (Beach and Pedersen, 2013). To facilitate the interpretation of document, 
interview and media data, a framing scheme will be provided, which details the 
different perceptions and arguments presented in the negotiation processes to make 
the conclusions drawn about actor behavior, strategic mechanisms and conditions 
transparent. The search for frames, the way experts describe the process that is 
studied, will be a means of extracting information from interviews (Gläser and Laudel, 
2010; Mayring, 2007).           
      
The literature on qualitative content analysis refers to this iterative type of design and 
determines a number of criteria research should fulfill (Gläser and Laudel, 2010): the 
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(1) principle of openness, which postulates that the process of empirical analysis has 
to be open for unexpected discoveries that cannot be accounted for by the 
preconceived expectations and hypotheses, therefore the analysis should not be too 
restricted by a theoretical framework; the (2) principle of theory-led interpretation, 
saying that all empirical research should be driven by theoretical expectations to 
structure the process and provide a framework for interpretation; the (3) principle of 
structured interpretation, focusing on comprehensible criteria, which can also be used 
by others to also interpret the data and reconstruct the proposed interpretation and 
lastly the (4) principle of comprehension as a basic way of proceeding in empirical 
social sciences, which focuses on the understanding actions and actors’ motivation 
as the basic task of empirical social sciences. 
  
Data analysis will be performed using a combination of congruence analysis for 
within-case process analysis and structured comparison for cross-case comparison. 
Congruence analysis allows for the detection of mechanisms and conditions of failure 
within cases, both structural and actor-focused (George and Bennett, 2005; Bennett 
and Checkel, 2014).   
 
Around 560 case-related documents and 61 expert interviews were manually 
analyzed using qualitative content analysis (Mayring, 2007) to look for the following 
elements: positions and conflict constellations and main controversies in each case, 
key actors and relais actors, evidence of influence on relais actors, evidence for 
conditions and mechanisms having an influence on the process of legislative 
deadlock and  failure. After the manual content analysis, all documents were 
processed with MaxQDA to systematically verify the frames actors use to explain and 
justify their actions and choices and collect evidence for the comparability of frames 
across cases. It also permits the evaluation of the amount of evidence in favor of a 
certain mechanism, which is crucial for process tracing methods (Beach and 
Pedersen, 2013).  
4.3.2 Inferring strategic mechanisms and blame exchanges through frames 
 
“To frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more 
salient in a communicating context, in such a way as to promote a particular problem 
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definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation and/or treatment recommendation 
for the item described.” (Entman, 1993: 52)  
 
Framing is linked to salience the more important the issue is to the public, the more 
likely it is that policy-makers will devote attention to it (Daviter, 2011; Lecheler, De 
Vreese and Slothuus, 2009; Weaver, 2007). It matters for the entire policy-making 
process from agenda-setting to success or failure, since how an issue is shaped or 
portrayed matters a lot for success or failure (Daviter, 2011). Framing should start 
with the definition of the problem, along with a determination of which elements are 
most prominent within the structure of political conflict and determine who is part of 
the political competition (Schattschneider, 1960; Riker, 1986). Framing captures the 
dynamic nature of the political process. It brings about an understanding as to why 
certain issues make it onto the agenda while others are left out and considers the 
ambiguity and contentiousness of a negotiation by looking at what actors focus on 
(Peters, 1994; Peters, 2001). During the policy-making process, the Commission 
frames proposals in a particular way and Council and Parliament frame their 
positions and strategic choices and moves (Daviter, 2011; Zahariadis, 2008). As 
argued in the models of failure (chapter 3), the framing of a Commission proposal 
can be challenged by the co-legislators and constitute a reason for failure.   
 
Framing is better able to capture the complexity of EU negotiations, since “given the 
highly variant effects of EU political organisation on policy choices, the institutional 
level of analysis alone (thus) remains insufficient to predict how issues and interests 
will play out at the supranational level” (Daviter, 2011: 13) 
 
“The way in which issues are perceived, packaged and processed systematically 
affects how policy conflicts form around the issues, how interests mobilize and 
restructure at the supranational level, and which of the conflicting organisational and 
representational logics of EU decision-making shape the lines of both intra- and inter-
institutional competition” (Daviter, 2011:19). Actors use framing to advocate particular 
problems and highlight the dimensions that are most important to them as well as  
frame losses and gains (Zahariadis, 2008). 
  
Framing occurs at different stages of the negotiation process, starting with policy 
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formulation, where actors have strategic opportunities to influence the agenda 
through framing (Daviter, 2011; Atikcan, 2015). Framing the agenda means setting 
the tone of the negotiation and defining the zone of agreement (Cobb, Ross and 
Ross, 1976; Daviter, 2011; Ackrill, Kay and Zahariadis, 2013). Framing in this case 
describes the process in which competing political elites define their most important 
issues for the public. The better elites are at placing issues on the agenda, the more 
likely it is that public opinion will perceive the issue or the arguments given as 
important. Successful framing affects the salience of an issue and can alter the 
negotiation outcome. Political rationality approaches describe framing as the 
manifestation of how actors define issues, how they  handle interests, communicate 
their their perception of issues to get them included into dominant frames and make 
use of the availability of choices in the policy process (Verloo, 2005; Klein, 2013; 
Helbling, 2014). 
  
Framing of choices includes reduction of complexity (1), the decision to focus the 
attention on specific aspects of the issue, the creation and use of policy venues (2), a 
choice to compartmentalize issues to create stability and structure the parallel 
handling of issues that are high on the agenda, policy shift (3) as frames change due 
to issues moving higher or lower on the agenda, framing contestation (4) to create or 
consolidate conflict or provide opportunities for policy change and the creation of 
policy interests (5) in areas where the EU does not have a policy legacy. 
    
The policy formulation process has been characterized by frame competition in the 
Commission (Peters, 2001; Nylander, 2001; Daviter, 2011), where conflicts arise 
based on the initial choice of alternatives, which are framed strategically. Agenda 
conflict becomes a complex concept with different dimensions. Any manipulation of 
these factors turns them into political strategy (Bachrach and Baratz, 1962; Cobb and 
Elder, 1971; Baumgartner, Green-Pedersen and Jones, 2006). Frame competition 
includes the scope of the proposal and the decision to expand or restrict the issue to 
include more actors or exclude them, the intensity of policy change, the visibility of 
the measure and the degree to which the Commission decides to control the direction 
of the proposal, since new actors get involved in the course of negotiations and the 
lines of conflict shift and new alliances become possible (Daviter, 2011). 
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During negotiations, all actors frame their view on the issue to further their interest, 
by projecting their view in terms of irrefutable claims (Smeets, 2015). The Council 
Presidency, as the one in charge of negotiations in the Council can decide whether 
or not to include frames or spend time on discussing a proposal by a representative. 
If a proposal does not serve the interest of the Presidency, there is a lower chance of 
it being considered by the Council (Kleine, 2014). Dynamics are similar in the 
Parliament, where the rapporteur is the one steering the process and deciding, which 
elements of the discussion to take on board in the committee reports (Ringe, 2010; 
Ripoll Servent, 2012). 
  
Ultimately strategic framing has an important impact on the dynamics of success and 
failure: the way an issue is framed, from policy formulation to negotiation can 
increase or decrease the likelihood of adoption. Initiatives that fail under one frame 
can become feasible under a different frame (Radaelli, 1995). It has been shown 
that, in the area of Social and Employment policy, the Commission argues in 
reference to the single market and the EU’s founding principles, equality, non-
discrimination, social, civic and personal freedom rights (Klein, 2013). In Justice and 
Home Affairs, there is a cleavage between rights-driven and  security-driven rhetoric 
at the EU level, which is used by national actors to oppose liberal immigration 
measures by reference to security (Guild and Mantu, 2011; Roos, 2013).  
 
Nonetheless, it is still insufficiently studied how differences and conflicts about 
perceptions of issues impact the policy process, how institutions or actors engage in 
framing or reframing, how they explain their policy choices through frames (Daviter, 
2011) and how framing is used in actors’ handling of policy failure (Héritier, 1999; 
Bovens and t'Hart, 1998).  
 
The blame game is also a framing game. Actors refer to particular frames and 
concepts of blame attribution and blame avoidance when trying to justify failure 
(Héritier, 1999; Daviter, 2011) and explaining the origins of particular controversies 
and disputes, which lead to conflict and deadlock (Matthes, 2012). The more often 
actors mention particular frames, the more explanatory weight they have in 
accounting for strategies and choices (Helbling, 2014; Hänggli, 2011).  
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Framing can be combined with content analysis as a means to empirically 
demonstrate strategic action and strategies in documents and interviews in order to 
make strategies visible, the arguments more tangible and the research on processes 
more systematic and transparent: “suggest that a frame is a ‘central organizing idea 
or storyline that provides meaning to an unfolding strip of events, weaving a 
connection among them. The frame suggests what the controversy is about, the 
essence of the issue’” (Gamson and Modigliani, 1989:143). 
  
Inferences from qualitative content analysis without coding are usually a detailed 
narrative of the researcher’s understanding of the data. Qualitative analysis with 
coding can be helpful in some instances, but can also become an unnecessary and 
unhelpful forced quantification of qualitative data without real added benefit. 
However, a certain balance has to be struck between depth and richness of the 
empirical narrative and verifiability, to achieve credibility and dependability of the 
analysis. The goal is to understand how actors describe their actions and choices in a 
negotiation situation, which elements appear to have been most important and how 
their choices are motivated (Baumgartner and Mahoney, 2008). How actors 
legitimate their strategies and choices can be analyzed by looking at the use of 
arguments, norms and ideas in their statements (Beyers, 2011). The framing 
categories and classifications chosen for the detection of justifications used in EU 
decision-making are in line with existing scholarship on framing mechanisms as 
strategies in political communication and political psychology (Snow and Benford, 
2000; De Vreese, 2002; Entman, 2004). 
 
Doing framing analysis without coding requires a tailor-made system of categories13 
of frames relying on previous research on frame analysis and observations about 
strategic dynamics from qualitative and quantitative research, which will then be used 
as a guideline for the analysis of interviews and different types of documents (De 
Vreese, 2012). The researcher looks for “the presence or absence of certain 
keywords, stock phrases, stereotypical images, sources of information and sentences 
that provide thematically reinforcing clusters of facts or judgments” (Entman, 
                                                          
13 The tables with categories developed for this analysis can be found in the annex. Sources for framing analysis 
in the EU: Daviter, 2011; Verloo, 2005 
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1993:52) and pays attention to “choices about languages, quotations, and relevant 
information” (De Vreese, 2012, after: Shah et al., 2002:367). 
   
The present analysis of strategic framing in EU legislative processes will encompass 
actors at different levels in the Council, the Parliament and the Commission, which 
are framing their strategic choices or the strategic choices of others. Framing 
includes strategic choices that are made at any stage of the negotiation. From 
agenda-setting to inter-institutional trilogues, actors continuously frame their choices 
and actions. Looking at how actors frame their choices allows for the inference of 
strategic mechanisms leading to deadlock or failure of a negotiation in an ex-post 
manner through interviews, official statements and documents or media reports, 
when participatory observation is not possible. 
4.4 Discussion of the methodological approach  
 
An additional challenge qualitative content analysis of documents and interview 
material faces is how to address questions of reliability and validity. External validity 
will be discussed at a later stage, but it is necessary to discuss the choice of methods 
with regard to whether conclusions drawn will be valid and the empirical analysis 
reliable.  
 
There have been decade-long debates about whether or not qualitative research 
needs to engage with debates on methods standards of quantitative research (Brady 
and Collier, 2000). From the 1980s onwards, the general tenor has been negative 
with the main argument being that qualitative studies should be evaluated with regard 
to the trustworthiness and utility of their conclusions and findings. However, soon 
enough, scholars have reopened the debate about rigor in methods (King, Keohane 
and Verba, 1994; Adcock, 2001; Morse et al., 2002). 
  
Case-based process research on informal negotiation processes is again a special 
case again, because access to data is difficult and information is often confidential 
and therefore not suitable for reliability exercises or available for replication to other 
researchers. As long as permission for publication of data has not been given by the 
sources, the researcher runs the risk of compromising the data. 
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MaxQDA will provide a basis for a systematic proceeding in data analysis of 
documents and interviews, used to structure the documents and interview transcripts, 
and assess the appearance of frames in the data, in a way that could potentially be 
replicated by someone in possession of the data and the guide used for the framing 
analysis14. It cannot respond to all concerns about replicability, because the 
information given by the experts in the interviews is of course sensitive to the 
interviewer and the context of the interview situation (Aberbach and Rockman, 2002).  
4.5 Summary and research mandate  
 
Failure is a more pressing issue in distributive policy areas, like Social and 
Employment Policy, or high politics areas, like Justice and Home Affairs, where the 
stakes are higher for member states and there are controversial issues with higher 
potential for inter- and intra-institutional conflict, which allows for disentanglement of 
conflict lines and gives actors incentives to bargain over gains and losses. A 
triangulation of official documents, media documents and expert interviews permits 
analysis of informal actor behaviour, by inferring choices and actions from the 
justifications and explanations actors provide and the traces of those actions in 
official documents. A structured approach using MaxQDA allows the analysis to be 
more transparent and enhance the credibility of the proposed interpretation. In the 
following two chapters, the models presented in chapter 3 will be tested by applying 
congruence analysis and structured focused comparison to investigate which models 
have the most explanatory value. Analysis of the frames used by actors to justify their 
actions, choices and perceptions will be used to unveil the blaming game regarding 
origins for blockage and failure and attempts at resolving controversy.  
 
In the following two chapters, the dynamics of legislative failure will be analyzed first 
in the area of Justice and Home Affairs (chapter 5), specifically the area of border 
policy, on two recent cases, the Schengen reform (subchapter 5.2) and the Smart 
Borders Package (subchapter 5.3). The same type of analysis will be conducted for 
two cases in the area of Social and Employment Policy (chapter 5), concretely the 
area of gender equality, on the two recent cases of the Maternity Leave Directive 
(subchapter 6.2) and the Gender Quota Directive (subchapter 6.3). A detailed 
                                                          
14 An overview over the complete MaxQDA dataset and the framing analysis will be provided in the annex, 
including documents, media reports and expert interviews 
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analysis of the provisions of the proposal, the agenda-setting and policy formulation 
by the Commission, the causes, conditions and mechanisms of deadlock and the 
behavior of key actors will be incorporated in the process analysis. To uncover as 
much as possible about the dynamics of each case, all the relevant intra-institutional 
and inter-institutional processes will be included in the analysis.  
V. Justice and Home Affairs: dynamics of policy failure in the area of border 
policy  
 
5.1 Introduction  
 
Justice and Home Affairs has long been marked by intergovernmentalism and 
member states defending their fiefdoms against supranationalization, but with the 
Treaty of Lisbon, as the formal decision-making procedure has changed with the 
generalization of co-decision, there is a move towards integration (Lavenex, 2015).  
 
The Europeanization of justice and home affairs matters has been a tough process 
involving a number of open and lengthy conflicts between member states and 
supranational institutions about competence transfers, the role of different actors in 
the area and the amount to which policy instruments in different subfields of justice 
and home affairs (Geddes, 2003). Even after the significant leap forward in terms of 
competences the Treaty of Lisbon brought about, the entire area is still marked by 
the tension between the persistent intergovernmentalism of member states and 
steadily reinforcing supranationalist tendencies  of Commission  and Parliament 
(Roos, 2013). In the subarea of home affairs, which is of particular interest here 
because it is at the forefront of the EU’s crisis management, the changes brought 
about by the Treaty of Lisbon, in particular the extended use of co-decision and 
thereby the increased influence of Commission and Parliament, have only 
aggravated this tension (Roos, 2013). In substance, as regards concrete policy 
instruments, the picture is much more complex: it has long been argued that member 
states pursue largely restrictive preferences in home affairs matters (Givens and 
Luedtke, 2004; Papagianni, 2006) and tend to oppose communautarization of key 
policy areas like legal migration and asylum (Freeman, 2006; Lahav, 2004). 
However, recent studies, which take into account the role and impact of the 
Commission and the Parliament come to a different conclusion: first and foremost, it 
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is necessary to distinguish between issue-areas and even issues when speaking 
about preferences, as member states do not necessarily pursue either purely 
restrictive or expansive preferences in a consistent manner across issues and over 
time (Roos, 2013; Boswell, 2007). Yet, scholars continue to disagree on whether the 
area of home affairs is dominated by either a securitization or a burden-sharing trend 
(Boswell, 2000; Bigo, 2002), which some have tried to explain by a discrepancy 
between short-term and long term interests of governments and a carefully 
constructed security and anti-immigration rhetoric towards the public, while in the 
background policy-makers pursue and agree to liberal migration policies (Castles, 
2004; Guild and Mantu, 2011). 
  
Border and migration policy are tightly linked and indeed there seems to be a trend to 
combine liberal with more restrictive measures, making scholars claim that the EU is 
developing into a “gated community” (Van Houtom and Pijpers, 2007) and moving 
towards “Fortress Europe” (Geddes, 2008). A restrictive and control-oriented 
approach to external border policy is used to reinforce the securitization of asylum 
and migration (Léonard, 2010) by emphasizing the systematic selection of and 
distinction between different types of migrants and travelers who are subject to 
different kinds of control  to verify their permission to enter the territory (Van Houtum, 
2010). 
  
Preference and conflict constellations in the Council are predominantly determined by 
the following factors (Lahav, 2004; Freeman, 2006): Economic factors (single market, 
welfare systems, labour relations), immigration share, political partisanship (left-right 
cleavage), public opinion and media trends, dynamics at the national level dominate 
the Council agenda and negotiations in the Council (Papagianni, 2006). Debates in 
the Parliament are centered around increasing the role of the Community and a 
balance between facilitating travel within the Schengen area and ensuring high 
security standards, transparency and information for citizens (Huber, 2015). 
  
Since the abolishment of internal border controls with the Schengen agreement in 
1985, external borders have become a common concern for member states, but only 
the aftermath of 9/11 has added a security element to it, which made external border 
security a key instrument together with policies to combat illegal migration to form an 
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“integrated management” of external borders (Monar, 2014). From 2002 onwards, the 
EU engaged in a number of significant policy reforms regarding external border 
management, specific bodies, cooperation mechanisms and financial burden-sharing 
initiatives were launched, among them FRONTEX and a European Border and Coast 
Guard (Monar, 2014). The aim was to achieve a progressive integration of national 
border security services and enhance operational homogeneity across the different 
member states to ensure an even level of protection (Monar, 2014). 
  
European Council and Commission are joint agenda-setters in matters of Justice and 
Home Affairs, they mutually depend on each other, yet engage in a subtle power play 
(Bocquillon and Dobbels, 2014). With regard to the policy agenda, the Commission 
plays power games with the European Council in border policy matters, in the post-
Lisbon era, the Commission played a double-faced game with the heads of state, 
expressing itself in favor of revising and tightening border control, but ultimately 
presented a proposal that did not at all correspond to the intergovernmental measure 
the European Council had requested (Bocquillon and Dobbels, 2014). 
  
The Commission strategically consults stakeholders to ensure support for its policy 
initiative and tests how extensive its proposal can be, Commission and Parliament 
preferences tend to be more expansive than member state preferences, who prefer 
less integration and more restrictive policy (Roos, 2013). The co-legislator dynamics 
post-Lisbon have been marked by an increase in influence of the European 
Parliament in the Justice and Home Affairs area (Ripoll Servent, 2012; Ripoll Servent 
2013; Ripoll Servent, 2014), and it has become a credible and legitimate actor and 
has made a substantial difference in the integration of in border policy matters, 
successfully shaping border policy according to citizen interests  (Huber, 2015), in 
previous border policy reforms, the Parliament had to fight for its involvement, as the 
Council favored consultation, but the Parliament eventually insisted on co-decision 
for matters concerning Schengen in individual cases, but struggled to more generally 
push for a more Community-based approach to border control matters, as the 
Council continued to refuse a stronger involvement of Community institutions (Huber, 
2015). 
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It is not yet clear if the post-Lisbon era can be seen as the start of a new inter-
institutional phase in border policy where the EP takes a more affirmative stance vis-
à-vis the Council or if the successful pushes for co-decision have been the result of 
ambiguity in the Treaty and the confrontation with intergovernmental leftovers: 
despite the increasing co-legislative experience of both institutions and the 
Parliament’s attempts to take a constructive approach and show the Council that its 
amendments lead to better and more balanced legislation, the Council still considers 
member state interests to be more important than Parliament amendments. 
Increased problem and time pressure can both facilitate and complicate inter-
institutional negotiations: the Council has shown greater willingness to make 
concessions to ensure speedy agreements, but also evaluate the added value of 
Parliament involvement based on whether or not it slows down the process (Huber, 
2015). 
  
Pre-crisis, it was an orchestrated game as well, there were no big fights or major 
stakes, despite it being a core-state-power area, post-crisis a high salience area with 
increasing pressure on member states and the EU to deliver policy and an incentive 
for member states to contest integration and demand policy reversal in favor of taking 
back control, if EU policy is seen as too extensive or counter to member state 
interests (Roos, 2013). 
  
In the post-9/11 EU, there have been ongoing discussions about how to expand and 
improve data and information collection about migration and travel flows to better 
control entries into and exits from the European territory and several centralized 
databases and information processing systems have been set up, the most important 
ones being the Schengen Information System I and II and the Visa Information 
System. Both systems have been subject to data protection concerns and criticism 
from the European Data Protection Supervisor, other stakeholders and most 
importantly the European Parliament (Bigo et al., 2012). The migration and security 
crisis has given an impetus for the European Council to call upon the Commission to 
reform and further expand the integrated border management system, by reforming 
existing tools and adding new ones, that would allow further securitization and control 
of external and internal borders. These instruments include the European Border and 
Coast Guard, Passenger Name Records and ultimately the Smart Borders initiative. 
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All new systems would be connected to the existing ones and create a 
comprehensive set of instruments and databases to systematically collect traveler 
data, patrol and secure borders and monitor entry and exit from the territory (Monar, 
2014). 
5.2 The Schengen Governance Package: strategic failure in several rounds  
 
The reform of the Schengen Governance took several attempts to result in 
agreement, a first attempt by the Commission to reform the Schengen Evaluation 
Mechanism in 2009 through a Council regulation under the consultation procedure 
was immediately rejected by the Parliament, a second attempt in 2010, a regulation 
of the Council and the Parliament under the co-decision procedure, was formally 
amended by the Commission in 2011 after insistence by key member states, 
Germany, France and Italy, to include a reform of the provisions for reintroducing 
border control at internal borders alongside the reform of the Schengen Evaluation 
Mechanism and negotiate both as a package. The first proposal was rejected by the 
Parliament in 2009, the second unanimously amended by the Council in a battle over 
the legal base in 2012, while the Commission remained at the sidelines. The co-
legislators mainly attributed blame to each other, the Council accusing the Parliament 
of a lack of pragmatism and an insistence on being involved at all costs and the 
Parliament accusing the Council of intergovernmentalism and trying to circumvent the 
Parliament to avoid facing public accountability. The Commission was accused by 
both of being overly lenient with the other, but was able to avoid most of the blame by 
portraying itself as an honest broker.  
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(table 5, Schengen timeline, source: own illustration) 
 
5.2.1 The previous rounds of failure  
 
The Commission wanted to push a reform of the Schengen evaluation mechanism 
and took the opportunity of the controversy over the Schengen internal borders to 
propose a package in hopes of increasing the chances to pass it through the Council, 
since there apparently were several attempts by the Commission for the Schengen 
Evaluation mechanism, which were scrapped immediately by the Council, informally 
before they were presented for negotiation.  
 
“Since 1999, there have been several discussions between Member States and the 
Commission on making the Schengen evaluation mechanism more efficient, in 
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particular concerning the second part of the mandate, namely verification of the 
correct application of the acquis after the lifting of internal border controls.15” 
 
The Commission continuously exchanged information with the member state 
delegations on the design of a possible reformed Schengen evaluation mechanism: 
“The concrete need for on-site visits will be determined by the Commission after 
seeking the advice of the Member States taking into account changes in the 
legislation, procedures or organisation of the Member State concerned as well as the 
risk analysis provided by Frontex regarding external borders and visas.”16 
 
As well as one attempt to reform the Schengen Evaluation Mechanism in 2009, which 
the Parliament rejected, because the Commission chose consultation as the legal 
basis thus excluding the Parliament (Dobbels, 2014; Huber, 2015). The Parliament 
supported the Commission’s proposal for a reform of the evaluation mechanism, in 
particular the proposal to involve both Commission and Parliament more strongly in 
the decision-making and implementation process17. Especially in Schengen 
evaluation matters, where the Parliament had been deploring the dysfunctional peer-
review system for a long time (Huber, 2015). Parliament was generally divided 
between a right-wing sympathizing with the Council’s security concerns and wanting 
the proposal to pass and a left-wing keen on fighting a battle of principle over 
competences and influence would later on provide a good loophole for relais actors 
to escape the deadlock situation18. State representatives in the Council were skeptic 
of the proposed reform of the evaluation mechanism, especially the involvement of 
supranational institutions (Huber, 2015; Hilpert, 2015). 
 
While the 2010 Commission proposal was considerably more ambitious in terms of 
not only strengthening the involvement of the EU, but also increasing the role of the 
Commission in national border control activities, the 2011 proposal provided the 
                                                          
15 European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
establishment of an evaluation mechanism to verify application of the Schengen acquis, 16 November 2010 
16 European Commission, Proposal for a Council Decision on the establishment of an evaluation mechanism to 
monitor the application of the Schengen acquis, COM/2009/0105 final, 4 March 2009 
17 Official Journal of the European Union, European Parliament, European Parliament resolution of 7 July 2011 on 
changes to Schengen, P7_TA(2011)0336, 7 July 2011  
18 Interview 21; Interview 22 
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Council with the requested separate proposal on the reintroduction of border control 
at internal borders19.   
In both the 2010 and the 2011 proposals, the Commission focus was on the reform of 
the SEM and its desire to be in charge of the evaluation process to be sure that 
states properly applied the Schengen agreement and did not unilaterally reinstate 
border control20. The idea of member states touching upon the Schengen acquis is a 
big issue for the Commission, it tried to find a way to circumvent the problem by 
framing the package as an “EU response, thereby avoiding unilateral decisions by 
individual member states and establishing a collective approach to protect our 
common interests”21 
The Council informally demanded the amendment of the 2010 right after it was 
presented, mainly because of the very Union-focused approach of the SEM and 
border control reform and the increase in competence for the Commission it would 
have entailed22. Apparently, some state representatives in the Council had defended 
stronger positions over border control and outright rejected the Union-led approach 
proposed by the Commission for the Schengen evaluation mechanism, the French 
delegation in particular23. 
 
“Without wanting to diminish the Commission's role as guardian of the Treaties, we 
believe that the conditions in which the provisions of the Schengen acquis are put 
into practice on the ground are the responsibility of the Member States, in particular 
as far as the aspects covered by the proposal for a Decision are concerned, and that 
this argues in favor of a balanced approach to the distribution of responsibilities when 
it comes to implementing evaluation.”24 
  
Attempts by the Commission to increase its power have been received as a 
provocation by the state governments: “We consider that such a mechanism could 
lead to a loss of substance compared to evaluation as currently defined in the 
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20 European Commission, Memo, “Statement by Commissioner Malmström on the compliance of Italian and 
French measures with the Schengen acquis”, MEMO/11/538, 25 July 2011  
21 European Commission, Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE 
COUNCIL on the establishment of an evaluation mechanism to verify application of the Schengen acquis, 
Amended proposal, 16 September 2011 
22 Interview 49 
23 Interview 49  
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mandate of 16 September 1998, the object of which is manifold: not only to evaluate 
how the Schengen acquis is actually applied and identify any shortcomings, but also 
to make recommendations and promote best practices in a spirit of mutual 
cooperation and trust between Member States.”25 
 
Many national governments were facing increasing pressure by extreme right wing 
parties due to nationalist backlashes and populist waves in other parties and 
uploaded their controversies to the European level26. Rather than encouraging more 
involvement of the EU, the Ministers of the Interior, challenged in their national 
arenas, perceived the Council to be the ideal platform to reinstate their contested 
political leadership by demanding more leeway for national governments (Carrera, 
2012; Pascouau, 2013).   
 
5.2.2 The proposal  
 
The so-called Schengen Governance Reform Package consists of two legislative files 
in one package: Regulation no 1051/2013/EU of the Parliament and the Council of 22 
October 2013 amending Regulation No 562/2006/EC in order to provide for common 
rules on the temporary reintroduction of border control at internal borders in 
exceptional circumstances, associated to this a second proposal directly linked in 
substance and in terms of negotiation, the Regulation No 1053/2013/EU of the 
Council of 7 October 2013 establishing an evaluation and monitoring mechanism to 
verify the application of the Schengen acquis and repealing the Decision of the 
Executive Committee of 16 September 1998 setting up a Standing Committee on the 
evaluation and implementation of Schengen (SEM). The origin has been, first of all, a 
Commission Proposal for a Regulation on the establishment of an evaluation and 
monitoring mechanism to verify the application of the Schengen acquis27, which was 
the result of a previous proposal from 2010, that has been worked on by the 
Commission since 1999 and emerged from discussions between the Commission, 
member states, experts and mainly the Schengen Evaluation working group in the 
Council. The former Schengen evaluation mechanism constituted an 
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intergovernmental system of peer-review, the Commission played only an observer-
role and the Parliament none at all. The proposal foresees a stronger role of the 
COM in the implementation and evaluation process. The new version actually goes 
even further and also gives the Commission the power to decide on which measures 
to take in case there are deficiencies in member states; instead of simply informing 
the state, the Commission is able to request a state to close a border crossing point 
for a certain amount of time or can deploy European Border Guard Teams under 
FRONTEX. The new proposal foresees the introduction of border control only as a 
measure of last resort and only if the Commission considers that the deficiencies are 
persistent. With regard to the former SEM regulation, the Commission identified a 
number of deficits: inadequacy and lack of clarity as regards the rules on consistency 
and frequency of evaluations, without the possibility of unannounced visits (1), lack of 
method for “priority-setting” based on risk analysis (2), ensuring high quality expertise 
during the evaluation exercise so that the experts taking part in the evaluation show 
an adequate level of legal knowledge and practical expertise (3), weaknesses in 
follow-up and post-evaluation to the recommendations made after the on-site visits 
and the measures taken to address identified deficiencies and the timeframe within 
which they need to be remedied (4). The Commission proposed a set of solutions: 
the possibility to conduct unannounced visits by teams of member states and 
Commission experts and the sending of questionnaires. On its basis, the 
Commission would draft an evaluation report analyzing the main aspects, listing 
shortcomings and weaknesses and putting forward specific recommendations for 
remedying the action as well as deadlines for their implementation. The second part 
of the package was the Commission Proposal for a Regulation amending Regulation 
(EC) No. 562/2006 in order to provide for common rules on the temporary 
reintroduction of border control at internal borders in exceptional circumstances28. It 
postulated that the decision on whether or not to reintroduce border control should be 
taken by the Commission and the evaluation of the situation should be based on two 
main criteria: a serious threat to public policy or internal security, such as a sudden 
inflow of migrants that might cause such a risk, and serious deficiencies identified by 
the SEM and cause an equal threat to public policy or security. The Commission 
would also judge the lawfulness of requests to reintroduce border control thus making 
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the role of the Commission a major one, as it would be the one taking decisions in all 
cases except for immediate/short term introduction of border control, which is limited 
to five days, and can be done by member states directly29. 
 
5.2.3 The policy formulation, conditions and conflict constellations   
 
The agenda on border control had been subject to controversy around the time of the 
reform proposal on internal border control, the heads of state called for a revision of 
border control policy30 and the Commission manifested its support arguing that it had 
also considered such a reform31, which immediately prompted the liberals and the left 
of the European Parliament to accuse the Commission of blindly following member 
states (Bocquillon and Dobbels, 2014).  
 
The Commission’s initial proposal in 2010 did not entirely correspond to what the 
European Council had asked for32, the Commission advocated a much more 
supranational agenda than the heads of state had agreed to33 (Bocquillon and 
Dobbels, 2014): “But in 2011, the EC announced it wanted progress on the internal 
security strategy, yet the Commission still took its time, did not hurry and even 
changed the framing. So the Commission does what it wants and when it wants.”34 
 
The Commission and experts from relevant agencies it had consulted during the 
drafting process, asserted that reintroduction of border control should "be applied in a 
gradual, differentiated and coordinated manner", say that "as a very last resort (...) a 
safeguard clause could be introduced to allow the exceptional reintroduction of 
internal border controls in a truly critical situation where a member state is no longer 
able to comply with its obligations under the Schengen rules. Such a measure would 
be taken on the basis of specific objective criteria and a common assessment, for a 
strictly limited scope and period of time, taking into account the need to be able to 
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30 European Council, Cover Note, European Council Conclusions, 24-25 March 2011, 20 April 2011 
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react in urgent cases."35 Heads of state had set a clear agenda for the border control 
element: more influence for supranational institutions and a limited extension of 
internal border control.  
  
If we look at the order of events, we observe that there has been a European Council 
meeting with conclusions on the topic in July 2011 right before the Commission 
submitted the new proposal in September 2011, where heads of state very openly 
asked for legislative action by the Commission36. The reason why the EC considered 
the issue important can be found in events taking place earlier in 2011 that took 
place in Italy and France, where the French government decided to reinstate border 
controls at its internal borders after the Italian authorities had issued residence 
permits with authorizations to travel within the Schengen area and let them travel to 
France. The incident was brought to the European Council’s attention by letter by 
President Sarkozy on April 26, to which President Van Rompuy responded on May 
11 that the European Council would encourage action on the matter at the European 
level37. Sarkozy had made promises to his electorate about taking back control of the 
borders, but offended Berlusconi with the unilateral decision to close the border to 
Italy, that the two heads of state decided to solve the problem by forcing the 
Commission to deal with it38. 
 
Some have tried to explain this controversy by a resurgence of nationalism in 
member states, arguing that governments find it increasingly difficult to domestically 
justify the restrictions in competence over border control and migration39 (Hilpert, 
2015). Governments hoped to renationalize the border control issue under the guise 
of wanting to reinforce security, in particular France, Italy, Denmark and the 
Netherlands, which had defected from EU rules before40 (Carrera, 2012). The urge to 
renationalize border control supposedly stems from a shift in priorities for national 
governments towards securitization in reaction to the early stages of the migration 
crisis41. France was the most prominent national delegation to use Schengen to 
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satisfy populist needs and react to the increasing popularity of extreme right wing 
Front national leader Marine Le Pen in an attempt to counterbalance the 
dissatisfaction of the French population with French national politics as well as 
European migration politics42(Carrera, 2012).   
 
When presenting the first proposal in 2009 on the Schengen Evaluation Mechanism 
reform, the Commission framed the choice of instrument as a means to ensure that 
mutual trust between member states is compatible with the new legal and political 
requirements of post-Lisbon Europe and used references to state sovereignty and 
division of competences as an explanation for why the mechanism is state-centered 
and without a role for the Parliament: “maintain mutual trust between member states 
in their capacity to effectively and efficiently apply” the Schengen rules”43 
 
In 2010 and 2011, Commission framed the choice to go from intergovernmental peer-
to-peer mechanism to a Union-based mechanism, and a Commission-led evaluation 
with the possibility of unannounced visits to state borders as a reaction to the 
Parliament’s rejection of the first proposal and a means of retaining control over 
Schengen matters44: “The Commission in its proposal decided to focus on the 
question of authority over reintroduction of border control, and not the aspect of 
border control as such. States made it clear that they want to keep the authority over 
decisions.”45 It was also meant as a clear signal in opposition to intergovernmental 
trends in border control, especially in the light of unilateral reintroduction of  border 
control by Denmark, Italy and France46.   
 
To make it acceptable to both the Council and the Parliament, the Commission linked 
a more member state oriented proposal to a more supranational one: the Schengen 
Evaluation mechanism proposal to a new proposal to reform the rules of internal 
border control in exceptional circumstances which was framed as a common way to 
respond to border deficiencies in a way that represents the common interest47. 
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5.2.4 The negotiation process: mechanisms of deadlock  
 
At the beginning of negotiations in 2011 there were a number of states, which didn’t 
consider the situation at external borders to be a reason to review the rules for border 
control and were therefore generally not in favour of a revision of the Schengen 
Borders Code: Cyprus, Malta, Belgium, Sweden, Finland, Luxembourg, Portugal48. 
Then there were those states, which saw the need to reform Schengen, but did not 
favor a substantial amendment in the form of re-nationalization of border control 
competences or extension of criteria for internal border control: Eastern European 
states.49 Countries in support of border control tightening from the outset were 
France, Netherlands, Austria, Spain, Sweden, UK, Denmark50. The pivotal state 
proved to be the usual suspect: Germany. 
 
France and Italy jointly demanded In the Council, France and Italy made their 
positions heard by other member states looking for potential allies and were 
successful in rallying Germany, which became a supporter due to internal pressure 
on the conservative party by voters (Hilpert, 2015), and later on Spain by 2012. While 
there was little support in the Council initially for the demands by France and Italy to 
renationalize border control, there was more support for the more moderate, but still 
very security-focused appeal by the French and the Germans in 2012, who wrote a 
letter to the Danish Presidency demanding for an intergovernmental and security 
approach to the Schengen package51.  
Apparently, there has been some inconsistency in the German position, this time 
from opposing a reform of the Schengen border code, especially a reintroduction of 
border control in 2011, to requesting such a reform in 201252 (Hilpert, 2015). The 
German discourse consisted of saying that the way of regaining confidence in 
Schengen was to extend member states' competences in the security area of border 
management; the aim of the German position was therefore to defend national 
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sovereignty and get to the introduction of an emergency clause permitting states to 
unilaterally reintroduce border control53.  
The Italian position also evolved considerably, from strongly advocating for a reform 
that reinstates state control over borders to supporting a Union-based solution, which 
prevents unilateral border control actions by other states (Hilpert, 2015). After the 
question of whether or not the reintroduction of border control would serve Italy was 
controversially discussed in the Italian government, parliament and public opinion, 
the Italian representative argued that the 2011 announcement by Berlusconi about 
the request of re-nationalization was made under pressure, concretely, extreme right 
wing pressure both in Italy and France. An important factor in this evolution is the 
government change in Italy, as afterwards and in the following 2 years of negotiation, 
the Italian position changed almost completely to supporting a union-led mechanism 
with a strong role of the commission and a reduction of national sovereignty. The 
Italian position thereafter concentrated on the argument that unilateral action by 
states and lack of solidarity among Schengen states had undermined the governance 
in the past and the Italian government heavily criticized the French government for 
having reintroduced border control and supporting a security-focused approach in the 
reform process (Hilpert, 2015). 
Discussions in the Council were quite sovereignty- and security-oriented and referred 
to the need to ensure that governments still had control over their borders when 
confronted with a threat to their territory, all delegations considered that it should be 
up to member states to decide on duration of border control: “a member state may 
exceptionally reintroduce border control” and that it should be the member state that 
is in charge of the “evaluation of the threat presented in a member state”54 
In both rounds of negotiations on the Schengen Evaluation Mechanism, the Council 
framed its criticism of the communautarization of Schengen Evaluation and the 
increased involvement of the Commission as a sovereignty issue, referring to border 
issues as a sensitive matter for states, and linking it to the importance of mutual trust 
in ensuring good performance during evaluation, which the involvement of the 
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Commission could jeopardize55. In the second round, on the second and amended 
third proposal, Council repeated its criticism of the excessive involvement of the 
Commission in evaluation, however, it focused more strongly on the newly increased 
role of the Parliament using similar arguments about state sovereignty and the 
respect for competence distribution56. Delegations used a legal rhetoric to frame their 
legal base conflict arguing that “disregarding Art. 70 could create a permanent 
change in the Schengen field, legally and politically, depriving the intergovernmental 
framework of its “effet utile”57 
The Parliament was initially strongly against the proposal to revise the criteria for 
internal border control and give more control back to member states, saying that the 
migration crisis did not justify questioning the Schengen agreement.58 However, the 
focus of the Parliament entirely shifted to the Schengen Evaluation mechanism and 
the conflict over the legal base, as soon as it became clear from informal negotiations 
in the Council that member states considered excluding the Parliament from the 
process59.  
The Council built unanimity about rejecting the involvement of the Parliament and 
requesting Art. 70 (consultation) over Art. 77 TFEU (co-decision) (see table in annex) 
for the reform of the Schengen Evaluation mechanism. The Council framed the 
position using legal rhetoric by referring to the special provisions in the Treaty 
regulating decision-making about Schengen evaluation and the Parliament’s blatant 
disregard for Treaty provisions in an attempt to grab power60. The Commission 
agreed to the change in legal base from Art. 77 to Art. 70 TFEU as requested by the 
Council61, which the Parliament framed as incompatible with the requirements of the 
Lisbon framework, an intergovernmentalist attack on the democratic powers of the 
EU62. The Council, on the other hand, approved the intergovernmental framework by 
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referring to state sovereignty in border matters and the special provisions regarding 
evaluation in the Treaty63.  
 
The successive Council Presidencies played a very ambiguous, yet important role in 
the negotiation process. The Polish Presidency handled the issue in 2011 until 
December, but was unable to strike a compromise in the Council both with regard to 
substance and procedure. The Danish Presidency took over in 2012 and played a 
very controversial role: initially, the Danish Presidency did not follow the request of a 
large majority of states and the recommendation of the Council legal service to use 
Art.70 TFEU and started negotiations with the EP under Art. 77 TFEU, but the 
following decision to change the legal basis of the proposal from Art.77 to 70 TFEU 
and thus excluding the EP, also has been taken under their lead (Dinan, 2013).64 
This prompted the Parliament to acclaim treason and accuse the Danish Presidency 
of having lost all credibility as a broker and all trust of the European Parliament65. 
The Parliament played the blame framing game very successfully and vocally, it 
issued several reports on the matter and even involved the highest echelon, the 
Parliament Presidency.66 The following Cypriot Presidency in late 2012 was 
perceived to be considerably more diplomatic and officially resumed negotiations to 
ease the tensions67.  
 
The Schengen case is a good example of the complicated role of the Council 
Presidency, as it shows that depending on the importance of the policy-area or issue 
to the respective state holding the Presidency, it has more or less interest in pursuing 
its own agenda and this can affect negotiations both ways: worsen conflict between 
national actors if the Presidency is perceived to fail at its role of mediator or striking 
compromise if actually refrains from substantively engaging its interest in the 
proposal. There was particularly great pressure on the Danish Presidency, coming 
from a majority of actors, except the Belgian and the Luxembourgish representative, 
to change the legal basis to exclude the Parliament and the Danish Presidency was 
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judged to have failed at it, since the change could only be voted in June 2012, when 
the Cypriot Presidency had already taken over68.  
 
The Danish Presidency falsely assumed, coming from an obvious lack of 
communication or a deliberate misunderstanding of the position of EP LIBE 
rapporteur Carlos Coelho, that the EP would be willing to accept a change of the 
legal basis if the Council ceded to the rapporteurs demands in substance, which was 
absolutely not the case69.   
 
The negotiations were on hiatus from June 2013 until almost a year later, after the 
Council unanimously voted to amend the Commission proposal to Art. 70 TFEU in its 
Minister reunion on June 8th, 201270. The process entered its second conflict phase, 
the deadlock between Council and Parliament over the legal basis of negotiations.   
 
The Parliament strongly reacted to the process in the Council and interpreted the 
actions as a signal that states are asking for a repatriation of border control 
competence. Interestingly, there has been a strong debate about the procedural 
elements, not only between the Council and the EP, but also within the institutions 
coming from the legal services of both institutions71. From a purely legal perspective, 
argued by the Council and to some extent also the Parliament legal service, the 
Commission‘s decision to use Art. 77 TFEU as a basis for the SEM reform has not 
been the correct decision, Art. 70 TFEU would have been correct72. As there are 
numerous problems related to the purpose of Art. 77 TFEU, which mainly concern 
the limited and specific scope of the article: it is meant to deal with the absence of 
border control and reflects the fact that between the Treaty of Amsterdam and the 
Treaty of Lisbon, the purpose changed from promising to establish an area of free 
movement to the promise to offer one. So the article is devoted to the absence of 
internal border controls and does not specifically relate to the question of 
reintroducing controls. This legal basis does not allow the COM to interfere in the 
evaluation mechanism or ask member states to introduce or abolish temporary 
border controls. Art. 70TFEU has been introduced by Lisbon specifically to permit the 
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Council to manage Schengen evaluation together with the Commission without 
mention of the Parliament. Therefore, the Council argued that Art. 70TFEU would be 
the more legitimate basis, since they all agreed to and ratified it. The opposition by 
the EP is based on concerns about democratic legitimacy of the decision, if it is not 
involved, which was the same reason for rejecting the proposal in 200973. The 
Council further argued that the use of Art.77 TFEU would however involve a risk of 
annulment by the ECJ for cause of wrong legal basis, and de facto exclude the UK 
and Ireland from participating in the evaluation mechanism (Carrera, 2012; 
Pascouau, 2013).  
 
The Parliament’s blockage reaction was not only informal, but very formal, as 
rapporteur Carlos Coelho (EPP, PT) and the LIBE committee convinced the MEPs to 
announce to interrupt all negotiations in Justice and Home affairs with the Council 
under the Danish Presidency and a majority of the plenary proposed to freeze the 
negotiations on five proposals for a year74. Rapporteur Coelho recommended to the 
plenary to block the negotiations on the following proposals: (1) Amendment of 
Schengen Border Code and Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement; (2) 
Judicial cooperation in criminal matters: combating attacks against information 
systems; (3) European Investigation Order; (4) Budget 2013 aspects relating to 
Internal Security; (5) EU Passenger Name Records (PNR)75 And the plenary decided 
to remove the discussion of the draft reports from the July 2012 agenda as a signal 
that the Parliament had officially interrupted negotiations with the Council76.  
 
The reform of the Schengen Governance is good example of the inter-institutional 
quarrels between the three main institutions about competence and power 
distribution: under the Danish Presidency, the Council said that it would interpret the 
legal basis of the Schengen Evaluation Mechanism in a way that excludes co-
decision, excluding the EP from influencing the negotiation process; the EP in 
consequence blocked a significant number of dossiers related to Schengen and 
threatened to cut funding  and the EP (committee JURI) insisted that co-decision 
would be appropriate legal basis for the procedure, informally disagreeing with the 
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legal service of the EP77. Even President Schulz interfered and declared it a political 
affair by stating that the Council disregarded parliamentary democracy to fall back 
into intergovernmentalism to be able to conceal the fact that more and more member 
states introduce illicit border controls at internal borders (Dinan, 2013; Zaiotti, 2013).  
 
5.2.5 The mechanisms of consensus-building: from deadlock to agreement   
 
Conflict between the co-legislators, however, was eventually resolved and the 
process ended in a second round agreement. The Commission, it seems, played a 
strategic game with the legal base and achieved an upgrade in substance and 
decisional influence for itself by inciting the co-legislators to start a battle over the 
legal base and the procedural framework of the policy reform: “And one controversy 
between the Council and the Commission was of course the legal basis, and the 
Commission acted very smartly, I mean they did not put themselves versus the 
Council, but they used the Parliament to fight with the Council, it was really smart. 
So, actually, what Parliament wanted, was exactly the same what the Commission 
wanted and from the moral point of view, from the ethics, it was simply not fair, but 
this is the game that the Commission is conducting since some time, I mean they 
simply stopped to be, long time ago, to be just the Guardian of the Treaty but they 
started to have their own policy”78.  
 
Rather than starting with a supranationalist proposal, the Commission responded to 
the Council’s preferences immediately and decided to base the reform on Art. 70 
TFEU and use the consultation procedure instead of co-decision, which could be 
expected to provoke the Parliament and lead to opposition79. The second attempt 
was too close to the Parliament, the procedure was based on Art. 77 TFEU, which in 
combination with an expansive proposal in substance was likely to incite opposition 
by the Council80. The Council, on the other hand, knew that the unanimous 
amendment of the proposal to return to Art. 70 TFEU would not be acceptable to the 
Parliament and deadlock was to be expected81. Since, however, the Commission had 
strategically linked the Schengen Evaluation reform under co-decision to the desired 
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81 Interview 21; Interview 3; Interview 4; interview 5 
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reform of internal border control the Council was advocating for82, thereby pleasing 
the Parliament as well, which feared that it would be sidelined83.  
 
The first outbreak of the migration crisis due to the Arab spring in 2011 provided a 
window of opportunity for the Commission to link the two reforms and give the co-
legislators the opportunity to bargain over the shape of the policy change, knowing 
that the package provided the necessary elements for both to be able to strike a 
deal84. In the end, the desire to have the internal border control flexibilization 
convinced the Council to accept a package and issue-linkage deal to settle the 
procedure conflict with the Parliament, which de facto allowed the Commission to 
take over the evaluation mechanism85.  
 
This stepwise game was both facilitated and hindered by the behavior of the relais 
actors involved. The Commission representative in the first round in 2009 was 
perceived as incompetent and unfit to be a mediator, the actor was replaced in the 
second round in 2010 and 2011 and was considered to be much better fit86. The 
most important relais actors were the rapporteur and his assistants, they were both 
advocates of deadlock and facilitators of resolving it at a later stage, as the 
rapporteur, Carlos Coelho, was trusted by both the Parliament to act in its best 
interest and trusted by the Council’s conservative majority to work towards a 
compromise that would be acceptable to the Council87. The fact that Coelho belongs 
to the conservative EPP group helped establish a majority in both Council and 
Parliament for the compromise solution. The rapporteur in turn trusted his assistants 
with very informal contacts and negotiations with a few selected state 
representatives, Portugal and Luxembourg, to find a creative legal and textual 
solution for compromise88. The Council Presidencies had a more ambiguous role, the 
Danish Presidency, while trusted by the Council members to defend their interests, 
was not accepted by the EP to be an honest broker, because it was not seen as 
                                                          
82 “We judged that the last proposal, number 3, was a lot more tangible, also on the Schengen Borders Code, at 
that time, the experts which participated in Schengen evaluation made us support it, because we saw that we 
missed in the original mechanism, that after discussions there was a need to act, which some member states 
simply ignored, so we thought that with the transfer of competences, this would change, there would be an 
incentive in the new one to say when it is enough.” (Interview 49)  
83 Interview 22; Interview 21; Interview 4; Interview 5 
84 Interview 22, Interview 21 
85 Interview 13 
86 Interview 49 
87 Interview 21; Interview 9; Interview 25 
88 Interview 22; Interview 21 
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being sufficiently impartial, the Cypriot Presidency was more trusted to be a neutral 
broker, but was not the main driver to conflict management. It can therefore be said 
that deadlock and failure are facilitated by relais actors’ divergence from their 
intended role as mediators and providers of information and informal contacts, for 
example, by Council Presidencies that defend national interests instead of acting as 
mediators, like the Danish Presidency did.  
 
5.2.6 The agreement  
 
The risk of the EP refusing to adopt the changes to the border control part of the 
proposal, very much desired by Germany, France and other influential states, 
prompted the Council as a whole to reconsider its stance89. Thus, between June and 
September, the Council agreed to a compromise, initiated by the LIBE rapporteur and 
the Cypriot Presidency in cooperation with the respective legal services of the two 
institutions, accepting to ask the EP for its opinion on the SEM with regard to the 
content90. This was made possible by linking the two proposals and convincing the 
Council that the EP would never yield to the Council’s demands on internal border 
control, which was under co-decision, if the Council disregarded its opinion on 
SEM91. The solution proposed was a so-called bridging clause, a form of package 
deal, in the Schengen Borders Code: the new proposal on internal borders included a 
paragraph with reference to the SEM and its general guidelines, thus co-decision, 
meaning that if the SEM was ever going to be reformed again, it would have to be 
with the involvement of the Parliament92:  
“They understand that any future proposal from the Commission for amending this 
evaluation system would be submitted to the consultation of the European Parliament 
in order to take into consideration its opinion, to the fullest extent possible, before the 
adoption of a final text.”93 
 
In conclusion, the process proved to be a policy battle of subsequent retaliatory 
blows in several rounds of bargaining, starting with the Commission’s ambitious 
proposal for supranationalization of Schengen evaluation, the Council’s aggressive 
                                                          
89 Interview 22; Interview 3; Interview 49  
90 Interview 22; Interview 21 
91 Interview 21; Interview 22; Interview 3 
92 Interview 21; Interview 22 
93 Council of the European Union, I/A Item note, General Secretariat to COREPER, 14057/13, 27 September 
2013 
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correction under the Danish Presidency and ultimately the Parliament’s retaliation 
with the issue-linkage, which ensured its involvement (Ripoll Servent and Trauner, 
2015). Rather than consensus, the negotiation produced a hard-fought and fragile 
compromise, which reflects the tension between both camps. The Commission was 
both strategic and a good anticipator or honest broker of Council and Parliament 
preferences in this case, it knew of the Parliament’s desire to be involved and the 
Council’s desire to have a reinforced mechanism of internal border control and 
heeded both in its proposal (Carrera et al., 2013; Carrera, 2012).  
 
Council and Parliament engaged in a power battle over influence in the Schengen 
case, because the Parliament had been facing a security-focused Council in many 
negotiations in the JHA area and states increasingly showed a tendency to revert to 
intergovernmentalist methods; the Parliament’s hardcore blockade strategy worked, 
because it involved a number of sensitive files, which were of interest to the Council 
and it actually succeeded in extracting concessions from the Council on procedural 
matters (Ripoll Servent and Trauner, 2015).  
 
If the Parliament uses co-decision rules to its advantage and knows when a battle is 
worth fighting, it can extract concessions from the Council and get its way. The 
Parliament ultimately privileged pragmatism over power battle, fearing to compromise 
its past efforts to become a credible actor in Justice and Home affairs matters 
(Huber, 2015). The compromise accommodates both agendas, the security-focused 
state agenda and Commission’s and Parliament’s need for supranationalization, 
since the Schengen Evaluation mechanism has been moved from a peer-review 
system to a centralized system monitored by the Commission, but the control over 
the reintroduction of border control at internal borders remains in the hands of the 
states (Ripoll Servent and Trauner, 2015). 
  
The unblocking mechanism proved to be the rapporteurs’ team and their ability to 
exploit loopholes in the blockage situation, namely the fact that the right wing majority 
in the EP would be likely to agree to a reform in substance if its procedural influence 
was guaranteed. The team of actors rightly anticipated the Parliament valuing 
procedural elements over substance and benefitted from the change in governments 
in key member states, among them Germany, France and Italy, which made the 
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Council position overall more moderate and made it easier to push for a compromise 
on border control rules, tight enough to please the Council, yet not threatening the 
Schengen agreement in principle. The actual strategic solution was fairly simple and 
legal in the end, but required a certain amount of political maneuvering:  
 
“So we continued in what was more of a goodwill than anything, so basically there were too 
member states, I don’t know if I should say their names, but very pro-European member 
states, that continued to have meetings, I met with them, just the three of us, we refused the 
blockage, so we continued to meet, every week, going through the text to see where we 
could find compromises and come with the better text that could be accepted, they have the 
idea of what would be acceptable to member states and I had an idea of what would be 
acceptable to the Parliament between the political groups. And that’s how we started working 
on a different proposal. From the beginning I always said, if you someone else, let me them 
join, if others are interested, let them join, we start with these two member states.”94  
 
As for conditions of consensus-building, both trust and legal expertise were given in 
the case of the rapporteur and the Cypriot Presidency, which were aided by very 
astute legal services95. 
  
In content, the reform changed little with regard to the extant rules. The Council 
therefore could not achieve a more security-based approach to border control and a 
renationalization of border management. The SEM reform ultimately benefits the 
COM and to some extent also the EP, which are more involved now in the 
management and evaluation process. Therefore, the EP, though it has lost the 
procedural battle formally, as the wording states that the proposal was decided under 
Art.70 TFEU, has gained influence and control informally, by an extension of its 
influence. 
  
The Schengen case also attests to the strong interdependence of the national and 
EU level in a two-level setting: changes in the domestic arena can completely reset 
the conditions for the negotiation game at the EU level, a situation of conflict or 
deadlock can just as easily be created as it can be solved by changes in the national 
preference setting96. This can lead to inconsistencies in national positions, which in 
the case of Schengen was clearly a case of populist exploitation of an issue by 
politicians in power with respect to national public opinion, as soon as government 
                                                          
94 Interview 22 
95 Interview 22; Interview 21; Interview 3; Interview 48  
96 Interview 18; Interview 19; Interview 20  
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changed, the issue was no longer politicized and therefore perceived to be less 
salient97.  
 
5.2.7 The blame framing game 
  
The Commission blames failure on the Council’s extreme position, especially the 
unwillingness to accept the involvement of the Parliament. The main element of 
blame rhetoric is that the Council could have anticipated the political upheaval with 
the Parliament, yet insisted on sticking strictly to the Treaty provisions, knowing that a 
combination of intergovernmentalist procedure (consultation and limited role of 
supranational institutions in implementation) and substance (keeping peer-to-peer 
mentality) would be impossible to accept for the Parliament.  
 
The Commission blames deadlock on the Council and uses a rhetoric of political 
pragmatism, blaming the Council’s decision to exclude the Parliament for the conflict, 
as Parliament involvement would add legitimacy to the policy instrument from a 
citizen rights’ perspective:  
 
The Commission is siding with the Parliament by framing co-decision as a political 
ambition to ensure that the evaluation mechanism would be properly enforced and 
announces to cooperate closely with the Parliament:  
 
Ultimately, the Commission plays a game with substance and procedure and exploits 
divergences in general preferences and agenda of the co-legislators to focus on one 
conflict dimension and gain in the other: it gains decisional influence in the Schengen 
Evaluation Mechanism by accepting a security rationale and rhetoric for the internal 
borders reform. Any power gains, upgrades in the standards of evaluation and 
competence increases, are framed as successes in protecting Europe and its 
citizens, saying that a European mechanism ensures that all member states correctly 
apply the Schengen acquis. The Commission frames concessions to the Council as a 
necessity with regard to the border control aspect to be able to push for a stronger 
role of supranational institutions in the Schengen Evaluation Mechanism98.  
                                                          
97 Interview 20; Interview 18; Interview 19 
98 “(...) at a certain point, the situation was so complicated and so tense that the consequences of not having 
agreement were so bad for the entire EU that they wanted a compromise at any cost. So I have to say that after a 
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The Council blames deadlock on the Commission’s and the Parliament’s procedural 
power-grabbing using efficiency and accountability rhetoric and the the legal base: 
“The Commission is equally focused on power politics and and tries to avoid each 
reform that would grant more influence to states, even if it might make sense from a 
content point of view.”99 
 
The Council also blames the Parliament’s insistence on being involved in 
negotiations on the Schengen Evaluation Mechanism, where it had already been 
offered by the Council to fully participate in the internal border control part, rather 
than keeping the eyes on the bigger picture and focusing on delivering results for 
citizens: “The EP is very naive often due to its fixation on power politics, extension of 
influence in interior politics, especially in border matters, it lacks realism in political 
assessment and is too idealistic often.”100 In parallel, the Council praises itself for 
being pragmatic and choosing the easiest way to deliver a result on the evaluation 
mechanism reform, accusing Parliament of prioritizing power politics101: “The Council 
takes into account the position of the Commission, but can and has actually outvoted 
the Commission before, they do try to find a compromise, but the Commission is not 
an honest broker. Compromises like package deals, are all found informally, 
consensus as a result often involves hard bargaining in negotiations, along the logic 
of “it’s better to have 50% of something than 100% of nothing”. Package deals can 
be struck across issues or over different files, with the EP it’s usually within the same 
file. Both institutions promise things that they will not fulfill in the future just to reach 
agreements, the Council Presidency tends to make such proposals in negotiations 
knowing that it might not be possible.”102 
 
Conflict is also blamed on the Commission’s strategic manipulation of the cleavage 
between Council and the Parliament: “Commission acted very smartly, I mean they 
did not put themselves versus the Council, but they used the Parliament to fight with 
the Council, it was really smart.”103 “The Commission plays a manipulative informal 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
while they were very quiet on the negotiations, saying please discuss, find an agreement, we will accept it (...)” 
(Interview 22) 
99 Interview 17 
100 Interview 17 
101 Interview 17; Interview 49  
102 Interview 4 (and Interview 5)  
103 Interview 25  
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game, smaller countries or countries who think that they can’t afford to offend the 
Commission are systematically manipulated, it says “if you vote against or for this, we 
will not forget” or “ if you support our position, we will reward it”.”104 
 
The Council frames its losses in substance in the Schengen Evaluation proposal by 
highlighting procedural gains, the reform was passed under Art. 70 TFEU, formally 
excluding the Parliament, and its losses in matters of Schengen Evaluation by 
highlighting the fact that the criteria for internal border control have been flexibilized 
and allow for more state discretion105. The main elements of the framing exercise 
include the emphasis of the achieved balance between sovereignty and preservation 
of state competences and common application of Schengen rules  and flexibilization 
of border control criteria as a means to ensure security106.  
 
The Parliament on the other hand recognizes that the Commission successfully 
exploited the Council’s demand for border control reform to push the evaluation 
mechanism reform in package and frames its losses in terms of procedure by 
highlighting substantive gains and projecting to future negotiations107. It argues that 
the new evaluation mechanism increases citizen’s rights by allowing for systematic 
checks of whether or not member states respect Schengen rules and highlights that 
the Parliament has fought for and won safeguards in terms of limiting possibilities for 
border control and intergovernmentalist elements in Schengen evaluation108. It also 
emphasizes that the Commission’s role has been increased as a counterbalance to 
intergovernmentalism and that the Parliament will be involved in future negotiations 
through the bridging clause: “(...) it was one of our key demands, because the idea 
was to move towards a more European approach, leave the intergovernmental 
approach, okay, they are state borders, but they are also European borders, we have 
a common VISA policy, we have asylum, still not at the stage that we would like, but 
we have a common interest in protecting the borders. And states at that point 
accepted it, because it was this or nothing”109.  
 
                                                          
104 Interview 17 
105 Interview 6; Interview 12 
106 Interview 3; Interview 17; Interview 13 
107 Interview 22; Interview 6 
108 Interview 22; Interview 6 
109 Interview 22; Interview 6 
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The Parliament blames deadlock on the Council’s intergovernmentalist agenda and 
accuses the Council of abuse of trust by voting to exclude the Parliament from the 
decision-making process and of having an intergovernmentalist agenda of gradually 
re-nationalizing Schengen and rejecting a European model110. The Parliament 
particularly blames the Danish Presidency of betraying the trust of Parliament and 
accuses the Minister of going against the social-democratic agenda of his own 
government. Meanwhile, the Parliament praises itself for looking out for citizens by 
ensuring that it is involved in decisions about freedom of movement111.  
 
5.2.8 Model fit and evaluation of the evidence 
 
There is strong evidence for a strategic game for a policy update in several rounds 
with blame attribution and blame avoidance. The formal indicators for a strategic 
multi-round game, are the recast attempts by the Commission in 2010 and 2011, 
after the 2009 attempt had been rejected and the final approval by co-legislators, 
even after several instances of severe deadlock. The has been constant support by 
all institutions for the intended policy change and constant informal contacts between 
Commission and member states, member states and Parliament to exchange 
information and try to find solutions for conflicts.  
 
Originally, repeated deadlock between Council and Parliament in the last round of 
negotiations before agreement is not something anticipated by the Commission-
centric model of failure, as it would be expected that once the Commission conforms 
to its role as the honest broker and recasts the proposal, the co-legislators would 
agree without further serious conflicts. However, if we look closely at the blame 
game, we see that the second round of conflict was necessary for the Parliament to 
reap sufficient reputational gains to be able to accept severe losses in substance and 
procedure in the final agreement: after all, the Council got more control over borders 
and the Schengen Evaluation Mechanism was ultimately agreed upon based on 
Art.70 TFEU, despite the bridging clause. For the Council, accepting blame and a 
year of blockage was acceptable, given the considerable gains in control over 
national borders. The Commission as able to achieve significant increases in 
                                                          
110 Interview 6; Interview 13 
111 Interview 6; Interview 22 
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competence in the Schengen Evaluation Mechanism, at all steps of the evaluation 
process, which was its main focus for the policy change.        
 
 
(table 6, evaluation conditions Schengen, source: own illustration) 
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(table 7, evaluation mechanisms Schengen, source: own illustration) 
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5.3 The Smart Borders Package: strategic failure in two rounds  
 
The Smart Borders Package was a package of two proposals aiming at integrated 
external border management, mainly consisting of an automated Entry-Exit-System 
and a Registered Traveller Program, the Commission presented in 2013. The Council 
and the Parliament held internal negotiations on the proposals in the LIBE committee 
and the relevant working groups and COREPER II in the Council and came to the 
conclusion that the Commission should reassess the package, especially with regard 
to costs and feasibility, which resulted in the withdrawal of the package and the 
recast of a new and considerably amended proposal for an Entry-Exit-System. 
Failure of the first round was mostly blamed on the Commission for presenting a 
proposal that was overly costly and not adapted to the external border policy 
problem. The Council wanted it to be geared towards border protection and law 
enforcement, the Parliament wanted more safeguards against data protection 
violations and lobbied against the security rationale.  The Commission framing 
changed alongside the substance in the second proposal, presented in 2016, where 
before it advocated citizen rights under Commissioner Malmström, the new rationale 
of Commissioner Avramopoulos was security and law enforcement. The Parliament’s 
shift to the right with the 2014 benefited the conservative rapporteur Diaz de Mera 
Consuegra, who was able to rally a majority behind the new proposal leading to 
informal agreement being achieved in autumn 2017.  
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(table 8, Smart Borders timeline, source: own illustration) 
 
5.3.1 The proposal  
 
The original package from 2013 contained three proposals: a proposal for the 
establishment of an Entry-Exit System (EES) at the EU external borders, a proposal 
for a Registered Traveller Programme (RTP) and an amendment to the Schengen 
Borders Code. The idea of the EES was to register entry and exit of third-country 
nationals (TCN) and thereby keep track of the circulation at EU external borders, 
verify the length of stay and register potential overstayers, by using alphanumeric 
data at first and supplementing biometric data after 3 years by collecting 10 
fingerprints upon border crossing. The Commission proposed for data to be retained 
in a central database for 6 months in regular cases and 5 years in case of detection 
of overstay. Access to the collected data should be granted to border authorities for 
identity verification and otherwise be strictly limited for data protection purposes, law 
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enforcement access for national authorities was not foreseen, but considered 
possible via amendment at a later stage. The RTP was supposed to apply to TCN 
with or without VISA to facilitate repeated border crossings, access was foreseen for 
maximum 5 years, with a 1-year initial period extendable two times by 2 years. The 
program should also contain alphanumeric and biometric data (4 fingerprints) and 
data should be stored for 5 years in a central repository with restricted access for 
national authorities. The total costs of the package were estimated at € 1,1 billion. 
The revised package presented in April 2016 contained a few significant changes. 
The RTP proposal has been completely withdrawn from the package and the 
proposal for an EES has been amended in several ways: interoperability between the 
EES and the Visa Information System (VIS) is foreseen from the outset of the new 
system, biometric data will be collected from the beginning, but 4 fingerprints and 
facial image, the total amount of data collected is reduced from 36 to 26 items, but 
data will be stored for 5 years in all cases. And most importantly, law enforcement 
access for national authorities is possible from the beginning, under “strictly defined 
conditions”. The cost estimate has decreased to €480 million.The scope of the 
system as proposed is to register short stay (maximum 90 days within a 180 day 
period), entry and exit, of non-EU nationals with a visa, the aim is threefold: to 
address border check delays and improve the quality of border checks for third-
country nationals (1), ensure systematic and reliable identification of “overstayers” 
(2), reinforce internal security and the fight against terrorism and serious crime (3). 
The system will register standard alphanumeric and biometric data (the name, type of 
travel document, biometrics (four fingerprints and a visual image) and the date and 
place of entry and exit). The broader objective is to facilitate the border crossing of 
bona fide travelers, detect overstayers and illegal migrants in the Schengen area. 
The new system of entering entry and exit data into a central database will replace 
the practice of manual stamping of passports, which had been the standard way to 
calculate duration of stay, but deemed to be slow and error-prone112.  
 
 
                                                          
112 European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council establishing an 
Entry/Exit System (EES) to register entry and exit data of third country nationals crossing the external borders of 
the Member States of the European Union, COM/2013/095 final, 28 February 2013; 
European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council establishing a 
Registered Traveller Programme (RTP), COM/2013/097 final, 28 February 2013 
  
154 
 
5.3.2 Policy formulation, conditions and conflict constellations  
 
Before diving into the process dynamics, we will map out the initial positions and 
preference constellations to understand the conflict dynamics and subsequent actor 
behavior. The Commission announced a clear preference for a system, which would 
grant better involvement of the Commission in external border management, keep 
law enforcement access and data retention to a minimum and not contain any 
tightening of the border control system113 (Bürgin, 2017). The Parliament showed no 
particular internal or inter-institutional division on the problem of cost and feasibility, 
all camps agreed that the proposals was by far too costly and sided with the Council 
on the demand for better proof of practicality and impact assessment114. However, 
there was a significant left-right division on law enforcement access: the left opposed 
the large data collection and retention system and did not favour law enforcement 
access, the right was more sympathetic to the Council’s demands115.  
 
“(...) you will see that the more centre-right groups like EPP and ECR will be in favour 
of the EES, but we’re quite sure that the liberals, ALDE, will be divided, because they 
usually are on these issues and we have for example Sophie in t’ Veld in LIBE, who 
is very much against all big system from the argument of data protection, but we 
have other liberal politicians in the EP that will be in favour and then of course you 
have on the left side S&D and the Greens and so on, which will not be very keen to 
have such kind of system, they would see as a big information system interfering with 
people’s private lives and costing too much in comparison to what it’s meant to 
bring.”116 
 
The situation was similar in the Council: again little division on the overall doubts 
regarding feasibility and benefits of the system as well as the cost problem, all states 
doubted the cost-benefit ratio and found the impact assessment results lacking proof 
of practicality117. However, state representatives were divided along functional and 
                                                          
113 European Commission, Communication, “Next steps in border management in the EU”, COM (2008) 69 final, 
13 February 2008; European Commission, Press release, “Commission proposes better management of 
migration to the EU”, IP/11/532, 4 May 2010 
114 European Parliament, Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, Interparliamentary Committee 
Meeting, European Parliament - National Parliaments, Smart Borders Package: European challenges, national 
experiences, the way ahead, 23-24 February 2015 
115 Interview 24; Interview 47 
116 Interview 24 
117 Council of the European Union, Note Presidency to Strategic Committee on Immigration, Frontiers and 
Asylum, Access for law enforcement purposes, 13617/13, 13 September 2013; Council of the European Union, 
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ideological lines on the substance of the EES: the functional elements mainly 
concerned the focus of the proposal and the requirements to make it work at different 
types of borders118. The Eastern European states wanted to focus on matters 
regarding land borders and the challenges of installing high-tech systems at vast land 
borders, whereas southern European states were mostly concerned with the 
management of mediterranean sea borders and the almost impossible endeavour to 
use high-tech border stations on islands or continental sea borders. Germany and 
other central states focused its attention mainly on air traffic, since this is its biggest 
challenge in terms of migration influx119. The ideological differences regarded law 
enforcement access and data protection, the most sensitive issues involved: the 
more conservative governments favoured longer data retention periods, the inclusion 
of biometrics from the start and a broad law enforcement access, the more left-wing 
governments were against long data retention periods and viewed biometrics more 
skeptically, they also favoured limited law enforcement access120. 
 
There were two main conflict lines between the legislative institutions were the 
following: (1) the balance between security and rights protection was contested 
between the institutions, Commission, Council and Parliament disagreed on where 
the balance should be struck between law enforcement access and data protection, 
the Council demanding more law enforcement and the Parliament more data 
protection, and they also disagreed on scope extension and proportionality of the 
EES, the Council wanted to extend it to a larger population of migrants and collect 
more data, the Parliament wanted to keep the scope restricted and reduce data 
collection and retention to a minimum. Feasibility and interoperability (2) were the 
elements of the second conflict line of the co-legislators with the Commission, despite 
extensive impact assessments and pilots, the Council argued that there are concerns 
with regard to the implementation and points to the potential dangers of malfunction 
or misfit to national borders and border systems when moving from sovereign 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Outcome of Proceedings, Strategic Committee on Immigration, Frontiers and Asylum, Access for law enforcement 
purposes, 14066/13, 1 October 2013 
118 Interview 47; Interview 28 
119 Council of the European Union, Note Presidency to Working Party on Frontiers, Smart Borders, Wrap-up of 
discussions, 15024/15, 10 December 2015 
120 Council of the European Union, Note Presidency to Strategic Committee on Immigration, Frontiers and 
Asylum, 14073/1/15, 13 November 2015; Council of the European Union, Outcome of Proceedings, Working 
Party on Frontiers, 13193/15, 17 November 2015; Council of the European Union, Note Presidency to Working 
Party on Frontiers, Smart Borders, Wrap-up of discussions, 15024/15, 10 December 2015 
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systems to harmonized ones. The Parliament put less emphasis on feasibility, but 
agreed with the Council that the measure was too costly.  
 
The inspiration for the system the Commission proposed came partly from its own 
evaluations of existing systems and possibilities, and partly from discussions in the 
Council among technical experts in SCIFA121 and the evaluations of national 
practices and was justified in reference to European Council conclusions on the need 
to improve border management systems122. In the first round, the Commission 
proposed the EES framed as a border and migration management tool, restricted to 
third-country nationals and limited law enforcement access and data retention: 
justified the choice by referring to the need to protect citizens’ rights, the ECJ 
jurisprudence  and the Parliament’s stance on data protection. The RTP was framed 
as a facilitation mechanism for border crossing and justified it by a need for balance 
between border security and mobility facilitation. To justify the choice in terms of 
technical feasibility, the Commission carried out several impact assessments to 
analyze the modalities of a smart borders system (2008, 2012 and 2013) and 
explored many different options for data storage for the EES in combination with the 
RTP. To justify the cost-added-value ratio, the Commission developed a funding plan 
for the entire system, which would cover the set-up at the EU level and in the 
member states, future operational costs would have to be covered by national 
programmes123. The Commission had conducted extensive assessments and 
consultations and even sought contact with member states124.  
Negotiations on the “Smart Borders Package” have formally been ongoing since the 
Commission presented its proposals in February 2013, however, the impulse for a 
reform of external border management dates back over a decade: in reaction to 9/11, 
the European Council issued a specific conclusion with regard to the management of 
                                                          
121 Council of the European Union, Note Presidency to Strategic Committee on Immigration, Frontiers and 
Asylum, “Integrated Border Management, Strategy Deliberations”, 13926/3/06, 21 November 2006 
122 European Council, Cover Note, Conclusions, General Secretariat of the Council to Delegations, EUCO 23/11, 
23 and 24 June 2011  
123 European Commission, Staff Working Document Impact Assessment, Accompanying the document 
PROPOSAL FOR A REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL establishing an 
entry/exit system to register entry and exit data of third-country nationals crossing the external borders of the 
Member States of the European Union, SWD/2013/047 final, 28 February 2013; European Commission, Staff 
Working Document Executive Summary of the Impact Assessment, Accompanying the document PROPOSAL 
FOR A REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL establishing an Entry/Exit 
system (EES) to register entry and exit data of third-country nationals crossing the external borders of the 
Member States of the European Union, SWD/2013/048 final, 28 February 2013; European Commission, Staff 
Working Document Detailed Explanation of the Proposal by Chapters and Articles, Accompanying the document 
Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council, SWD/2013/049 final, 28 February 2013 
124 Interview; Politico, 30 October 2011;  
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external borders at its Laeken meeting in December 2001:“ Better management of 
the Union’s external border controls will help in the fight agains terrorism, illegal 
immigration networks and the traffic in human beings. The European Council asks 
the Council and the Commission to work out arrangements for cooperation between 
services responsible for external border control and to examine the conditions in 
which a mechanism or common services to control external borders could be created 
(...).”125 
 
The Commission responded with a Communication to the Council and the 
Parliament, announcing that it would pay particular attention to the issue of joint 
management of external borders when accompanying member states in the 
implementation of the Schengen acquis. But the tone of the Communication 
insinuates that the Commission blames a lack of competence transfer and integration 
in the third pillar for its inability to act and deplored the resulting lack of operational 
coordination: “The institutional reality of the three pillars which is an absolute must for 
the creation of legal norms remains unaffected (...) The acquis communautaire as 
regards external border management still lacks proper operational coordination.”126 
The Commission Communication to Council and Parliament, however, already 
included a very detailed discussion of the stakes involved in creating a system of 
integrated border management. While there is no explicit mention of an electronic IT-
based system, the Commission does discuss the challenges of conducting border 
checks at different types of borders in detail, proof of its awareness and anticipation 
of the criticism that would later on be raised in the discussion of the EES system. The 
Communication alerted both member states and MEPs to the topic and, in hindsight, 
gave ample time to prepare and assess the stakes.  
The Council adopted a Plan on external border management in reaction to the 
Commission Communication, where it highlighted 5 components of such an 
integrated border management system: a common operational cooperation and 
coordination mechanism, common risk analysis, personal and operational equipment, 
a common corpus of legislation and burden sharing between the member states and 
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the Union.127 After the Council adopted its plan, the issue remained off the agenda 
without any legislative proposal by the Commission until the Council brought it to the 
SCIFA agenda in 2006.128 
The issue was then revived by a Communication by the Commission in 2008 and a 
European Council meeting in 2011, where the heads of state called for the 
Commission to present a strategy for integrated border management129.  
The Arab spring provided a window of opportunity for discussions to be reopened as 
it entailed a major migrant crisis for the European Union and it has been struggling 
since 2011 to find solutions for the issues arising from the increased influx of people 
at its external borders. Border management has been a key interest for national 
governments since the outbreak of the migrant crisis and the issue of securing 
external borders while maintaining the Schengen acquis has been very actively and 
controversially discussed in European (and national) media between 2013 and 
2015130.  
As mentioned above, the idea for a reform of the external border management 
originated directly from the European Council, and it again encouraged the 
Commission in 2011 to reflect on possible forms of integrated border management, 
explicitly mentioning legislation. This prompted the Commission to present proposals 
on the so- called “Smart Borders Package” in 2013. The intention was clearly 
described at that time: provide for a European border management system to 
facilitate border crossings for third country nationals and keep track of potential 
overstayers with the help of a technologically advanced IT-system. The rationale of 
the legislative package was clear in 2013: border management facilitation131. The 
Commission, when preparing for the legislative proposal, has conducted a great 
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series of impact assessments and actively sought the input of public stakeholders132. 
There were also contacts to member state representatives and the Parliament, which 
were used to exchange views on the issue and exploited by the co-legislators to give 
the Commission input:  
“(...)one important issue that influences negotiations is also what has been 
done before the current negotiation, the idea for Smart Borders has first been 
brought up in 2008/2009, after that you start inputting ideas into the 
Commission, trying to negotiate with them what they are looking at, whether 
they are coming up with a proposal and what they are considering about 
specific issues, like land borders, so exchanging views. First step is to get the 
position of the Commission and get the Commission to understand what could 
and could not be done, to get as good a proposal as possible and that is totally 
done at the margins, so you cannot officially affect the process, because you 
do not have a national position yet, but you still have to maneuver in the playing 
field.”133 
The Commission’s ambition was to provide better mechanisms of controlling border 
traffic and supervising migration, in particular TCN and the danger of over-stay. 
However, many operational questions were left open by the Commission to be 
addressed during the legislative negotiations: whether the interoperable systems 
should be centralized or decentralized, with the Commission favoring a centralized 
one, centralized or decentralized data storage and the Commission arguing that a 
centralized system would be cheaper and equally problematic in terms of data 
protection than a decentralized one, the inclusion of biometric data, where COM 
recommended starting with alphanumeric data and including an option to activate 
biometric data at a later stage and data protection as a main priority and 
recommended a restricted law enforcement access. At the outset of negotiations in 
2013, the Commission was open to the input by the co-legislators, but the rationale 
seemed to be clear: border management facilitation with an objective to aiding 
migration control134: “Commissioner Malmström was Commissioner at that time, and 
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of course the world was different, but from her political background, what I have 
understood, she is more pro on facilitating travelling and connections of societies, 
(...)”135 
This rationale was pushed in particular by the Commissioner Malmström, who was in 
charge of the dossier at the time, since she did not consider the issue to be a priority 
and did not support a security approach, being explicitly against law enforcement 
access and data retention due to data protection concerns136. Malmström responded 
to the pressure by heads of state and agreed to develop a file, but used her level of 
discretion for policy entrepreneurship (Bürgin, 2016). Since no other DG’s or the 
President Barroso and the Secretariat General were involved, as they trusted 
Malmström to handle the dossier by herself, she benefited from a low level of 
interdepartmental coordination, as the unit for borders in the DG Home was the lead 
unit on the substance and the framing of the system137(Bürgin, 2016): “(...) but the 
Commissioners and their highest hierarchy, the Commissioners are also politicians, 
so they need to get something for themselves, if they are prone to some ideas, they 
must show their voters and the public that they are defending the ideas and can 
manage to put them forward, because they have been put into these positions for 
some reason.”138 
Malmström’s team made strategic use of the impact assessments and the 
preparatory information available to the Commission. The impact assessments did 
not produce a clearcut result as to which format of data collection and data retention 
would be preferable139. It has been criticized by some member state delegates that 
the communications by the Commission were biased in favor of data protection 
instead of considering all policy options laid out by the impact assessments and 
stakeholder consultations equally to focus more on how to counteract irregular 
immigration, fight against terrorism and serious crime, rather than data protection140 
(Jeandesboz, 2013).  
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In fact, the Commissioner Malmström stated upon release of the proposal, that the 
Entry-Exit System was not a priority for the Commission, restricted law enforcement 
access and data retention were a consequence of the Commission’s belief that 
further information databases were not needed at EU level, as information exchange 
was already sufficiently developed141. Commissioner Malmström was able to impose 
her preferences in this case and exert political leadership, because she enjoyed 
discretion within the Commission, due to low interdepartmental coordination and a 
disengagement by other DGs142 and she herself decided to frame the proposal as 
modernisation of border management with the aim of facilitating mobility as a political 
narrative for the discussions about the Entry-Exit-System and strategically used 
impact assessments, which were biased in favour of data protection instead of 
considering all options equally143 (Jeandesboz et al., 2013).  
5.3.3 The negotiation process: mechanisms of deadlock  
  
Some member states in the Council considered that the Commissioner had 
disregarded their interests, rather than incorporating security concerns into the Entry-
Exit-System144: 
“(...) this is also why in the beginning we were not very convinced, because there was 
no law enforcement access from the beginning, so where we saw or though, if you do 
such an important investment and you cannot draw any positive effects of it in the 
whole security issue, what is then the added value, is it only to create lists and so 
on.”145 
Additionally, member states were not welcoming the proposal for a RTP, first and 
foremost, because it was considered too costly and of little benefit and they also did 
not appreciate the Commission’s decision to make them negotiate as a package, 
seeing it as an attempt to force the RTP upon them in exchange for the EES (Bürgin, 
2016). Rather than admitting to it, delegates instead framed the removal mo the RTP 
as a sensible measure by the Commission to reduce costs146 and as a logical step to 
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separate the two systems and first provide the EES as a base, thereby pushing the 
RTP issue into the future to avoid conflict in the present negotiations147. 
Since the first meetings on working group level in the Council, in the Working group 
on Frontiers and SCIFA, the Council discussed preferences on law enforcement 
access. From the outset of Council negotiations in February 2013 until September 
2013, the successive Irish and Lithuanian Presidency noted that a large majority of 
delegations have argued in favour of providing access to the EES for law 
enforcement, in particular for the purpose of combating cross-border crime and 
terrorism, from the date of start of the operation of the EES148. The Lithuanian 
Presidency suggested to SCIFA to discuss granting law enforcement access as a 
secondary objective: under specific conditions in a limited manner, which would imply 
redrafting the proposal to clearly define the relations of the EES to national border 
authorities and law enforcement authorities. To collect the views of delegations, the 
Presidency issued questionnaires to find out whether law enforcement access would 
provide benefits in terms of combating crime149. Repeatedly, the different levels in the 
Council, mostly the Working party on Frontiers and SCIFA, but at times also the 
Ministers and COREPER, discussed the proposals and slowly edged towards a more 
security-focused rationale, in particular regarding the EES. At working party level, the 
technical conditions and prerequisites of granting law enforcement access have for 
example been discussed since 2013, even though neither the Commission, nor the 
Parliament desired granting law enforcement access from the outset at this stage of 
negotiations150. The agenda on the inclusion of law enforcement access was 
politically endorsed by the Minister level and became the main concern of the Council 
in 2013151. In later meetings, a majority of states declared themselves in favour of law 
enforcement access from the outset and see a clear added value for national law 
enforcement, cannot provide any statistics on how this plays out in practice, however 
some delegations underlined that it is necessary to ensure the feasibility and 
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operability of the systems in view of the high costs, COM responded by suggesting to 
assess these aspects in the impact assessment study and pilot undertaken by COM, 
eu- LISA and member states until 2015. Until 2014, there was some degree of 
division in the Council, in particular on matters of law enforcement access, however, 
the European Council picked the issue up in its conclusions in June 2014, after which 
there was agreement among the delegations152. 
The following negotiations in the working parties and COREPER raised a number of 
other issues, on which delegates did not agree, such as the number of biometric data 
used, abolition of stamping, use of accelerators etc., however, these issues were 
much less controversial than law enforcement access and data protection.153 The 
occurrence of the terrorist attacks on Charlie Hebdo, 8 January 2015, changed the 
setting of the negotiations and considerably affected the Council, Parliament and the 
Commission positions on the matter of external borders and security. A number of 
EU member states (Germany, Latvia, Austria, Denmark, Spain, Italy, Belgium, 
Netherlands, Poland, United Kingdom) joined France in a joint declaration of 
Ministers of the Interior on 11 January 2015 requesting a speedy improvement of 
external border management with a view to reinforcing security measures when 
examining external border crossings154. In a following meeting of the Working group 
on Frontiers, 16 February 2015, the Commission expressed its reluctance to make a 
decision on the topic of law enforcement access in view of the concerns of the EP, 
prompting the German and French delegation to demand the position of the 
Commission on the security issue in the Schengen area in view of the Paris 
attacks155. The Latvian Presidency supported the Commission’s hesitation and 
suggested waiting for the results of the EP debate on law enforcement access, 
before making a decision. This reluctance gave the French delegation an incentive to 
bring forward a formal strong statement in the Working Party on Frontiers advocating 
a clear security rationale for the Smart Borders Package156. 
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The French position was quite extreme, demanding to extend the Smart Borders 
system to all travellers, including EU citizens. Germany, France, the Netherlands and 
the UK formed a coalition to defend the proposal under a security rationale. This idea 
was not taken up by the other delegations, however, they pronounced themselves in 
favour of including residence permit holders, a proposal that was viewed critically by 
both the Commission and the Council legal services and therefore not upheld by the 
Council in further discussions157. By the end of 2015, after discussions of the results 
of the impact assessment study and the pilot had been concluded, the delegates 
agreed on including law enforcement access, biometric data collection and the 
abolition of stamping and requested a general data retention period of 5 years for all 
systems. France used national security threats and appealed to its fellow big member 
states, Germany, UK, Netherlands to back its security rationale. Especially the 
German- French axis became quite strong and visible after the Paris attacks in 2015: 
both delegations wrote an informal letter to the Commissioner demanding an 
increased use of biometric data and unlimited access for law enforcement 
authorities158. In the Council, they teamed up to advocate the use of biometric data at 
Minister level, which proved to be successful. The use of issue-specific and interest-
based coalitions in combination with a use of political pressure, by moving up to the 
Minister level appears to have been a winning strategy for the French and German 
actors in this case159. As an institution, the Council strongly benefitted from the EP’s 
inaction in most parts of the 2015 negotiation, used links via national parties in the 
EP to gain access and persuade MEPs160, and the Commission’s weakness towards 
the security threat, especially after 2015, to exert pressure regarding the key issues: 
law enforcement access and use of the biometric data of the EES for security 
reasons: “(...) and Commissioner Malmström was Commissioner at that time, and of 
course the world was different, but from her political background, what I have 
understood, she is more pro on facilitating travelling and connections of societies, 
people to people, than what we have now in the Commission, with Juncker, 
Timmermans and also Commissioner Avramopoulos, so they have been in quite a 
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tough position due to the security situation on the ground, so of course all these 
facilitation programmes can be exploited (...)161 
Summarizing the Council agenda, the following points have to be highlighted: the 
Council position became more and more focused on security rather than border 
crossing facilitation, the Council pressured the Commission to revise the proposals 
and kept the EP fairly sidelined, mainly insisting on the Council being regularly 
informed by the Commission162. 
The Commission, despite the initially not security-oriented framing, manifested an 
intention to include the Council’s suggestions and revise the proposal. On law 
enforcement access, for example, the Commission position significantly evolved from 
2013 to 2016: while it was reluctant to include it in the proposals and only mentioned 
the possibility of a future amendment of the EES in that regard, it had conceded to 
demands by the Council by the time the revised proposals were presented in April 
2016 and included law enforcement access from the outset as a secondary/ancillary 
objective163. In 2013, the Commission had still insisted on the need for a clear 
justification for granting access to the EES for law enforcement purposes and 
emphasized that the costs of the EES could not constitute in itself a justification for 
expanding the objectives of that system164. COM finally reserved its position pending 
the outcome of the discussions within the Council and, later on, between the co- 
legislators. In 2015, after the Paris attacks in January, the Commission position still 
remained quite hesitant with regard to law enforcement access and did not relinquish 
to the demands of the French delegation about including all travellers. Commissioner 
Avramopoulos stated at the European Parliament Plenary Session on the Smart 
Borders Package, on 9 June 2015 and 28 October 2015, that the COM insists on the 
system applying to TCN, not EU citizen and law enforcement access was being 
investigated, but should be weighed against proportionality and necessity:   
“Possible law-enforcement access will be a key issue to be addressed in the impact 
assessment for the new proposal. The Commission has already acknowledged, in 
the impact assessment for the 2013 proposal, that the data generated at entry/exit 
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could be of use to law-enforcement authorities in the fight against terrorist offences 
and serious crime in specific cases – both as an identity verification tool and as a 
criminal intelligence tool. (...) “But any decision to allow law-enforcement access from 
the outset will need to be based on the demonstrated necessity and proportionality of 
the measure. Strict, specific substantive and procedural safeguards would need to be 
laid down, taking into account, inter alia, the rulings of the European Court of Justice 
on data protection”165 
The Commission emphasized both its awareness of the existing problems and 
tensions between the co-legislators, already when proposing the package in 2013, as 
well as its openness towards including Parliament suggestions.  
The EP agenda showed some inconsistency at the early stages of negotiation, the 
rapporteurs had divergent opinions on the value and conception of the proposed 
border system and interestingly the initial rapporteurs of the package: the left wing of 
the Parliament, aided by the European Data Protection Supervisor and the European 
Court of Justice, strongly agreed with the Commission’s assessment regarding data 
protection, whereas the right wing supported the Council on the necessity to provide 
for law enforcement access and reevaluate the risks regarding data retention more 
objectively.   
Renate Sommer (EPP, EES) and Ioan Enciu (S&D, RTP), were replaced between 
2013 and 2015 and the package was split, the EES file was taken over by Agustin 
Diaz de Mera (EPP) and the RTP file by Tanja Fajon, (S&D), Fajon in turn was also 
taken from the package by the time the proposals were recast in 2016 and Diaz de 
Mera took over both proposals. The first rapporteur reshuffle in 2014 could be 
explained by the intervention of EP elections, which changed the personnel in the 
LIBE committee and shifted majorities in the entire EP. Most likely the choice of a 
conservative rapporteur was the EP’s way of ensuring better links to the Council’s 
conservative majority166. It could be a counterbalance to the left-leaning tenor in the 
meetings of the LIBE committee in 2014, chaired by Claude Moraes (S&D), where a 
number of concerns, especially by the left wing MEPs were raised: across groups, 
the EP expressed a wish for more clarity on a number of issues, especially the 
general rationale of Smart Borders, but also interoperability, data protection. Overall, 
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the EP questioned the legal basis to allow for EP involvement in pilot schemes and 
the usefulness of the new system for combatting terrorism and illegal migration, 
increased administrative burden (Carrera et al., 2013). RTP rapporteur Fajon, also 
left-wing, pointed out that the impact assessment study raised a number of concerns 
and questioned whether the COM would be willing to withdraw the proposal if the 
study showed that the objectives are not met, or whether other scenarios are 
considered and specifically highlighted data protection issues. ALDE openly 
questioned necessity and proportionality of the proposal alongside the excessive 
costs. Greens/GUE opposed the proposals qualifying them as generalized 
surveillance system, criticizing the poorly defined objectives and costs and pointed 
out data protection concerns and specifically opposed law enforcement access. EES 
rapporteur Diaz de Mera, though generally supportive, demanded more time to 
examine the material, raised concerns about the costs and the timetable, wanted to 
have a hearing with national parliaments, expressed concerns about the options and 
the unclear objectives, law enforcement access was considered a major concern as it 
lacked concrete proposals, interoperability was a main issue167. 
As for the positions of the different rapporteurs in more detail, there were 
disagreements between the right-wing rapporteur Diaz de Mera and co-rapporteur 
Fajon from S&D and the left-wing shadows, ultimately the disagreements were not 
settled in negotiations on the first proposal, but through the strategic exploitation of 
the opportunity provided by the recast. The following comparisons of positions show 
that the disagreements could have complicated the negotiations in the Parliament, 
had it not been for the Commission recast and the disappearance of the RTP168:   
Rapporteur Diaz de Mera (EEP, EES) supported the comprehensive, European-led 
management of border controls and the idea of granting access to security forces 
would make the EES more useful and effective, which would, in turn, help to improve 
the management of the Schengen Area. Diaz De Mera, who became the lead 
rapporteur on the recast proposal as well, argued that there is a choice between 
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(RTP), co-rapporteurs Agustín Díaz  Mera García C nsuegra, Tanja Fajon, 6 January 2015; European 
Parliament, Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, Working Document, on the Registered 
Traveller Programme, rapporteur Tanja Fajon, 6 January 2015  
  
168 
 
security and speed with regard to the use of biometrics: the more fingerprints, the 
more reliable the result, but also the slower the border crossing. Data retention 
should uphold the principles of need and proportionality: the current data retention 
period is too short to ensure correct management of traveller movements, the study 
has demonstrated that 5 years are more feasible and proportionate, as stipulated in 
the RTP, but the issue is dependent on the structure of the system architecture in 
particular whether or not it will be linked to extant systems (VIS/SIS), in any case the 
data retention period for both systems should be aligned. Cost reduction can be 
achieved by linking RTP and EES and extant system, as minimizing costs for 
establishment and maintenance are important.  
Renate Sommer (EPP, EES), rapporteur before Diaz de Mera, strongly lobbied for 
the proposal and its potential security elements, considering it useful and necessary 
and expressing herself in favor of law enforcement access from the beginning as 
member states in their national systems have made positive experiences and it 
appears valuable for combating crime and terrorism. Ioan Enciu (S&D, RTP), former 
RTP rapporteur, considered that the policy-making process does not allow for 
properly structured debates focusing on the key elements of the COM proposals, 
namely a clear definition of the problem and an open debate on possible solutions, 
the proposals and the study, as well as all supporting documents are drafted in a 
view to supporting the creation of new systems and not to assessing their necessity 
or proportionality, which remain unproven, just as there is no evidence that the 
objectives will be reached. Tanja Fajon (S&D, RTP), the co-rapporteur on the RTP, 
broadly supported the point of view of her colleague and former rapporteur Enciu, 
who was not reelected in 2014. Proportionality and necessity have not been 
sufficiently demonstrated, the compatibility with data protection standards has not 
been addressed properly in any study, neither have alternative options, cost 
evaluations have not been reconsidered as to providing clear estimates. Law 
enforcement access is included as a secondary objective and seems to become 
increasingly central to the proposals without having been properly analyzed. She 
argues that the objectives of the system would change if law enforcement access is 
included, from facilitating border crossings to a tool for fighting crime and terrorism. 
The implications of data retention, especially in view of recent court rulings, have not 
been properly taken up and answered by the study. The impact study does not 
suggest granting law enforcement access and the 5 year period of data retention 
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seems to be sufficient. Fajon points out that the suggestions made by the study vary 
considerably with regard to the initial COM proposals, some of the options raise 
security questions and would need further consideration, such as the use of online 
applications for the RTP. Options regarding use of biometrics should be tested before 
making a decision. Integration of the systems, EES, RTP and VIS would be useful 
from a capabilities and data point of view, but then data retention has to be 
harmonized and the rights of the data subject fully guaranteed.  
Given the EP’s fear of being sidelined or excluded from the negotiations during the 
time of impact assessment and pilot studies due to the arguable lack of expertise169, 
a likely assumption would be that the Parliament’s best strategy for remaining 
involved would be to move towards the Council, especially on matters of law 
enforcement and security elements like collection of biometric data data retention170. 
Since 2013, the Council had indicated, at working party level, that the EP should be 
“associated” to negotiations with the Commission during the assessment period, 
whereas the Council should be informed at all times and Commission should 
manifest full transparency with the Council actors171. 
Council and Parliament ultimately agreed on the necessity to halt negotiations and 
focus on impact assessment and practicality questions, the Parliament was 
convinced by the Council to fail the original package due to the proximity between the 
conservative EPP rapporteur and the conservative majority in the Council (Bürgin, 
2017).   
In terms of substance, the Council was able to prevail: member states agreed that 
the package as proposed would not be discussed, because it had previously lacked 
the necessary security elements172. The Registered Traveller Program was argued to 
be too costly and and not a priority in view of the Council security agenda173, which 
made states conclude that the Commission proposed it as a package alongside the 
desired border management system to force the Council to negotiate it (Bürgin, 
2017).  
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5.3.4 The withdrawal and blame framing game  
 
There is a strong focus on the technocratic nature in the way all actors in the three 
institutions frame failure174: “Yes, but honestly, when the European Council 
formulates the demand for smart borders, and the Commission has to table a 
proposal, nobody really knew in the Commission either, it would have been a lot 
easier if the Commission had already made that thought exercise, but it wasn’t 
possible. So our thinking evolved incredibly over the 3 years, I now know what smart 
borders will look like, I didn’t know 3 years ago, so it’s normal that the text didn’t 
represent the idea that was behind it.”175 
 
The Council unanimously voiced support for such a system, but criticized the 
Commission’s framing and also a general design of the system, by saying that it 
lacked consideration for security elements and did not respond to the demands of 
member states, whose agenda for external borders was not focused on 
management, but rather on control and security: “(...) It’s clear that we need such a 
system. 13 member states have national EES and there is a need for shared control 
of entry, once people entered and moved within the borderfree zone, they 
disappeared from the national system, it’s beneficial to all of us to have an EU level 
EES, so the system is really important and it can help a lot, but some points in the 
proposal we are not so happy with.”176 
 
The Council framed reluctance to negotiate the proposal as a cost-added-value issue 
and linked it to the question of how this centralized data collection tool would be 
useful to increase security without law enforcement access. The criticism of the 
limited availability of security measures was framed as a question of added value. 
The Council questioned the benefit to states in view of the costs if the system was 
mainly directed at monitoring and not at law enforcement177.  
 
“(....) so of course all these facilitation programmes can be exploited, it’s always a 
possibility, if you talk about 200 million border crossings, there might be one or two 
rotten apples always, that’s why we have the law enforcement authorities to pick 
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them up. But that was one of the biggest reasons why substantive changes were 
made, that the balance between facilitation and security was a bit shifted and now it 
is more about security than facilitation.”178 
 
The critique of the RTP was framed as a question of avoiding additional costs for little 
comparative benefit. The Council also emphasized feasibility concerns, in particular 
regarding implementation for different kinds of borders and the proceeding of border 
control by border guards and demanded a more detailed impact assessment and 
pilot to test different options179.  
 
The Parliament joined the Council in cost-added-value concerns, substantively 
emphasized concerns about data protection safeguards and doubted the feasibility of 
the Commission’s proposed design180: “Back then, the Commission really tried to 
finalize the SIS II after a few years of delays and the Parliament was very critical 
about the Commission’s capability of delivering large scale IT-projects, which is one 
of the reasons why eu-LISA was created, to have a competent IT center to deal with 
technical issues. And it goes quite well, so now there is more trust that ideas put 
forward of a technical nature can also be implemented.”181 
 
The Parliament welcomed the Commission’s framing of the package and framed the 
system as migration management and facilitation tool, while criticizing the Council 
demands in data retention matters as disproportionate to the purpose182. The 
Parliament did not voice particular procedural concerns, as it approved of the 
centralized system under supervision of the Commission and its own involvement in 
the decision-making process. The Commission pursued a double agenda with the co-
legislators: it wanted to push for a European-based and integrated external border 
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management to please the Parliament, but was also aware of the need to consider 
the security incidents and the implications for border policy for the member states:  
“Parce que la Commission envisage cette proposition principalement sous l’angle de 
la mobilité, plus que sous l’angle de la sécurité et de la gestion des problématiques 
migratoires. Alors il y a un peu de tactique de la part de la Commission, la tactique 
notamment envers le Parlement (...)”183 
“Wie das konkret ausgehen wird mit den neuen Vorschlägen, ist zu früh, klar ist 
natürlich, die Vorschläg  haben jetzt eine sehr viel stär ere Sicherheitsdimension 
bekommen, auch in der aktuellen Diskussion, als das vorher vielleicht der Fall war 
und die Kommission ist ja auch nicht blöd, die haben zwei Datenbanken 
vorgeschlagen, eine die mehr die repressive Seite darstellt, über das EES, und eine, 
die mehr die positive Seite darstellt, das wir erleichtern den Grenzübergang, diese 
positive Seite ist jetzt ein Stück weit weggefallen.”184 
As a result, the national governments and the national public are very likely to blame 
the Commission for not sufficiently taking into account the views of the co-legislators.  
“Malmström had her ideas and views on the facilitation issues for example, but the 
Commissioner can only influence the main idea and maybe a few concrete issues, at 
that time that was the case, she would take aboard her ideas and you can of course 
try to influence, but the Commissioners and their highest hierarchy, the 
Commissioners are also politicians, so they need to get something for themselves, if 
they are prone to some ideas, they must show their voters and the public that they 
are defending the ideas and can manage to put them forward, because they have 
been put into these positions for some reason.”185 
But, rather than blaming it on straightforward activism, the blame was attributed to an 
unfortunate lack of overlap of the old proposals with the new security agenda:   
“The former EES system that came under the previous Commissioner, it was not one 
of her priorities, but clearly, you have to understand that it was in 2013, before any 
attacks, and before the migration crisis, so Europe then was a different place. It 
would not say that she necessarily did a bad job, simply the circumstances were 
different. (...) 
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She did not see, in that context, as relevant as it is in today’s context. The decisions 
are taken in time and place and that time and place was different from today.”186 
The faulty design was attributed to the fact that the policy agenda had changed in the 
meantime, making the old proposals unfit. There is also mention of potential internal 
coordination problems in the Commission at the policy formulation stage:  
“Then internal procedures for the adoption of the proposal, it was a little bit hard in 
terms of, yes, it’s an element of decision-making process internal discussion within 
the Commission, it’s also something that is influencing the content of a proposal, 
because here we had several internal stakeholders, more active ones were DG Just 
and the legal service. (...) So, it has changed, it has an influence on the way you can 
propose, because this inter-service consultation, it’s important, it’s essential, you 
cannot for a decision of the Commission if you don't pass this, if you don’t have the 
green line from the legal service, from the General Secretariat of the Commission, 
these are elements that are also changing a proposal, even if you have agreements 
with the Parliament and the Council, you have to be compliant with all these internal 
stakeholders.”187  
The tenor on all sides was clear that the Commission had indeed conducted 
extensive consultations and that member state representatives had sought to 
influence the DG and the responsible units during the process188:  
“For bigger proposals, like Smart borders, apart from the Parliament and national 
expert groups, the Commission also holds hearings with stakeholders and conducts 
pilots. Proposals like that also involve a larger number of DGs in the Commission, in 
the case of Smart Borders the IT unit regularly reported to the borders unit. Smart 
Borders proved to be challenging, because positions were different and financial 
implications of the project quite huge.”189 
“But then there are many other persons, you go into a certain DG, trying to influence 
more in detail at the DG level, and go to the head of unit to have the actual expert 
who is writing the proposal, where you can also have discussions, and many times 
small details are really big details when you come to the practice, for example 
changing “and” to “or” can make a big difference for border control when you talk 
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about 500 million border crossings. It’s those small issues also that you try to 
influence.”190 
However, underneath the rhetoric about technicalities and feasibility, there is the 
clear baseline of wanting to avoid blame from the constituents, not only for failure, but 
also for an outcome that was not desired, especially on the side of the co-legislators: 
“The absence of transparency it’s also the result of this attitude: it’s Brussels doing 
this. Yes, but you were involved, your administration was involved (…) and your 
members in Parliament elected by your people were involved. It’s also the way it’s 
communicated: it’s not me it’s the other.”191    
5.3.5 The recast: conditions and mechanisms of consensus-building 
 
Time passed and the circumstances changed. Within one year, three terrorist attacks 
occurred on European soil, two in Paris in January and November 2015 and one in 
Brussels in March 2016. These incidents brought the security question to the 
forefront of member states’ concerns and changed the setting for the negotiations on 
external border management192. What had been a management issue, loosely linked 
to concerns about irregular migration, now became a major security question193. In 
meetings on the aftermath of the attacks in Paris in November 2015, the European 
Council and the Council made it abundantly clear that changes in external border 
management had a new goal: help combat terrorism and reinforce internal 
security194.  
It is important to mention that the European Council is now much more involved in 
the negotiations than it was on the previous proposal. It exerts more pressure on the 
legislative institutions, has set a clear deadline for agreement by saying that an inter-
institutional agreement needs to be found by the end of June 2017. This was used by 
the Maltese Presidency as an argument to push the trilogue mandate through the 
Council, even though some delegations still do not agree with some of the elements. 
 
“The European Council at its meeting of 20 October 2016 called on the Council to 
establish its position by the end of the year. The Presidency is deploying its best 
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efforts to meet this objective to the extent possible, without losing sight of the need to 
address adequately all the legal and practical concerns which have emerged during 
this examination and which have ramifications on other parts of the acquis as well.”195 
“The importance and the priority nature of the file has been repeatedly underlined by 
the European Council. Most recently, at its meeting of 15 December 2016, the 
European Council considered that the co-legislators should agree on the Entry/Exit 
System by June 2017. The Presidency is doing its utmost to meet this objective, 
without compromising the quality of the text.”196  
About half a year later, the Commission submitted revised “Smart Borders” 
proposals, in April 2016, which clearly reflected the security rationale that had been 
set out by the heads of state and the ministers197. The evolution in the border policy 
rationale surrounding the “Smart Borders” negotiation favors the Council, as the 
European Parliament has been co-legislator since 2013 and emphasized that it did 
not agree with the framing of the proposals, fearing a securitization of border 
management, at a time, when the proposals showed little of the security rationale.  
The Commission had presented its original proposals with the intention of pushing 
forward a more European external border management and encouraging member 
states to agree on facilitating border crossings for third country nationals. The framing 
was oriented towards a balance of security and migration facilitation elements:  
“enabling national authorities to identify overstayers and take appropriate measures” 
since “third country nationals not requiring a visa are currently not subject to any 
systematic check for border control purposes before arriving at the border itself” and 
RTP could “offset better management of the flow of passengers” and “other positive 
aspects such as the satisfaction of travellers and the symbolic effect of showing the 
EU as open to the world”, but balanced it by saying that “time savings in border 
crossings” would “allow border authorities to focus their resources on those groups of 
third country nationals that require more attention, thus improving overall security at 
borders”.198 
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Commissioner Malmström presented the project for Smart Borders with a double 
agenda “recalling that the purpose of border control is to facilitate legitimate travel 
and trade while preventing irregular migration and cross-border crime: having safe 
and reliable external borders is a priority for the EU and its member states”199. 
Between 2013 and 2016, there is little left of the facilitation rationale in the 
Commission proposals and the statements made by relevant Commission 
representatives, especially lead Commissioner Avramopoulos, increasingly highlight 
security aspects.  
The Commission insisted more strongly on the security aspect “EU citizens expect 
external border controls on persons to be effective, to allow effective management of 
migration and to contribute to internal security. The terrorist attacks in Paris in 2015 
and in Brussels in March 2016 bitterly demonstrated the ongoing threat to Europe's 
internal security.” and specifically referred to the migration and security crisis and 
used it as a basis to link “border management, law enforcement and migration 
control” by describing them as “dynamically interconnected” to “enhance both 
external border management and internal security in the EU”200. 
The Commission changed the framing of the project from migration management to a 
border management and security tool with more extensive law enforcement access 
and data retention provisions. The scrapping of the RTP was framed as a cost 
reduction measure to avoid blame for taking away the liberal, pro-migration element 
of the package201. The Commission used reframing of the agenda from migration 
management to border security to make the proposal more acceptable to the Council 
and added data protection rhetoric to make it acceptable to the Parliament, which 
joined the frame of border management and security, but retained the criticism about 
data retention.202  
 
By 2016, the Commission rhetoric about external border management had shifted to 
security203, as the official declaration stated that: “The access to the Entry-Exit-
System by law enforcement authorities will constitute an additional instrument to 
prevent and combat terrorism and serious crime, by tracking travel patterns and 
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combatting document and identity fraud. Commissioner for Migration and Home 
Affairs Dimitris Avramopoulos declared that “(t)errorist attacks on our soil have shown 
the threat to our security, at the same time as we face a migratory crisis of 
unprecedented proportions. Information sharing is at the nexus of both. Our border 
guards, customs authorities, police officers and judicial authorities must have access 
to the necessary information and the right tools to tackle these issues rapidly, 
efficiently and effectively.”204  Commission Vice-President Frans Timmermans’ 
position on law enforcement access was equally straightforward: “Border and law 
enforcement authorities in the EU must have appropriate access to all the existing 
databases when needed to help them do their specific jobs. Better information 
sharing is a priority of the European Agenda on Security and the recent attacks 
confirm our resolve. We will find a way to do this whilst ensuring that individuals’ data 
is safe and that there is no infringement of their right to privacy. This is about the 
intelligent, proportionate and carefully regulated access all our information border 
and security authorities need to do their job – to protect us and the freedoms we 
defend.”205  
Overall, the Council as a whole expressed support and confirmed that the new 
proposal constituted a significant improvement over the old proposal, in matters of 
design and framing:  
“These are a revised version of the proposals presented by the Commission in 
February 2013 and for which the co-legislators had voiced technical, financial and 
operational concerns.”206  
“Widespread support was expressed by Member States to the objectives of the 
proposals. As far as the substance was concerned, delegations considered that the 
new proposals represented an improvement compared to the version presented in 
2013.”207 
The new proposal has two equal purposes namely migration management and law 
enforcement access, where the Council wanted both principles on equal standing, 
whereas the Parliament wanted law enforcement access to be a secondary objective, 
it contains biometrics, 4 fingerprints, which is less than the Council wanted initially, 
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thus most likely a concession to the Parliament, from the outset, which is not what 
the Parliament wanted and definitely what the Council requested, with a data 
retention period of 5 years, again corresponding to what the Council requested, and 
not to the 2 years the Parliament proposed, an element which is still highly 
controversial. The proposal is also focused on interconnectivity with VIS and the SIS 
systems208. The Commission presented it under the headings of addressing border 
check delays and improve the quality of border checks for third-country nationals, 
ensuring systematic and reliable identification of overstayers and reinforcing internal 
security and the fight against terrorism and serious crime. 
 
Trilogues from 2016 to early summer 2017, until the informal agreement, were very 
secretive, there is little to no access to documents about the progress on the 
proposals between EP and Council. Despite the lack of access to official information 
about the progress on the substance of the proposal, the official documents record a 
great number of meetings at different levels in the Council.209 It can be concluded 
that there was an interest among member state representatives to reach an 
agreement on the new proposal, since the Council meet very frequently at all levels 
to produce a compromise to enter trilogues: “The technical examination of the 
proposals by the Working Party on Frontiers started right after their presentation. 
Since then, ten meetings were held, which allowed for several readings of the 
proposals, as well as the examination of a number of compromise suggestions 
presented by the Netherlands and the Slovak Presidencies. The JHA Counsellors 
also met to further develop the work carried out at Working Party level. Policy 
debates were held at political level, both in the JHA Council (21 April and 13 October 
2016) and in SCIFA (21 June, 13 September and 25 October 2016), to give guidance 
to the Working Party on some of the most sensitive issues.”210  
 
From the few documents available, which reveal information about the conflict 
constellations within the Council and the Parliament, it emerges that there were still a 
number of controversial issues for both institutions, both not the same ones as on the 
first proposal, the focus was less on data protection and more on the question of 
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scope, where the Parliament demands strict criteria for non-Schengen countries, and 
the conditions of law enforcement access, the Council would like to have rather broad 
approach.  
  
In the Council, the Dutch, Slovak and Maltese Presidency had to solve a number of 
controversial issues the Council did not agree on, the calculator and the role of 
Bulgaria, Croatia and Romania, access for law enforcement, connection with other 
databases like VIS: “The Presidency intends to pursue actively the examination of the 
outstanding issues with a view to finding an agreement on a mandate to open 
interinstitutional negotiations as soon as possible.”211  
 
By the end of June 2017, the Maltese decided to leave those issues open for 
trilogues and push for the the trilogue mandate and give the compromise proposal to 
COREPER for approval.212 In the Council progress reports and mandate for trilogue 
negotiations, from December 2016 to March 2017, the following controversial issues 
were especially highlighted: on the issue of the scope of the EES, COREPER 
guidance  from 1 February 2017 established that all states should be included if they 
are eligible under Art. 60 of the proposal, even though they are not full members of 
Schengen, based on a proposal by the Council legal service to get the calculator 
through in the Council, disregarding the opinion of the Commission legal service on 
the matter, 7 December 2016.213 With regard to the calculator application, the 
Presidency insists that the COREPER guidance on a uniform application of the 
automated calculator should be followed, even though some states still oppose it on 
legal and practical grounds, again a proposal by the Council legal service, 
disagreement between Commission and Council legal service, 29 September 2016. 
The issue of bilateral agreements remained unresolved, the Presidency proposed a 
compromise that would allow the agreements about visa waiver to stay in force, but 
the Commission rejected the proposal, but the Presidency proceeded with a 
compromise proposal, even though a number of delegations did not agree with it. 
Lastly, regarding the application to EU nationals, the French proposal was not taken 
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up, but COREPER mentioned the possibility of addressing the issue in separate 
legislation214. 
  
As for the positions of the EP LIBE committee, based on Draft Report December 
2016,  which was approved by the plenary on 27 February 2017215: overall, the 
Parliament is not happy with the decision to combine two purposes without clarifying 
what it implies for data protection, migration management should remain the first 
purpose and law enforcement access a secondary one, as the implications for data 
management and storage are not the same. The plenary as a whole rejects the idea 
of data transfer to countries that are not part of the EES and still wants to reduce the 
data retention period: 4 years in case of overstay and 2 years for regular cases. 
There is disagreement within the LIBE committee between the different parties, the 
right is more in favor of the whole system, the left and liberals do not approve of the 
new framing and the data protection standards.   
  
However, the approach by the rapporteur, Agustín Díaz De Mera García Consuegra 
(EPP, Spain), who stated before the LIBE Committee, 11 May 2017, that progresses 
have been made during the “trilogue” negotiations and that the good cooperation 
between delegations will probably allow to come to a political agreement by the end 
of the summer, there was little official output by the Parliament on the issue216, was 
rather conciliatory.  
 
Nonetheless, there was quite some remaining controversy in the LIBE committee and 
the Commission’s decision to put a stronger emphasis on law enforcement to enable 
the right-wing rapporteur to promote the system to the plenary by stressing the 
security links to the Council majority:  
 
“(...) European Parliament will be divided, but you will see that the more centre-right 
groups like EPP and ECR will be in favour of the EES, but we’re quite sure that the 
liberals, ALDE, will be divided, because they usually are on these issues and we have for 
example Sophie in t’ Veld in LIBE, who is very much against all big system from the 
argument of data protection, but we have other liberal politicians in the EP that will be in 
favour and then of course you have on the left side S&D and the Greens and so on, which 
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will not be very keen to have such kind of system, they would see as a big information 
system interfering with people’s private lives and costing too much in comparison to what 
it’s meant to bring. So I expect very difficult discussion in the EP on this file, they will have 
many difficulties finding a common position and then you can expect that it will be a 
common position that is somewhere between the big data protection concerns and the 
concerns for more security, so I think in the end, it might be a good idea to include this law 
enforcement access from the beginning, because of course the opponents will have more 
strong arguments against, but I can imagine that on the right side, this will help EPP 
defend the system, because they would also see it as an element in the fight against 
terrorism and so on (...)”217  
 
Rapporteur Diaz de Mera is generally favorable, but insisted on the balance between 
security and fundamental rights, voiced concerns about data protection with regard to 
interoperability with other systems, data retention and law enforcement access, 
technical questions regarding the modalities and procedures of access, as well as the 
procedure for dealing with temporary failure of the systems. Shadow Tanja Fajon 
(S&D) is not in favor of the new framing decision and the link make between border 
control and crime prevention, insists that it should be presented as a border 
management tool and the differences with regard to data collection and retention 
between trusted travelers and criminals should be made clear to guarantee 
fundamental rights, criticizes the data retention period as disproportionate and voices 
feasibility concerns for countries with busy land borders. Shadow Jussi Halla-Aho 
(ECR) strongly supports the new framing in terms of security and would like to extend 
law enforcement access. Shadow Angelika Milnar (ALDE) considers that the 
amendments have improved the Commission proposal, but there are still problems 
regarding the disproportionate retention period and the unclarity regarding protection 
of fundamental rights, criticizes the new framing and the double purpose of the new 
proposal saying that the law enforcement purpose is unjustified. Shadow Jan Philipp 
Albrecht (Greens/EFA) argues that data protection standards should be ensured at 
the highest level, data retention period and conditions of access for law enforcement 
most controversial, risk of turning it into a costly system of data collection with long 
retention periods that does not facilitate border control in the end.218  
  
However, the perception the Parliament gave in the second round of negotiations 
with the Council was quite compromising, it signalled awareness of the security 
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agenda, and an instrumental goal of avoiding blame for a potential failure to produce 
results in matters of combating terrorism: “for the EES trilogues the mood is very 
different in the EP, from financial concerns are less important now, everyone is fully 
committed to having a quick agreement until June, every institutions is adapting to 
the new context, no institution wants to be the one to be blamed for not having new 
tools to combat terrorism, which matters for EP.”219 
 
There have been some compromise attempts between Council and Parliament, 
initiated by the rapporteur and the Presidencies. Regarding law enforcement access, 
some national delegations in the Council wanted to further extend access, but 
eventually agreed to the Presidency compromise which limits law enforcement 
access to what is possible under the current legal framework. The compromise 
proposal by Presidency from 22 May 2017 summarizes the following positions: the 
Council wanted to extend the scope by changing the (a) the reference to ‘designated 
authorities’ rather than ‘law enforcement authorities’, also allow for (b) the possibility 
to access the EES even when the search in national databases results in a hit, 
include the (c) the possibility to proceed to access the EES once the Prum search is 
launched, and (d) the possibility to also check against refusal of entry records220. 
 
The Parliament on the other hand argued for  (a) limiting the urgency procedure to 
cases where there is an ‘imminent danger’ related to a terrorist offence or other 
serious criminal offence and requiring the ex post verification to take place within two 
working days and also argued that (b) providing that there must be reasonable 
grounds to consider that consulting the EES will contribute to the detection, 
investigation or prevention of a terrorist/other serious criminal offence. Actually, it 
should be noted that ‘reasonable grounds’ would still be enough and certainty is not 
required. Moreover, a substantiated suspicion that the person falls within the scope of 
the EES would still be sufficient to fulfil this requirement221. 
  
Open issues between the three institutions that had remained after June 2017 are 
especially data retention period, data transferability, bilateral agreements, and the 
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scope of the system, especially whether or not to include non-Schengen members222. 
Nonetheless, the Maltese Presidency and the Parliament negotiating team were able 
to announce an informal agreement by 30 June 2017, which would result in an 
overall agreement after technical details had been settled:  
  
“Malta is very good as a Presidency on this, they are a small team, but very 
coordinated, very involved in different dossiers, they have a language advantage with 
the EP, are very organized on the files, even if they did not expect to be involved in 
EES negotiations, because it should have been agreed upon under the Slovak 
Presidency, but there were coordination problems between EU and member states. 
Agreement would have been possible in December 2016, with a bit of pushing by the 
Slovak Presidency, the law enforcement access was the biggest issue, and the 
declaration by member states could have been a way out of the blockage.”223 
 
There are no official records of these negotiations, but the agreed upon inter-
institutional position after trilogues shows that on most issues, the Council has 
agreed on a number of safeguards regarding access to data for law enforcement 
purposes and the Parliament agreed to a more extensive data retention period for 
overstayers (5 years instead of 4 years as demanded by the LIBE rapporteur)224 
 
After summer, the rapporteur confirmed the final agreement in the Parliament in late 
October 2017 and the Council signaled informal agreement through the Estonian 
Presidency in late November 2017225. The formal adoption was confirmed on 
November 29 by Council and Parliament and the adopted proposal was published in 
the official journal on December 9226. The solution for the more controversial issues 
was, comparable to the Schengen case, a creative legal and textual one, in this case 
constructive ambiguity in the formulation of the legal text, which leaves discretion for 
implementation and enables the actors to frame the agreement in a way that is 
beneficial for them.  
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5.3.6 Model fit and evaluation of the evidence 
 
Looking at the process analysis, we find a clear indication in the data that the reason 
for failure of Smart Borders is to be found at the policy formulation stage. There are 
indicators for both strategic miscalculation, some evidence in favor of technocratic 
failure and activism and no indication that the Commission did not play an important 
role in the origin and process of failure.   
 
In this case, the compromising positions of both institutions in the second round 
seem to stem from a concern to ensure that everyone can achieve gains, which is in 
line with the assumption that the institutions strategically use the second negotiation 
round to create winners: “It cannot be at the end of the day that the Parliament thinks 
that the Council won more, it has to be a win-win situation, to keep the balance 
between the institutions, at least to me, it’s always something people keep in mind, 
whether you have personal success or not.”227 
 
Reviewing the process leading to withdrawal, the following conclusions can be drawn 
about the mechanisms of failure and the conditions, which were present or absent in 
this case.  
As regards mechanisms, faulty agenda-setting due to a flawed drafting process in the 
DG Home and a deliberately dissonant framing of the package in combination proved 
to be an impossible ground for negotiation for Council and Parliament, states in 
particular felt that the package as presented did not correspond to their needs in 
terms of border management and border security. The key component of failure was 
the division in the Parliament and the state representatives’ ability, led by the 
Presidencies, to exploit the division and rally the conservative majority to the Council 
majority, by appealing to the EPP rapporteur. In terms of conditions, both trust in the 
Commission as an agenda-setter and technical expertise and preparation on the side 
of the Commission by Council and Parliament were lacking. Due to the technical 
complexity of the issue and the insufficient evidence, flexibility on the side of the 
Commission to adequately respond to Council or Parliament demands was not given 
either and the Commission was deemed unfit to mediate and find an acceptable 
compromise based on its proposal. The new Commissioner, the conservative Greek 
Dimitris Avramopoulos, adopted a position that was less directed at promoting liberal 
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rights and pronounced himself more in favor of a security approach than the former 
Swedish socialist Commissioner, Cecilia Malmström.  
 
The discretion available to Commissioners in the drafting process and the framing of 
the proposal was exploited by Commissioner Malmström to steer the proposal 
towards a liberal rights agenda, Commissioner Avramopoulos showed more 
willingness to include co-legislator demands into the draft proposal, which explains 
why the new proposal responds to the demands made during negotiations between 
Council and Parliament in the first round, mainly the Council’s demands about 
security elements.   
 
As for the influence of relais actors on the process of failure, there was no particular 
contribution of the Council Presidencies in pushing for failure, since the positioning of 
state delegates was rather clear on the issue and the proposal was rejected by both 
Council and Parliament before actually adopting formal positions and starting trilogue 
negotiations. However, the Irish and Lithuanian Presidencies invested much time in 
collecting information about the preferences of the different delegations and working 
out the problematic substantive aspects of the proposal, the Greek and Italian 
Presidencies continued the technical discussions about the system, especially the 
request for more law enforcement and the Latvian and Luxembourgish Presidencies 
mainly discussed law enforcement access and the French proposal to extend the 
system to EU nationals. Those were the main Council inputs for the Commission’s 
redrafting exercise and the new proposal strongly reflects the elements agreed upon 
by the Council in working party and COREPER discussions. The Presidencies 
therefore have contributed to playing the part for the Council in the strategic game of 
informally lobbying the Commission to achieve gains in the second round.      
 
As would be expected in a strategic model, in the second round, there was a stronger 
role for Presidencies and the behavior was geared towards consensus-building, 
because the new security rationale of the proposal was better received by the 
Council, but there were still controversial aspects remaining, before an agreement 
could be reached. The Dutch and Slovak Presidencies proposed compromises on the 
calculator issue, interoperability law enforcement access and data retention and 
Malta was able to achieve a trilogue position in March 2017, even though most of the 
  
186 
 
controversial discussions were still ongoing, which shows that the second proposal 
was much closer to Council interest and there was a general push to negotiate with 
the Parliament and achieve an agreement on the policy instrument.  
 
Both LIBE rapporteurs on the first and second round EES proposals came from the 
EPP group, the RTP rapporteur was from S&D, the first round rapporteur Renate 
Sommer (EPP, Germany) already pushed for a security rationale in LIBE in 2013, her 
successor Diaz de Mera Consuegra (EPP, Spain) focused more on the cost and 
feasibility concerns in the first round in 2014 and 2015, because those were the main 
concerns for S and D and ALDE MEPs who would be necessary for the supporting 
EPP to form a majority. In March 2017, around the same time the Council reached a 
trilogue position, the rapporteur Diaz de Mera Consuegra was able to rally a majority 
to adopt a trilogue position by inviting the Commission to discuss the inclusion of data 
protection elements and ensure proportionality and necessity in law enforcement and 
interoperability matters to make the proposal acceptable to the S&D and ALDE. This 
indicates that for the Parliament as well, the second proposal was acceptable and 
there was a desire to push for agreement on the policy instrument.  
  
There as a reframing exercise by the Commission which points towards the strategic 
model. The initial framing did not help convince Council and Parliament of the 
usefulness of the tool, since it aroused the suspicion that the Commission was trying 
to create a huge centralized system, which would ultimately benefit itself, but not 
states (Bürgin, 2017). In the second round, as the data shows, the Commission 
adapted its framing to include more security elements and took over many of the 
Council’s suggestions regarding law enforcement access and other security 
elements, thereby displaying the intent to achieve a compromise that would 
acceptable to the Council. In the negotiations between Council and Parliament, the 
Commission assumed an honest broker role in the second round, leaving it to the co-
legislators to bargain over the detailed provisions.  
 
As far as structural factors and the influence of the two-level setting go, we can 
observe that the coincidence of migration and security crisis made it more attractive 
for the Council to consider the proposed package even if it is costly, where before the 
Council considered it an additional costly Union instrument without added value. The 
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aggravation of the crisis in 2015 opened a window of opportunity for the Commission 
to exploit with a more security-oriented framing of the proposed border system. 
Therefore, the Commission changed its framing to respond to the Council demands 
in terms of security elements, especially regarding law enforcement access, 
collection of biometric data and removed costly and non-security related elements, 
such as the Registered Traveller Programme. The framing concerns both official 
documents and public statements, as well as informal signals to the co-legislators.  
 
For the Parliament the shift in public opinion and government agenda in reaction to 
the migration and security crisis mattered in so far as it adapted its position to be 
more open towards a security approach. The Parliament was aware that as pressure 
increases on national governments due to rising concerns in the public opinion and 
pressure by populist parties, the representatives in the Council would adapt their 
strategies to focus on border security rather than open borders.   
 
The European Council conclusions also reflect this shift, from 2013 to 2015, heads of 
state amplified the security rhetoric and asked for an extension of the scope to law 
enforcement. After the 2015, the European Council set a time horizon for 
negotiations and put pressure on the co-legislators to negotiate speedily.  
 
The following tables summarize the main findings about conditions and mechanisms: 
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(table 9, evaluation conditions Smart Borders, source: own illustration) 
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(table 10, evaluation mechanisms Smart Borders, source: own illustration) 
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5.4 Border policy: comparative findings and conclusions  
 
There is evidence in both cases for a strategic game between the three institutions, 
but also some evidence for technocratic failure. The Commission clearly responded 
to member states’ input on the framing and the purpose of the Smart Borders system 
and recast a more security-oriented second proposal, and it also responded to the 
member states’ demands for a compensatory security element in the Schengen case, 
to make the supranationalization of the Schengen Evaluation Mechanism acceptable. 
The Commission failed to link its proposal to the member state agenda in the first 
round, but successfully used the shift to a security agenda as a window of opportunity 
for the second round.  
 
When comparing the two cases, it becomes obvious that the conflict dimensions 
were different in nature, even though there were preference conflicts both in the 
Council and between Council and Parliament in both cases, the Schengen 
Governance negotiations mostly focused on the procedural conflict between the 
Council and the Parliament, whereas the Smart Borders negotiations ultimately 
brought Council and Parliament together and made them confront the Commission 
on a proposal that was considered disproportionate by the co-legislators 
 
Though it is difficult to draw general conclusions from one case study, there are still a 
few things to be observed, most of which are unsurprising: National politics prevail 
over legal matters: legally, the two aspects, first the reintroduction of border control 
by France, and second the legal basis of the Schengen Evaluation Mechanism, 
would not have required new legislative action, as both were in conformity with the 
EU law, but national politics and saliencies triggered action on the European level. 
Salience or politicization however have to be put into perspective: salience and 
politicization of an issue on the national level might matter at the agenda-setting 
stage and even at the initial stage of negotiations in the Council, yet not be 
determinative for the decision outcome. Salience or politicization are endogenous in 
many ways: first of all it is not constant for states, thus state representatives, 
throughout a negotiation process (which sometimes takes several years) due to 
changes on the domestic level (such as elections, crises etc.), second there is no 
effect by itself on the negotiation process but needs to be strategically used by actors 
to be effective, and third, its effect depends very much on the context of the 
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negotiation (issue, actors involved etc.) whether or not a strategic use is successful. 
Salience or politicization of an issue is no guarantee of success in EU negotiations, 
though they might be a successful strategy for bringing an issue to the EU level, but 
not for being successful in the actual negotiations.  
 
Overall, relais actors mattered, if they were considered trustworthy and experienced 
relais actors, like the rapporteurs in the second rounds of Schengen and Smart 
Borders, failure can be avoided, whereas untrustworthy actors, such as the 
Commission official in the first round of Schengen and the left-wing rapporteurs in the 
first round of Smart Borders had to be replaced to enable agreement. The Council 
Presidencies played an ambiguous role in the Schengen case, the Danish 
Presidency almost led to another round of failure in the second attempt, whereas in 
the Smart Borders case, they perfectly assumed their honest broker role.  
 
The Council Presidency as a relais actor played an ambiguous role in the Schengen 
negotiations, it both aggravated the conflict and helped solve it in the end. The 
reason for this can be found in the individual Presidencies that took place during the 
process, especially the Danish Presidency and the subsequent Cypriot Presidency. 
Presidencies do sometimes take positions, making the negotiations very complicated, 
as the Danish Presidency did in 2012. There was great pressure by a majority of 
state representatives on the Polish and subsequent Danish Presidency to change the 
legal basis to Art. 70 TFEU to exclude the Parliament from the Schengen Evaluation 
Mechanism reform. However, there was no unanimity in the Council between 2011 
and 2012, as the Belgian and Luxembourgish representatives firmly opposed the 
application of Art. 70 TFEU. In 2012, the Danish representatives decided to support 
and push the proposal for an application of Art. 70 TFEU and also supported the 
security rationale, more competences for member states in internal border control. 
This decredibilized the Danish Presidency in the eyes of the Parliament and 
encouraged the rapporteurs to break off the negotiations and suggest a blockade 
(Zaioitti, 2013). The Presidency changed at the end of 2012 and the Cypriot 
delegation decided not to take a position on the issue and focus on restarting 
negotiations with the Parliament. The Cypriots strongly relied on the assistance 
provided by the Council Secretariat General and the legal service, which came up 
with a proposal for a bridging clause, allowing the Parliament to be involved in future 
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reforms of the Schengen Evaluation mechanism through a reference to it in the 
Schengen internal borders file of the package. This created a de facto situation of co- 
decision for future reforms of the Schengen Evaluation mechanism, as all reforms of 
the Schengen Borders Code have to be executed under co-decision and the bridging 
clause included the Evaluation Mechanism in that list (Carrera et al., 2012; Dinan, 
2013). 
 
The Council legal service played a considerable role in the conflict resolution, as the 
legal experts came up with a solution that was sufficiently technical to take the 
political tension out of the procedural battle between the institutions, yet not so 
technical as to disregard the political importance and sensitivities involved for the 
Parliament. It also convinced the legal service experts of the Parliament that the 
application of Art. 70 TFEU was indeed correct in this case. The EP legal service in 
turn convinced the rapporteurs to accept an issue-linkage compromise, since a legal 
procedure before the ECJ could not be won by the Parliament in any case. 
 
As for the role of the Council Presidency and the Council legal service in the Smart 
Borders case, it was less ambiguous and conflictual, because no Presidency took a 
particular position or exploited the issue in their favour, instead all delegations 
assumed their role of mediator and tried to establish a common position for the 
Council, but its behavior still proved to be important with regard to the failure of 
consensus-building on certain matters. The main role of the Presidency consisted of 
trying to abide conflicts between delegations on substantive matters, especially law 
enforcement access and data protection questions. The Lithuanian and Latvian 
Presidencies had to resort to a great number of informal meetings with delegations in 
working groups and COREPER II in order to bring member state delegations to a 
common position on these issues. 
The issue-linkage proposal coming from the legal services and the Council 
Secretariat General provided a solution for the deadlock in the Schengen case: by 
depoliticizing the issue and providing a legal solution for the procedural problem, the 
actors were successful in convincing the majorities in their respective institutions of 
the value of an agreement. The state representatives in the Council were willing to 
accept the bridging clause solution, because they desired an agreement on the 
substance of the proposals, especially the strengthening of border control criteria in 
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view of the escalating migrant and refugee crisis. Coalition-building proved to be 
crucial in the Smart Borders case, as the security rationale was enforced through the 
initiative of the French and the German delegations and their success in building 
interest-based and issue-specific coalitions with other big member state delegations 
(law enforcement access, security rationale for the entire Entry-Exit System). 
The rapporteurs, especially the EPP rapporteur of the Schengen Evaluation 
Mechanism file, Carlos Coelho, played an important role in the Schengen 
negotiations, both in terms of fostering the deadlock, as well as solving it. Carlos 
Coelho, very trusted by his committee colleagues from all parties as the expert on 
border matters, convinced the plenary to engage in the battle over competences with 
the Council and block the negotiations after Art. 70 TFEU was enforced and he was 
also the one who successfully negotiated a compromise between Council and 
Parliament after the deadlock. Together with the Cypriot Presidency, the Council 
General Secretariat and the legal services of Council and Parliament, Coelho 
managed to convince the plenary to accept the bridge clause solution in the two 
proposals forming the package, which guaranteed the Parliament’s involvement in 
future reforms of the Schengen Evaluation Mechanism in exchange for accepting to 
vote this reform under Art. 70 TFEU. The importance of a united plenary for the 
negotiation power of the Parliament is crucial in case of conflict between Council and 
Parliament. The rapporteurs were successful in uniting the plenary on the procedural 
questions and form a large coalition to confront the Council, which resulted in 
augmenting the Parliament’s influence on the negotiation process and contributed to 
its success in getting the Council to moderate its position. 
As for the role of the rapporteurs and shadow-rapporteurs in the Smart Borders 
negotiations, the most interesting observation with regard to agency in the EP is the 
change of rapporteurs from 2013 to 2016, which resulted in a de facto exclusion of 
left-wing rapporteurs from the negotiations, as all rapporteurs are now from the EPP 
group. This probably accounts for the fact that the EP no longer shows internal 
division on matters of data protection and law enforcement access and is more 
supportive of the security rationale in the LIBE committee than it was in 2013. 
In the Schengen governance negotiations, the Commission representatives tried to 
push for a more Union-based mechanism from the outset, but did not play a very 
important role and they were quickly sidelined as the conflict between the Council 
and the Parliament escalated. The delegates were also not very successful in 
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contributing to the resolution of conflict. However, the solution that was finally found 
did resemble its initial preferences quite a lot, since the Evaluation Mechanism now 
contains safeguards against member states relying on peer-to-peer procedures 
rather than conducting proper evaluations of border control performances. Also, the 
Commission is significantly more involved in the process of border control evaluation 
and got the right to undertake impromptu control visits. So, the Commission seems to 
have benefited from the conflict between Council and Parliament in substantive 
terms. The European Council intervened in the beginning of the negotiations by 
supporting the request for a strengthening of national competences in internal border 
control questions, but withdrew from the negotiations as the conflict between the 
Council and the Parliament escalated over procedural questions, as there was no 
point for the heads of state to get involved in this matter. 
The Commission started of ambitiously by framing the Smart Borders Package as a 
means to communitize external border management and develop a monitoring 
mechanism for movements inside the Schengen area, but from a very technical 
perspective. The combination of a highly technical, costly system that did not provide 
any measurable security benefit and the underlying intention of the Commission to 
increase its influence through the system proved to be off-putting for the Council and 
the Parliament. Thus, the Commission found itself confronted with criticism from both 
co-legislators, who focused on their rejection of a financially unsustainable project, 
rather than their differences regarding the content of the proposals. Strategically, the 
Commission’s agenda setting was not very beneficial, so it had to reconsider its 
strategy and withdraw the proposal, as it was clear that it would be rejected under 
these conditions. The new proposals seem to be much closer to the requests by the 
Council, in particular, and reflect the security rationale that was desired after the 
agenda shifted to focus on terror prevention. The European Council set the 
framework for the proposal in 2013 by encouraging the Commission to come up with 
an idea for better management of the external borders. However, the heads of state 
were sensitive to the agenda change with the occurrence of terror attacks in several 
member states, so the European Council changed preference and intervened in 2015 
to call for a revised rationale of the Smart Borders Package with a stronger focus on 
security. 
With regard to the success or failure of consensus-building, the following 
observations can be made:  
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In the case of the Schengen Governance Reform, actors managed a to achieve an 
agreement in the second round, which is quite balanced and does not overly favor 
any of the institutions. Nevertheless, the Parliament’s blockage strategy paid off, 
even though the package was not decided under co-decision for the Schengen 
Evaluation Mechanism, the decision-making process of the package de facto 
involved the Parliament in every step of the negotiations and eventually resulted in 
the Council agreeing on a bridge clause between the two proposals guaranteeing the 
Parliament a say in all future reforms of the Schengen Evaluation Mechanism. The 
Council had to concede to the Commission and especially the Parliament on a 
number of substantive and procedural aspects: the Commission negotiated its 
involvement in the decision-making process about Schengen border control 
evaluation and the Council had to relinquish the peer-to-peer mechanism for a more 
standardized evaluation system. The Council successfully defended the 
strengthening of the criteria regarding the reintroduction of border control, but the 
Commission and the Parliament succeeded in avoiding renationalization of internal 
border control competences. The Commission’s original proposals foresaw a much 
stronger role for itself both regarding Schengen evaluation and decisions about 
border control. It had to renege most of its positions in the course of the negotiations, 
as the Council and the Parliament.  
As for Smart Borders, the initial negotiations resulted in a failure to reach a 
consensus on the proposal between co- legislators and disagreements with the 
Commission on the package, in particular the conditions of functioning of the Entry-
Exit System and the purpose of the Registered Traveller Programme in view of its 
costs. Two reasons seem to prevail: The Commission submitted a proposal that was 
framed in a way that was not acceptable to the Council and the Parliament, as it was 
highly technical, to Union-focused and involved exorbitant costs compared to 
perceived small benefits. Persuasion and informal negotiations seem to also be the 
working mode of rapporteurs to exert influence for the Parliament in co- legislation 
processes, however, the Smart Borders case suggests that the Council actors are 
more successful than the Parliament actors, as the new proposals are closer to the 
Council’s initial positions and overall, those representatives with a stronger 
preference for a security rationale seem to have been more successful, as both 
proposals ultimately contained a security rationale, linking border control and 
management to the terrorist threats and the uncontrolled migration influx. The final 
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agreement achieved in the second round of negotiations is closer to the Council than 
the Parliament, but the Commission gains significant influence in the external border 
policy area with the new centralized monitoring system. Thus, the Commission’s 
strategic approach in the second paid off: the Council accepted the new centralized 
border management approach in exchange for more security elements in the design.  
In comparison, the role of the Commission, its influence on the process and success 
in having a favourable decision outcome strongly vary and depend to a large extent 
on its agenda-setting strategies: the more sensitive the Commission is to the 
saliencies on the agenda of member states and the Parliament, the more likely it is 
that they will view the proposal favourably and actually enter into negotiations. 
However, this does not guarantee a favourable outcome, as the behavior of 
Commission representatives during the negotiations is also crucial: the more 
successfully they convey the relevance of the proposal to the institutions, the more 
likely it is that agreement is found, but if they cannot convey their position, the 
success depends on the Commission adapting its position to move closer to the co-
legislators. So relais actors in this case have to be willing to seek compromise and 
push the relevant Commission unit to reconsider its framing if necessary, as it 
happened in the Smart Borders case. The European Council has an impact on the 
Commission’s agenda setting strategies, but its influence seems to vary according to 
the political agenda of the heads of state: the more political an issue, the more 
involved they are throughout the negotiation process, whereas they tend to 
disengage once the issue is or becomes technical or procedural. 
 
All in all, Justice and Home Affairs seems to be an area where the strategic game 
functions particularly well, for all institutions, presumably due to the longstanding 
experience of all institutions in dealing with each other. The Commission knows 
where and to what extent it can push the co-legislators with demands and when it 
has to adapt to the Council, in particular, to exploit the window of opportunity for 
policy change.  
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VI. Social and Employment Policy: dynamics of policy failure in the area of 
gender equality policy 
 
6.1 Introduction  
 
Overall, the area of Social and Employment Policy has been a policy area of  minimal 
EU involvement, where the nation state prevails (Falkner, 2000; Offe, 2003), however 
the progress of single market integration has led to the inclusion of social issues in 
the European policy agenda (Obinger et al., 2005; Anderson, 2015). The entire policy 
area has remained a challenge for European Integration due to member state 
insistence on state competence before, but post-crisis less important and 
overshadowed by other areas and issues. To this day, it has remained one of the 
most contested policy areas in the EU, there has been comparatively little binding 
legislative output: only 5 directives have been adopted since the beginning of 
communitarisation in the mid-1990s. A majority of proposals were either significantly 
watered down or outright rejected. The most disputed and rejected proposals 
concern the impact on member states’ socio-economic structure, especially the 
labour market and welfare system (Tomlinson, 2011; Ostner  and  Lewis, 1995). 
Since the late 1990s, the EU changed its focus in the area from employment to 
dealing with inequality in the larger sense, including household relations and welfare 
provisions and developed a “gender mainstreaming” strategy, which affected a 
number of policy areas in the Lisbon framework (Duncan, 1996; Rubery, 2002). Yet, 
in that same framework, the Commission also continued pushing for equality in the 
employment sector and started setting concrete goals in terms of quantitative targets 
in the employment sector: achieve 70% total employment, 60% employment for 
women and childcare provision to cover 33% of children aged 0-3 and 90% aged 
between 3 and mandatory school age by 2010 (Tomlinson, 2011). As social policy 
remains an area of sovereignty, the preferred mode of decision-making is non-
binding legislation, soft law and the open method of coordination. Member states are 
most sensitive about binding legislation, especially if it concerns the labour market. 
The Commission deliberately links gender equality measures to the labour market in 
its discourse, to make up for the fact that it does not possess much competence in 
employment matters. By linking gender equality and family policy matters to the 
labour market, the EU can push integration of employment policies through the back 
door (Lombardo  and  Meier, 2008). 
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Social and employment policy oriented towards gender equality is an area of high 
importance to member states, leading them to frequently resist and oppose 
Commission proposals on the matter (Klein, 2013; Van der Vleuten, 2007; Leibfried  
and  Pierson, 1996). Of all member states, the British have been the most reluctant to 
agree to any form of interference of the EU in social and employment policy matters 
(Van der Vleuten, 2007; Ravn-Nielsen, 2016). The areas of gender equality and 
family policy are particularly interesting, because most member states significantly 
invested in national legislation on that matter in the past decade, regarding both 
family policy measures like paternity and maternity leave, as well as child-care 
provisions, and gender equality measures in the workplace, including (Franceschet  
and  Piscopo, 2013; Praud, 2012), yet continuously contest the EU’s attempts to 
legislate in these areas (Tomlinson, 2011). Some argue that due to this resistance 
and the many unsuccessful attempts to push for common legislation, the Commission 
has decreased its efforts over time (Jenson, 2008). Others do not consider the 
Commission to have given up on her efforts, but rather focused on the economic 
dimension, thus framing policy in terms of work-family reconciliation and labour 
market participation of women (Lewis, 2006; Duncan, 1996). The European 
Parliament has become a crucial factor for policy progress, since it strongly 
advocates gender equality and family policy measures (Van der Vleuten, 2007). 
Similar to other studies about policy-making, scholarship on social and employment 
policy also mainly focuses on institutions apart from each other or the EU’s action as 
a whole compared to member states. What is missing is an analysis of the process, 
including the negotiation process between the institutions leading to policy success 
or failure. Especially since there are no comprehensive explanations for why some 
proposals have passed, where many others fail. 
  
Even after Lisbon still one of the least integrated areas, member states are very 
reluctant to give up competences to the EU and there is comparatively little in terms 
of strategies and programmes coming from the European Council (Klein, 2013), 
member states carefully protect their prerogatives in social policy (Leibfried and 
Pierson, 1995; Van der Vleuten, 2007). Any intervention that is accepted by member 
states is due to normative pressure no to refuse equal rights measures and the 
primacy over ideological benefits of claiming to promote gender equality, which can 
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outweigh economic costs (Milward, 2017). The British have been the most resistant 
in terms of family policy, the UK has vetoed several parental leave proposals and 
later on opted out of most gender equality measures (Van der Vleuten, 2007). 
  
Since the 1990’s, the EU has delivered little in matters of gender equality, since the 
outset of the Union, the EU has adopted 5 equality directives, including provisions on 
women’s health over the past two decades, all of them have been either watered 
down entirely or rejected outright (Tomlinson, 2011), all those proposals that were 
contentious and either modified or rejected would have had a major impact on 
women’s socio-economic status in many member states and public spending (Lewis, 
2006; Van der Vleuten, 2007). 
  
The early 90’s EU’s gender equality measures were focused on employment rather 
than decreasing inequalities beyond the labor market, in household relations and 
provisions (Duncan, 1996), later it also included provisions on the EU’s commitment 
to equal opportunities following improvements on women’s representation in 
parliaments and working-time arrangements, regulation of part-time work and a more 
developed framework on the reconciliation of work and family life (Tomlinson, 2011). 
  
However, the EU has largely preferred soft law and the Open Method of 
Coordination, which do not coerce member states, all legislative measures are 
closely to the labor market, any measures on “gender mainstreaming” are largely soft 
policy coordination (Shaw, 2002; Lewis, 2006; Tomlinson, 2011). Interestingly, the 
EU’s Lisbon Strategy is more ambitious, setting quantitative targets for women’s 
employment rates to achieve 70% total employment and 60% employment for 
women, the reduction of the gender pay gap and child-care coverage of 33% for 
children aged 0-3 and 90% for children aged 3 to mandatory school age by 2010 
(Jenson, 2008; Tomlinson, 2011). 
  
Social and employment policy is significantly less integrated than other policy areas, 
yet it is not a fully sovereign area anymore either, since there have been significant 
spillover effects from internal market policy since the 1980s (Van der Vleuten, 2007). 
The Commission as long pursued a low politics strategy in social policy, since it has 
little room for maneuver due to restrictive treaty provisions (Haverland, De Ruiter  
  
200 
 
and  Van de Walle, 2016). The area is increasingly marked by high politics struggles 
over proposals to strengthen treaty provisions on social policy and a gradual erosion 
of national sovereignty in matters of welfare by the Commission and the CJEU and 
the Council trying to guard its right to being gatekeeper to Commission initiatives. 
Before 2014, the Commission DG Employment, Social Affairs and Equal 
Opportunities (DG EMPL) was in charge of gender mainstreaming, mainly focusing 
on ensuring that all directives are legally compatible with the equal opportunity 
requirements (Jenson, 2008), with the Commission’s shift to the center-right and the 
Eastern enlargement, gender mainstreaming has lost importance in terms of policy 
output compared to the 80s and 90s, the EU focuses on discrimination, employment 
and inequality more generally now (Jenson, 2008). The Parliament has developed 
into a key element of policy progress in substance and quantity of policy measures 
(Van der Vleuten, 2007). 
  
States still show a diverse picture when it comes to passing gender equality 
legislation, yet they increasingly invest in gender equality measures in the post-
Lisbon period, including the introduction of quota legislation, at the national level, 
signalling that there is a consensus about the necessity to introduce measures to 
promote women (Franceschet and Piscopo, 2013). There have been recent 
legislative reforms in Portugal, France, Belgium, Italy, Spain, Germany and Sweden, 
party ideology and contagion across borders as well as EU discourse on the 
necessity of enhancing women’s involvement in decision-making providing the 
impetus for the changes (Praud, 2012). As for the influence of party ideology, France, 
Portugal, Spain, Germany, Sweden: social democratic and socialist parties pushing 
for legislative change with party contagion effects in Portugal, Spain, Belgium (Baum 
and Espirito-Santo, 2012; Murray et al., 2012), the women’s branch of political parties 
and civil society impulses have a particular importance in Portugal, Spain, Belgium 
(Meier, 2012) where as in Italy, policy change often occurs through constitutional 
court advancement (Suni, 2012).  
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6.2 The Maternity Leave Directive: (ongoing) strategic failure?  
 
The reform of the Maternity Leave Directive dates back to 2008 and was a 
Commission initiative to reform the very dated directive from 1992, which was 
considered to no longer be adapted to the current situation in society and in the labor 
market. The main aim of the reform was to increase protection of pregnant women 
and young mothers, legally from a health and safety perspective by extending the 
duration of maternity leave and politically from a gender equality perspective from 
being discriminated against by providing a higher level of pay and guarding them 
against termination and demotion. The proposal was immediately welcomed by the 
Parliament and the relevant committee for gender equality developed a strong 
position, exceeding the proposals of the Commission in most aspects. The Council 
reacted very negatively to the Parliament’s demands and halted negotiations for six 
years, never formally adopting a trilogue position. The Parliament exploited the 
Council’s blockage for a very public blame attribution and the Commission benefited 
from the Parliament’s activism to be cast in the role of mediator. The Council’s blame 
avoidance strategy consisted of constantly throwing the ball at the Parliament and 
demanding that it give up its ambitious position. Ultimately, the Commission withdrew 
the directive in 2015 and recast it in 2016 as part of a work-life-balance package in 
the European Pillar of Social Rights, after holding a number of consultations. The 
negotiations have not progressed past intra-institutional coordination, the Council is 
discussing subsidiarity issues and  technical details of the proposal, the Parliament is 
still negotiating in the relevant committees. There is no signal of blockage from either 
of the institutions at this stage.  
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(table 11, Maternity Leave timeline, source: own illustration) 
6.2.1 The proposal  
 
The so-called Maternity Leave Directive, officially the “Directive of the European 
Parliament and the Council amending Council Directive 92/85/EEC on the 
introduction of measures to encourage improvements in the safety and health at work 
of pregnant workers and workers who have recently given birth or are breastfeeding”, 
negotiated from 2008 to 2014, contains several aspects regulating women’s work 
conditions during pregnancy and after childbirth. The most important and most 
controversial aspects were the following: the Commission proposed an increase of 
maternity leave duration from 14 to 18 weeks, proposed full payment for the entire 
leave period, but included a possibility for member state to set leave allowance to the 
level of sick pay. 
The new proposal is situated within the “European Pillar of Social Rights” and the 
broader objective of addressing work-life-balance challenges faced by working 
parents and carers. The Commission presents the revised directive on leave 
provisions as part of taking a “broader approach in order to address women’s 
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underrepresentation in the labour market”228. The new legislative proposal is taking 
“into account the developments in society over the past decade in order to enable 
parents and other people with caring responsibilities to better balance their work and 
family lives and to encourage a better sharing of caring responsibilities between 
women and men.”229  
The proposal for a “Directive on Work-Life-Balance for Parents and Carers”230 
addresses several types of leave: four months of parental leave compensated at 
least at the level of sick pay and non-transferable from one parent to another. 
Parents will also be able to take part-time leave in a flexible way and the age of the 
child up to which parents can take leave is increased from age 8 to 12. Paternity 
leave is introduced, fathers/second parents will be able to take leave up to 10 days 
around the time of the birth, compensated at least at the level of sick pay. Carers’ 
leave is also introduced, workers caring for seriously ill or dependent relatives can 
take 5 days per year, compensated at least at the level of sick pay. The right to ask 
for flexible working arrangements is also extended to parents with children up to the 
age of 12 and carers. 
6.2.2 Policy formulation, conditions and  conflict constellations  
 
In 2008, the Commission decided to propose a revision of the maternity leave 
directive from 1992, proposing a 4 week increase of the period of maternity leave 
arguing that it corresponds to a “modest increase”, with full payment, which 
corresponds to the situation in most member states, notwithstanding the fact that 
there is a variation which goes from 14 weeks to 28 or 52 weeks in some states. The 
Commission combined different types of frames, arguing from an economic 
perspective, that a longer maternity leave will discourage mothers from taking 
parental leave, from a health perspective that longer maternity leave is better for the 
health of mother and child and from a rights and gender equality perspective that 
longer paid maternity leave will decrease the inequalities between men and women. 
It included possibilities for discretion for member states in implementation, as they 
would be allowed to cap the allowance and determine the share of the allowance that 
is financed by the state. 
                                                          
228 European Commission, Communication, COM(2017) 252 final, 26 April 2017 
229European Commission, Communication, COM(2017) 252 final, 26 April 2017 
230 European Commission, Directive of the European Parliament and the Council on work-life balance for parents 
and carers and repealing Council Directive 2010/18/EU COM(2017) 253 final, 26 April 2017 
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The first Maternity Leave proposal was not perceived as overly ambitious on the 
Commission’s side by the member states231, but it was framed as a rights-based 
proposal as visible in the Communication accompanying the presentation of the 
proposal, where the Commissioner deliberately presented it as a rights-proposed 
initiative that aims at improving women’s rights and considerably increase the 
standards232. However, despite the rights-based framing, the text of the proposal 
allowed for several possibilities for discretion for member states and even considered 
the necessity to closely involve national governments and social partners in the 
process and the Commission was open to propositions of the Council Presidency to 
water down the proposal233. Actually, the Commission proved to be an imperfect 
agenda-setter rather than an overzealous one in this case. It significantly 
underestimated or misjudged the Parliament’s intention in matters of maternity leave, 
overlooking the fact that the Parliament, at this stage still leaned towards the left and 
would take this as an opportunity to push for more integration in the social and 
employment area. In fact, the Commission’s proposed flexibility measures would be 
the main reason for the Parliament to put forward even stricter demands to prevent 
member state representatives from watering the regulation down.  
 
The conflict lines on the Maternity Leave proposal center around two dimensions: the 
choice of substance (1) and the choice of legal base (2). The Commission justified its 
choice for a significant upgrade in substance (1), especially duration of maternity 
leave and level of pay by referring to the international standards, set in the ILO 
Convention234, to which the EU should adhere to ensure adequate protection of its 
citizens235.The Commission justifies the choice for hard law by arguing that non-
legislative measures, which have prevailed in the area, apart from the Directive on 
Maternity Leave (1992) and and the Directive on Parental Leave (1996), are not 
enough to reconcile private life and work and promote gender equality on the labour 
market236, referring to the Impact Assessment of 2008 and several Commission staff 
documents that reflect social partner and stakeholder consultations. Regarding the 
                                                          
231 Interview 41 
232 Interview 41; Interview 35; Interview 36 
233 Interview 29; Interview 61 
234 Interview 55; Interview 56 
235 Council of the European Union, Outcome of Proceedings, Working Party on Social Questions, 14520/08, 24 
October 2008 
236 Interview 55; Interview 56 
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role of social partners and the question of EU competence on the matter, the 
Commission argues that national social partners negotiate measures for parental 
leave, which means that Community action is required with regard to maternal leave 
only237.  
 
“In 2006 and 2007, the Commission consulted the European social partners on better 
reconciliation of professional, private and family life (...) In December 2007 the 
Commission consulted the Member states on the same range of options which had 
been included in the consultation of the social partners. As regards maternity leave, 
some member states were in favour of (modest) increases in the duration, some 
were in favor of increasing the payment and some were against any changes at EU 
level. Some other member states did not reply to the questionnaire.”238 
 
The Commission used the divisions inside the Council to its favor and presented the 
proposal, which corresponded to a policy upgrade, but argued that the proposal was 
justifiable as proportionate and did not violate member states concerns about 
violations of national sovereignty239.   
 
“In the light of the results of the consultation process and of the study commissioned 
by the Commission, the option of extending the duration of maternity leave and 
increasing the payment was considered a proportionate way of improving the health 
and safety of women as well as allowing women to better reconcile their professional 
and family obligations, thereby fostering equal opportunities between women and 
men in the labour market.”240 
 
The Commission also enquired after the positions of national stakeholders, social 
partners in particular, and claimed that it had included their views, however, a closer 
                                                          
237 European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document, Proposal for a Directive of the European 
Parliament and of the Council amending Council Directive 92/85/EEC on the introduction of measures to 
encourage improvements in the safety and health at work of pregnant workers and workers who have recently 
given birth or are breastfeeding, SEC(2008) 2595, 3 October 2008  
238 European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document, Proposal for a Directive of the European 
Parliament and of the Council amending Council Directive 92/85/EEC on the introduction of measures to 
encourage improvements in the safety and health at work of pregnant workers and workers who have recently 
given birth or are breastfeeding, SEC(2008) 2595, 3 October 2008  
239 Interview 55; Interview 56; Interview 30 
240 European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document, Proposal for a Directive of the European 
Parliament and of the Council amending Council Directive 92/85/EEC on the introduction of measures to 
encourage improvements in the safety and health at work of pregnant workers and workers who have recently 
given birth or are breastfeeding, SEC(2008) 2596, 3 October 2008  
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examination shows that a majority were not in favor of the proposal for the most 
part241: “In Germany, the proposal stirred a huge debate on why change legislation if 
it’s not necessary and there is no immediate pressure for it.”242 
 
The justification for proposing binding legislation (2) despite the knowledge that it 
would be difficult for the Council to accept was to present it as a  package of binding 
and non-binding work-life-balance measure, the binding ones being maternity leave 
and a directive on self-employed women, and the non-binding ones 
recommendations on parental leave and childcare243. It also justified the legislation 
as a health and safety measure towards the Council, rather than equal opportunities 
and gender equality, as the old directive was based on Maastricht Treaty provisions 
about health and safety at work, even though the directive also referred to equal 
treatment provisions in the Treaty of Lisbon244245.  
 
The Commission linked the proposal to a demand by the heads of state for EU action 
in the area of gender equality. Indeed, the European Council mentioned work-life-
balance three times in the conclusions from 2006 to 2008, specifically the 
reconciliation of work and private life, without an explicit mention of maternity leave.  
 
“The March 2006 European Council stressed the need for a better balance between 
work and private life in order to achieve economic growth, prosperity and 
competitiveness, and approved the European Pact for Gender Equality. (...) In 
December 2007, the Council called on the Commission to evaluate the legal 
framework supporting reconciliation and the possible need for improvement. (...) The 
March 2008 European Council reiterated that further efforts should be made to 
reconcile work with 
private and family life for both women and men.”246 
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242 Interview 31 
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However, while the heads of state referred to reconciliation in the years shortly before 
the economic crisis, afterwards the European Council did not actively push for the 
proposal anymore or call for any gender equality measures related to leave policy in 
particular. There was no signal of support by the heads of state throughout the 
negotiations on the file in the first round. Comparing the first and the recast proposal, 
it comes clear that the second package, explicitly dealing with work-life-balance and 
reconciliation of work and private life in a holistic fashion, not singling out mothers, 
corresponds more to the original request by the European Council, in substance and 
framing.  
 
The first proposal to reform maternity leave came in the context of the aftermath of 
the economic crisis and fell into a period where member states’ agendas were very 
sensitive to cost-heavy measures with a strong impact on the national labor markets 
and welfare systems247:  
 
“Und 2008 war voll während der Krise, da waren die ganzen südlichen Länder waren 
zwar nicht dagegen, haben aber nicht gewusst, wie sie das zahlen sollen. (...)248” 
 
“(...) but it feel as though the level of concern grew in the Council over that period, 
because we had the financial crisis, which hit around the time as the EP report, so 
member states which had been broadly supportive of the proposal became more 
concerned about the costs, (...) so we entered that kind of stalemate period and that 
persisted for a long period of time (...)”249 
 
“Of course, during the period of handling this directive, the financial crisis at the 
European level occurred and there were some member states in the beginning that 
stated that the fully paid maternity leave could be launched, but when the years went 
on and the financial crisis hit those countries the hardest, they were not supportive 
anymore.”250 
 
There was overall little to exploit in terms of a window of opportunity, both when the 
Commission proposed the file originally and throughout the 7 years that it was 
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negotiated. The momentum for the proposal had passed by the time the Parliament 
delivered its opinion, because the Council had moved on to other files, and the 
situation in member states had changed as well, more states had taken their own 
measures on gender equality, so the policy demand was not the same anymore251. 
The momentum for compromise between the co-legislators passed very quickly, due 
to prolonged blockage, the Council had shifted attention away, as member states 
were less and less willing to engage with the Parliament’s requests, given that the 
Parliament did not show willingness to engage with member state concerns in the 
wake of austerity252: 
 
“(...)  that the aspect of austerity measures was also a decisive element in the 
negotiations, member states emphasized that after the crisis in 2008, they had to cut 
certain benefits, including maternity leave, but the Parliament was not flexible enough 
to address these concerns and wishes of the delegations, so it was also quite an 
important aspect in the process.”253 
6.2.3 The negotiation process: mechanisms of deadlock  
 
In the Council, conflict lines between member state delegations during intra-
institutional negotiations in 2008 and 2009, centered around two dimensions, first a 
contestation of the legal base linked to subsidiarity concerns (1) and second criticism 
related to the design of the directive, especially the quantitative targets on duration of 
leave and level of pay (2).  
 
The Council criticized the choice of legal base (1) as inappropriate and 
recommended gender equality or family policy as a better area of the Treaty to base 
the proposal on, as in this area, the Commission only has very limited possibilities to 
use binding law and would not have a precedent to build on254. The Council thereby 
suggested that the Commission change from binding law to non-legal measures and 
framed the possibility of changing from hard to soft law as a way out of potential, as 
non-binding would eliminate the co-decision problem and make the Council more 
willing to agree255.  
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Substantive criticism of the Council focused on the mandatory period of leave and 
fixed level of full pay and the majority of delegates concluded after a year of 
discussions in the relevant working parties and COREPER I that “the Community 
rules were only minimum standards and that the Member States should be allowed to 
decide on the other rules concerning maternity leave in national legislation, referring 
for example to the timing and the obligatory nature of maternity leave.”256 
 
However, the Council as a whole did not have one clear-cut preference throughout 
the internal discussions from 2008 to 2011, there was a great amount of intra-
institutional division on all fronts: The first controversial element was the duration and 
scope of maternity leave: a majority of delegations support the Commission proposal 
to extend maternity leave to 18 weeks, one third of delegations expressed 
reservations on extending maternity leave as proposed as they did not wish to only 
extend the leave solely to the mother, a number of delegations wanted to review 
parental leave more generally. The second element was the  passerelle clause, a 
number of delegations were happy with the Presidency compromise solution, while 
others considered that the passerelle clause would not help all delegations as it 
excluded some issues like paternity leave, some delegations considered that mixing 
two systems could lead to confusion and implementation problems. Delegations also 
stressed the diversity of national legislations, some delegations emphasized that 
national regulations are very diverse and the proposal by one delegation to formulate 
the article more generally to allow for more discretion was welcome by some but 
criticized by others as it would lead to EU à la carte, whereas EU legislation in this 
case should just set minimum standards and not try to regulate flexibility or diversity. 
The obligatory portion of maternity leave and timing of maternity leave were also still 
controversial. Lastly, regarding level of pay, a number of delegations considered it 
unnecessary and not useful to include the reference to full salary, but the 
Commission maintained its proposal to fix full salary as an aim even if the Directive 
would allow for other practices257. Some members states, especially the northern and 
western member states, like Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands, were not against 
EU legislation on the matter in principle, but rather criticized the narrow scope and 
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demanded a more general assessment incorporating different measures of family-
related leave258. Other states argued that regulating mandatory maternity leave might 
negatively affect the situation of women and mothers on the labor market, as it would 
disincentivize employers from hiring women259. 
 
“A certain number of delegations welcomed the extension of leave proposed by the 
Commission; some delegations, however, expressed doubts.”260 
 
“Issues regarding the length of maternity leave, the allowance and relation with 
paternity leave are more sensitive. Views expressed during the EPSCO Council 
showed a broad diversity of situations in the different Member States. Accordingly, 
Member States’ positions vary considerably and will require in-depth discussions.”261 
 
Council Presidencies initially played a strong role in trying to find a compromise in the 
Council, until the Parliament adopted its position. The French and Czech 
Presidencies strongly invested in finding compromise between member states, the 
Czech Presidency proposed a flexibility clause, which would allow member states 
more discretion in implementation262. The French Presidency was the first to propose 
a compromise to deal with the duration of leave issues, especially dealing with the 
controversial Article 8a of the proposal. A large majority of delegations affirmed that 
they liked the flexibility of the previous Directive (1992), but some delegations 
accepted the Commission proposal (Estonia, Italy, Lithuania, Hungary, Finland, 
Latvia) and were in favour or a more ambitious approach. Critics of the proposal 
mainly referred to concerns about implementation (Malta, Spain) , some delegations 
also criticized the restrictive scope, as the proposal only referred to mothers and not 
generally to parents (Belgium, Germany, Denmark, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, 
Austria, Portugal and Sweden) had reservations on extending maternity leave as 
proposed, the majority of them did not wish to reserve the extension solely to 
mothers.  
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During the Czech Presidency, delegations discussed their general positions on the 
proposal, some delegations questioned the need for the proposal saying that the 
1992 directive provided sufficient protection, joined by others who said that the 
maternity leave proposal should not negatively affect the goal of female labour 
market participation, a majority of delegations stressed that different national 
traditions should be respected and Community standards should only set a minimum. 
The Presidency formulated a number of compromise texts, working party discussions 
led to “a good understanding of the issues at stake in the proposal and, in particular, 
in its most controversial article, Article 8, dealing with the length of o and other 
provisions regarding maternity leave. 
  
The Presidency developed a concrete, creative legal and issue-linkage compromise 
proposal about Article 8 and duration via a “passerelle clause” in Article 8 (1a) for 
further discussions263. The Presidency suggested including an option under which 
states that offer less than 18 weeks of maternity leave would still be considered 
compliant with the Directive if family-related leave offered to the mother other than 
maternity leave fulfilled the criteria set out in the Directive, with the main principle 
being that the period of parental leave provided must exceed what is offered in the 
parental leave directive from 1996. Concerning allowance: for member states to still 
count family-related leave as maternity leave the overall level of pay must not fall 
below a certain level, the exact level was left open for later discussions, as was the 
exact relation between maternity leave and other family-related leave measures. 
Germany, Finland, Sweden and Denmark were satisfied with the compromise, but 
other delegations were more critical and entered scrutiny reservations, considering 
that it did not solve the issue of the restricted scope and arguing that the issue should 
be tackled from the perspective of parenthood in general (Portugal, Belgium, 
Luxembourg, Spain), some also considered it a step backwards with regard to the 
former Directive if paternity leave was reduced to grant 18 weeks solely to mothers, 
ES requested that any links between paternity and maternity leave should be made 
in this Directive. Regarding allowance, delegations did not agree on the terms and 
criteria for which types of leave and remuneration should be considered as 
benchmarks. Regarding the duration of mandatory maternity leave, the Presidency 
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proposed to keep the current rules of 2 weeks, which was supported by a majority, 
while others requested a longer period. The Presidency concluded that a majority 
preferred to keep the status quo on the issue. The Czech Presidency had completed 
substantial work on the legal text, mainly focusing on adapting the text to make it 
more acceptable to a majority of delegations, moving it closer to the status quo in 
terms of maternity leave. However, after the Czech Presidency, by the end of 2009, 
there were a number of open issues264. 
 
Afterwards, the Spanish and Swedish Presidencies did not invest much in 
negotiations inside the Council, as the Parliament had formally delivered its position, 
but instead demanded an impact assessment to determine whether the Parliament’s 
requests would be feasible at all, compared to the Commission’s original proposal. 
The Belgian Presidency then signalled through a position paper addressed to the 
Commission that the Parliament’s position was not acceptable to a majority of 
member states and under the Hungarian and Polish Presidencies the Minister level 
intervened and recommended halting negotiations with the Parliament, however the 
Polish Presidency informally continued talks to find out whether there would be 
possibilities for compromise265. The Danish Presidency again improved the 
compromise proposed by the Czech, the subsequent Cypriot, Irish and Lithuanian 
Presidencies did not put the issue on the agenda266. Under the Greek and Italian 
Presidencies, the Commission already informally signalled its intention to withdraw 
and recast the proposal. Latvia and Luxembourg signalled the Council’s support for 
withdrawal. The Maltese Presidency has negotiated the first part of the new proposal 
and together with the Estonian Presidency achieved first compromise possibilities on 
leave and pay provisions.  
  
In early 2010, the Council began engaging with the Parliament position and quickly, a 
great majority of delegations announced that they would not accept the Parliament’s 
amendments in the first reading, particularly the request to increase the period of 
maternity leave to 20 weeks at full salary: “The Belgian Presidency started the 
examination of the EP amendments, in particularly (sic!) focusing on those 
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acceptable to the Commission. The Council debate on 6 December 2010, shortly 
after the adoption of the EP’s position, revealed that a number of EP amendments 
could be difficult to (sic!) the delegations to accept. In particular, a very large majority 
of the member states were unable to accept extending minimum maternity leave to 
20 weeks full pay and as a consequence called for thorough reflection in the Council. 
However, a number of Member States expressed their willingness to continue 
discussions on the file.”267 Eight delegations submitted a declaration (Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Germany, Estonia, Netherlands, Slovakia, Sweden, UK) asking 
the Council and the other member states to halt the negotiations with the Parliament 
to assess the amendments properly, by leaving more time for national social partners 
to evaluate the impact and conduct an impact assessment regarding the financial, 
social and economic consequences268. The main criticisms were that the proposal, 
especially as amended by the EP, focused entirely on duration and financial 
compensation and does not consider the other forms of maternity leave that exist in 
member states269. The delegations argued that in this regard, other initiatives to 
improve reconciliation between work and family as discussed between member 
states and the Commission in the (non-legislative) framework of Europe 2020 have 
been more successful270. Subsidiarity and proportionality concerns were raised, it 
was argued that the EU is supposed to set minimum standards in the area of social 
and employment affairs, not maximal standards, especially member states’ right to 
define the fundamental principles of their social security systems and their financial 
implications, as well as the participation and involvement of social partners271. 
  
The Belgian Presidency concluded that the Council as a whole could not accept a 
substantial part of the amendments proposed by the Parliament, especially the 
duration of 20 weeks with full salary. It stressed that the Council would be more open 
to discussing other EP amendments, in particular passerelle clause, evaluation of 
health risks, reintegration after maternity leave and concluded that the Ministers want 
to pursue the discussions on the amendments that are acceptable as well as on a 
potential impact assessment272. In an EPSCO meeting in 2011, the Ministers agreed 
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with the COREPER and working group reservations on the COM proposal and the 
EP amendments, some Ministers even advised against continuing the negotiations, 
others requested that it continue273.  
 
The Parliament not only strongly supported the Commission proposal in matters of 
the legal base and the choice of co-decision, but also the increase in both duration of 
leave and amount of pay274: In fact, the FEMM committee report, which was the lead 
committee on the file, developed a position, which exceeded the Commission’s  
position in substance, by requesting more in terms of leave duration and payment, 
with a citizen’s rights oriented framing of its position275: “I think the reason why a 
common agreement could not be reached was that the European Parliament at the 
first stage, because they had two opinions on this directive, and the first opinion they 
went further than the Commission and no country was able to agree with the 
Parliament, so at the same time, the Council had not reached an agreement and it 
was difficult to reach an agreement in Council because now the opposite was the EP 
with the amendments which they proposed.”276 
 
The Parliament justified its demands by a need to further women’s rights and 
accused the Council of abusing the subsidiarity argument and thereby turning the 
matter into a fight of conservative governments against liberal supranational 
institutions277. The Parliament argued that governments focus on the economy and 
businesses whereas the Parliament and Commission focus on citizens and framed 
the choice for binding legislation as a necessary step to remedy persisting 
intergovernmentalism278.  
 
The Council framed the position as excessive, both in terms of interference into 
national labor markets and cost implications for national budgets, and used the same 
framing to justify its sovereignty concerns: “The discussions showed however, that a 
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large majority of the Ministers considered the Parliament’s position in favour of 
extending maternity leave to 20 weeks as going too far, and expressed concern 
regarding the cost implications.”279  
  
The conflict frames centered around feasibility questions, with delegates stressing 
national diversity of regulations, for example with regard to the degree of involvement 
of social partners280. The Council argued that negotiations could be continued on the 
basis of the Commission proposal, but not the proposed Parliament amendments:  
 
“They therefore considered that the EP’s opinion could not constitute a basis for 
compromise at this stage. A very large majority of Member States agreed that the 
Commission’s initial proposal constituted an acceptable basis for the negotiations. 
(...) As the debate has shown, the member states do not seem ready to accept the 
amendments of the European Parliament in favour of fully-paid maternity leave 
lasting 20 weeks as a basis for further negotiations. A great majority of delegations is 
rather in favour of discussing on the basis of the Commission’s proposal, which de 
facto does not represent any substantive amendment to the proposal requiring a new 
impact assessment at this stage.”281 
  
Those previous factors limited both the influence of relais actors, as well as the 
relevance of factors, such as informality. Informal contacts enabled Council and 
Parliament discussions to form positions, but due to a lack of consideration for each 
other’s positions, there was no opportunity to negotiate an informal inter-institutional 
agreement once the Parliament’s position had been formalized, even though there 
were intense informal exchanges between Council Presidency, Commission and the 
rapporteur282.  
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In matters of actor behavior, specifically relais actors, the Parliament rapporteurs 
stand out as those with the greatest impact on the failure of the process between the 
co-legislators from the Council perspective.  
  
The 2009 and 2010 reports of FEMM committee rapporteur Edite Estrela (S and D, 
PT) reflected a maximalist position, which exceeded the propositions of the 
Commission proposal in substance on both leave and level of pay283. The Parliament 
demanded an increase from 14 to 20 weeks, based on a suggestion by the 
rapporteur referring to the situation in member states where the general duration is 
18 weeks and the recommendation by the Advisory Committee on Equal 
Opportunities which was 24 weeks. The rapporteur also argued that allowance 
should be equal to full salary, workplace safety and health requirements have to be 
ensured before and after birth, and there should be a ban on dismissal. The 
rapporteur proposed to delete the reference to a recommendation of 18 weeks, so 
that member states with more generous provisions would not be discouraged or 
prompted to lower the conditions. Apart from duration and level of pay, the rapporteur 
insisted on the complementarity of the national measures regarding paternity leave, 
maternity leave and parental leave and called on the Commission not to separate the 
measures artificially. 
 
The rapporteur played a twofold role in encouraging failure: first, she pushed for a 
narrow and contested left-wing majority in the plenary, instead of considering the 
intra-institutional divisions and striking a compromise. And secondly, she refused to 
concessions to the Council despite the repeated informal attempts by several 
Presidencies to explain the Council’s problems with their position284.  
 
The Parliament negotiated the proposal in several committees, FEMM, in charge of 
gender equality and women’s issues, JURI, the justice committee, and EMPL, the 
employment committee in charge of social and employment policy. All committees 
have different political shades, FEMM is reported to be more to the left, while EMPL 
is a more right-wing committee, and JURI tends to be a very formalized, but slightly 
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right-wing committee. The proposal had left-wing rapporteurs, which steered the 
reports and debates about the amendments to the left quite early in the negotiations. 
FEMM disagreed with JURI and EMPL on the necessity of both proposals, as well as 
the content, with JURI raising subsidiarity concerns and EMPL considering the 
demands made with regard to duration and amount of the remuneration for maternity 
leave, as well as the targets set for gender quota, to be excessive285. 
 
The Parliament ultimately agreed on a very strong and very left-wing position. The 
success of this narrow left-wing majority is the fruit of very active rapporteurs that 
personally lobbied MEPs from the left as well as the liberals to join the majority, by 
framing both proposals as crucial matters of women’s rights and justice against 
discriminatory member states. The framing as a rights matter was very successful, 
since it even convinced the skeptical liberals that such a measure would not 
constitute an excessive interference in business matters. Ultimately, the rapporteurs 
negotiated a small, but sufficient left-wing majority in the plenary, by convincing parts 
of ALDE, the liberals and usually the pivotal group when it comes to coalitions, to 
back the Parliament amendments. The conservative groups in the Parliament did not 
back the demands of the more left-oriented FEMM committee, in charge of gender 
equality proposals. Neither did the JURI committee, which was associated to the 
negotiations on both proposals, as it considered the demands of the Parliament’s left-
wing rapporteurs to be excessive.  The conservative groups, especially the EPP, 
accepted the final EP position, because they faced some internal division 
themselves, as some EPP MEPs supported the idea of setting minimum standards 
for duration and allowance of maternity leave286.  
 
The new rapporteur Arena (S&D, Belgium), who took over the file in 2014, openly 
signalled willingness to compromise by a letter to the Council Presidency and the 
Commission to offer a reconsideration of the Parliament position if informal talks were 
relaunched: “The Chair of the FEMM committee and the Rapporteur have, in recent 
weeks, signalled their desire to reach progress with a view to avoiding the withdrawal 
of the proposal by the Commission after six months. The Presidency has received 
two letters from the Chair of the FEMM committee to this effect. In both letters, the 
Chair proposes ‘the establishment of a Working Group, comprising representatives of 
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the Trio Presidency, in close cooperation with the European Parliament in order to 
channel efforts to make progress on the file’”287 
 
The attempt, while welcomed by the Council in principle, came too late to still be 
considered by the Council, arguing that it was not a trustworthy attempt, as the 
Parliament had turned down any attempts at achieving a compromise beforehand, 
despite the continuous effort by all Presidencies288.  
 
In early 2015, the Council concluded that withdrawal was the preferred option, as 
there was no majority in the Council for continuing negotiations with the Parliament: 
“it became clear that there was no general support for the establishment of a Working 
Group as suggested by the Chair of the FEMM committee. Some delegations were 
still inclined to keep the door open for possible future negotiations with the European 
Parliament. However, a large number of delegations, including some that had 
previously supported the Directive, spoke in favour of a fresh start. The Presidency 
concluded that it had no mandate for entering informal negotiations, although 
informal contacts with the European Parliament could still take place.”289 
 
The Commission remained rather unengaged in the negotiation process, the previous 
Commissioner Spidla (DG EMPL) did not steer the proposal in a particular direction, 
but rather proposed a minimum standards and lowest common denominator 
approach based on stakeholder consultations, social partners and member states 
and impact assessments on member states290. The new Commissioners, Jourova 
(DG Just) and Thyssen (DG EMPL), also took a mediator approach by trying to 
reframe the proposal in a way that would satisfy the co-legislator demands, including 
more flexibility and a broader scope with more non-legislative measures to make it 
acceptable to the Council291. 
6.2.4 The withdrawal and blame framing game  
 
Ultimately, the struggle about the file also points towards a strategic staging of 
bargaining with the goal of giving each institution the necessary leverage to achieve 
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and frame gains and losses: “Each has a game to play, they know that for example 
when the Commission comes up with a proposal, the Council is going to try to lower 
the levels, so they need to increase them in order to strike a balance, and hopefully 
on the other end come out with something that is a bit balanced for everyone. It’s a 
game.”292 
 
The Council proved to be the initiator of deadlock from an institutional perspective, 
since it refused to take an official position for trilogues in both cases and stalled the 
negotiations. However the Council claims to have been pushed to a strong reaction, 
as the previous accounts of the Commission’s and the Parliament’s strategic actions 
show, much more extreme than it might have been without the ambitious framing and 
the blaming approach of the Parliament. In fact, all member state representatives, 
even those generally skeptical towards EU intervention in social and employment 
policy, argued that the proposals might have reached the trilogue stage, had it not 
been for the Commission’s leniency and the Parliament’s overzealousness293. Now, 
this does not mean that the intra-institutional negotiations in the Council were 
consensual, far from it294. In fact, the delegates admit that internal negotiations on 
both directives are examples of the integrationist-sovereignist debate between those 
reluctant to progress in social and employment policy on the European level and 
those pushing for the EU to take measures against gender inequality295.  
 
The Commission blames deadlock on the Parliament’s insistence on taking a very 
strong public and final position early in the process and not reneging on it even when 
the Council made it clear informally that flexibility would be needed296. The 
Commission particularly criticizes the Parliament’s insistence on sending strong 
public signals and getting a significant improvement in standards rather than settling 
for a moderate outcome: “I remember that the aspect of austerity measures was also 
a decisive element in the negotiations, member states emphasized that after the 
crisis in 2008, they had to cut certain benefits, including maternity leave, but the 
Parliament was not flexible enough to address these concerns and wishes of the 
delegations, so it was also quite an important aspect in the process.”297 The 
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Commission specifically singles out the rapporteur as the origin of the blockage: “The 
rapporteur was a socialist and it explains a lot, actually, she didn’t show any flexibility 
on this, on the different elements of the proposal, so the negotiation was blocked, 
because the Council had its own red lines and the Parliament was not flexible,so 
there was no room for the Commission to negotiate with both parties in a trilogue.”298 
 
Alongside that,  the Commission also blames failure on the Council’s unwillingness to 
accept binding measures and interference in labor market regulations and budgets to 
increase women’s rights and gender equality299. The withdrawal and recast are 
framed as a way to start anew and incorporate lessons learned from co-legislator 
exchanges to avoid giving the impression of the EU failing to deliver300.  
  
The Council strongly blames failure on the Parliament’s extreme position and its 
unwillingness to abandon excessive demands, on duration of leave and level of pay, 
for a pragmatic approach that reflects what is compatible with member state systems 
and economically feasible301:  
 
Failure is framed as the result of a lack of flexibility of the Parliament and especially 
the rapporteur and their unwillingness to engage in compromise-seeking: “It was 
incredibly frustrating, we did pick up that there was division within the committee and 
the Parliament more generally, between those who absolutely wanted to stick to the 
position, because they felt it was right, and those who thought it would be better to be 
a bit more pragmatic and get a deal even if it was not the perfect deal, but we never 
broke through and I don’t know whether that was purely due to the strength of feeling 
and the weight between the groups, or whether it was a bit of the Parliament also 
wanting to push back and kind of demonstrate its own strength in not being pushed 
around by Council, there was quite a bit of challenge to the Council position, with the 
view that Council was just refusing to discuss this.”302  
  
Despite clear signals from the Council Presidencies that the Parliament position was 
perceived to be excessive, for too long there were no attempts to forge a compromise 
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and no encouragement of contacts to solve the issue between co-legislators303: 
“They know that and they are entitled to learn, it may be that once this new package 
comes out, the Commission may also say to them, please be careful, if you are too 
aggressive, the Council will just back off and you will not get anything.”304  
 
The Council also partly shifts blame to the Commission for not providing the 
necessary evidence to support or invalidate the claims about feasibility, 
proportionality and necessity of the Parliament’s requests305. The Council partly also 
blames the initial Commission, especially Commissioner Reding, for siding with the 
Parliament and actively placing blame on the Council: by insisting on binding 
legislation, it compromised the negotiation process and further pushed Council into 
isolation while encouraging Parliament to keep its extreme position306. Delegates 
argue that failure of this measure is a means for the supranational institutions to 
recognize that these types of measures, related to the labor market and social affairs, 
are better dealt with at the national level307.  
 
In the period following its own internal negotiations and the publication of its position, 
the Parliament awaited the Council position, which did not come, as the Council had 
taken note of the Parliament’s position and considered them unacceptable in the 
form they were presented308. The framing of both proposals as an absolute necessity 
for the progress of women’s rights by both the Parliament’s FEMM committee and the 
rapporteurs, as well as the Commission, made it impossible for the Parliament to 
withdraw or reconsider its position without risking to lose face. The Commission tried 
to frame it as a procedural matter towards the Council: “Commission to some extent 
tried to persuade us that procedurally it was not possible for the Parliament to change 
its position, because it had a first reading position and under the procedures it could 
not change.”309 
 
The Parliament openly frames failure as a scandal and the abandonment of women 
and women’s rights and accuses the Council of being vindictive in not accepting the 
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later-stage informal compromise offer310: “The Parliament pointed out all possible 
ways for compromise, talked to all delegations, with or without Commission and 
Presidency, but supported by the Italian Presidency and the Germans, as well as the 
left wing parties. But the response by the Council to the EP was that the file was 
clearly not a priority anymore.”311 The failure of the measure is a sign of a lack of 
engagement by the Presidencies and a lack of understanding in a large majority of 
member states that there is a political need for a strong impetus in women’s rights 
and gender equality matters312. According to MEPs, deadlock is to be blamed mainly 
on the Council refusing to make concessions to increase women’s rights and gender 
equality: “(...) it had a lot to do, I think, with the European Parliament, or at least a lot 
of members of the European Parliament, being fed up with discussions in the Council 
on subsidiarity, proportionality, the money side, the not taking, in the perception of 
the member states, not taking the position of pregnant women seriously, the 
breastfeeding part, not taking that seriously, this whole bunch of factors led to a 
feeling on the Parliament’s side and at least by a lot of members of frustration, anger, 
towards the Council313 
 
The Parliament also criticizes the Commission’s disengagement, as it is not pushing 
the Council to making concessions and actively/publicly pushing for a rights agenda 
to pressure the Council: “Yes, and to send a signal. It’s not necessarily always to the 
Council, it’s sometimes also the Commission, they can say it’s an indirect way of 
saying that they are sick and tired of the Commission always being so careful with 
their proposals, telling them to be more ambitious. It’s a way for them to send a 
signal. They see it like this, if they are too careful themselves, the Commission will 
say, well okay, the Parliament is going to be easy peasy, so we will just draft it as we 
would like, because they are just going to say yes and bla bla. So it’s a relationship 
built up through many years.”314 
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6.2.5 The recast: mechanisms of consensus-building  
 
As for the new proposal, the Commission has changed the framing and extended the 
scope, and most importantly, it has thereby removed the main element of controversy 
and the origin of deadlock: the focus on maternity leave. The priority is now to 
improve work-family-life balance, references to improving or increasing women’s 
rights are connected to a labor market oriented perspective, in the sense of 
increasing women’s participation in the labour market. A reaction to the experience 
that a rights perspective doomed to fail in the Council and the Parliament is too 
maximalist on the rights perspective. In parallel, the proposal has been reduced in 
substance, while scope has been extended and a focus on parental leave has been 
more clearly included, alongside an additional focus on carer’s leave. The reference 
to maternity leave as such has disappeared completely: “(...) the previous proposal 
was more based on rights, and women’s rights and here they’ve changed a little bit, 
it’s still gender equality, but they have changed the perspective a little bit in saying it 
is about having more women into the labour market and I think it’s wise of them to do 
that, because the problem is that every time you come up with a new proposal under 
the setting of rights, you go wrong in the Council, we have these discussions and we 
can never agree on anything that has to do with rights, so in that sense, it is very 
wise of the Commission to focus more on labor participation and that part, whereas 
the maternity leave was more about rights for women and mothers and that was a 
different setting.”315 
 
Measures are much softer and don’t diverge much in substance from the previous 
maternity or parental leave directives. The parental leave part sets a standard of 4 
months, so 16 weeks, which is no different from the previous standards of the 2010 
directive, so no would not constitute a substantive improvement, there is a mention of 
pay at least at the level of sick leave, which is also not a significant change compared 
to the previous proposal. The paternal leave just sets a minimum standard for 
paternal leave (10 days around the birth of the child) and a minimum requirement for 
pay (at least sick leave). This is an obvious reaction to the demands by the Council in 
terms of watering down the substantive elements, so the new proposal is far away 
from the maximalist framework the Commission and the Parliament requested in the 
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first attempt of maternity leave316. However, the extended scope, family and other 
types of leave included, alongside more soft-law measures against discrimination and 
for the promotion of gender equality, is an apparent attempt at satisfying the 
concerns of the Parliament. Nevertheless, the new proposal clearly corresponds 
more to the demands by the Council than it does to those by the Parliament317. 
Another indicator is the inclusion of more non-binding measures in the entire 
package, the Commission seems to have learned from the maternity leave mishap 
and gone back to focusing on non-binding legislation mainly in terms of social policy, 
which works better for member states, as the history of the policy field shows318.  
 
The Council has started examining the file at COREPER level, and the last progress 
reports show that there is one remaining reservation on the new file, pertaining to 
Article 8, and the “concept of defining the minimum level of adequate income in the 
Directive and tying it to the sick-pay level”.319 The progress report also attests that 
there have been discussions in the Social Questions Working Party between July 
2017 and November 2017, but there are no official records of these meetings and the 
discussions therein. The Commission has conducted a number of impact 
assessments prior to submitting a recast and the Social Questions Working Party has 
examined the results alongside the responses to a questionnaire submitted to all 
member states by the Estonian Presidency.  
 
It seems that the new round of negotiations in the Council is leading to a 
compromise, as delegations strongly invest in negotiating the different provisions of 
the directives and the Presidency is successful in proposing compromises320. This 
can be interpreted as a sign that the second Commission proposal is viewed 
favorably by member states and the bargaining now centers around determining the 
concrete provisions, rather than fighting battles over principles321.  
 
In working party negotiations, the delegates generally supported the mandatory 
parental leave provisions, and there is little controversy about the proposed 10 days 
and the application of the sick-pay level. Carer’s leave is more controversial, 
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especially the definitional aspects, the amount of leave days and the level of pay. 
The Presidency has proposed a compromise of more general wording and discretion 
for governments and social partners to decide upon the amount of pay, which was 
acceptable to most delegations. The increase in non-transferable months of parental 
leave from 3 to 4 months is the most controversial aspects, the Presidency has again 
proposed a compromise, lowering the targets and making them most flexible, which 
again is supported by a large number of delegations. The overall controversy about 
whether or not the EU should be allowed to determine a minimum level of pay for 
leave has not been fully settled, but the Presidency compromise to entirely separate 
leave pay from sick pay and give member state the maximum amount of discretion.      
 
The Estonian Presidency seemed confident that a first reading position could be 
reached in the Council on the basis of the compromises achieved since April 2017, 
provided some technical details could be solved in negotiations under the following 
Presidency, and submitted the report to the EPSCO Council.   
 
“Overall, the Estonian Presidency considers that the basis for a final compromise has 
been established on a number of provisions. With a view to finalise the work in the 
Council as soon as possible, further discussions should focus on the remaining 
issues outlined above.”322 
 
The progress on the file was swift for the Council and attests to the fact that the 
recast Commission proposal was more in line with member state preferences and 
most importantly, that there seems to be a general interest in having the policy 
change and achieving an agreement on the file. However, the Parliament has not yet 
determined its position. It seems, as committee negotiations have not progressed, 
that the Parliament is waiting for the Council to move first in this second round. This 
could be due to the experience in the first round, where the Parliament’s maximalist 
demands pushed the Council to blocking the file. Strategically, this would make 
sense in a multi-sequence game, where the Parliament wants the policy change and 
accepts making the necessary concessions to the Council, but also needs to fulfill its 
role as the advocate of citizen rights, pushing it to activism and maximalist demands 
in the first round.  
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There is a general problem between Council and Parliament in the sense that if the 
Council waits with its official position and the EP adopts one, which is stronger than 
the Commission, it’s usually a lost case, so the Council will try to kill it by waiting, it’s 
a common strategy.”323 
However, there is no clear indication yet, if the Parliament will strategically opt for a 
more moderate position to pursue the policy change, or if it will instead focus on 
reputational gains by repeating maximalist demands and risking another round of 
failure.  
“(...) it is not beyond imagination that the Parliament will put some maternity leave 
requirements in, it is not beyond imagination that the Parliament will look for a 
different rate of pay, so we could still see some quite significant changes coming from 
the Parliament. I suspect the mood in the Council has not changed dramatically, I do 
not know whether the mood in the Parliament has changed, I imagine it will be more 
pragmatic, but I don’t know.”324 
“Ich weiß noch nicht genau wie, aber das Gespür in Brüssel ist, dass es eher in die 
Richtung geht, die sind immer für maximalen Schutz und im EP sind sie ja auch 
gewählt und wollen 2019 wiedergewählt werden und sehen, was sie nach außen 
vertreten können und es ist natürlich politisch immer schöner, etwas zu vertreten, 
womit man sagen kann, es wird Frauen, Männern und Eltern im Alltag geholfen, sie 
sind immer positiver, nicht finanziell so eingeschränkt, weil sie nicht für eine 
Regierung arbeiten.”325 
As the Parliament has not yet presented its report, it is difficult to tell which gains they 
consider more valuable at present.  
6.2.6 Model fit and evaluation of the evidence  
 
The following tables assess and summarize the main findings from the case with 
regard to conditions and mechanisms and model fit.  
                                                          
323 Interview 35; Interview 36 
324 Interview 61 
325 Interview 39 
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(table 11, evaluation conditions Maternity Leave, source: own illustration) 
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(table 12, evaluation mechanisms Maternity Leave, source: own illustration) 
 
The Maternity Leave proposal was the result of a thorough consultation of all 
institutions and stakeholders and presented as a substantive and procedural 
compromise proposal, the Commission framed it as a rights initiative, but meanwhile 
insisted that was openness for compromise. The Commission’s role in the process 
varied with regard to how strongly it pushed for progress between the Barroso and 
Juncker Commission, as Commissioner Reding was much more engaged in pushing 
for the Council to take a position and openly taking a side in favor of the Parliament’s 
position. 
 
In terms of substance, when comparing the first and second round, there is definitely 
failure of the original Commission project to regulate maternity leave, since the 
provisions specifically dedicated to mothers has disappeared in a much broader 
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scope of family and carer’s leave. However, the actors within the two institutions do 
not signal that they oppose the new scope, the Parliament has not given any 
indication that second round agreement is impossible. The radical shift of scope and 
the resulting increased investment by the Council in finding a trilogue position 
together with the Parliament’s more cautious attitude, waiting for developments in the 
Council, rather than bringing forward another strong position, rather suggest 
willingness to invest in compromise.  
 
There are, also indications that the dynamics between Council and Parliament are at 
the origin of failure, specifically the Council refusing to take a position after the 
Parliament has public made maximalist demands. The Parliament’s demands did 
indeed exceed the Commission’s proposal was more moderate and more balanced in 
comparison to the Parliament’s demands. This suggests that the Commission might 
have performed its task as a perfect agenda setter and the Parliament has surprised 
by developing a position, which could not be anticipated by either the Commission or 
the Council.  
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6.3 The Gender Quota Directive: persistent deadlock?  
 
The Gender Quota Directive, officially denominated as “Directive of the European 
Parliament and the Council on improving the gender balance among non-executive 
directors of companies listed on stock exchanges and related measures”, was an 
initiative by the former Justice Commissioner Viviane Reding in November 2012, who 
promoted a stronger gender equality agenda and referred to Commission 
assessments of the disparities across member states with regard to the 
representation of women in the upper echelons of the labor market. The Parliament 
enthusiastically welcomed the proposal, as it responded to a number of resolutions 
the Parliament had adopted on the matter since 2007, and decided on a first reading 
position in November 2013 already, hoping to prompt the Council to enter trilogues. 
The Council, however, only held very few meetings on the file, 5 in total from 2013 to 
2017, and never agreed on a first reading position to enter trilogues with the 
Parliament. The last unsuccessful attempt at bringing the Council to a common 
position came from the Maltese Presidency in late May 2017.  
 
 
(table 13, Gender Quota timeline, source: own illustration) 
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6.3.1 The proposal  
 
The main element of the Gender Quota Directive, as proposed by the Commission, 
officially called “Directive of the European Parliament and the Council on improving 
the gender balance among non-executive directors of companies listed on stock 
exchanges and related measures”, introduced in November 2012. It was a proposal 
for a fixed quota, a clear quantitative target, set at 40% of women for non-executive 
board members, or 33% for both executive and non-executive board members for 
stock-listed companies to be fulfilled by member states until 2020. The quota rule 
would apply to 5000 companies in the EU, but not to small and medium sized 
companies or non-listed companies326.  
6.3.2 Policy formulation, conditions and conflict constellations 
 
The Commission justifies the choice of a fixed quantitative target by the lack of 
progress using non-binding measures and the trend of national governments to also 
use legislative measures instead of entrusting it to companies and social partners. 
The Commission argues that the legal base, foreseeing binding legislation as a 
remedy to persisting inequalities across member states in women’s representation327.  
 
In 2011, the Commissioner Reding issued a number of public statements referring to 
studies, which have revealed that there is still a huge gender gap in representation of 
women in business, women making up only 11,9% of board members, despite being 
45% of the labor force: "I want to send a clear message to corporate Europe: women 
mean business," said Vice-President Reding, the EU’s Justice Commissioner. "We 
need to use all of our society’s talents to ensure that Europe’s economy takes off. 
This is why the dialogue between the Commission and the social partners is so 
important. I believe that self regulation could make a difference if it is credible and 
effective across Europe. 
However, I will come back to the matter in a year. If self-regulation fails, I am 
prepared to take further action at EU level."328 
 
                                                          
326 European Commission, Proposal for a Directive  of the European Parliament and of the Council on improving 
the gender balance among non-executive directors of companies listed on stock exchanges and related 
measures, COM (2012) 614 final, 2012/0299 (COD), 14 November 2012 
327 Commission, Communication, IP/10/236, “European Commission aims to significantly reduce the gender pay 
gap”, 5 March 2010 
328 Commission, Memo, MEMO/11/124, “EU Justice Commissioner Reding challenges business leaders to 
increase women’s presence on corporate boards with “Women on the Board Pledge for Europe”, 1 March 2011 
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In 2011, after receiving the support of the EP, Commissioner Reding underlined that 
if member states did not comply with the goal of voluntarily increasing women on 
boards by 2012, the Commission would take legislative steps329. She underlined that 
only Spain, France, Netherlands, Belgium, Italy had introduced quota for women’s 
representation in business leadership. She insisted on a proposal for quota with fixed 
quotas of either 40% of women for non-executive board members, or 33% for both 
executive and non-executive board members. In 2011 and 2012, the Commission 
published a special Eurobarometer on Gender equality revealing that the European 
public would like to see more women on boards and in business. In parallel, the 
Parliament presented a resolution requesting the Commission to present a proposal 
on gender equality in business330. From March to May 2012, the Commission held a 
public consultation to gather views on women representation and on 8 October 2012, 
Commissioner Reding held a speech on gender equality attacking member states for 
lack of progress: In particular, gender diversity in the boardrooms of European 
companies is showing no signs of improvement. Across the EU, company boards are 
currently dominated by one gender: 86.5% of board members are men while women 
represent just 13.5%. 97.5% of the chairpersons are men and only 2.5% are women. 
If you compare this to the 60% of female university graduates, you understand that 
something is profoundly wrong. Women and men should have the opportunities to 
take leadership positions.”331 In November 2012, the Commission submitted a 
proposal for 40% of women as non-executive directors in boards of listed companies 
by 2020332.  
 
The Commission subsequently proposed legislation in 2012, which contained a 
compulsory request for member states to increase the representation of women in 
company boards to 40% and impose sanctions for noncompliance, Commissioner 
Reding wanted to set a rapid pace to address the problem (Ravn-Nielsen, 2016). The 
Commission decided to opt for a broad approach and not only deal with the problem 
                                                          
329“ I have called on publicly listed companies in the EU to sign the "Women on the Board Pledge for Europe" to 
voluntarily increase women's presence on corporate boards to 30% by 2015 and to 40% by 2020. However, if 
there has not been credible progress by March 2012, I stand ready to take the necessary legislative steps at EU 
level.” European Commission, Memo/11/487, “Reding welcomes European Parliament’s strong support for more 
women in decision-making positions”, 5 July 2011 
330 Commission, Eurobarometer, “Women in decision-making positions”, Special Eurobarometer 376, 2011-2012 
331 Commission, Speech/12/702, Speech by EU Justice Commissioner Viviane Reding, “Mapping EU action on 
Gender Equality: from the Treaty of Rome to Quotas”, 8 October 2012  
332 European Commission, Proposal for a Directive  of the European Parliament and of the Council on improving 
the gender balance among non-executive directors of companies listed on stock exchanges and related 
measures, COM (2012) 614 final, 2012/0299 (COD), 14 November 2012 
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of underrepresentation, but also remedy the divergences between countries, which 
interfere with the functioning of the single market in terms of cross-border 
employment (Ravn-Nielsen, 2016). The proposal constituted a strong ambition by the 
Commission to push for legislation, arguing that soft law measures had failed: 
“However, progress in increasing the presence of women on company boards has 
been very slow, with an average annual increase in the past years of just 0.6 
percentage points. The rate of improvement in individual Member States has been 
unequal and has produced highly divergent results. The most significant progress 
was noted in those Member States and other countries where binding measures had 
been introduced. Self-regulatory initiatives in a number of Member States have not 
yielded any similarly noticeable changes. At the current pace it would take several 
decades to approach gender balance throughout the EU.”333 
 
The Commission’s rhetoric, especially the aggressive rights-oriented framing by 
Commissioner Reding was negatively viewed by the Council, who later justified its 
objections based on the obstinacy of the Commissioner to force binding legislation334. 
Over the course of the negotiations, this very ambitious approach led to dissonance 
in Commission leadership, since Commissioner Reding from Luxembourg was 
replaced by Commissioner Jourova from Slovakia, who did not consider the issue an 
absolute priority and informally announced to some member states, amongst them 
the Slovak delegation, that she did not support the substance of the proposal and 
would therefore not specifically push for it in the Council335. 
 
Commissioner Reding strongly intervened in the drafting process, from the initial idea 
to the final proposal, Reding steered the process and strongly communicated her 
agenda to the public, to justify her choices she referred to the Parliament which had 
issued several resolutions calling for more gender equality measures336, 
Commissioner Jourova showed less interest in pushing for the proposal to be 
unblocked337.   
 
                                                          
333 European Commission, Proposal for a Directive  of the European Parliament and of the Council on improving 
the gender balance among non-executive directors of companies listed on stock exchanges and related 
measures, COM (2012) 614 final, 2012/0299 (COD), 14 November 2012 
334 Interview 34 
335 Interview 35; Interview 36 
336 Interview 39; Interview 55; Interview 56; Interview 41; Interview 34 
337 Interview 35; Interview 36 
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However, the behavior of the Commission has changed from 2012 to 2017, as the 
new Commissioner of Justice, Vera Jourova, has introduced changes in policy 
priorities, which have shifted the issue from the agenda of the Commission, leading 
the Commission to be less involved in the file338. In fact, the new Commissioner does 
not support the approach take, especially the aspects of binding legislation and EU 
intervention in that area, and does not publicly fight for the file anymore, as it is 
considered an inherited file.339 The Commissioner Jourova still invests in informal 
contacts to blocking member states, but does not frame the proposal as actively and 
aggressively to the public as Commissioner Reding did, an approach that is 
supported by the Council but not the Parliament340.  
“It was Viviane Reding, the former Commissioner of Justice, she was very keen on this, very 
much about women’s rights are very important, bla bla, and it was her idea, the first proposal 
she came up with in 2012, was very much with financial sanctions and it was very different. It 
was her idea. And this Commissioner who has the file now, Jourova, she has never actually 
hidden the fact that it was not her idea, it’s not her baby, she comes from the Czech Republic 
and they at first were very much against the file and then eventually she succeeded in turning 
over her own country, so now they are for the file, but it’s never been her idea, and that you can 
tell, it’s very easy to feel it that she is not too keen on it, she has to pretend that she likes it, but 
deep down I think she’s quite irritated about this directive.”341  
 
Timing, window of opportunity and salience of the gender equality issue played a role 
for the Council, as there was little momentum for such a proposal in the Council in 
the aftermath of the economic crisis where the focus lay on fiscal consolidation and 
avoiding any negative impacts on national labor markets342. Also, the the longer the 
blocking minority persists the less willing member state representatives are to 
actively work towards finding an agreement, because their attention has shifted to 
other, more pressing issues on the agenda, which are not linked to gender equality. 
An argument used by the German delegation for example, is the impact of the crisis 
and need to focus on the economy, not on social policy343. The European Council, 
meaning the heads of state, has also disengaged from the area, there has not been a 
mention of the directive as a priority in Council conclusions344.  
 
                                                          
338 Interview 55; Interview 56 
339 Interview 35; Interview 36  
340 Interview 41; Interview 34 
341 Interview 41 
342 Interview 55; Interview 56; Interview 32; Interview 53; Interview 54  
343 “So there is a clear linkage, social policy is less important to Germany in a situation of economic crisis.” 
(Interview 29) 
344Council of the European Union, Conclusions on gender equality, Press release, 337/16, 16 June 2016; in 
reference to: Conclusions of the European Council (25/26 June 2015) (EUCO 22/15) 
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6.3.3 The process: mechanisms of deadlock 
 
In the Council, the conflict centers on the combination of binding law and quantitative 
targets. The Council frames the combination of binding law and fixed quantitative 
targets as excessive, the Commission and Parliament frame it as a necessary 
remedy to gender inequalities since non-binding measures had proven ineffective.  
 
The obvious cause for deadlock was the building of an informal blocking minority in 
the Council, by the following member state delegations, which still persisted in 
January 2018: Denmark, Germany, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, the Netherlands, Czech 
Republic, Slovakia, UK and Sweden345. These member states formed a blocking 
minority to signal their general opposition to the proposal on grounds of subsidiarity, 
claiming that interference of the EU in company law violated sovereignty and 
proportionality, insisting that binding measures would have a disproportionate impact 
on the labor market346. The Council reacted to the binding legislation with a claim to 
sovereignty concerns, spelled out as concerns over cost and procedural implications 
for national companies, the impact on company budgets and the workings of hiring 
processes347. Delegates argued that such a legislation would be disincentivizing 
companies from encouraging job growth and work-life-balance. The Council framed 
subsidiarity reservations as concerns over necessity and proportionality of a binding 
measure with quantitative targets348. Delegates referred in particular to the 
organization of national labor markets, especially the reliance on regulation by social 
partners and constraints on companies due to the economic situation post-crisis349.   
 
Informal attempts by successive Presidencies to convince members of the blocking 
minority to engage in negotiations were not successful, since the opposition was 
framed as a matter of principle, namely rejection of legislative intervention at EU 
level, and the Commission was not willing to consider transforming it into soft law or 
further watering it down350. From June to December 2013, the Council negotiated the 
proposals, and the Irish and Lithuanian Presidencies concluded that overall, all 
delegations were in favour of improving gender balance on company boards, some 
                                                          
345 Council of the European Union, Presidency to EPSCO Council, General approach, 14343/15, 30 November 
2015 
346 Interview 30; Interview 55; Interview 56; Interview 61; Interview 41; Interview 32 
347 Interview 59; Interview 32; Interview 52 
348 Interview 58; Interview 55 
349 Interview 58; Interview 41; Interview 41 
350 Interview 34; Interview 41; Interview 32 
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prefer national measures while others support EU-wide legislation, but the situation 
was not entirely unfavorable in the Council351. A progress report on 7 June 2013 
summarized the following issues: while discussions in the Working Party show a 
broad consensus in favour of the objective of the proposal, however, representatives 
had different opinions on how to achieve it. Some delegations supported the 
proposal, but others preferred a voluntary approach, non-binding legislation, which 
would allow member states more discretion in policy choice and some delegations 
criticized the proposal for not complying with the principle of subsidiarity: many 
national parliaments have submitted scrutiny reservations and reasoned opinions 
(Denmark, Netherlands, Poland, Sweden, UK, Czech Republic, France) saying the 
proposal violates the principle of subsidiarity352.  
 
Representatives were particularly divided on the threshold of the quota, some 
member states supported the 40% threshold, some member states criticized it saying 
that states come with very different standards, some states wanted the 33% objective 
to be better explained with regard to practical implications, some delegations wanted 
the quantitative objective of 40% to be better put into perspective and understand it 
more as a general objective for which the Directive would provide procedural 
requirements353.  
 
Procedural requirements were also subject to controversy, as a number of 
delegations questioned the practicability of provisions such as the obligation for 
companies to draw up “clear, neutrally formulated selection criteria” 354for the 
selection of board members especially the application in selection processes, some 
member states warned against interference with the employees freedom to select 
their own representatives in member states where employees are present on boards. 
As for the  disclosure requirement, some delegations considered that it went beyond 
existing discrimination legislation and might compel companies to reveal company 
strategy. Some member states were not in favour of sanctions and some member 
                                                          
351 Council of the European Union, Report Presidency to COREPER, 16437/13, 22 November 2013 
352 Council of the European Union, Report, Presidency to COREPER I/ EPSCO Council, Progress Report, 
10422/13, 7 June 2013  
353 Council of the European Union, Note Presidency to Working Party on Social Questions, 14412/14, 31 October 
2014 
354 Council of the European Union, Outcome of Proceedings, Working Party on Social Questions, 8002/13, 22 
April 2013; Council of the European Union, Note Presidency to Working Party on Social Questions, 11584/13, 25 
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states raised the concern that the proposal might not be consistent with company 
law355.  
 
By November 2015, discussions at Working Party level confirmed that while the 
objective of the proposed Directive was supported in principle, the opposing 
delegations criticized non-compliance with the principle of subsidiarity and referred to 
the variance in national legislation and the difficulties the directive would produce for 
some states, which would have to significantly adapt their national systems356.  
 
The Luxembourg Presidency wanted to put the issue to the EPSCO agenda for 5 
October 2015, but the issue was withdrawn to have further discussions, Presidency 
drafted further suggestions, which were submitted to the working party on social 
questions on 5 and 7 November and COREPER I on 25 November357. Commission 
decided to not adopt a position on the compromise text. The Luxembourg Presidency 
fine-tuned the cases in which the flexibility clause would apply, extending it to those 
cases where states do not cover all listed companies falling within the scope of the 
Directive but compensate with other national measures, which was broadly supported 
by some delegations (Belgium, Bulgaria, Ireland, Greece, France, Italy, Cyprus, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Austria, Romania, Slovenia, Finland), while 
others remained opposing (Czech Republic, Germany, Spain, Portugal, Poland, 
Denmark, United Kingdom, Hungary, Croatia, Sweden).  
 
In 2015, the December conclusions of the Luxembourg Presidency stated that there 
was no consensus on the substance of the Directive in the Council, so the Council 
would not be able to agree on the Directive, as there was no qualified majority358. 
Even though there was a broad consensus on the general idea of taking measures to 
improve gender balance on company boards, some member states  insisted that 
measures be taken at the national level and stressed that the proposal does not 
comply with subsidiarity. In reaction to those critiques, the Presidency had redrafted 
                                                          
355 Council of the European Union, Outcome of Proceedings, Working Party on Social Questions, 8002/13, 22 
April 2013 
356 Council of the European Union, Outcome of Proceedings, Working Party on Social Questions, 14126/15, 19 
November 2015 
357 Council of the European Union, Presidency to EPSCO Council, General approach, 14343/15, 30 November 
2015 
358 Council of the European Union, Presidency to EPSCO Council, General approach, 14343/15, 30 November 
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the text, making it more flexible, national measures are now fully recognized and the 
deadlines have been extended:   
“One of the big countries who really did a lot of work to amend it and to get the general 
approach was actually Italy during their Presidency in 2014, Greece also did some 
attempts to water it down or at least adjust it, so that member states would actually say 
yes to it. Throughout 2015, there were some minor changes, but it was mostly Italy that 
changed it, along with the Commission obviously, but they didn’t succeed, and then for 
the entire year of 2016 it was blocked and taken off the table, because it was the Dutch 
and the Slovaks, their Presidencies and none of them want it, so they had no incentives of 
trying to move forward, so it’s been now up to the Maltese, they’ve tried to bring it up 
again, we’ve only met once, and it means that for all of us who have been sitting with the 
file, we have to think about it one more time and see about the status of it and what we 
are all going to do.”359 
 
In the meantime, while negotiations stalled in the Council, several more countries 
have implemented quotas to boost female access to boardrooms, some before the 
EU proposal was presented, others during the negotiations: Spain, France, the 
Netherlands, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Germany and the UK. From the beginning, 
the UK has shown the strongest opposition, since the very announcement of the plan 
to present a legislative proposal they threatened blockage, emphasizing that they are 
while they are against interference by the EU, they are not against quotas as such 
(Ravn-Nielsen, 2016; Teigen, 2012), but they also announced to encourage gender 
equality through national non-binding measures, and proceed along with like-minded 
member states, but insisted on subsidiarity360. The UK framed the proposal as a use 
of force by the EU, blaming the EU for using force to impose an idea and arguing that 
the UK would reply in kind and use force to oppose it, throughout the entire process, 
both government representatives and British media used negative phrasing painting 
the picture that the entire idea of European Gender Quota is a measure of force 
where it is not needed (Teigen, 2012; Ravn-Nielsen, 2016). Together with the UK, the 
Germans are currently leading a blocking minority and refusing to change positions 
despite their national legislation, as a symbolic statement of opposition to EU 
interference in crucial matters of sovereignty (Ravn-Nielsen, 2016). Germany has 
voiced its opposition against interference by the EU and while it has not formally 
taken a blocking position361. National elections in several other European countries 
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are making the Council Presidencies reluctant to bring the controversial issues back 
on the table, especially considering the failure of previous Presidencies362.  
 
In parallel, the occurrence of the Brexit crisis has shifted the attention, with the UK 
announcing Brexit, the Council had a good excuse to shift attention away from 
dossiers that were controversial for the British, this being one of the more important 
ones. The UK representatives and government had publicly stated several times, 
both in negotiations in the Council and on the national level by public statements of 
government representatives, that it was set on stopping the Gender Quota plan363. 
Britain has entered parliamentary scrutiny reservations and the UK Parliament has 
rejected the directive proposal, former Prime Minister David Cameron had 
announced fighting the directive based on subsidiarity claims (Ravn-Nielsen, 2016), 
as the House of Commons had objected to an EU regulation saying it should be 
resolved on the national level on voluntary basis. The House of Commons was joined 
by the Danish, Swedish, Czech, Dutch and Polish Parliament364. The UK also 
opposed the compromise agreement proposed by the Luxembourg Presidency. 
Given that the majority of delegations are in favour of the proposal and the UK has to 
fight quite hard to keep the minority in place, but remained opposed despite having 
introduced national gender quota legislation in 2015365. Indeed, in Germany has 
introduced a 30% gender quota for company boards, which is inspired by the debate 
on EU gender quota and caused Germany to switch its position nationally. It is most 
likely at Chancellor Merkel’s initiative and constitutes concessions to her coalition 
partner SPD that had requested gender quota to be introduced for a while, she 
supported the proposal of SPD Minister Schwesig against the opposition of her own 
party366.  
 
The Parliament framed its support for quantitative targets as a question of fighting for 
women’s rights. It repeatedly referred to governments’ unwillingness and inability to 
combat gender equality on the labor market and the lack of progress in the European 
Union as a whole. MEPs also claimed to be supported by insights on how companies 
and society benefit from improving female labor market participation and female 
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364 Summary of the state of negotiations: Council of the European Union, Presidency to EPSCO Council, General 
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representation in high levels of decision-making. The Parliament defended European 
intervention and binding legislation as a question of combating intergovernmentalism,  
referring to governments’ persisting inability and reluctance to use binding legislative 
measures and the resulting discrepancy between male and female representation on 
the labor market, especially in high levels of decision-making.   
 
In the Parliament, the co-rapporteurs Regner (S&D, Germany) and Kratsa-
Tsagaropoulou (EPP, Greece) issued a report in 2013, the baseline for the 
Parliament’s first reading position, supporting the Commission proposal and adding 
extension, in particular sanctions, a scope extension to include more types of 
companies, binding procedures for the hiring of executive committee members and a 
procedure for achieving balanced representation. The position was confirmed by the 
plenary, but there were no trilogues possible, since the Council did not agree to a 
position. Informal contacts with Presidencies were useful to signal willingness to 
negotiate a compromise, but did not enable trilogues, as the blocking minority in the 
Council persists.  
 
By 2013, negotiations in several relevant committees in the Parliament produced a 
rather strong position, siding with that of the Reding Commission. Overall, the EP 
requested a clear goal in terms of improving gender equality by increasing the 
presence of women on boards and strongly agreed with the Commission on setting 
the goal of 40% by 2020. The Commission responded to the EP position saying that 
most of the amendments are acceptable in principle, but the proposal will not be 
amended until the Council has put forward a common position. The Commission 
specifically pointed out in its response to the Parliament that the Council internal 
decision-making process is going very slowly, but that agreement before EP recess, 
due to elections in 2014, is possible, as some member states are proposing 
compromise texts.   
 
In October and November 2013, the Parliament presented another report and 
formally adopted its position by vote in the plenary on 21 November 2013. However, 
even by December 2014, the Council could not reach a general line on the Directive, 
the Greek Presidency presented a revised flexibility clause and prolonged the 
deadlines: the flexibility clause was supposed to deal with subsidiarity concerns to 
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permit member states to realize the objectives of the Directive on their own terms. A 
deadline delay was introduced to give states and companies more time and flexibility 
to adapt and prepare their own measures, the transposition deadline was extended 
to 3 years and the deadline for the presentation of progress reports also has to be 
delayed to fit the new calendar.  
 
In December 2015, in a plenary debate, the Parliament expressed its dissatisfaction 
with the Council’s delay of adopting a position on the Directive. Co-rapporteur Mariya 
Gabriel (EPP, Bulgaria) from the FEMM committee, argued that subsidiarity concerns 
were not valid or acceptable, since the legal basis of a directive was already chosen 
to leave sufficient discretion to member states. Meanwhile, Regner has been 
replaced by Rodi Kratsa-Tsagaropoulou (EPP, Greece). Co-rapporteur Evelyn 
Regner (S&D, Austria) from the JURI committee, also argued that the directive 
respected subsidiarity and does not set women quota, but rather lays down rules for 
procedure for all candidates.  
 
Although, publicly, the position of the Parliament was to demand a fixed quota to be 
implemented by a certain time under the threat of sanctions for the company in case 
of non-compliance, but they informally signalled flexibility to the Council on all the 
important issues367: “Yes, but frankly speaking, when it comes to maternity leave, 
there was really a push from the Parliament side, but I don’t think it is the case in this 
dossier, but maybe I’m not aware of that, it’s on the Presidency. But I think it’s not 
pushy like on the maternity directive.”368 
  
The blocking minority still persists and the Maltese Presidency has announced that 
the proposal will be a key priority on its agenda for the social and employment area, 
but was unable to progress on the proposal, due to a persistent refusal of the 
German delegation to announce whether or not they would change their position369. 
The last official mention of negotiations in the Council dates back to May 2017, when 
the Maltese Presidency delivered a progress report to COREPER370. The Maltese 
Presidency put the issue on the agenda of COREPER in May 2017, after noting that 
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the issue had been kept off the Council agenda since the Luxembourg Presidency in 
2015. The Working Party on Social Questions had been discussing the text again in 
a meeting on 15 March 2017, with the Maltese Presidency making a set of 
compromise suggestions, in line with the text discussed by EPSCO on 7 December 
2015. Member states especially discussed the possibility of a flexibility clause. The 
Presidency concluded that while there were a number of supporting delegates in 
favor of EU wide legislation, there was still a significant number of delegates that 
preferred national measures or non-binding EU measures371. The Presidency was 
not confident that a compromise could be reached soon and concluded that there 
was still need for further technical and political discussions. The European Council 
mentioned gender equality and the need for member states to take measures to 
promote equality in its conclusions in December 2015, did however not specifically 
call on the Council to negotiate the Gender Quota Directive372. 
 
The evidence is not entirely clear on whether the problem lies in fundamental 
disagreements between the co-legislators or if there is simply a lack of momentum for 
compromise: “Yes, and actually the problem is a different one, because the file is 
broadly supported by the Council and it has also strong support of the Parliament, 
but still there is no momentum for a general approach.”373 “There is a general 
problem between Council and Parliament in the sense that if the Council waits with 
its official position and the EP adopts one, which is stronger than the Commission, it’s 
usually a lost case, so the Council will try to kill it by waiting, it’s a common 
strategy.”374 
6.3.4 The blame framing game  
 
The analysis of the Council statements reveals that, despite the compromise 
attempts, the Gender Quota proposal was perceived by the Council as a personal 
project of the former Commissioner, Viviane Reding, which used the issue to achieve 
her personal ambition of becoming a candidate for the Presidency of the Commission 
by pushing particularly integrationist and ambitious proposals to promote a European 
agenda. She personally framed the project very assertively towards the public and 
presented the directive as a long-overdue rectification by the EU of member states’ 
                                                          
371 Council of the European Union, Presidency to COREPER, Progress Report, 9496/17, 31 May 2017  
372 Council of the European Union, Draft Council Conclusions, 14325/15, 2 December 2015 
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negligence in promoting women in business. Her speeches were considered as too 
forward by member state representations, which biased them against the proposal 
from the outset375. Ultimately, the personal dimension is further proven by the fact 
that even the new Commissioner, Vera Jourová, which took over the proposal, did 
not actively support the proposal in the same way and stopped pushing for it376. In 
this particular case, the Commission deliberately and visibly disregarded the 
Council’s critical stance to push a proposal, which in substance might have been 
acceptable to the Council for negotiation, since the legal text provided for a number 
of opportunities to negotiate compromises and more flexibility377. The Commissioner 
Reding put all blame on the Council and member states and very clearly sided with 
the Parliament. She publicly promoted a rhetoric of neglect on the side of member 
states and presented the European institutions as the defenders of women’s rights: 
“She said at some stage that the Council was stupid and inflexible and conservative 
and didn’t know what they were talking about (...)That made not a good impression in 
the capitals, not with the experts, but certainly not with the Ministers involved (...)”378 
 
The Council proved to be the initiator of deadlock from an institutional perspective, 
since it refused to take an official position for trilogues in both cases and stalled the 
negotiations. In fact, all member state representatives, even those generally skeptical 
towards EU intervention in company matters and framed it as subsidiarity and 
proportionality concerns, often times referring to the diversity in national labor market 
systems and company law: Some representatives also referred to the effects of the 
crisis and austerity measures and argued that governments would be the best 
instance to judge on relevant and necessary labor market measures:  
The Council blames the Commission for an overly aggressive rhetoric, especially the 
Commissioner Reding repeatedly blaming member states for a lack of progress in 
gender equality and building a large front claiming to speak for the entirety of the 
non-intergovernmental European institutions, both Commission and the European 
Parliament379.  
 
                                                          
375 Interview 35; Interview 36  
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377 Interview 34; Interview 55; Interview 56; Interview 30  
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The Council blames the Parliament for reinforcing the Commission rhetoric instead of 
taking a pragmatic and compromising stance380. Delegates especially criticize the 
Parliament’s public siding with the Commission and the public of accusing member 
states of lack of progress in gender equality matters without being open to the 
subsidiarity argument381: “(...) you have quite a large group content to agree on the 
proposal and then you have a group that has been opposed pretty much before the 
proposal was even issued, largely on grounds of subsidiarity, the theory is that this is 
not something the EU should legislate for, and what happened throughout the 
negotiations is that the UK, Germany and others actually wrote to the Commissioner 
Reding even before the proposal was published to set out these concerns about 
subsidiarity and then that has persisted right away through the negotiations (...)”382      
Parliament blamed the Council for being uncompromising and stalling negotiations to 
avoid discussions about a potential middleground and the Commission for being too 
lenient with the Council: “The same on gender quota, the Council still doesn’t take an 
official position, so the Commission should push the Council much more, a lot of 
member states already have it and it doesn’t cost them, Germany has even 
introduced new legislation, but even when it doesn’t cost anything, it doesn’t pass. 
The Parliament has a hard time accepting the short-term financial arguments. In the 
Council, the Dutch delegation said that the more liberal states were opposed, 
because the file would have meant an interference in economic matters, and rejected 
it as one too many regulations on business matters. They reject quotas, because 
they come from a logic of merit. Arena also mobilized on this, talking to the capitals, 
but Germany said that they don’t want to compromise their allies in austerity matters 
just for a file on social policy.”383 
 
But the comparison of statements by different MEPs also also internal divisions 
between left and right wing, the right wing sided with the Council and the left wing 
with the Commission, making it difficult for the Parliament to have a good bargaining 
position384: “The EPP eventually agreed that they would not support a rigid quota 
system, but wanted flexibility and held onto their position, which was why they got the 
passerelle to be introduced to be able to avoid sanctions. There was supposed to be 
                                                          
380“(...)  some member states said that if the Commission wants to achieve something in this regard, it should 
think about a recommendation and not a directive.” (Interview 40) 
381 Interview 53; Interview 54; Interview 32 
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a joint report by FEMM and JUST committees, but it was difficult, because FEMM 
was so emotional about the issue, but the cooperation with rapporteur Regner was 
very good. She offered the possibility to get many people on board. She got the EPP 
to eventually support the proposal through the flexibility that was introduced, even 
though they were against quotas.”385   
 
6.3.5 Model fit and evaluation of the evidence 
 
The model of strategic failure in several rounds does not seem to hold, the evidence 
seems to point into the direction of activist Commission. The Commission is not 
showing any signs of wanting to withdraw the proposal to submit a revised, more 
moderate proposal, which is more likely to secure the Council’s support. Despite 
informal contacts to member state representatives, which have signalled their 
opposition and repeated contact to the rapporteurs, there is no indication that the 
Commission will withdraw and bring a new proposal, just as informal contacts have 
not led to unblocking in the Council, despite attempts by the Parliament.  
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(table 13, evaluation conditions Gender Quota, source: own illustration) 
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(table 14, evaluation mechanisms Gender Quota, source: own illustration) 
 
On the structural side, there is a lack of support by national party politics and the 
policy agenda of national governments, as even those who are not openly blocking 
the issue are not investing in convincing the blocking states in the Council. Even 
social democratic governments, which traditionally are more supportive of equality 
measures, are not siding with the Commission. Apart from the lack of support by 
national party politics, there is also no broad support by the agenda for such a policy 
change, as many national labor markets still heavily struggle with the aftermath of the 
economic crisis. Even five years after the proposal, there is no window of opportunity 
for the policy change.     
 
Indeed, the evidence points towards a reputational game without the final goal of 
achieving policy change. Institutions are setting things up for failure to distribute 
blame and praise oneself for gains and attempts to reconcile disputes, without 
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pushing for unblocking or withdrawal and recast. In this case, the goal of Commission 
activism would be to initiate a game of symbolic politics and propose policy change 
for the sake of sending a signal to the public that the Commission tries to advocate 
citizen rights and deliver policy, but the co-legislators block it. The Council on the 
other hand can blame the Commission for activism and impracticality and signal to 
national constituencies that it tries to reign in European activism and protect national 
sovereignty. The Parliament has the choice between blaming the Commission for not 
being more realistic and not active enough in pushing the Council and focusing on 
blaming the Council for being intergovernmentalist and unrelenting.  
There is still a chance of the negotiations turning into strategic game, if the 
Commission agrees to withdrawing and proposing something more in line with 
Council preferences or agrees to the watering down and the flexibilization proposed 
by the successive Council Presidencies. However, so far, there is no indication that 
the Commission will do either. But the long shadow of the future of the EU’s policy-
making process does not allow to fully rule out that possibility at this stage.   
There is some indication that blockage might be due to co-legislator dynamics, since 
the evidence collected from the Council suggests that the German delegation is a 
pivotal player in the deadlock situation. Negotiations might also be unblocked if the 
German delegation leaves the blocking minority.   
 
The internal negotiations in the Council are an example of the integrationist-
sovereignist debate between those reluctant to progress in social and employment 
policy on the European level and those pushing for the EU to take measures against 
gender inequality. However, both supporters and opponents of the proposal expected 
deadlock to be unlocked in the Gender Quota case once the Germans introduced 
their national legislation, it was expected that they would abandon their blocking 
position and support the project, since in substance the directive is not much different 
from the national legislation and the other states would have been willing to give 
concessions to the Germans in return for their support for the directive. 
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6.4 Gender equality policy: comparative findings and conclusions  
 
The Council blamed the Parliament’s extreme position and strong communication 
around the proposal as being the main problem for the lack of progress, using it to 
conceal an internal division and a general skepticism towards EU intervention in 
family policy matters. In fact, in the internal negotiations before the Parliament 
adopted and publicly communicated its position, the representatives had accepted a 
number of compromise proposals made by the successive Czech, Spanish and 
Belgian Presidencies regarding the duration and the amount of leave allowance, but 
most importantly the possibility of escaping sanctions for non-fulfillment of gender 
quota targets if a company can demonstrate that it has taken compensatory 
measures (“passerelle clause”). However, once it was clear that the Parliament 
position, which exceeded that of the Commission and therefore crossed the red lines 
of most state representatives, would not be abandoned and the compromise 
proposals by the Presidencies would not pass, the Council decided to unitedly refuse 
to halt internal negotiations. Even the successive Council Presidencies did not 
consider it worth their time to really invest in trying to forge a consensus between the 
state representatives after the Parliament had submitted its position and 
amendments.  
 
If we take all three institutions together, it becomes evident that the first reason for 
deadlock are divergent agendas: the Commission framed the Maternity Leave 
proposal as a measure of improving women’s rights on the labor market by 
increasing leave time and allowance and not working conditions, while the Council 
was expecting a moderate proposal that regulated work conditions for pregnant and 
breastfeeding women, as the previous directive did. The Parliament contributed to 
the aggravation of the conflict by advocating a gender equality agenda that mainly 
consisted of blaming member states for their negligence and positioning itself as the 
defender of women’s rights and social progress. If we look into the dynamics within 
the institutions, the reason for deadlock and failure can be found in the very different 
approaches taken and the personal as well as political agendas pushed in each 
case: Viviane Reding’s ambition of becoming a candidate for the Commission 
Presidency. Her attempt to use an aggressive campaign for gender equality against 
member states as a lever antagonized the Council to the point where member states 
disregarded their internal division and jointly decided to refuse negotiations by not 
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taking a position to start trilogues with. In the Maternity Leave case, the Parliament 
was the over-ambitious actor surpassing the Commission’s demands in the initial 
proposal and further pushing an integrationist and interventionist agenda already 
deemed excessive by the Council, the left-wing rapporteurs in charge of the proposal 
in the FEMM and EMPL committees, both refused to depart from their extreme 
positions for years, inciting the Council to block position-taking and ultimately leading 
to a loss of credibility as a trustworthy partner for a compromise.  
 
The Maternity Leave proposal built on previous legislation and was the result of a 
thorough consultation of all institutions and stakeholders and presented as a 
substantive and procedural compromise proposal, the Commission framed it as a 
rights initiative, but meanwhile insisted that was openness for compromise. The 
situation was quite different in the Gender Quota case, where the Commissioner 
herself advertised it as a personal project and strongly relied on the public 
communication of blame addressed to the Council. Where in the maternity leave 
case it behaved as an honest broker, in the Gender Quota case it was an activist, 
pushing for its own agenda. The Commission’s role in the process varied with regard 
to how strongly it pushed for progress between the Barroso and Juncker 
Commission, as Commissioner Reding was much more engaged in pushing for the 
Council to take a position and openly taking a side in favor of the Parliament’s 
position.  
 
Reasons for legislative deadlock and policy failure can be found at different stages of 
the legislative process, originate from the behaviour and strategic decisions of all 
institutions involved, which in turn can derive from particular actors’ ambitions 
regarding the proposals under discussion. The reasons for deadlock appear may 
appear trivial, yet the concurrence of conditions, formal rules and strategic actors 
determines whether consensus-building succeeds or fails. We know from other 
areas, like Justice and Home Affairs or Foreign Policy, that positions can be extreme 
in the beginning, but relais actors, like the Council Presidency or the Parliament 
rapporteurs can steer the discussion towards a compromise (Smeets, 2013; Ripoll 
Servent, 2012). Similarly, even a sovereignist Council can be skeptical of a proposal, 
but convinced by the proposals made by the Parliament or even the Commission, if 
they in turn are capable of anticipating the red lines. And last but not least, much 
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depends on the behaviour of the Parliament and the responsible rapporteurs: the 
more ambitious and assertive Commission and Parliament in their integration 
demands, the less likely it becomes that the Council will agree to its demands. This 
seems to hold true in particular for areas where the Council does not see a pressing 
need for action - and in the current climate, the focus of governments clearly is not on 
gender equality, but rather on migration and economics (Teigen, 2012; Forest and 
Lombardo, 2012). 
 
Interestingly, compromise proposals by Council Presidencies in particular proved to 
be unsuccessful, in the maternity leave case, because the Council entirely focused 
on the Parliament’s position, which was perceived as excessive and argued that it 
would not be worth engaging in finding a compromise among member states if it was 
doomed to fail in trilogies. The rapporteurs insistence and very public aggressive 
framing of the Parliament position against the Council further added fuel, as 
delegations could unite against the other institution instead of focusing on their own 
conflicts. The Parliament played a risky game in pushing the Council for more 
substantial policy change and lost. Ultimately, the rapporteur did not perform a broker 
role, but entirely focused on pushing a particular agenda, which centered the conflict 
around her as the metaphor for the Parliament being excessive and relentless. The 
long persistence in the extreme position shut the window of opportunity on the 
negotiation and by the time the rapporteur, which was no longer trusted by the 
Council, had changed, any compromise offer by the Parliament was no longer 
credible to the Council. For the Council, especially those delegations that were not 
keen on policy change, the rapporteur’s persistence was an easy and welcome 
element to focus on to find blame for blockage, while portraying themselves as open 
for compromise. The Council Presidencies, who mostly disengaged from the file, also 
used the blame rhetoric. In the Gender Quota case, the Council found its scapegoat 
in the Commission and the reluctance to change the proposal into soft law or 
abandon the quota target. The Parliament and the fact that the rapporteur sided with 
the Commission were of secondary importance, as the position of the Commission 
came first and was most vociferously communicated from the beginning.   
 
Despite the differences, the conflict dimensions in both cases were not much 
different, the Council opposed interference by the EU, claiming subsidiarity concerns 
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to conceal sovereignty arguments and opposed any measures that would have 
redistributive consequences or affect the national labor market systems in ways that 
would require significant legal changes. A strong preference for the status quo is 
obvious for the Council and it clashes with a strong rights-agenda of the Commission 
and the Parliament. The Parliament did not focus on procedural elements, since co-
decision applied to both proposals and therefore entirely concentrated on making 
demands in substance. However, rather than being open to compromise, as it was 
the case in the border policy negotiations, even after deadlock had become apparent, 
the rapporteurs persisted in their positions for a long time, risking losing the window 
of opportunity for agreement. Pushing for a strongly supranationalist agenda has not 
paid off for the Parliament in both cases, mainly because the rapporteurs were not 
trusted by the Council to be willing to compromise.  
   
After its largely unsuccessful attempts at promoting women’s rights during the 90s, 
the EU introduced the gender mainstreaming rhetoric, a strategy to relate processes 
and outcomes of mainstream policies to the gender issue (Rubery, 2002). Since the 
2000’s, gender mainstreaming rhetoric has been the most common strategy for 
framing policy requests and proposals in the gender equality area (Verloo, 2005), the 
EU has attempted quite a few measures to implement gender parity, but mostly non-
legislative measures, one of the most important ones being the 2006 Roadmap for 
Equality and a number of Action plans, which maintain equal participation of women 
in decision-making as one of the six key areas of gender equality. The goals fixed in 
the roadmap were used to judge the performance of states with regard to the 
indicators set up by the Finnish Presidency in 1999 (McRae, 2012), recent EU 
rhetoric is linked to the labor market, since the EU does not have much competence 
in social policy, hence it opted for a gender equality approach in labor-market related 
policy, the link to the labor market has opened possibilities for the EU to encroach 
upon family policy matters even though formally it does not have extensive 
competences in this area (Lombardo and Meier, 2008). The EU has pursued a similar 
strategy for the entire field of social policy since the Lisbon Treaty has been ratified, 
social policy has continuously been included in work programmes and action plans 
(Jenson, 2008). Work and family reconciliation has been promoted by the EU as a 
means for addressing a whole variety of problems, from low fertility rates to improving 
competitiveness and growth and achieving gender equality, the framework has 
  
253 
 
always been closely tied to the labor market and employment policy strategy (Lewis, 
2006). Labor market participation frames dominate over social policy and rights-
related frame, as the focus of member states lies on employment policy, the social 
dimension remains secondary. Similarly, business frame dominates gender equality 
frames. equal opportunities are framed in terms of business benefits or costs or 
integrated in a larger anti-discrimination framework.  
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VII. Comparing findings across policy areas: highlighting similarities and 
idiosyncrasies in processes of policy-making failure  
 
Before proceeding to general conclusions about the implications of the findings for 
research on EU policy-making, it is commendable to bring together the comparative 
findings from the four case studies and evaluate the different components of the 
models presented initially.  
 
(table 15, overall model evaluation, source: own illustration) 
 
As regards the evaluation of the overall fit of the models proposed initially in 
explaining legislative failure, we can draw the following observations from the case 
studies: there is evidence for strategic failure and a reputational blame game for the 
Schengen, Smart Borders and Maternity Leave cases.  
 
“And they’ve (add: the Parliament) succeeded, because when the Commission drafts 
something, they very much look at the Parliament as well. But they also need to 
strike a balance with the Council, because they know if they look too much at the 
Parliament, we will see it, we see these things, you very easily see when you read 
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through a directive, it’s very easy to see how much of it was intended for the 
Parliament and how much was not. If it it’s too much for the Parliament, we will 
protest. It’s a game. But for some reason, we always end up being able to strike a 
balance somehow.”386 
 
There is also evidence for other types of Commission behavior, the Commission 
might sometimes value pure activism and the reputational gains more than the actual 
policy change, as the Gender Quota proposal suggests, or have trouble correctly 
performing its agenda-setting, which seems to be the case in the Smart Borders 
negotiations. While theoretically plausible, the activism model still leaves the question 
of why co-legislators would engage in intra-institutional negotiations at all, if the 
Commission presented a truly activist proposal.  
 
Taken together, three in four cases show indicators for a multi-sequence game, two 
of the legislative files being concluded, either formally or informally, and one being 
negotiated in the second round. The fourth case is an outlier in that regard, at least 
until the time the data collection and analysis was completed for this study, deadlock 
persisted. The Schengen, Smart Borders and Maternity leave cases not only show 
indicators for a multi-sequence game, but also strategic elements that indicate that 
the key actors, institutions and individual actors, use failure to their advantage to 
achieve procedural, substantive and/or reputational gains. The cases, however, 
demonstrate, that the models (1)-(3) and the model of strategic failure (4) are not 
necessarily mutually exclusive.   
 
The Schengen case is a completed multi-sequence game, where failure and recast 
ultimately led to agreement, after a power battle over procedural and substantial 
gains and a mutually beneficial framing game. It is a textbook case for strategic 
failure, as everybody wins after the last round.  
 
The Smart Borders case is clearly a comparable case, another multi-sequence game, 
after withdrawal and recast and bargaining about the scope and substance and 
blame framing exchanges between the institutions, there has been an agreement. It 
shows indications, that strategic games can be combined with first instance 
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technocratic failure. The mechanism leading to success in this case is scope 
reduction, through elimination of RTP, and reframing.   
 
The Maternity Leave case is still in the second round and there is no informal 
agreement yet, but the institutions signal an interest in producing an agreement, 
especially the Council, and they have practiced a similar blame game after failure 
and withdrawal of the first proposal. In this case, first instance failure due to co-
legislator position-taking could be combined with strategic failure, as the Commission 
clearly took the main controversial element out of the proposal: maternity leave. The 
main mechanism of reacting to failure is a combination of scope extension, legal 
base modification, leading to the inclusion of more issue areas, more non-legislative 
elements and a reframing from maternity leave to work-life balance, which eliminated 
the main controversy.   
 
The Gender Quota case is the only one that is currently not pointing towards strategic 
failure, but rather to absolute failure due to Commission activism, as blockage and 
deadlock have continued with no sign of withdrawal. However, it could still come 
about, as the Maternity Leave case also remained deadlocked for almost seven 
years, before the Commission formally withdrew it.  
 
Based on the observations from the cases, the following table will provide general 
observations about the models and propose ways to refine them:  
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(table 16, model evaluation and refinement, source: own illustration) 
7.1 Causes of failure  
 
The analysis has shown that structural factors play an important role in the process of 
legislative failure. Which ones are the most influential?  
 
Preference and conflict constellations can be conducive to failure, especially if 
extreme positions persist a long time during the negotiation process, instead of being 
replaced by more moderate ones. In the Schengen case, position conflicts could be 
resolved through informal deals, whereas they persisted in the Maternity Leave case 
and also persist in the Gender Quota case. Conflict constellations evolved in the 
Schengen case, the re-nationalization aspect vanished and positions evolved to a 
much more moderate stance on internal border control, in the Smart Borders case 
from a conflict over law enforcement access and data protection to a much more 
security oriented compromise and  in the Maternity Leave case to a more flexible 
approach to leave provisions and level of pay, which allows for more state discretion. 
Overall, all proposals, which have resulted in agreement or are moving towards it, 
  
258 
 
show a tendency towards more moderate positions in the second round, on all 
institutional fronts. On the other hand, conflict constellations consolidated and even 
worsened in the Gender Quota case over the question of quantitative targets and 
binding rules.   
 
When it comes to the interaction between the national and the European agenda and 
the salience actors attach to the issues, there is crucial variance between the areas. 
This is induced by the overall crisis agenda, which strongly affects the national level. 
Governments consider immigration and border issues to be more important and 
dedicate more time and attention to these issues on the national and the European 
level. In the Schengen and Smart Borders case, the crisis led to a reinforced security 
agenda, which is why national actors pay comparatively more attention to the border 
policy area than the gender equality area, and insist more on security elements and 
rights protection. In the case of the Schengen reform, the sole reform of the 
evaluation mechanism was not considered a priority by member states, but rather the 
combination of the evaluation mechanism with border control made the issue 
attractive. The first Smart Borders package was not attractive to the Council when 
framed as a migration management tool. The second proposal which had a security 
angle was much more convincing. The gender equality measures were clearly not a 
primary concern for states, and the willingness to engage in negotiations decreased 
over time for member states when it became clear that there would be no progress. 
The Maternity Leave case was saved by the withdrawal and the Commission's 
decision to water down the new proposal and keep it at the lowest common 
denominator.   
 
National level factors, such as coalition and party politics, timing of national elections 
and public opinion have affected the policy-processes in all four cases. National 
elections and the need to circumvent populist pressure gave the impetus for the 
Schengen Governance Package recast in 2011 with key member states insisting on 
the internal border control element. Coalition and party politics seem to play an 
important role in all negotiations. The Schengen negotiations were influenced by the 
conservative quest to ensure reelection or maintain governing coalitions and respond 
to perceived threats of public opinion, Smart Borders is also marked by left-right 
cleavages and disagreements between coalition partners. The role of governing 
  
259 
 
coalitions is even more pronounced in the Maternity Leave and Gender Quota case, 
where actors uploaded a strong left-right cleavage and internal disagreements, again 
centering around the grand coalition in Germany, which was the source of the 
German reluctance to take a position.    
 
Alongside party politics controversies, public opinion has been mobilized as a 
justification for positions in all cases, by all institutions. The security element was 
instrumentalized by the Council in Schengen. The security as well as the data 
protection element were pitted against each other by the Council and the Parliament 
in the case of Smart Borders and the rights protection element was strongly 
advocated by the Commission and the Parliament in the cases of Maternity Leave 
and Gender Quota. 
 
In the Schengen case, delegates uploaded national political competition to exploit EU 
policy-making to distract from populist pressure at the national level. This was done 
in view of upcoming presidential elections in France in 2012, where Sarkozy 
unsuccessfully campaigned for reelection, upcoming Länder elections in Germany in 
2012, where the conservative parties needed a boost in key Länder like North-Rhine-
Westphalia and upcoming general elections in Spain in November 2011, with a 
similar support problem for the conservatives. Similarly, in the Smart Borders case, 
national actors uploaded concerns about public opinion and populist pressure: for 
example the reaction of national governments to pressure by the public over terror 
threats to avoid controversies at the national level. Also, delegates uploaded the left-
right cleavage over border control, establishing a preference for security versus 
protection of individual freedom and data protection concerns exploiting the 
uncertainty of the migration and terror crisis. 
  
In the case of Maternity Leave, delegates were uploading national views on labor 
market regulation and austerity, creating a particular cleavage between a preference 
for redistribution and worker protection versus preference for budgetary 
consolidation. Alongside that, states also uploaded the left-right cleavage over labor 
market regulation, between creating gender equality obligations for employers versus 
leaving employment regulation to social partners. In the Gender Quota case, the 
blocking states in the Council were successful in uploading two types of national 
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concerns and found sufficient support, especially by big states, to build a blockage. 
The first national controversy that was uploaded were diverging views on labor 
market regulation, preference for state intervention versus preference for company 
self-regulation.  
 
Positions can strongly vary over the course of a negotiation. Extreme positions make 
negotiations more difficult and can increase the likelihood of failure, but it depends on 
how willing actors are to accept compromise solutions and make concessions. The 
longer extreme preferences persist, the more likely deadlock becomes. Conflict 
constellations can also strongly vary. As actors change positions, conflicts can 
dissolve or shift. Success or failure of a negotiation depends on the ability to dissolve 
conflict. The more intense and durable, the more likely deadlock becomes.  Salience 
also varies over the course of a negotiation. Actors shift their attention if the context 
changes, therefore the effect of salience can go both ways. As the literature has 
established, it makes finding agreement easier, if actors value an issue or parts of an 
issue differently, but it is important that actors agree on an issue being important 
enough to devote attention to it.  
 
Using upcoming national elections or national populist pressure as a means to gain 
leverage in negotiations seems to be rather ineffective, if not counterproductive to 
enforce a position, especially if there is not broad support by other actors, who face 
similar pressures. Coalition politics are effective in creating and maintaining 
blockage, but do not necessarily lead to success in imposing a position. For this the 
strongest and most influential actors are needed, meaning the biggest states in the 
Council and the biggest groups in the Parliament.  Public opinion influence is difficult 
to isolate, since it is not entirely clear to what extent governments respond to existing 
trends in public opinion or create them, but public preference for security over 
perceived threats seems to matter, as all the related proposals have been adapted 
accordingly. 
 
With regard to the role of EU level factors, there are some interesting findings on the  
convergence or divergence of coalitions across institutions and the Parliament’s 
tendency to take extreme positions. Overall, we observe a tendency of the 
Parliament to take extreme positions on substance in the social policy area and on 
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procedure in the Justice and Home Affairs area. It shows more willingness to 
abandon extreme positions in the latter than in the former. We observe ideological 
convergence across institutions in the border policy area. The right wing in Council 
and Parliament strongly coincide in their positions, as do the left wing parties, 
coalitions for the right wing center around security and sovereignty, while the left wing 
centers around rights protection and an opposition to intergovernmentalism. In the 
Schengen, Smart Borders, Maternity Leave and Gender Quota cases, the statements 
by members of the right wing in either institutions strongly resemble each other, with 
the Parliament right wing showing more understanding of the Council’s preference for 
restrictive measures and limited intervention. The Parliament shows intra-institutional 
inconsistency, which make it easier for the Council to appeal to the right wing for 
compromise. 
 
Ideological coalitions travel across institutional borders, but do not necessarily 
produce either success or failure of a negotiation. These coalitions are more 
influential in Justice and Home Affairs issues than in Social and Employment issues. 
Extreme positions of the Parliament are quite common and in line with expectations 
about the spatial positioning of the institutions, yet the Parliament does not always 
pursue extreme positions when it would be expected to, especially in Justice and 
Home Affairs matters.  
 
7.2 Stages and institutional dynamics of failure  
 
The in-depth analysis of the four cases has shown that the process matters and 
breakdown can occur at different stages, depending on the behavior of key actors. In 
this section, the key stages will be shortly reviewed with regard to their importance for 
the occurrence of failure.  
 
In terms of agenda-setting and policy formulation, it can be observed that the 
Commission shows a willingness to adapt proposals, learn from failed position-taking 
attempts or  trilogue negotiations and incorporate, especially the Council’s demands 
in the Schengen, the Smart Borders and the Maternity Leave cases. In procedure as 
well as in substance, the Commission is more responsive to the Council. It changed 
to an intergovernmentalist procedure in the Schengen case, deleted most of the 
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rights-protection-oriented elements in the Smart Border scase, and watered down the 
Maternity Leave directive recast to a minimum.    
 
In matters of position-taking, we observe that the Council and the Parliament work 
better together informally in Justice and Home Affairs matters. Second round 
agreements are swifter, after the big issues have been settled in the first round and 
they are more willing to move closer together in the second round and after having 
successfully demonstrated that they make maximalist demands to please their 
constituencies in the first round.  Inside the institutions, Germany strongly dictates the 
game in the Council and the right wing dominates the committee work in all four 
cases in the Parliament. Timing and extreme positions are important at the position-
taking stage, the more extreme a position and the longer it is kept, the higher the 
likelihood of failure.  
 
As for trilogues and inter-institutional coordination, informal coordination is key, but it 
does not solve all the problems. In the Schengen case, it enabled the solving of the 
controversy in the second round, but in none of the case was it able to avoid first 
round failure. Informality is very important, however, in order for all institutions, to 
learn about the red lines and the requests for the recast, as well as to figure out 
where potential anchor points for textual, legal or political compromise might be 
found.   
 
7.3  Actor influence and relais actors  
 
Which actors play a key role in steering the process and how does their behavior 
affect the dynamics of success and failure? This section will contain a review of the 
key actors in the four cases.  
 
The European Council is an underestimated actor in the legislative process. It 
strongly influences and more actively intervenes in the agenda-setting and policy 
formulation processes. Pushes for agreement, gives clear technical and political 
instructions and sets clear deadlines, like in the Schengen and Smart Borders cases, 
or manifests disengagement, like in Maternity Leave and Gender Quota. It leaves 
less leeway for the Commission and reinforces national influence on the policy 
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process, which leads to more competition between the Commission and heads of 
state over the European policy agenda.    
     
The Council manifests an increase in intergovernmentalist behaviour in reaction to 
extension of co-decision and a desire to limit the influence of the Parliament and 
advocate more restrictive policy and less supranationalization. There is increased 
competition between Council and Parliament over substance, procedure and form of 
policy instruments, with the Council provoking deadlock and failure by stalling 
negotiations and insisting on extreme positions. In Schengen, Maternity Leave and 
Gender Quota, the Council is the institution that has forced the deadlock. Delegates 
are less compromising and more insistent on settling conflicts in favor of member 
state interests, which is clearly visible in all the evidence collected from member state 
delegates in all four cases.  
 
The Council Presidency as a relais actor displays ambiguous role behaviour across 
the different Presidencies and cases. Some Presidencies took on an independent 
broker role, like Poland, Cyprus and Ireland in the Schengen case, all of the 
Presidencies in the Smart Borders case, Belgium, Czech Republic, France, Poland, 
Spain, Denmark in the case of Maternity Leave and Cyprus, Lithuania, Greece, Italy, 
Luxembourg and Malta for Gender Quota. Others sided with a certain position or 
group, either openly opposing the policy proposal or not including the issue on the 
agenda, like Denmark for Schengen, Netherlands and Slovakia who sided with 
blocking minority, Sweden and Hungary who did not address the issue in the 
Maternity Leave case, and again the Netherlands, Slovakia and also Denmark, who 
sided with the blocking minority on Gender Quota, Ireland and Latvia did not push for 
the file on the agenda. 
  
Presidencies also show variation in contact and quality of relations with the 
Parliament actors: some Presidencies had good relations and extensive contact with 
the responsible rapporteur and committees. In the case of Schengen, it moved from 
bad relations with the Danish Presidency to compromise with Cyprus and Ireland. In 
the case of Maternity Leave, all Presidencies attested to bad relations with the 
rapporteur Estrela and better relations with rapporteur Arena. In the Smart Borders 
and Gender Quota case, there seems to be little decisive effect in that regard.   
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In the Parliament, we observe an oscillation between constructive pragmatism and 
supranationalist activism. Ultimately, behavior depends on the conflict dimensions 
and the overall stakes involved in the file, if they are procedural, and the Parliament 
is likely to gain influence, it will adapt its behavior in a way that is conducive to 
agreement, as the Schengen and Smart Borders case show. If the stakes are 
substantive in nature, the Parliament can insist on its extreme position by claiming to 
fight for an upgrade in standards for citizens. This is clearly visible in the case of 
Gender Quota, and also the first round of Maternity Leave.   
 
Rapporteurs have the greatest influence inside the committee, because they have 
privileged access to information and are in a position of power as they are in charge 
of reports. They have to strike a balance between not compromising the EP’s 
influence on the one hand and conceding enough to the Council to be able to get an 
agreement, as the Schengen rapporteur and the Smart Borders rapporteur have 
perfectly done. Most of the informal work is done in committees. Committees have 
strategic influence on the Parliament’s position on each issue and have quite a large 
discretion in terms of determining its position for the trilogue, which makes them 
drivers or brakemen of compromise from the Parliament side. In the Maternity Leave 
case, rather than attempting a broad compromise that incorporates the views of the 
right wing, the rapporteur relied on a narrow left-wing majority, which was unlikely to 
find support in the Council.   
 
In the LIBE committee, solving disagreements in the committee depends on how 
divided the committee is internally and how trusted the rapporteur is. On Schengen, 
EPP rapporteur Coelho was trusted by the left and right to defend the Parliament’s 
interest. On Smart Borders, EPP rapporteur Diaz de Mera recommended a balanced 
position between security and data protection safeguards, because there was little 
leeway for battles with the Council.  The issue is much more complicated in the social 
and employment area, where several committees are responsible for gender equality, 
concretely the FEMM, JURI and EMPL committees. The division of labor between the 
three committees can lead to disagreements over how to approach a proposal. In the 
case of Maternity Leave, the rapporteur from the FEMM committee, Edite Estrela, 
lobbied the EMPL and JURI committee to take an extensive position in terms of 
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duration and level of pay and was successful in rallying a left-liberal majority in the 
committee and the plenary, leading to failure. In the Gender Quota case, the 
committees, were more prudent, and the co-rapporteurs from the EPP and S&D 
recommended adopting the position of the Commission instead of going beyond it.  
 
A well-connected rapporteur with a sense for how far interests can be pushed and 
when a compromising position should be adopted, can facilitate agreement with the 
Council, as the Schengen and Smart Borders case show. Disagreements within or 
between responsible committees hinder this process and can lead to extreme 
positions in the Parliament that in turn increases the likelihood of failure, which has 
been a crucial factor in bringing about failure in the Maternity Leave and Gender 
Quota case.  
 
All four cases show that the Commission clearly is less and less an honest broker 
and more a strategic player and an activist, advocating its own agenda and willing to 
risk immediate failure to achieve mid- or long-term integration progress. Proposals 
are more failure-prone. If they do not provide a middle-ground between Council and 
Parliament and the Commission is less trusted as a broker, Council and Parliament 
rely on other relais actors for conflict management.   
 
Commissioner influence is important in directing the drafting process of the initial 
proposal: if the Commissioner promotes a particular agenda or defends a particular 
position rather than looking for what could be an acceptable compromise for Council 
and Parliament, it can increase the risk of deadlock, as the Gender Quota case 
perfectly illustrates. In the case of Schengen, Commissioner Malmström supported a 
redraft with a legal base change in favor of co-decision, which subsequently led to 
the controversy between Council and Parliament in the second round and almost to 
another failure situation. Also, on Smart Borders, Commissioner Malmström 
advocated a rights agenda and limited any security elements to a minimum while 
Commissioner Avramopoulos was more in favor of security elements. In both the 
Maternity Leave and Gender Quota cases,  Commissioner Reding promoted a strong 
rights agenda.  
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Legal services can enable compromises through strategic changes to the proposal 
that reflect a compromise. In the case of Schengen, together with the rapporteur and 
the delegations from Luxembourg and Portugal, the legal service drafted a 
compromise that included a passerelle clause to link the decision-making procedures 
of the Schengen Borders Code with those of the Schengen Evaluation Mechanism. 
In Smart Borders, Maternity Leave and Gender Quota, the legal service proposed 
flexibility provisions to enable a compromise in the Council. The contributions by the 
legal service can provide grounds for compromise, but do not necessarily lead to 
one, in Schengen, the solution was acceptable to both a Council and a Parliament 
majority. On Smart Borders and Maternity Leave the second round compromise 
proposals were also acceptable, but in Gender Quota, so far, the flexibility clause has 
not rallied a majority.  
 
7.4 Conditions and mechanisms of failure: key findings   
 
In this section, the key conditions and mechanisms, which can tip a process towards 
success or failure are reviewed, comparing insights from all four cases. A table for 
each summarizes the key findings.  
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(table 17, general evaluation of conditions, source: own illustration) 
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(table 18, general evaluation of mechanisms, source: own illustration) 
 
In the remaining part of the section, the conditions and mechanisms are evaluated in 
detail, drawing on insights from the cases.  
 
Voting rules matter for the process, because they enable blocking strategies, such as 
blocking minorities, which have been the key strategy in the Council in both the 
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Maternity Leave and Gender Quota cases. Qualified majority voting in the co-
decision setting benefits bigger states and disadvantages smaller states and 
weakens the consensus-drive. Bigger states can decide to outvote or even disregard 
smaller states and have better strategic opportunities for blockage. Due to QMV, 
bigger states have become even more pivotal as actors in the Council and smaller 
states are even more disadvantaged. However, bigger states also need coalitions 
with other big states or many smaller ones or they can also be isolated, if their 
position is not supported, as the French and Italian were in Schengen and the French 
again in Smart Borders. The evidence shows in all cases that Germany is the sole 
and clear winner, as its position is always considered, even if it is extreme, they 
receive concessions and are not outvoted.  
 
Crises can be used as a window of opportunity. If the proposed policy solution 
corresponds to the perceived problem, a crisis can provide an opportunity for policy 
change, which is the case for Schengen and the second round of Smart Borders. If 
the proposed policy clashes with the perceived problems, a crisis can encourage 
failure. This is evident in the Maternity Leave and Gender Quota, as well as the first 
round of the Smart Borders cases.  
 
Timing is crucial when considering the actor’s ability to strike a compromise when 
preferences are sufficiently overlapping or when actors are willing to engage in 
negotiations to figure out compromises and the attention of actors is sufficiently 
focused on the issue. If actors pay attention to time constraints on attention and 
willingness to invest resources in negotiating a compromise, as Schengen clearly 
shows timing can help achieve agreement, even when preferences are initially very 
conflicted. If however actors remain on extreme positions for too long, the momentum 
for agreement will pass and even a preference change or compromise proposal will 
not lead to a restart of negotiations for an agreement, which was the case for 
Maternity Leave and Gender Quota. In this context, salience can be an enabler. The 
more attention an issue gets by the public, the more attention policy-makers have to 
devote to solving conflict. This is due to the fact that the more important an issue is to 
the domestic population, the more likely it is that policy-makers devote themselves to 
finding solutions, since the costs of failure, involving blame and potential electoral 
repercussions, become quite high. This dynamic could be observed for Schengen 
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and Smart Borders in the second round but salience only works as an enabler in 
combination with timing regardless of preference divergence. If actors miss out on 
the right time to conclude a negotiation, it is likely to end up in deadlock, regardless 
of preference constellations, because the focus shifts to other issues and it is difficult 
to get actors to devote the necessary attention and resources to the negotiation, as 
the first round of Maternity Leave shows. 
 
How actors deal with uncertainty and information distribution is important, but 
possessing sufficient information about the positions of others is not sufficient to bring 
about success or failure, since positions can change. It is however very important to 
frame positions and perceptions in a way that appeals to the other actors in order to 
legitimize a position, point out common ground and have sufficient information about 
potential coalition partners.   
 
Informal contacts prove to be a necessary condition for actors to build coalitions, 
either to support or block a proposal or to exchange information about preferences 
and positions without compromising potential coalitions. A level of secrecy is required 
in the first place, in the institutions and also in the trilogues to propose ideas. All 
types of actors, in all institutions use informality to defend their own interests and 
agenda on the one side and tread the ground for potential partners. Relais actors use 
informality to figure out potential avenues for compromise. However, informality is not 
a way to forego failure, issues can fail regardless of whether there have been 
informal contacts, what matters much more is the way positions are framed and 
perceived and how successful actors are in pushing the issue through the key 
channels to each institution, to the Commission for drafting and to the respective 
other co-legislator for trilogues.  
 
Interpersonal relations and networks are very important in the way actors can make 
use of informality. Trust helps build these networks and make informal channels 
available, as trust works as an enabler of compromise across institutions if this trust 
is shared across institutional borders, otherwise there might be agreement within one 
institution, but not between the institutions. If trust is non-existent or broken in the 
process, a negotiation can be compromised. This particularly applies to relais actors. 
Bigger states have better influence on all levels in the Council, as bigger 
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administrations  and those with more resources can build greater networks and have 
better abilities to mobilize, this works in particular for bigger state and richer state 
representations who can afford bigger administrations. They are therefore better able 
to make their positions count.  
 
The Schengen case is the perfect example for how trust, networks and information 
availability in combination with knowledge about how to build a sufficient supporting 
coalition helped overcome the controversy over procedure.  
 
Flexibility, stubbornness and personal ambition are particularly important for those 
singular actors who can steer the process, relais actors and especially the 
Commissioner or Commission officials during the drafting process, since they lay the 
groundwork with the draft proposal, if they depart from the potential area of 
compromise an actor’s ambition can compromise negotiations. In the cases of 
Maternity Leave and Gender Quota, the rapporteur and the Commissioner pursued a 
personal agenda and proved unrelenting when facing opposition by the Council.    
 
In this case, actor change can function as a window of opportunity, actor change 
either as a replacement of an actor by another or the exclusion of an actor from the 
process. Replacing a contested actor can unblock negotiations if the co-legislators 
both approve of the replacement or exclusion, which was the case for the Smart 
Borders rapporteurs and the Commission representative in Schengen. Replacing a 
contested actor can cause deadlock if either of the co-legislators does not approve of 
the replacement or exclusion or does not consider it a trustworthy move towards 
compromise, as it was the case in Maternity Leave.  
 
By referring to an (individual or collective) actor’s most and least contested elements 
of a proposal or package to offer alliances and compromises, variance in salience 
and sensitivity to issues is exploited. For example by focusing on procedure when 
substance is contentious to enable a compromise. If quantitative targets, rules or 
regulations are contested, offering changes to the decision-making or implementation 
procedure or the legal base can enable compromise, like the Presidency has tried to 
do in the Maternity Leave case. Offering discretion in terms of how to interpret 
deadlines, targets or process requirements to make a substantive requirement 
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acceptable, like in the Schengen and Smart Borders caes with the decision-making 
rules and the provisions on law enforcement access. On the contrary, offering 
concessions on substance when procedure is highly contested can enable 
compromise by offering or relinquishing targets or other substantive provisions to 
make a procedural request acceptable. This mechanism works as a remedy for 
deadlock, if there is sufficient support for the issue-linkage proposed, because the 
benefits of having the agreement are higher than the concessions that have to be 
made to enable the compromise. As a result gains can be material or reputational. 
 
Coalition-building is important. Under co-decision and QMV member states in the 
Council and groups in the Parliament search for coalition partners. Both majority and 
blocking minority positions require support, so naturally the incentive is there. Within 
the Council, coalitions based on ideological proximity are important, but less 
important than coalitions based on economic performance, population size/voting 
weight of the country or influence. Everyone looks towards the big ones, France and 
Germany, as well as the older ones with lots of experience and influence, BENELUX, 
and the newer allies of the big ones, such as Poland and Austria. These coalitions 
extend to the Parliament, where the right wings often look to each other in trilogues. 
In the Parliament, which ideological coalition is more likely depends on how 
successful the rapporteur is in pushing for a particular position in the respective 
committees and which way the pivotal group ALDE is leaning. In the Schengen and 
Smart Borders case, a right wing coalition dominated, in Maternity Leave a narrow 
left wing coalition dominated in the first round and in the Gender Quota case, the 
right wing is also currently dominating.  
7.5 Framing failure: reputational gains and losses compared   
 
Actors frame positions and choices they make in the negotiation process and frame 
the gains and losses, which resulted from it. Failure largely depends on how actors 
make use of the structural conditions and the opportunities provided by the 
constellations, the context and the dynamics. In this section, the key frames in 
important dimensions of the process of failure will be reviewed and evaluated.  
 
The dominant conflict frames that emerged from the analysis center around three 
dimensions are: (1) Legal/technical (relating to legal basis/feasibility/hard or soft law), 
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(2) Political (concerning party ideology and sovereignty versus supranational 
integration) and (3) Economic (relating to cleavages about redistribution and market 
regulation)  
 
Legal and technical conflicts (1) have manifested in debates about the legal basis 
linked to quarrels about role of supranational institutions, with the Commission and 
the Parliament pushing for more procedural influence, for example in the Schengen 
and Smart borders case. There are also disagreements about the degree of 
supranational integration, with member states raising subsidiarity and proportionality 
concerns in the cases of Schengen, Maternity Leave and Gender Quota.  
 
Actors mobilize ideological cleavages about the role of the EU and its right to 
interfere in member state competences and existing institutional quarrels between 
the EU, such as the role and influence of the Commission and the Parliament in 
former matters of national sovereignty, with Justice and Home Affairs and Social and 
Employment Policy being key areas, connected to the sovereignty of the territory and 
the control over the welfare state and the labor market. Common frames included 
questioning the right to propose policy, advocating a restriction of involvement and/or 
the extension of influence in decision-making processes and implementation.  
 
In terms of political conflicts (2), actors mobilize well-known cleavages in the post-
crisis context, and we can observe a preference for security frames and less room for 
pro-integration, pro-data protection and pro-rights frames in the Council. The Council 
majority mobilizes security concerns and sovereignty concerns in Justice and Home 
Affairs matters and focuses on keeping the Commission out of national labor markets 
to avoid further supranationalization of competences, which does not resonate with 
the situation in national constituencies in the face of populist pressure.  
 
The Parliament is generally more divided and has better chances of agreement with 
the Council if the EPP group sets the tone in the committees, as its perception and 
framing of issues and conflict lines is closer to Council. If the Council internally has a 
clear position, like in the case of Schengen and Smart Borders, it helps the 
Parliament if it can overcome internal divisions to leave the negotiations to the 
majority that overlaps with the Council’s. If the Parliament, however, mobilizes 
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internal divisions and goes against the dominant frames in the Council failure occurs, 
for example advocating for integration and a social rights agenda where the Council 
is clearly concerned with national competence preservation and avoiding any impact 
on national labor markets, as is the case in Maternity Leave and Gender Quota or 
requesting data protection and the defense of free movement, when the Council is 
focused on security and fortress Europe, as was the case in the first round of the 
Smart Borders case.  
 
Similarly, in terms of economic cleavages (3), the Council is more likely to focus on 
cost implications of integration, and show less willingness to support a proposal if it 
implies high costs for the EU budget and national budgets, whereas the Parliament 
mobilizes social union frames and advocates inequality as a result of the member 
states focusing too much on budget concerns and too little on citizens. Debates 
about feasibility are often linked to cost-benefit concerns in the Council. Actors 
mobilize concerns about financial or infrastructural implications of required changes 
in national legal and political systems. The Parliament counters mostly with rights-
based frames and advocates the need to compensate citizens through European 
policy for the lack of action by national governments.  
 
Context and agenda are also used for framing positions and reinforcing conflict lines. 
Actors mobilize crises to frame a policy change as a response to a crisis. 
  
A crisis can be a window of opportunity for policy change, if the proposed policy 
corresponds to the perceived problems, especially for the Council. The migration and 
security crisis worked as a source of failure in the first round and as an enabler in the 
second, because the Commission framed the second round proposals as a response 
to the perceived threats, as it had not been incorporated the pressure by the new 
security agenda in the first round. In the case of Schengen, the second round linkage 
of the proposal on the Schengen Evaluation Mechanism with a measure to 
reintroduce border control at internal borders corresponded to the member states’ 
demands for more security and more control. In the case of Smart Borders, there was 
a preference to have a security system, rather than a migration management tool, 
and the reframing made it easier for the Council to accept the financial and 
implementation costs. The economic and financial crisis only worked as a blockage, 
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as the Commission did not incorporate member states’ agenda on avoiding any 
unnecessary costs for national budgets and any disproportionate regulatory and 
distributive impact on national labor markets in the aftermath of the crisis. Both the 
first Maternity Leave and the Gender Quota proposal were framed in a way that led 
member states to believe that the constraints and costs on companies and national 
budgets outweigh the reputational benefits for governments. 
 
How do actors frame blame attribution and blame avoidance? The comparison of the 
four cases shows that there is a common theme for each institution for both failure 
and success. 
 
Actors frame failure in with a straightforward double agenda: draw a picture of 
themselves that is in line with the expectations of their constituents to which they are 
accountable, while putting as much blame on the other institutions, as is possible, 
without compromising the possibility to strike a deal later on. The Commission is the 
strategic broker at the center of it:  
 
“No, I think they are pretty good at being in-between, they have to take a little bit of the 
EP in. They want to get the proposal through, so they have to give the Council 
something and they have to give the EP something, so they have to be somewhere in-
between, and when they negotiate with us, they throw the EP at us and when they 
negotiate with the EP they throw the Council at them, so they are playing a double 
game. Of course that is their game, that is how it needs to be done, they come to us and 
say that the EP has a strong position on this issue and we have to give them something 
or there won’t be a compromise and then they go back to the EP and tell them that the 
Council has offered this and it’s the last offer so they have to take it. that’s how they do 
it and they are quite good at it. That’s how we get all these very difficult compromises 
through.”387 
 
The Commission highlights European problem-solving, finding European solutions for 
shared problems, and practices blame avoidance by claiming to be an honest broker 
attributing blame for failure to the co-legislators extreme demands in the process.  
 
The Commission plays a double-faced game and strategically maneuvers between 
the co-legislators and places proposals in a way that allows for a blaming game that 
focuses on the two co-legislators. The Council will have to take the blame for 
                                                          
387 Interview 50  
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deadlock or failure based on positions that are perceived extreme, restrictive, 
conservative, intergovernmentalist by the Parliament. The Parliament will have to 
take the blame for deadlock or failure based on positions that are perceived extreme, 
supranationalist or activist or unpragmatic, irrespective of Treaty rules on procedure 
and subsidiarity. The Commission thereby portrays itself as the constructive honest 
broker that mediates between the two extremes to find a compromise and improve 
the proposal. It highlights any attempt at providing legal counsel and explaining the 
provisions of the initial draft, giving political guidance to the Council Presidency and 
rapporteur on how to approach the other institution. Lastly it provides technical 
expertise, on costs, feasibility and impact via impact assessments, studies and 
consultation reports.  
 
The Council focuses on supranational activism as a theme for blame attribution to the 
Parliament and the Commission for deadlock and failure and refers to pragmatism 
and realism to avoid blame. The Council blames failure on the Parliament for keeping 
and publicly promoting an extreme position and showing persistent unwillingness to 
abandon excessive demands and adopt a pragmatic approach. The Council argues 
that if the Parliament has an interest in adoption, it has to concede to Council 
demands by framing it as a compromise. The Council also shifts responsibility for 
failure to the Commission because it is at the origin of the proposal and thus 
responsible for its outcome and the Council also criticizes its leniency with the 
Parliament’s excessive demands. It argues that if the Commission has an interest in 
adoption, it has to concede to Council demands by framing it as being a mediator 
and honest broker.  
 
The Parliament mainly focuses on attributing blame to the Council while claiming that 
the Council is compromising its defense of European citizens and the European 
project with its intergovernnmentalist behavior. It uses the same strategy for blame 
avoidance by claiming to act out of concern for democratic legitimacy and citizen 
rights. The Parliament blames the Council for keeping intergovernmentalist positions 
and isolating itself from the supranational institutions and the Commission for not 
pushing enough to force the Council to abandon extreme positions. Failure is the 
result of the Council’s stubborn insistence on sovereignty where a European solution 
would be politically necessary or pragmatically needed to solve the problem. With 
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regard to failure in the process, the Parliament also blames the Council’s persistence 
to keep the upper hand and its unwillingness to accept concessions that would be 
necessary to get an agreement and the Commission for not initiating a compromise 
process by forcing the Council to engage in negotiations. The Commission is overall 
criticized for not being engaged enough in the process to push the Council.  
 
Success and gains achieved or losses endured in the process are framed in a very 
similar manner.  
 
The Commission portrays itself as a successful policy initiator, a mediator and a 
defender of the European project. It highlights its achievements in being a facilitator 
of agreement between Council and Parliament alongside fulfilling its role as the 
guardian of the Treaty in pushing for policy integration to provide solutions for 
problems. Its desire for competence increase for supranational institutions is framed 
as a means to achieve democratic legitimacy and representation of citizen interests. 
The Commission blames any losses it had to accept in terms of procedure or 
substance on the need to balance between Council and Parliament: reneging on 
competences or policy elements as a concession to the co-legislators  
 
The Council poses as the pragmatist and realist in legislative negotiations and always 
insists that in every instance it was open to accepting concessions in competence 
and policy substance matters to further European integration. It insists on a goodwill 
relation to the Parliament, where the Council is the benevolent actor accepting to 
include demands that are often unpragmatic in order to get a common solution to a 
shared problem. It also emphasizes the goodwill relation to the Commission, where 
the Council accepts solutions that are not ideal to show that it is supportive of 
European integration. The Council blames losses on its obligation to give 
concessions to the Parliament in order to each an agreement and the Commission’s 
leniency towards the Parliament.  
 
The Parliament portrays itself as the defender of citizens and the democratic 
legitimacy of the European project. In procedural matters, it argues that by fighting for 
procedural influence, it becomes the provider of a counterbalance to member state 
intergovernmentalism. In substantive matters, the insistence on upgrades in policy 
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standards is framed as part of the Parliament’s obligation to be the provider of 
representation to citizens for the protection of their rights. The Parliament blames any 
losses on concessions it had to make to the Council to get an agreement and the 
Commission’s leniency towards the Council. It portrays losses as a necessary evil to 
achieve more policy integration and a greater transfer of competences.  
VIII. Lessons learned: discussion of findings and implications for policy 
research  
 
Which conclusions can be drawn from the analysis with regard to how negotiations 
end up either in failure, deadlock or agreement? What do the findings imply for the 
understanding of policy-making dynamics and what do they tell us about failure? The 
last chapter will evaluate the contribution made, show awareness of the limitations of 
the present study and point to further avenues of policy research. The central 
argument and final conclusion about the theoretical models presented and the 
empirical evidence is provided is both optimistic and cautious. There is evidence for 
the EU institutions using failure strategically, but four cases are not sufficient to allow 
for final conclusions and methodologically, there is room for improvement in process 
research on EU policy-making.  
8.1 Internal validity: how much failure can the approach explain?  
 
The difference between success and failure seems to be Commission and Council 
centric. Commission behavior matters in agenda-setting and in the process of 
negotiations. The Commission can be strategic and ambitious, but it cannot be 
activist, if the proposal is supposed to go through, even after first-instance failure. 
Council preferences and behavior are key at all stages, as the Council still very much 
dictates whether a proposal is set for success or failure. If member states are set 
against a proposal and remain unrelenting throughout the negotiation process, it is 
unlikely to be adopted. Council preferences are more important for the success or 
failure of policy negotiations than Parliament. A proposal can pass with few 
concessions to the Parliament, but it cannot pass without important concessions to 
the Council.  
 
The Council rejecting or recommending withdrawal or stalling the negotiations most 
often induces failure. If the Parliament does not agree with a proposal, deadlock is 
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possible, but is unlikely that it will fail entirely, as the Council will invest in pushing for 
agreement  
 
The agenda-setting and policy formulation stage is crucial in the process of failure 
and the Commission plays a key role. The issue has to be salient enough to the 
Council in order to encourage state representatives to invest in an agreement. There  
also has to be a window of opportunity for actors to perceive that there is a common 
problem to which the proposed policy can provide a solution. The Council has to be 
sufficiently favorable to the proposed policy change to invest in building a supporting 
majority, if the issue only appeals to a small minority or is opposed by a sufficiently 
large minority, durable blockage is likely and the Commission and/or Parliament are 
unlikely to be able to convince the Council to agree to the proposal. An issue has the 
most success, if the Commission and the Parliament can connect it to those agenda 
points that are most important to state actors. The Commission has to strike a good 
and credible balance between pursuing an pro-integration agenda and responding to 
co-legislator preferences, in substance and scope especially with the Council and the 
procedure of the Parliament.  
 
Salience to national actors and windows of opportunity matter, because national 
government preferences and political dynamics in the domestic constituencies are 
crucial. They are even more important as conditions than the leanings of the 
Parliament. Government agenda, national party politics and public opinion 
tendencies are more important than party politics in the Parliament in the sense that it 
has a greater impact on legislative dynamics if the Commission disregards 
government.   
 
Overall, the Council is most concerned with protecting sovereignty and avoiding 
excessive upgrading of policy standards. If these red lines are respected the Council 
is likely to agree to policy change. On the other hand, failure is likely if the demands 
of the Parliament or the Commission are excessive in these areas. The Council 
appears to be more willing to make concessions in areas where it has more long-
standing negotiation experience, even to expansive Parliament demands, than in 
areas where integration has not progressed very far and there is limited co-decision 
experience.  
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The Parliament is mostly concerned with safeguarding or extending its influence in 
Justice and Home Affairs, and with upgrading standards in Social and Employment 
Policy. However, while it has learned to play the bargaining game sufficiently well in 
Justice and Home Affairs matters, failure in the Social and Employment area is most 
often blamed on excessive demands by the Parliament, regularly linked to the 
Commission’s attempt to supranationalize in a collective blame attribution to 
supranational institutions.  
 
In the Schengen case, a crucial set of actors in the Council preferred a distinct 
security framework for the border control and evaluation mechanism reform and 
insisted on intergovernmentalism as the basis for the policy instrument. The first 
Commission proposal did not include the security-element of extended internal 
border control and was proposed in the co-decision instead of the intergovernmental 
framework, whereas the second proposal contained the security element and the 
Commission included the desired change from co-decision to intergovernmentalism. 
In the Smart Borders case, the majority of state representatives in the Council 
preferred an external border management system geared towards border protection 
and law enforcement. In the Maternity Leave case, national governments preferred to 
keep the upgrading of standards to an absolute minimum, which is why the original 
Commission proposal and the Parliament position were unacceptable.  However, the 
recast with the lowest common denominator standards is receiving more support. 
The Gender Quota case is similar, a sufficiently large set of government 
representatives preferred low standards and non-binding solutions. 
 
The co-legislator preferences can matter tremendously, if either of the actors persists 
with a position that is too far away from the other, or decides to block altogether by 
not taking a position. Taking and keeping extreme positions for too long or pursuing a 
position that is perceived as too extreme by the partner can result in a loss of 
credibility and compromise the strategic game leading to more losses in procedure 
and substance. The Parliament kept the extreme position on substantive elements for 
a long time in the Maternity Leave case, leading the Council to block negotiations 
and refuse unblocking even after the Parliament signaled willingness to compromise. 
The Council kept the extreme position on procedural matters for a long time in the 
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Schengen case, which prompted the Parliament to provoke a deadlock of the 
negotiations. Position changes, changes in actors, inclusion and exclusion of actors, 
shifting of negotiations to different groups of actors and/or levels in institutions have 
an important effect, but they can either induce success (if blocking actors are 
removed or convinced to change their positions) or failure (if blocking actors are 
added or more actors adopt blocking positions). The rapporteur in the Maternity 
Leave case was replaced leading to a position change in the Parliament from 
extreme to compromising. In the Schengen case, the deadlocked negotiations were 
shifted to a restricted and small group of selected Parliament and Council actors to 
unblock them and a Commission representative, which was not considered 
trustworthy and competent, was replaced from the first to the second round. In the 
Gender Quota case, several actors in the Council changed their position from 
opposing the proposal to supporting it without however unblocking it. In the Smart 
Borders case a conservative rapporteur replaces the socialist rapporteur. This led to 
the Parliament being more open to including security elements. However, the more 
vocal and ferocious the framing, the more difficult to revoke a position and turn 
deadlock into an agreement without failure. This is true for all three institutions, as 
three of the cases have shown.  
 
Credibility of and trust in relais actors and their networks matter for co all three 
institutions, but particularly for co-legislator dynamics. The Council considered that 
the Parliament rapporteur had lost credibility in the Maternity Leave case, because 
she held onto the extreme position for too long. In the Smart Borders case, the EPP 
rapporteur was more trusted and had a better network in the Council than the S&D 
rapporteur. In the Schengen case, the credibility of and trust in the rapporteur and his 
team, an agreement could be reached after deadlock in the second round. In the 
Schengen, Smart Borders and Maternity Leave case, influence of relais actors before 
withdrawal and recast was either limited or conducive to failure, in the Gender Quota 
case, neither the Council Presidencies nor the Parliament rapporteur could dissolve 
deadlock. Nonetheless, the Schengen and Smart Borders case indicate, that there is 
a difference in influence, when it comes to disagreements between Council and 
Parliament: relais actors have limited influence if the Council takes issue with a 
proposal, but they can work towards unblocking deadlock, if the Parliament has 
fundamental issues with a proposal.  
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It can be said that the three institutions all perform well in the blame game, but taking 
both the actual procedural, substantive and reputational gains and losses altogether, 
the Council wins the most. The Council is successful in moving the policy proposal 
closer to its preferences in the second and following rounds, as the comparison of the 
legislative texts and negotiation documents show for all four cases. Regardless of 
whether the proposal was withdrawn or not, the negotiation process resulted in a 
watering down of the Commission proposal on the most controversial aspects. Even 
where the Parliament seemingly achieves gains, like the procedural issue linkage in 
the Schengen case, the Council actually dominates the negotiation. This was also 
the case for the Schengen reform, as the legal base remained as the Council 
desired. The Parliament is successful in achieving procedural gains if it is willing to 
yield in matters of policy substance. Its main gains remain reputational, it can very 
successfully place blame on Council and Commission for proposals failing and for 
final outcomes being lowest common denominator upgrades or even downgrades. 
The Commission is quite successful at the strategic game, as it gets policy change in 
areas and on issues where national governments are reluctant to accept interference, 
if it is willing to yield in substance to the Council and procedure to the Parliament. 
Even if it does not gain in substance or procedure, it tries to gain in reputation by 
blaming the co-legislators for failing to reach an agreement.  
 
The negotiations lead to success if all actors play their part and the necessary 
conditions for actor influence are given: most importantly, the Council needs to be in 
favor of policy change, if there is no will of governments to engage in negotiations on 
the issue, because they prefer the status quo, deadlock is most likely. Additionally, 
compromising positions need to be adopted throughout the process to replace initial 
controversial ones. This is especially true for the Parliament, as the Council will 
continue to prefer deadlock and failure over investing in further negotiations if the 
Parliament is not willing to give up an extreme position. The Commission can pursue 
a strategic agenda to a certain extent, but it has to eventually move from an 
ambitious to a realistic position, that is acceptable to the co-legislators, and perform 
the role of an honest broker. Informal channels for influence of relais actors are given 
and relais possess the expertise and trust to be able to use them.  
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The negotiations lead to failure if key actors dissent and/or the necessary conditions 
are not present: if the Council prefers the status quo, there is little room for maneuver 
for the Commission and the Parliament. The Commission keeping an ambitious 
proposal or behaving like a strategic activist throughout the agenda-setting and the 
negotiation phase makes deadlock very likely, similarly the Parliament maintaining an 
extreme position will increase the likelihood of failure. If informal channels are absent 
or remain unused by relais actors, because they are unwilling or unable to, due to 
lack of expertise, networks or trust, it also increases the chances of negotiation 
breakdown also increase.  
 
(Figure 12, paths to success and failure, source: own illustration) 
 
The following causes of failure in the process could be observed from the cases:  
 
Firstly (1) there is failure due to disagreement on substance. Factors that have 
emerged in the analysis include costs, quantitative targets and feasibility problems of 
a technical and legal nature. Failure depends on whether institutions abandon initially 
extreme positions on quantitative targets and related elements of policy design. If the 
extreme position is not abandoned, or not abandoned in a timely manner, the 
negotiation ends in failure.  If the legislative institutions disagree on the technical, 
legal or financial feasibility of the policy project, success depends on whether 
solutions can be found to improve feasibility, change the scope and the technical 
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details or allow for sufficient flexibility to compensate for the shortcomings. If this is 
not possible based on the proposal, it will fail, as the costs of negotiating are higher 
than the expected benefits from the proposal.  
 
Secondly (2), there is failure due to disagreement on procedure, such as legal base 
and decision-making rules. If the legislative institutions disagree on the appropriate 
legal base and/or decision-making procedure for a negotiation process, failure can be 
avoided. If a compromise can be found that satisfies the institutions, compromise 
solutions can include issue linkage, implementation flexibility and passerelle clauses. 
 
Thirdly (3), we observe failure due to sovereignty reasons, where the legislative 
institutions, in all cases analyzed the Council, can voice objections and reservations 
based on proportionality and subsidiarity concerns. This is usually due to internal 
coalition politics in the different member states. Mechanisms of avoiding failure can 
be a change from hard to soft law, flexibility in implementation and passerelle 
clauses. 
8.2 External validity: a generalizable approach to explaining policy failure?  
  
A cursory look through the EU’s policy registry of failed legislative proposals388 shows  
indicators, if only formal for the time being, that the strategic maneuvering extends to 
other cases. The formal indicator of several rounds of negotiations, including failure 
and withdrawal or rejection, followed by a recast and ultimately agreement, appears 
in quite a few other instances in other policy areas as well. Table 19 (see below) 
summarizes all potential cases that might correspond to the strategic failure model 
proposed initially and that largely fit the case selection criteria.  
To investigate whether the proposed process models of failure are applicable, a 
process analysis would have to be conducted on those cases as well, as only a look 
into the negotiation process, the strategic mechanisms and the informal dynamics 
between actors during negotiations. Strategic elements are difficult to detect without 
looking directly at the process and engaging with the actors involved. To verify the 
causal mechanisms and models proposed extend to other cases, it might be worth 
looking at all co-decision cases that have been withdrawn for contentiousness. On 
                                                          
388 European Commission Website with Work Programmes that include the list of withdrawals per year from 2007 
to 2018: https://ec.europa.eu/info/publications/european-commission-work-programme 
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pre-Lisbon cases, where actors are no longer available for interviews to assess the 
informal dynamics and the blame attribution, archival research would be used to 
provide as much information about the process, as possible. On more recent cases, 
the same type of data can be used, perhaps even including some form of participant 
observation (participating in trilogues, in Council meetings as part of a state 
delegation, in Commission policy drafting processes as part of the policy unit, in 
Parliament committee meetings as an assistant etc.) to increase the depth of 
information about the informal dynamics. It is also conceivable that instead, the focus 
is shifted from the informal elements to depend more on the formal factors measuring 
those conditions and mechanisms that can be inferred from documents and media 
reports (frequency of interactions, amount of documents, etc.). This of course 
reduces the density and richness of the data, as it can inflate certain elements, which 
might not have been of particular strategic importance or influence in the process. 
For example there might be many documents released, but Council documents, for 
example, often contain repetitions, revisions or corrections by the Council Secretariat 
General of misspellings or other formatting mistakes, without contributing any 
valuable information to the decision-making process. Also, actor influence in the 
process is difficult to measure based on document data. Measures of influence would 
be reduced to factors like involvement (participation in meetings, number of 
statements, etc.) and substantive influence (number of amendments, success in 
pushing amendments reflected in the final legislation), which can be inferred through 
standard content analysis. Still, the problem remains that for most outcome-centered 
and quantitative measures, observing failure as an outcome and explaining it can be 
difficult. As regards generalizability, it is obviously too early and too risky to draw 
general conclusions about mechanisms and conditions of success and failure, 
especially since dynamics can prove to be very case-specific and vary even within 
policy-areas according to issues (Bennett and Checkel, 2014). To be able to draw 
more general conclusions, it would be necessary to collect data on more cases and 
include more policy areas and trace the negotiation process from the beginning, 
before proceeding to a systematic comparison to single out key conditions and 
mechanisms. Conditions and actor typologies depicted and modeled in this thesis 
could be tested using more case studies in the first place to see if the mechanisms 
found here can potentially apply to a larger set of cases, from different issue areas 
and policy areas and in different contexts. Once a sufficiently large number of cases 
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have been researched, qualitative comparative analysis can be used to detect 
conditions as well as generalizable patterns for actors and strategies. Qualitative 
comparative analysis would the able to show which conditions and mechanisms are 
necessary and which are sufficient to account for failure.  
 
 
 
(table 19, external validity, source: own illustration) 
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8.3 Implications for policy research: theoretical limitations and prospects 
 
Regarding the initial theoretical proposal that failure is part of a strategic game of 
multiple rounds, it is difficult to confirm or dismiss this explanation based on the 
findings of the empirical analysis. In the case of Smart Borders and Maternity Leave, 
we can presume from the data that the chances for negotiation success in the case 
of the new proposals are significantly higher as well as the types of substantive 
changes to the proposal. The negotiations on Smart Borders have successfully 
passed the agenda-setting and the position-taking stages and the co-legislators have 
now entered trilogues. The strategies used by the different actors indicate that the 
second proposal will be much closer to the preferences of the legislators and 
therefore have greater chances of resulting in agreement. The replacement package 
for Maternity Leave was only been submitted in late April and discussions have 
started in mid- to late May, therefore it is too early to say whether the position-taking 
stage will be passed this time. Should both Gender Quota and the replacement of 
Maternity Leave end up in failure even after repeated negotiation rounds, it would 
indicate that the dynamics between policy areas are indeed quite different and that 
factors like the level of integration play a more important role than currently assumed. 
 
More research on intra-institutional processes which further opens the black-boxes of 
Council, Parliament, and especially the Commission, might bring about more 
information on strategic intent and mechanisms. This could be done through more 
interviews or even participant observation. More research on dynamics within the 
institutions would verify who dictates and dominates the blame framing game. It is 
very likely that bigger and more powerful member states fulfill this role. Research on 
intra-institutional processes should encompass relais actors and focus on their 
influence in terms of avoiding failure, especially the Council Presidency and the 
Parliament negotiating team, to evaluate whether there is a general indication of 
relais actors being crucial for the resolving of deadlock and consensus-building after 
failure.  
 
Generally, there is a problem of proving the validity of the proposed explanations or 
determining a preferred one based on a small set of cases (Bennett and Checkel, 
2014). It is difficult to determine which type of action actors have actually preferred, 
when inferring post-hoc, because actors placed in a strategic context have an 
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incentive to conceal or misrepresent their actions and preferences or the researcher 
might have a tendency of misconstruing the evidence to fit the preferred 
explanation.   
Related to this, the problem of generalizability of the theoretical framework remains. 
The empirical analysis and comparison of the four different cases show that the 
nature of conflict, reasons for deadlock and success and the conditions and 
mechanisms of success and failure are quite specific to the case, that is if they are 
looked at in their entirety, without prescinding or overly reducing complexity with the 
use of proxies for key concepts. Looking cross-sectionally rather than longitudinally 
and only comparing a small number of cases is not sufficient to draw definite 
conclusions about whether or not policy failure is strategic or due to other elements, 
which have not yet been included in the model.  
Other factors, which would need to be considered are the following: the degree of 
policy integration, longstanding and extensive the negotiation experience of the 
legislative institutions and the degree to which member states support integration in 
the first place (Wallace, Polland and Young, 2015; Laursen, 2012). Both explanations 
do not, however, fully exclude each other, since it is also possible that for some 
policy areas the shadow of the future is longer and repetitive games have more 
instances of failure over a longer period. Giving and taking in negotiations at a given 
point in time might be determined by and linked to previous negotiations, or even 
future ones. This makes it difficult to assess dynamics in case-based research with a 
rather short time frame and a limited scope.  
 
As for external influences, it would be required to include the influence of 
stakeholders outside of the institutions, interest groups or other stakeholders might 
have a decisive impact on the course of negotiations, which cannot be captured by 
the current actor framework (Klüver, 2013; Dür, 2008). There is ample research 
demonstrating the influence of stakeholders and interest groups on the Commission, 
as well as member state governments and the members of the European Parliament 
(Aspinwall and Greenwood, 2013). 
One step further to including a longer time horizon would be to explain the policy 
process entirely through path-dependence, where negotiation success and failure are 
purely the result of experience and tradition of policy integration, rather than actor 
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strategies and choices in individual negotiations (Saurugger, 2013). In this case 
actors and their strategies in individual negotiations would hardly matter, because 
failure or success would be predetermined by other external factors and prior to the 
negotiation process. 
  
On the bargaining side, there is also an alternative explanation, rather than being 
conceived of as a strategic game of framing deadlock and failure, negotiation 
processes could also be explained as an endless series of joint decision traps 
(Scharpf, 2006), meaning that failure might simply be the result of a zero-sum 
bargaining game, where actors were unable to reach a unanimous decision based on 
a lowest common denominator compromise (Tsebelis, 1990).   
8.4 Implications for process research: empirical limitations and prospects 
 
Regarding the explanation of the failure from a process perspective, there is the 
remaining issue of disentangling rationality and socialization in actor behavior. 
Ultimately, with the data available and purely observational studies, it is not possible 
to determine whether a result is caused by strategic action, normative processes or 
other structural factors. Still, we argue that strategic considerations and social context 
go hand in hand. Actors operate in the Brussels bubble, but it doesn’t eliminate 
concerns about national positions or discourage actors from pursuing maximal 
benefits from a negotiation. A related problem is that of distinguishing strategies from 
path dependence and learning effects. It remains difficult to  pinpoint whether a 
particular condition or mechanism was at the origin of success or failure, since 
negotiations cannot be separated from previous and successive ones, a previous 
negotiation can have an effect on the following one or actors can project themselves 
into the future and make choices based on what they expect to happen in the future. 
As already discussed for each individual case, we can observe that it is not possible 
to definitely confirm or disconfirm any of the models of failure with the data available. 
The stages at which the negotiations of the 4 cases currently are, do noi allow for the 
expression of a definitive preference for either of the causal mechanisms and models 
presented above. More comparative research, including archival research on older 
closed cases, where it is easier to judge whether negotiations are continued and 
several rounds lead to success, or whether there are indicators for activism with the 
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proposals being permanently discontinued due to either or both of the co-legislators 
rejecting it 
In the empirical analysis, intra-institutional dynamics have been partly black-boxed 
and other potential external influences might have been disregarded. Black-boxing of 
intra-institutional dynamics in the Council and the Parliament makes it difficult to 
understand actor strategies that are linked to changes within the institutions, such as 
the reshuffling in the Parliament from the 2009 to the 2014 Parliament, which has 
affected polarization and coalition dynamics and so on (Finke, 2016; Finke, 2017). 
Black-boxing of processes within the Commission miss out on potential changes in 
the policy formulation dynamics from the Barroso to the Juncker Commission in 
terms of DG arrangements, decision-making dynamics and agenda for policy 
formulation (Nugent and Rhinard, 2015). 
Qualitative process research in particular faces difficulties, when it comes to 
disentangling stages of negotiation, because the transitions between stages of 
negotiation are quite fluent in terms of conflict management and consensus-building 
and don’t necessarily correspond to the quite neatly distinguished stages of formal 
decision-making. Similarly, it is challenging to separate issues and policy areas in the 
EU. All negotiations are somehow connected, as similar actors are participating and 
mobilizing their networks across issue and policy areas.  
Empirically, this type of research faces several operationalization and measurement 
problems. Firstly there is the problem of accurately conceptualizing and measuring 
strategies, of differentiating between what actors preconceive and plan and what they 
decide upon ad hoc is as difficult as drawing the line between what is a rational 
decision and what happens due to socialization and norm effects (Saurugger, 2013). 
Therefore it is a challenge for congruence research to credibly argue where a 
strategic mechanism can be observed and whether it has really been the key factor in 
bringing about the outcome (Beach and Pedersen, 2011). This is further complicated 
by the method of data collection, as interviews are prone to bias and ex-post 
rationalization (Tansey, 2007). Interviews are perhaps not the best method to infer 
strategies and process dynamics, participant observation would be preferable, but 
that is seldom possible for researchers, especially for highly sensitive and 
controversial issues 
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Case study methods also run the risk of omitting variables or overemphasizing 
particular factors due to limited number of observations. As discussed before, there 
are a number of factors surrounding negotiation that might be overlooked by focusing 
on actors and their strategic interactions. Also small-n research runs the risk of over-
emphasizing certain factors, in this case especially the role of particular actors, 
strategic mechanisms and conditions (Brady and Collier, 2000; Bennett and Checkel, 
2014).  
Ultimately, it is not possible to draw conclusions about general trends. The limited 
number of cases makes it difficult to tell whether the conditions and mechanisms 
found can be extrapolated to other cases. It could be that the selected cases are 
outliers. It might also be that extending the number of cases reveals conditions and 
mechanisms that have not appeared or were negligible in these 4 cases, and they 
might turn out to be crucial in explaining deadlock and failure. There is also the 
question of issue specificity and idiosyncrasies of issue-areas. The conflict 
constellations and negotiation styles might partly be specific to the issues. A balance 
has to be struck between assuming a singularity of policy areas in terms of strategies 
and conditions and over-emphasizing the comparable elements and too quickly 
assuming that there might be generalizable dynamics. 
Part of the limited explanatory power comes from the difficulty of assessing and 
confirming strategic intention with the observational data available. Ultimately, 
observational data through documents and interviews can only infer post-hoc and 
from the outside, which makes it difficult to answer the question of whether the 
Commission is actually strategically planning a failure game and setting proposals up 
for failure, or if all three institutions are making the most of failure by staging a blame 
exchange. Assuming bounded rationality helps circumvent some issues, but it does 
not enable the researcher to actually infer strategies from observational data.  
Furthermore, it is equally conceivable that actors are not (boundedly) rational, but 
driven by norms and worldviews, which is partly reflected in the activism model. If 
actors are not rational, the process of failure cannot be explained with models of 
strategic action, and there would have to be other approaches, such as the analysis 
of socialization and norm effects or the use of heuristics in decision-making. In a 
norm or socialization-driven approach failure would be the result of unsuccessful 
socialization and norm transmission processes, whereas in a more ad hoc process 
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approach, success and failure would depend on process performance and the actors’ 
ability to cope with the negotiation process itself. In this case, models of failure would 
rather focus on tracing socialization process and identifying different mechanisms of 
socializing and determining where and why they fail. This, however, demands an 
entirely different ontological and epistemological approach to policy-making and 
conceptualizations of agency, which run into measurement, validity and reliability 
problems when it comes to explaining decision-making processes in the EU 
(Heisenberg, 2005; Schneider, 2008).  
 
Relying on how actors frame their actions and choices and the perceptions that are 
reflected in documents, media reports and interviews Further research framing, 
especially on how actors justify choices and deal with gains and losses in and after 
the process could help circumvent the problem of observing strategic mechanisms. 
This research would investigate the complexity of framing and blame attribution 
processes within institutions to see who is more successful in attributing and avoiding 
blame within the three legislative institutions: it is likely that some member states are 
more successful than others in playing the blaming game, larger member states can 
be expected to accept blame attribution to enable the less successful states to 
accept losses in substance and procedure. From the perspective of framing and 
policy-making failure, more research on failed cases and negotiation processes, 
especially informal trilogues, is needed to see if there is indication that the game 
might happen in other issue and policy areas, through both cross-sectional research 
(interviews and documents) on more recent cases and longitudinal research 
(archival) on older cases (Beach and Pedersen, 2013). From the perspective of 
actors and the decision-making process, it might again be interesting to use other 
kinds of data and methods, such as participant observation and ethnography to get 
closer to the actual decision-making process and observe behavior directly. The goal 
of more framing research would be to see who is most successful with the framing 
and how effective the frames are: is the blame attribution and blame avoidance game 
actually bringing the desired result? Do actors achieve reputational gains? 
8.5 Failing forward: does the EU really deliver through strategic policy-making 
failure? 
 
From the dynamics in the four cases analyzed in this thesis, we can draw the 
following conclusions with regard to the effect of crises on EU decision-making: more 
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conflict over competences, first and foremost influence and sovereignty. Generally, 
the analysis shows that states use the crisis in different ways to exploit the EU as a 
platform for their disagreements. The supranational institutions play along, but much 
less successfully so and end up losing against a Council that has mastered the game 
of blame and fear-mongering. Secondly, there are more power-driven scrappy policy 
solutions for complex problems. The Schengen reform is a perfect example of how 
the EU wastes time on power battles between states and institutions only to end up 
with half-baked policy that does not really solve the problem at hand: improving 
border security at external borders. The new tools for evaluation do not provide for 
adequate mechanisms to improve the implementation of the Schengen acquis. The 
revision of the rules for internal border control neither solves the perceived security 
problem nor counteracts the tendency of states to act unilaterally in that area, since 
only a few years after the reform, states are again demanding a revision and also 
unilaterally initiate and prolongate border controls at internal borders, de facto 
disregarding Schengen, as it was the case in 2011. More time wasted on 
inappropriate superfluous policy. The failed Smart Borders Package is another 
perfect example for a hugely costly and only vaguely useful project: a border 
management system, which does not entirely correspond to the political needs of the 
member states in matters of security, yet also does not satisfy the technical 
requirements of well-functioning high-IT migration management. The competence 
battles between the Commission and the member states in gender equality have not 
significantly improved in the post-Lisbon setting, the Parliament has only added a 
third player to the game, whose strategic maneuvers further complicate the 
negotiation process. Both maternity leave and gender quota show that power play is 
still more important than solving inequality problems, Parliament would rather risk 
failure than downscale its demands and Council insists on circumventing binding law 
by referring to national labor market structures and the role of social partners. 
Compared to border matters, the Commission is rather weakly engaged in 
negotiations on gender equality matters and largely leaves it to Council and 
Parliament actors to sort out their differences.  
In the area of Justice and Home Affairs, we observe incomplete agreements due to 
increased pressure. The pressure on the EU to provide results in the crisis context 
caues the Council and Parliament to agree on proposals even though they are not 
elaborate or even very appropriate to respond to the problem at hand. Resistance 
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against the involvement of supranational institutions is the other important overall 
observation, this is linked to the perceived discrepancy in the Council that 
Commission and Parliament are pushing for rights and liberalization, where more 
restrictive and security-focused measures would be needed. 
In the area of Social and Employment Policy, actors’ inability to pass legislation might 
be due to a shift in attention. Social policy initiatives, in this case those related to 
gender equality, are not a top priority of governments, which is why neither the 
European Council, nor Ministers devote much attention to these topics, the problems 
are acknowledged, but there is no immediate pressure for solutions. There is also a 
general resistance against binding law. Sovereignty concerns in this area lead to 
increased conflict about the type of measure used. This is not only due to the 
involvement of EU institutions, but the choice and bindingness of legislation 
altogether.  
If the EU plays a framing game by blaming others for failure and ultimately 
circumvents the problem of transparency and accountability to the public. Lengthy 
battles over competence and procedure, year-long debates about nitty gritty details 
of policy proposals take place in highly secluded settings and are hidden behind 
mutually beneficial blame rhetoric, to the detriment of efficiency and delivery of policy 
solutions to citizens. The consensus-norm is a convenient veil for hard informal 
bargaining, the EU portrays unity to the outside and advertises the impressive 
number of first-reading agreements and the 85% of successful legislative proposals, 
but conceals the difficult strategic battles that take place behind closed doors. Lowest 
common denominator solutions are often scrappy agreements, that take place after 
actors have worn each other out in long negotiations. The EU perhaps suffers from a 
diversity and representation trap. It is possibly that there are now too many actors 
involved, too many voices at the table. This leads to unnecessarily long negotiation 
processes and produces little result. Certainly, the Parliament provides a balance to 
the intergovernmentalist Council, but the co-decision processes take an infinitely long 
amount of time and often times. In addition, the Parliament is often a power player 
striving to increase its own influence in the EU’s institutional framework, rather than 
fighting for the best possible policy solution for citizens. The Commission portrays 
itself as the savior of supranational integration and claims to respond to demands 
which arise from its continued consultation of and interaction with the public, but 
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more often than not is nothing more than another power player in the game, trying to 
maneuver the co-legislators to gain a little policy change. If we compare the amount 
of policy problems and severe challenges the EU currently faces to the output it 
produces, the result is rather disenchanting. Output involves tedious negotiation 
processes, and cumbersome administrative structures, power games and very few 
upgrades that would satisfy the demands of those hoping for deeper integration and 
a European Union that delivers to its citizens. In this regard, the failure, even if 
strategic, might actually be real failure, even if agreement has been reached.  
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Grenzkontrollen-in-EU.html 
Tagesspiegel, EU-Länder dürfen Grenzen dichtmachen: 
http://www.tagesspiegel.de/politik/schengen-reform-eu-laender-duerfen-grenzen-
dicht-machen/8276272.html 
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Zeit Online, Schengen-Reform: EU-Länder dürfen Grenzen dichtmachen: 
http://www.zeit.de/news/2013-05/30/eu-schengen-reform-eu-laender-duerfen-
grenzen-dicht-machen-30190003 
EURACTIV, EU-Parlament verabschiedet Schengen-Reform: 
https://www.euractiv.de/section/soziales-europa/news/eu-parlament-verabschiedet-
schengen-reform/ 
FAZ, EU-Staaten einig über Schengen-Reform: 
http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/europaeische-union/grenzkontrollen-als-letztes-
mittel-eu-staaten-einig-ueber-schengen-reform-11776925.html 
FAZ, Empörung im Europaparlament: http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/europaeische-
union/streit-ueber-schengen-abkommen-empoerung-im-europaparlament-
11782905.html 
TAZ online, EU-Kommission verteidigt Schengen: http://www.taz.de/!5111789/ 
Süddeutsche, EU erlaubt im Notfall wieder Grenzkontrollen: 
http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/reform-des-schengen-abkommens-eu-erlaubt-im-
notfall-wieder-grenzkontrollen-1.1684398#redirectedFromLandingpage 
FAZ, Wer darf die Grenzen kontrollieren?: 
http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/europaeische-union/eu-innenminister-wer-darf-die-
grenzen-kontrollieren-11731600.html 
Spiegel Online, Deutschland und Frankreich wollen die Grenzen abriegeln: 
http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/schengen-abkommen-berlin-und-paris-
wollen-grenzkontrollen-zurueck-a-828655.html 
Spiegel Online, Empörung über geplante Grenzkontrollen in Europa: 
http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/schengen-abkommen-fdp-ist-empoert-
ueber-plan-fuer-grenzkontrollen-a-828703.html 
The Telegraph, Italy and France to propose European border reform: 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/immigration/8472417/France-and-Italy-to-
propose-European-border-reform.html 
BBC, France and Italy push for reform of Schengen treaty: 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-13189682 
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Welt Online, Die Rückkehr der Grenzkontrolle in die Köpfe: 
https://www.welt.de/politik/ausland/article13282448/Die-Rueckkehr-der-
Grenzkontrolle-in-die-Koepfe.html 
Tagesspiegel, Brüssel will Grenzkontrollen im Schengen-Raum erleichtern: 
http://www.tagesspiegel.de/politik/fluechtlingswelle-bruessel-will-grenzkontrollen-im-
schengen-raum-erleichtern/4133746.html 
EU ‘smart borders’ system may fingerprint US visitors: 
http://www.politico.eu/article/eu-smart-borders-system-may-fingerprint-us-visitors/ 
Plan to modernise EU border controls: http://www.politico.eu/article/plan-to-
modernise-eu-border-controls/ 
EU to tighten border controls in wake of attacks: http://www.politico.eu/article/eu-
agrees-to-tighten-border-controls/ 
US travellers set for EU biometric dragnet: https://euobserver.com/justice/127719 
EU ministers to discuss 'smart borders': https://euobserver.com/justice/130600 
Virtual biometric frontier awaits travellers to EU: 
https://euobserver.com/justice/127777 
France wants biometric data from all travellers at EU borders, including EU nationals: 
https://arstechnica.co.uk/tech-policy/2015/10/france-wants-biometric-data-from-all-
travellers-at-eu-borders-including-eu-nationals/ 
Interior ministers divided on EU border controls: 
https://euobserver.com/justice/114604 
EU countries say 'No' to commission powers on border control: 
https://euobserver.com/justice/113606 
Commission pushes for 'europeanisation' of border controls: 
https://euobserver.com/justice/113626 
EU virtual border scheme based on 'creative' figures: 
https://euobserver.com/justice/121923 
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The European Journal, Margarida Vasconcelos: EC wants final word on border 
controls: http://www.europeanfoundation.org/margarida-vasconcelos-the-european-
commission-wants-to-have-final-word-on-border-controls/ 
Smart borders: Member States seek to make law enforcement access compatible 
with data retention ruling: http://www.statewatch.org/news/2014/aug/lea-ees-drd1.htm 
Smart borders: "no sufficient evidence" to justify law enforcement access to proposed 
Entry/Exit System travel database: http://www.statewatch.org/news/2014/sep/smart-
borders-com.html 
Member States reassert support for law enforcement access to proposed new 
Entry/Exit System: http://www.statewatch.org/news/2013/oct/ees-lea-access.htm 
Smart borders: European Commission and Member States at odds over digitising 
passport stamps: http://www.statewatch.org/news/2015/jul/eu-passport-stamps.htm 
Member States want access to the proposed Entry/Exit System for law enforcement 
and counter-terrorism agencies: http://www.statewatch.org/news/2013/may/11eu-
entry-exit-system.html 
EU: France says protect free movement with mass fingerprinting, face scans and 
entry-exit logs: http://database.statewatch.org/article.asp?aid=35512 
EU-Pläne zur Grenzüberwachung "verletzen Grundrechte": 
http://www.zeit.de/digital/datenschutz/2013-03/schaar-smart-border 
Smart Borders: EU macht Grenzen elektronisch dicht: 
http://diepresse.com/home/ausland/eu/4749935/Smart-Borders_EU-macht-Grenzen-
elektronisch-dicht 
Parlamentarier rebellieren gegen Finger-Check: 
http://www.spiegel.de/netzwelt/netzpolitik/eu-parlamentarier-rebellieren-gegen-smart-
borders-a-929359.html 
Zur Abschreckung: EU baut elektronische Mauern gegen Flüchtlinge: 
http://www.focus.de/digital/smart-borders-projekt-smarte-harte-grenzen-so-schottet-
sich-die-eu-elektronisch-von-fluechtlingen-ab_id_5008112.html 
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Smart Borders: Deutschland und Frankreich wollen an Grenzen stärker überwachen: 
https://www.heise.de/newsticker/meldung/Smart-Borders-Deutschland-und-
Frankreich-wollen-an-Grenzen-staerker-ueberwachen-3044241.html 
Smart Borders: Reisende sollen sich mit elektronischen Pässen anmelden: 
https://www.heise.de/newsticker/meldung/Smart-Borders-Reisende-sollen-sich-mit-
elektronischen-Paessen-anmelden-1821573.html 
Smart Borders: EU-Kommission beschließt elektronische Grenzüberwachung: 
https://www.heise.de/newsticker/meldung/Smart-Borders-EU-Kommission-
beschliesst-elektronische-Grenzueberwachung-1813531.html 
Smart Borders: EU-Kommission nimmt neuen Anlauf zur elektronischen 
Grenzkontrolle: https://www.heise.de/newsticker/meldung/Smart-Borders-EU-
Kommission-nimmt-neuen-Anlauf-zur-elektronischen-Grenzkontrolle-3163940.html 
Milliarden zur "Abschreckung illegaler Einwanderer": 
https://www.heise.de/tp/features/Milliarden-zur-Abschreckung-illegaler-Einwanderer-
3390101.html 
Zeit Online, EU-Pläne zur Grenzüberwachung “verletzen Grundrechte”: 
http://www.zeit.de/digital/datenschutz/2013-03/schaar-smart-border 
Spiegel Online, EU-Prlamentarier rebelllieren gegen Finger-Check: 
http://www.spiegel.de/netzwelt/netzpolitik/eu-parlamentarier-rebellieren-gegen-smart-
borders-a-929359.html 
Welt Online, Datenschützer warnen vor digitalen Grenzkontrollen: 
https://www.welt.de/regionales/hessen/article143362506/Datenschuetzer-warnen-
vor-digitalen-Grenzkontrollen.html 
EURACTIV, Schengen: Smart Borders or Big Brother?: 
https://www.euractiv.de/section/gesundheit-und-verbraucherschutz/news/schengen-
smart-borders-oder-big-brother/ 
EURACTIV, EU unveils e-border scheme amid ‘Big Brother’ warnings: 
https://www.euractiv.com/section/justice-home-affairs/news/eu-unveils-e-border-
scheme-amid-big-brother-warnings/ 
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EUObserver, France wants all travelling EU nationals fingerprinted: 
https://euobserver.com/justice/130622 
EUObserver, EU reconsider anti-terrorism response: 
https://euobserver.com/justice/132782 
EUObserver, ‘Virtual borders’ scheme to track every non-EU citizen: 
https://euobserver.com/priv-immigration/121532 
EuObserver, Virtual biometric frontier awaits travellers to EU: 
https://euobserver.com/justice/127777 
EUObserver, France and Commission push to fortify Schengen: 
https://euobserver.com/justice/131165 
EuObserver, EU agrees on Schengen checks for all: 
https://euobserver.com/justice/131202 
Tagesspiegel, Die Grenzsicherung bringt nichts. Null: 
http://www.tagesspiegel.de/politik/30-jahre-schengen-abkommen-die-
grenzsicherung-bringt-nichts-null-/11929206.html  
New York Times, Paris attacks: France to call for effective suspension of Schengen 
open borders: 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/france/11998301/Paris-attacks-
France-to-call-for-effective-suspension-of-Schengen-open-borders.html 
Politico, EU to tighten border controls in the wake of attacks: 
https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-agrees-to-tighten-border-controls/ 
Tagesspiegel, Der Preis der europäischen Grenzschutzpolitik: 
http://www.tagesspiegel.de/meinung/tote-fluechtlinge-im-mittelmeer-vor-lampedusa-
der-preis-der-europaeischen-grenzschutzpolitik/11367284.html 
TAZ, Mit dem Fingerabdruck nach Europa: http://www.taz.de/!5072281/ 
EURACTIV, Brussels gears up for Maternity Leave II:  
https://www.euractiv.com/section/social-europe-jobs/news/brussels-gears-up-for-
maternity-leave-ii/ 
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EURACTIV, Commission prepares to axe Maternity Leave Directive:  
https://www.euractiv.com/section/social-europe-jobs/news/commission-prepares-to-
axe-maternity-leave-directive/ 
Politico, Maternity leave’s pregnant pause:  
http://www.politico.eu/article/europe-bailout-women-jourova-employment-equality/ 
BBC, Euro-MPs back 20 weeks maternity leave:  
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-11582112 
The Independent, EU Maternity Leave plans rejected:  
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/eu-maternity-leave-plans-rejected-
2299051.html 
The Telegraph, Maternity Leave would cost taxpayers billions:  
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/8007287/Maternity-leave-extension-would-
cost-taxpayers-billions.html 
EURACTIV, Draft EU law on maternity leave to be scrapped as ‘red tape’:  
https://www.euractiv.com/section/social-europe-jobs/news/draft-eu-law-on-maternity-
leave-to-be-scrapped-as-red-tape/ 
EURACTIV, MEP’s last attempt to save maternity leave extension:  
https://www.euractiv.com/section/social-europe-jobs/news/meps-last-attempt-to-
save-maternity-leave-extension/ 
The Independent, Maternity and Paternity Leave across the EU:  
http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/maternity-and-paternity-leave-across-the-eu-
2112229.html 
Financial Times: EU directive would not impose mandatory gender quotas: 
https://www.ft.com/content/4c9d5772-7894-11e3-831c-00144feabdc0 
Financial Times: Europe presses UK to increase female director numbers: 
https://www.ft.com/content/1e222b9e-ce23-11e4-86fc-00144feab7de 
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Financial Times: EU pushes 40% quota for women on boards: 
https://www.ft.com/content/65f494e6-f5e7-11e1-a6c2-00144feabdc0 
Financial Times: Quotas for female board members look like a toad too far: 
https://www.ft.com/content/e06ac8bc-784a-11e3-831c-00144feabdc0 
Financial Times: Are gender quotas needed?: https://www.ft.com/content/d65795f2-
0de6-11e5-9a65-00144feabdc0 
The Telegraph: Britain seeks to halt EU gender quota plan:  
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/eu/12034462/Britain-seeks-to-
halt-EU-gender-quota-plan.html 
Spiegel Online, European Commission calls for quotas:  
http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/european-commission-moves-towards-
approving-board-gender-quotas-a-867181.html 
EURACTIV: EU to go for 40% gender quota on company boards:  
http://www.euractiv.com/section/justice-home-affairs/news/eu-to-go-for-40-gender-
quota-on-company-boards/ 
Spiegel Online, Germany to lobby against EU Gender Quota: 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/germany-to-lobby-against-eu-gender-
quota-a-887174.html 
EURACTIV, Gender Equality and Environment laws on business lobby hit list:  
https://www.euractiv.com/section/social-europe-jobs/news/gender-equality-and-
environment-laws-on-business-lobby-hit-list/ 
The Guardian, Germany passes gender quota legislation for boardrooms:  
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/mar/06/germany-gender-quota-
legislation-boardroom-law-women 
New York Times, Germany sets Gender Quota in Boardrooms:  
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/07/world/europe/german-law-requires-more-
women-on-corporate-boards.html 
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New York Times, EU considers quotas for women on boardrooms:   
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/05/business/global/eu-considers-quotas-for-women-
in-boardrooms.html 
The Economist, The spread of gender quotas for company boards:  
http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2014/03/economist-explains-14 
BBC, Germany agrees law for women on company boards:  
http://www.bbc.com/news/business-30208400 
New York Times, European proposal presses for women to join boards:  
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/04/business/global/eu-official-proposes-sanctions-if-
companies-fail-on-gender-quotas.html 
EUObserver, Eu Commissioner ‘up for fight’ on gender quota: 
https://euobserver.com/economic/117715 
BBC, EUropean Union postpones women quota on boards plan:  
http://www.bbc.com/news/business-20039540 
New York Times, Split by Brexit, Merkel and May diverge on wider issues, too:  
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/05/world/europe/brexit-theresa-may-angela-
merkel.html?_r=0 
EURACTIV, Reding pushes 40% female quote on corporate boards:  
https://www.euractiv.com/section/social-europe-jobs/news/reding-pushes-40-female-
quota-on-corporate-boards/ 
EUObserver, Eu Commission to ‘smash’ glass ceiling on gender:  
https://euobserver.com/social/118197 
BBC, EU defends women-on-boards plans:   
http://www.bbc.com/news/business-20322317 
EURACTIV, EU to go for 40% Gender Quota on Company Boards:  
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https://www.euractiv.com/section/justice-home-affairs/news/eu-to-go-for-40-gender-
quota-on-company-boards/ 
EURACTIV, EU seen as dragging its feet on gender equality:  
https://www.euractiv.com/section/social-europe-jobs/news/eu-seen-as-dragging-its-
feet-on-gender-equality/ 
EURACTIV, Gender Quotas: Bad for businesses or ‘necessary evil’?: 
http://www.euractiv.com/section/social-europe-jobs/news/gender-quotas-bad-for-
business-or-a-necessary-evil/ 
EURACTIV, UK threatens firms with gender quotas as women’s appointments fall:  
https://www.euractiv.com/section/uk-europe/news/uk-threatens-firms-with-gender-
quotas-as-women-s-appointments-fall/ 
EURACTIV, Gender equality and environment laws on business lobby hit list:  
https://www.euractiv.com/section/social-europe-jobs/news/gender-equality-and-
environment-laws-on-business-lobby-hit-list/ 
Spiegel,Gender Quota vote tests German coalition:  
http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/gender-quota-vote-in-germany-tests-
coalition-solidarity-a-894417.html 
The Guardian, Germany passes gender quota legislation for the boardroom:  
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/mar/06/germany-gender-quota-
legislation-boardroom-law-women 
X. Annexes  
10.1 Expert Interview guide examples  
 
The examples include questions from different data collection rounds over time and guides 
for different cases and different institutions (Permanent Representations, EP, and 
Commission), different types of interviews (face-to-face/telephone) in different languages 
(English, French, German):  
 
1) Schengen Governance Package, telephone interview Council, JHA counsellor, 2/2/16 
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2) Smart Borders, telephone interview, JHA counsellor, 1/2/16  
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3) Maternity Leave & Gender Quota, face-to-face interview in the EP, MEP, 6/12/16  
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4) Maternity Leave & Gender Quota, face-to-face interview in the Commission, Head of 
Unit, 9/12/16 
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10.2 List of interviews  
 
 
 
Interview 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Interview 2 DG Home     
Interview 3 
 
 
 
Deputy Head of Unit  
 
  
Interview 4 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
Interview 5    
Interview 6 
 LIBE committee  
 
  
MEP for the EPP group,  
  
Interview 7  EP  
Interview 8 
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
Interview 9   
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 Commission DG Home  
Interview 10    JHA counsellor, PermRep Cyprus  
Interview 11 
 
 
 
  
JHA counsellor, PermRep Netherlands 
Interview 12 
 
 
 
  
JHA counsellor, PermRep Austria  
Interview 13 
 
 
 
 
  
JHA counsellor, PermRep Luxembourg  
Interview 14 
 
 
 
 
JHA counsellor, PermRep France 
Interview 15    JHA counsellor, PermRep Denmark 
Interview 16    JHA counsellor, PermRep France 
Interview 17 
 
 
 
 
 
Member of Parliament, Former Minister 
of the Interior  
Interview 18 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Ministère de l'Intérieur  
Interview 19 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Ministère de l'Intérieur  
Interview 20 
 
 
  
 
 
Interview 21    L.I.B.E committee EP,   
Interview 22   eu-LISA 
Interview 23   PermRep Germany  
Interview 24  Permanent representation Belgium 
Interview 25   Permanent Representation Poland 
Interview 26   EP 
Interview 27    Ministry of the Interior, Belgium 
Interview 28    DG Home Commission 
Interview 29 MEP, S&D, Belgium  
 
 
  
Interview 30   
 
 DG Employment 
Interview 31 MEP, EPP, Germany   
Interview 32  Perm Rep Slovenia 
Interview 33   PermRep Sweden 
Interview 34  PermRep Netherlands 
Interview 35    Perm Rep Slovakia  
Interview 36   Perm Rep Slovakia  
Interview 37   Perm Rep Netherlands 
Interview 38  Perm Rep Belgium  
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Interview 39  Perm Rep Luxembourg 
Interview 40  Perm Rep Poland 
Interview 41  Perm Rep Denmark  
Interview 42  Perm Rep Ireland  
Interview 43  PermRep Romania  
Interview 44   Perm Rep UK 
Interview 45  Perm Rep Sweden 
Interview 46  Perm Rep Sweden 
Interview 47  Perm Rep Finland  
Interview 48  Perm Rep Portugal 
Interview 49  Perm Rep Slovenia 
Interview 50  Perm Rep Estonia 
Interview 51  Perm Rep Lithuania 
Interview 52  Perm Rep Cyprus 
Interview 53  
Head of Department of Social Affairs in 
Malta for EU 
Interview 54  
Head of Department of Social Affairs in 
Malta for EU 
Interview 55 
 
 
 
Directorate General Justice and 
Consumers 
 
Interview 56 
 
 
 
Directorate General Justice and 
Consumers 
 
Interview 57 Social Affairs Counselor,   Perm Rep Finland  
Interview 58 Social Affairs Counselor,   Perm Rep Finland  
Interview 59  Perm Rep Spain 
Interview 60  Perm Rep Lithuania 
Interview 61  Perm Rep UK 
 
 
10.3 Data analysis: framing and data analysis catalogues for MaxQDA 
 
Sources used to compile the catalogues: Daviter, 2011; Verloo, 2005 
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10.4 Treaty of Lisbon: article 70 TFEU and article 77 TFEU  
 
Art. 70 TFEU Art. 77 TFEU 
“Without prejudice to Articles 258, 259 and 
260, the Council may, on a proposal from 
the Commission, adopt measures laying 
down the arrangements whereby Member 
States, in collaboration with the 
Commission, conduct objective and impartial 
evaluation of the implementation of the 
Union policies referred to in this Title by 
Member States’ authorities, in particular in 
order to facilitate full application of the 
principle of mutual recognition. The 
European Parliament and national 
Parliaments shall be informed of the content 
and results of the evaluation.” 
“1. The Union shall develop a policy with a 
view to: 
(a) ensuring the absence of any controls on 
persons, whatever their nationality, when 
crossing internal borders; 
(b) carrying out checks on persons and 
efficient monitoring of the crossing of 
external borders; 
(c) the gradual introduction of an integrated 
management system for external borders. 
2. For the purposes of paragraph 1, the 
European Parliament and the Council, 
acting in accordance with the ordinary 
legislative procedure, shall adopt measures 
concerning: 
(a) the common policy on visas and other 
short-stay residence permits; 
(b) the checks to which persons crossing 
external borders are subject; 
(c) the conditions under which nationals of 
third countries shall have the freedom to 
travel within the Union for a short period; 
(d) any measure necessary for the gradual 
establishment of an integrated management 
system for external borders; 
(e) the absence of any controls on persons, 
whatever their nationality, when crossing 
internal borders. 
3. If action by the Union should prove 
necessary to facilitate the exercise of the 
right referred to in Article 20(2)(a), and if the 
Treaties have not provided the necessary 
powers, the Council, acting in accordance 
  
371 
 
with a special legislative procedure, may 
adopt provisions concerning passports, 
identity cards, residence permits or any 
other such document. The Council shall act 
unanimously after consulting the European 
Parliament. 
4. This Article shall not affect the 
competence of the Member States 
concerning the geographical demarcation of 
their borders, in accordance with 
international law.” 
 
10.5 Salience tables, graphs and documents  
 
Summary of analysis 
of media 
reports/opinion polls to 
determine issue-
salience   
(sources: 
Eurobarometer, media 
data see document 
bibliography) 
Schengen Smart Borders Maternity Leave Gender Quota 
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Relative salience 
policy area 
(compared) 
Home Affairs get more media attention and are 
more controversially discussed in European 
and national media: 74% of Europeans 
consider migration to be a key issue for EU 
intervention and 82% say the same about 
terrorism 
Gender equality measures get less media 
attention and are less perceived as 
important by the public: in comparison, 55% 
consider equal treatment of men and women 
to be an important issue for EU intervention, 
also people tend to consider that national 
interventions and non-legislative measures 
are better 
Relative salience of 
the issue (compared) 
Schengen is of utmost 
importance to people, 
but public opinion is 
divided on whether or 
not to increase security 
through border 
controls or protect free 
movement: both rank 
very highly and have 
high approval rates for 
EU intervention 
  
Changes: from 2011 to 
2016, people attach 
more importance to the 
protection of free 
movement:  
2011: 67% 
2016: 79% 
Old proposal Less 
important than the 
new proposal, fewer 
media reports, no 
reports of public 
opinion polls on the 
matter: the focus was 
not on security and 
borders, but on 
migration more 
generally (legal and 
illegal migration, not 
refugees and asylum) 
  
New proposal much 
more discussed by 
national and European 
media: 71% of the 
people in Europe think 
that the EU should 
take more measures 
on external border 
protection, 61% judge 
current measures to 
be insufficient 
People care about 
work-life-balance 
in terms of 
flexibility and 
provision of child-
care, not 
necessarily fixed 
maternity leave 
Gender equality 
measures on equal 
representation of 
women in key positions 
is relatively more 
important in the public 
opinion polls 
  
Gender Equality Public 
consultation in 2015: 
voluntary measures and 
targets seem to appeal 
to the public, but 
mandatory quotas are 
not among the top 
desired measures 
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Source: Special Eurobarometer On Internal Security, 83.2, 2015 
 
 
Source: Schengen, Free Movement and External Borders: Public opinion on European  
Competences (2016) 
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Source: Schengen, Free Movement and External Borders: Public opinion on European  
Competences (2016) 
 
 
Source: Special Eurobarometer On Internal Security, 83.2, 2015 
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Source: Gender Equality and EU competences, Special Eurobarometer 428, 2014-2015 
 
 
Source: Gender Equality and EU competences, Special Eurobarometer 428, 2014-2015 
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Source: Gender Equality and EU competences, Special Eurobarometer 428, 2014-2015 
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Source: Public consultation On Gender Equality, Commission, 2015 
 
 
Source: Public consultation On Gender Equality, Commission, 2015 
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Source: Public consultation On Gender Equality, Commission, 2015 
 
10.6 Council document access request: response letter  
 
 
Brussels, 13 June 2017 
Ms Isabel Winnwa 
Email: isabel.winnwa@uni-bamberg.de 
Ref. 17/1005-ld/rh/jj 
Request made on: 25.04.2017 
Deadline extension: 18.05.2017 
Dear Ms Winnwa, 
Thank you for your request for access to documents of the Council of the European Union.389 
                                                          
389  The General Secretariat of the Council has examined your request on the basis of the applicable rules: 
Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council regarding public access to 
European Parliament, Council and Commission documents (OJ L 145, 31.5.2001, p. 43) and the specific 
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Please find attached the documents you requested: 
 
14310/11  
10051/12 
5815/14 
14026/15 
14026/15 ADD1 
14026/15 ADD2 
13270/15 
13894/13 
12531/15 
13225/14 
11337/14 
10720/14 
12860/13 
16279/13 
14852/13 
14046/13 
14046/13 COR1 
12322/13 
12322/13 COR1 
12443/13 
11584/13 
11584/13 REV1 
10362/13 
6569/13 
6569/13 REV1 
 
Please find attached partially accessible version of document 8743/15.390  
 
However, I regret to inform you that full access to this document cannot be given for the 
reasons set out below. 
 
Document 8743/15 of 19 May 2015 is a note from the Presidency to the Working Party on 
Frontiers/Mixed Committee (EU-Iceland/Liechtenstein/Norway/Switzerland) on Draft 
Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing an Entry/Exit System 
(EES) to register entry and exit data of third country nationals crossing the external borders 
of the Member States of the European Union - Access for law enforcement purposes. It 
contains concrete information about the fight with illegal immigration, terrorism and serious 
crime in Member States.  
 
Full release of the information contained in this document would reveal to third parties 
sensitive details of concrete cases. This would affect the efficiency of the European Union's 
action to combat illegal immigration, terrorism and serious crime in Member States. 
 
Disclosure of the document would therefore undermine the protection of the public interest as 
regards public security. As a consequence, the General secretariat has to refuse full access 
to this document.391 
 
I regret to inform you that access to documents 7230/13, 8020/13 ADD1, 13191/13 and 
6874/17 cannot be given for the reasons set out below. 
 
Documents  7230/13 of 7 March 2013, 13191/13 of 2 September 2013 and 6874/17 of 8 
March 2017 are notes from the General Secretariat to the Working Party on Social Questions 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
provisions concerning public access to Council documents set out in Annex II to the Council's Rules of 
Procedure (Council Decision No 2009/937/EU, OJ L 325, 11.12.2009, p. 35). 
390  Article 4(6) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. 
391 Article 4(1)(a), first indent, of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.  
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on Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on improving the 
gender balance among non-executive directors of companies listed on stock exchanges and 
related measures. These  documents concern an issue which is still under discussion within 
the preparatory bodies of the Council. 
 
The notes give details of progress made, contain drafting suggestions prepared by the 
Presidency and identify the difficulties that still need to be addressed before the Council can 
reach a political agreement.  
 
Release to the public of the information contained in these notes would affect the negotiating 
process and diminish the chances of the Council reaching an agreement. 
 
Disclosure of the documents at this stage would therefore seriously undermine the decision 
making-process of the Council. As a consequence, the General secretariat has to refuse 
access to these documents at this stage.392  
 
Having examined the context in which the documents were drafted and the current state of 
play on this matter, on balance the General Secretariat of the Council could not identify any 
evidence suggesting an overriding public interest in their disclosure. 
 
We have also looked into the possibility of releasing parts of the documents.393  However, as 
the information contained in the documents forms an inseparable whole, the General 
Secretariat is unable to give partial access at this stage. 
 
I would also like to inform you that once the legislative act in question is adopted, and taking 
into account the provisions of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001, the documents and any other 
legislative document relating to this legislative act will be made available to the public. 
 
Document 8020/13 ADD1 of 11 June 2013 is an Opinion of the Legal Service - Addendum 
on Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on improving the 
gender balance among non-executive directors of companies listed on stock exchanges and 
related measures - Legal basis. 
 
The decision-making process in question in currently ongoing. Moreover the discussions are 
sensitive and complex. The issue analysed in the opinion forms an important part of the 
basis for the discussions. Disclosure of the legal advice would adversely affect the 
negotiations by impeding internal discussions of the Council on the proposal and would 
hence the risk compromising the capacity of the Council to reach an agreement on the 
dossier and thus undermine the decision-making process pursuant to Article 4(3) 
of  Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 
                                                          
392 Article 4(3), first subparagraph, of regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. 
393 Article 4(6) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. 
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2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission document 
394. 
 
Moreover, the legal advice covered by this opinion deals with issues which are contentious 
and where the legal position remains to be clarified. The legal advice is therefore particularly 
sensitive. 
 
Disclosure of such a document would therefore undermine the protection of legal advice 
under Article 4(2), second indent, of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. It would make known to 
the public an internal opinion of the Legal Service, intended for the members of the Council. 
The possibility that the legal advice in question be disclosed to the public may lead the 
Council to display caution when requesting similar written opinions from its Legal Service. 
Moreover, disclosure of the legal advice could also affect the ability of the Legal Service to 
effectively defend decisions taken by the Council before the Union courts. Lastly, the Legal 
Service could come under external pressure which could affect the way in which legal advice 
is drafted and hence prejudice the possibility of the Legal Service to express its views free 
from external influences. 
 
As regards the existence of an overriding public interest in disclosure under Regulation (EC) 
No 1049/2001, the General Secretariat considers that, on balance, the principle of 
transparency which underlies the Regulation would not, in the present case, prevail over any 
such interests so as to justify disclosure of the documents. 
                                                          
394 OJ L 145, 31.5.2001, P. 43 
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Finally, we have examined the possibility of granting partial access to the document for which 
access is denied. However, partial access is not possible, as the requested document is fully 
covered by the exceptions provided for in Article 4(2) and 4(3) of Regulation (EC) 
No 1049/2001. 
 
In the view of the foregoing, the General Secretariat of the Council is unable to grant you 
access to this document. 
 
You can ask the Council to review this decision within 15 working days of receiving this reply 
(confirmatory application).395 
 
Yours sincerely, 
 
Fernando PAULINO PEREIRA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
395  Article 7(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. 
Council documents on confirmatory applications are made available to the public.  Pursuant to data 
protection rules at EU level (Regulation (EC) No 45/2001), if you make a confirmatory application your 
name will only appear in related documents if you have given your explicit consent. 
